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NOTES 



ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 



BY 



WILLIAM EDWAKD JELF, B.D., 

LATE STUDENT OE CHRIST CHURCH. 



OXFORD, 

AND 377, STRAND, LONDON; 
JOHN HENRY and JAMES PARKER. 

M DCCC LVI. 










PRINTED BT MESSRS. PARKER, CORN-MARKET, OXFORD. 



REV. ROBERT SCOTT, D.D., 

MASTER OF BALLIOL AND PREBENDARY OF EXETER, 
SOMETIME STUDENT OE CHRIST CHURCH, 

SF&ege STolumeg 

ARE INSCRIBED, IN GRATEFUL REMEMBRANCE 

OF AN UNBROKEN FRIENDSHIP OF MORE THAN 

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. 



PREFACE. 



It is not my purpose in this edition to set forth a complete 
system of moral philosophy, or to compare and reconcile dif- 
ferent views, but simply to assist the student of the Ethics 
in understanding Aristotle's meaning, and in following his 
arguments in the book before us. There is, indeed, scarcely 
a page of the work which might not have served as a peg on 
which to hang a dissertation on some point of the theory and 
practice of morals ; but to do so would have interfered with, 
rather than furthered, my main aim : and I have therefore ab- 
stained from general disquisitions, and have neither referred 
to ancient systems of philosophy, except where Aristotle's 
meaning would have been obscure without such reference ; 
nor to modern views, except where they directly illustrate, in 
more familiar language, and thus enable us more completely 
to apprehend what Aristotle meant to say. And this was the 
less necessary, as I believe what I have left undone will be 
performed by able hands. I wish rather to guide students, as 
far as I am able, to an understanding of what Aristotle says, 
before they proceed to compare him with, or judge him by, 
what has been advanced by those who went before or came 
after him. I am sure that he who carefully and patiently 
studies his ethical writings, (in which I would include the 
Rhetoric,) will gain a knowledge of many of the secrets of 
man's nature, as it practically exists, and of men as they 
practically act, which will be found of great service, as well 
in the abstract study of the subject, as in practical dealing 
with, or guidance of, men. For Aristotle, looking with a 
curious and careful eye on the realities of human life, saw the 
elements of man's nature, the motives and springs of action, 

b 




VI PREFACE. 

and the manner of their working, far more distinctly and 
accurately than any other philosopher, ancient or modern. 
He may not have had the brilliant imagination of Plato ; but 
his wonderful powers of discernment, of analysis, of com- 
parison, of combination, of distinction, of sifting the wheat 
from the chaff, enabled him to arrive at conclusions which, 
as far as they go, are wonderfully in harmony with the fuller 
and deeper knowledge which is vouchsafed to us. If I were 
called upon to rest Aristotle's fame on one part of his mani- 
fold wisdom, it would be on the patient confidence with 
which he believes that nature has worked, and does work, 
for the best ; and that true moral philosophy consists, not in 
dogmatising on what man ought to be, or what he would be, 
had he been created otherwise than he is, but in seeing what 
he was intended to be as he is ; on the patient skill with 
which, in accordance with this principle, taking man as he 
is, and the world as it is, he has worked out the nature, the 
functions, the perfection, the true happiness of such a being 
placed in such a world. If it may with truth be said that 
Socrates drew morality from heaven, it is not less true to 
say that Aristotle found it on earth. 

Aristotle's fame undoubtedly rests rather on his logical and 
moral writings than on his physical, though it is hardly fair 
to form an unfavourable judgment of his whole natural phi- 
losophy from what remains to us. The names of several of 
his lost works might lead us to suppose that he treated the 
subject more completely and truly than is sometimes sup- 
posed ; but without taking this into account, physical science 
was then undoubtedly in its infancy. Observations and ex- 
periment could not, in the nature of things, have given the 
same variety of data as the moderns possess ; and, it may be, 
our treasury of facts will seem to future enquirers to be but 
scantily filled. Physical science is always cradled in time, 
the giant of one generation is but the infant of the next; 
so that it is no detraction from Aristotle's powers as a philo- 
sopher, if his physical science seems a dwarf by the side of 
our own : but in whatever regards that on which time has 
nothing new to reveal,— the powers and laws of thought and 



PREFACE. Vll 

action, — Aristotle's data were as ample as, though not more 
so than, our own, and therefore his logical, ethical, and poli- 
tical writings maintain the place which was assigned them 
two thousand years ago : they have informed and guided 
the wisest men in succeeding generations ; and especially in 
our own language, the arms of the truest and deepest phi- 
losophers bear undoubted marks of the armoury in which 
they were forged. 

The keystone of Aristotle's philosophy, which enabled him 
thus to construct a stable system out of the shifting materials 
he had, is ov6ev rj fyvais fidrijv iroiel : while in Ethics he 
was led to truth by taking a true view of man as a compound 
being, made up of reason and passions, each of which had 
their function in the formation of his moral character and 
the development of moral action. This view of man as a 
compound being is discernible in his Rhetoric as well as his 
Ethics. 

The data which Aristotle uses will be found to be either 
the opinions of men, expressed or implied, or the facts of na- 
ture, as seen either in the general laws and principles which 
philosophy had been able to detect, or common sense to re- 
cognise; or in the facts of daily life, as discernible by our 
senses or reason. Most philosophers of his age rejected the 
one, while they asserted the claims of the other. Aristotle 
uses the one or the other as they come most readily to hand, 
(see bk. i. notes 58, 61,) and, if possible, both, so as to shew 
the agreement which ought to exist, and, when both are care- 
fully examined, does exist, between them. 

Again, in the examination of philosophic or popular opi- 
nions, and he does not throw aside a dogma, or even a proverb, 
without care : he extracts from the very dross whatever gold 
may be in it ; and pointing out where each has fallen short of, 
or exceeded the limits of truth, confirms his own opinion by 
shewing how it agrees with the truth, while he corrects the 
errors of others. And thus one great lesson to be learnt from 
the study of Aristotle is, that where contrary opinions are 
held by honest" men, with a fair show of argument on each 
side, or have obtained in popular opinion of different ages or 



Vlll PREFACE. 

countries, each is true with limitations or additions : where 
one says "it is wholly this," and another, "it is wholly 
that," the truth lies hid in the fact that both are partially, 
neither wholly, right. 

As for the treatise itself, enough is said from time to time 
in the notes on the general object and nature of its several 
parts and of it as a whole, to render it unnecessary to go 
over the same ground here. I had some thoughts, at one 
time, of prefixing an Analysis or Conspectus, such as that of 
Michelet's ; but on consideration, I think there is sufficient 
help given in the notes to enable the student to do it for 
himself, with far more benefit than if he had it ready made 
to his hands ; and I- should be doing more harm than good if 
I superseded useful labour, instead of merely guiding and as- 
sisting it. I have directed some blank pages to be left in the 
beginning of the first volume for this purpose, and I subjoin 
an analysis of one chapter very much on Michelet's plan, as 
a specimen of the way in which I should recommend such 
work to be done. Suffice it to say, that I believe the Ethics 
to have been written by Aristotle as a scientific proof that 
moral virtue was the perfection of man, a compound being, 
placed in the world in which we find him ; and hence that his 
happiness, the production and preservation of which ought 
to be the aim of the science of social life, is to be found in 
the faithful discharge of his duties as a citizen and a man. 
Of course there is much practical information and explana- 
tion given throughout, but I do not agree with those who 
cannot see in the Ethics a distinct point to be proved, and a 
distinct line of argument to prove it. It is a scientific en- 
quiry into and proof of the practical nature of human virtue 
and happiness,— not merely a barren speculation into its ab- 
stract nature, with no aim or result beyond speculation, but 
with a view to practice, and the attainment of something 
beyond itself. (See bk. ii. note 13.) 

The reading given is almost invariably that of Bekker's; 
The duodecimo text has been printed in an octavo page, so 
as to leave room for a running abstract or observations which 
may strike the student as he reads ; thus giving all the ad- 



PREFACE. IX 

vantage of an interleaved book, without being interleaved. And 
I have not loaded the text or notes with various readings, 
but have contented myself with merely giving those which 
seemed to affect the sense. Not that I would be supposed to 
undervalue various readings ; they afford scope for the ex- 
ercise and development of a very useful mental faculty ; but 
I think they belong rather to the poets than to the philo- 
sophers. In the former the taste is chiefly called into play, 
and therefore it is right that scope should be found for the oc- 
casional exercise of the critical faculties side by side with the 
other, in comparing and judging of authorities and probabili- 
ties. In the latter there is sufhcient scope for the critical 
faculty in the subject and the arguments, and the introduc- 
tion of unimportant and formal points of criticism would 
rather call off the judgment from its more important sphere 
in the contents of the book itself. 

In some, if not many passages, the conciseness of the style, 
so different from that of Plato, renders the reasoning at first 
sight obscure and difficult ; but these, even where the ge- 
neral line and conclusion of the argument are clear enough, 
may not be neglected or slurred over. It is no fruitless men- 
tal exercise to follow such a mind as Aristotle's even where 
the path is rugged, and where we think we see a short cut. 
Whoever declines this labour will fail to master many forms 
of thought and argument which would have made his own 
powers of thought and argument more varied and available. 
This important result will be obtained, and the treatise more 
thoroughly mastered, by following out the connection and 
arguments as closely as possible, — searching into the force of 
illative conjunctions, (such as <yap, ovv, &c), and the way in 
which one clause is connected with another. This requires 
much labour and patience, — but it will not be labour and 
patience misspent ; and I would warn beginners against sup- 
posing that they have got all that the Ethics has to offer when 
they have read it once over, or when they have mastered the 
details. These, of course, must be mastered first, but these 
are not all. The Ethics is an inexhaustible mine ; — I am 
afraid to say how often I have read it over, but I am not 



X PREFACE. 

afraid to say that every time I have read it I have found 
something worth knowing which had not struck me before. 

I would warn the student also against careless construing 
of Greek words into inadequate English ; such, for instance, 
as always construing icakov "honourable," or ala^pov "dis- 
graceful;" or, what is still more common, rendering a whole 
sentence into English words without mastering the notion 
which the Greek is meant to convey. 

It is not necessary for me to bring forward here the lead- 
ing and essential points in the book ; but among the points 
which occur incidentally, I would call especial attention to 
Aristotle's opinion of, and use of, induction, — to the way in 
which he speaks of the gods, — and the reverential and even 
affectionate way in which he speaks of Plato ; these being 
some among the many points in which Aristotle has been 
misrepresented and misused. 

Those who are acquainted with Michelet's Commentary will 
not fail to observe that I am occasionally indebted to him for 
explanations or references, which I have not hesitated to 
adopt without acknowledging them in each case. 

There are, of course, a few trifling misprints : those which 
I have myself detected are in the accents ; one especially, of 
the class which, to use a forcible expression of the late Dean 
of Christ Church, sets one's teeth on edge, — a pro-proparoxyton, 
aopiGTos. But I must add, that this arose from my cor- 
recting the press at a distance, which made me, sometimes, 
in order to save time, let the sheets be printed off without 
seeing with my own eyes that the final corrections had 
been made. 

I will only add, that I shall be much gratified if it should 
turn out that my labours assist others in the study of a 
work from which I feel that I have myself obtained much, 
and of which, the more thoroughly it is studied, the more 
will the value and benefits be felt. 

Caeedeon, Jan. 1856. 



Specimen of Analysis. 

Book i. ch. 6. — Plato's notion of the Idea does not give us the 
true nature of good. 

1. Apology for opposing Plato, 1. 

2. Why his doctrine wrong, 2 to the end. 

a. Good is predicated in Priority and Posteriority, 2. 
/3. Goods are predicated in different categories, 3. 
y. There is no one science of good, 4. 
8. The doctrine unintelligible and unpractical, 5 — 7. 

a. No real difference between the supposed Idea and con- 
crete goods, 5. 

b. Supposed eternity of abstract Idea no argument to the 
contrary, 6. 

c. Testimony of Speusippus, 7. 

e. The doctrine not tenable on the theory of distinction be- 
tween goods dependent and independent, 8, 12. 
act. Supposed division of goods, 8, 9. 
bb. Difficulty of distinguishing between them, 10. 
cc. Dilemma arising from different notions of dependent 
and independent goods. 

aa. If only the Idea independent, then no reality in 

concrete, 10. 
0/3. If others also, then all should fall under one de- 
finition, 11. 
dd. "Why called by common name of " good," 12. 
£. Even if true, not practical or attainable, 13 — 16. 

1. Argument of Platonists that it would serve as a model, 14. 

2. Disproved by practice of men in general, 15. 

3. By the practical sciences. 



NOTES. 



BOOK I. 

CHAPTER I. 

(1.) 1. In this chapter Aristotle is laying down definitions or 
characteristics of the good, preparatory to drawing the con- 
clusion in chapter ii., that the reXos npaKrup is the dyaOop of 
man. The syllogisms stand thus : — 

1. o Trap™ tyLerai is the rdyadop of man {opinions of men). 
reXos irpaKToiiP IS ov ndpra ecpierai. 
reXos TrpaKTcop is rdyadop of man. 

2. The epyop of all other epepyeiai is rdyaOop of man {constitu- 
tion of nature). 

IreXos TvpaKTwp is the epyop of all other ipepyeiai. 
reXos TrpaKTcop is rdyadop of man. 

(2.) 1. it a a- a k.t.X. All human action as it usually exists in the 
world, rexpy, systems of contrivance, with a view to pro- 
duction, p. e 6 o 8 o s (egis 68oTroir]TiKrj perd Xoyov), systems of 
rules, with a view to the proper regulation of our intellectual, 
social, or moral faculties, such as logic, politics, n p dg i s, 
actions in moral life. 7rpoaipeo-is, acts of choice. 

(2.) 3. 8 o k e I. This word points to the opinions of men. necpvice, 
is by nature. eVrl, simply is. (paiperai, evidently is. So in 
this chapter 8o<el is used in the premiss embodying the opi- 
nions of men : " Whatever all desire is rightly defined to be the 
good." netpvice is used where the argument is drawn from the 
constitution of nature ; so fieXnop necpvice, " the epyop of all epep- 
yetai is by nature the good." 

(4.) 2. Aia<popd be ns k.t.X. difference in value. Aristotle is 
not here merely setting forth a distinction between epepyeiai 
and epya, but he is doing so with a view to their relation to 
the good ; that one is a greater good than the other — /3 eXnop 
—dyaBoorepop. By noticing this, the connection between this 

B 



2 ETHICS— BOOK I. [c. i. 2—5. 

proposition and the main question is preserved. Observe that 
the comparative of good is in most, if not in all languages, 
irregular : there are, properly speaking, no degrees of good, 
though there are approaches towards it, which seem to be its 
degrees. 

(5.) 2. It is evident that Aristotle is here not merely giving us a 
piece of information, as it is commonly explained (see Harris 
on Happiness) ; laying down a mere abstract difference be- 
tween the eVpyetaand epyov, one signifying the operations 
which lead to a production, the other the thing produced. 
This may be a true distinction, but it is not what he has 
in view here, for he says immediately below that an evepyeia 
may be an epyov ; he is laying down a difference of value 
between them, with a view to the strict argument he is 
working out. 

(6.) 4. He lays down that in human actions and systems there is 
a subordination; that there are some subordinate to those 
above them, and these again to some one highest of all ; 
that this highest is more an object of choice than those 
below it : and thus by implication he gives the minor to each 
of the above major premisses. This, to which all else are 
subordinate and tend, (i.e. reAos fl-pa/cr©*/,) is most ov navra 

tyiercu, and also is the epyov of all other evepyeiai. 

(7.) 3. e7TL(TTr)p.r], a collection of abstract laws, rexvr}, the same ap- 
plied to practice as rules. 

(8.) 4. v 7r d refers rather to the constitution of nature, whereby 
one is placed in subjection to another ; the same notion often 
exists in the word Kvpios. — a Iperarepa. Observe that this 
word always has reference to the opinions of men. 

(9.) 5. biafpepei be ovbev. An evepyeia may be itself an epyov : 

and it is not less a good, or the good, for that. It was 
necessary to lay this down, as the epyov of man is an evepyeia 
ylrvx^s. Met. viii. 8. p. 186. Ed. Tauchnitz. See also Eth. 
vii. 12. 3 ; vii. 13. 2. 

(10.) 5. nap a ravras. Besides and beyond the evepyeiai. 

(11.) 5. eir\ t 5>v \ex6eio~cov en larr) p,S>v. emo-T^pr) IS here 

used loosely for systems or arts, such as vavrvrjyiK^, iarpucT), &c. 



c. ii. 1—2.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 



CHAPTEB II. 

(.1.2.) He here draws his conclusion from the premisses advanced 
in the last chapter, that the re\os npaKrcbv, whatever it may- 
be, is the aya66v of man. 

(13.) 1. The leading notion in Aristotle's mind is that man's own 
nature, with its tendencies and powers, would lead him to happi- 
ness ; and this is what he practically states when he says that 
it is re'Xos irpaKTwv. The irpaKTa of man are really only the de- \ 
velopment and exhibition of man's nature and tendencies ; 
and the very presence of these tendencies (fye£ic) implies 
some Te\os towards which they tend; and the reXos would 
be that which most fully comprehended and developed 
that nature and its opegis : hence the leading proposition of 
his moral system is that the full and complete development of 
man's nature is his happiness. He believed man not only de- ^J 
signed by nature to be happy, but contrived for happiness ; 
and that his own constitution would lead him to it, if he 
would honestly follow it. " This is what the Schoolmen mean 
when, in their way of expression, they say, That the will is 
carried towards happiness not simply as will, out as nature." 
L eighton's Lectures on Happiness, II. vol. iv. p. 190, ed. 1830. 

(14.) 1. Ei dq. 617 very frequently marks a conclusion in the 
Ethics. See Grammar, 721, 1. 

(15.) 1. 7rp6eitri k.t.X. If the elenchus on which this argument 
rests be worked out, it will bring us to the key-stone of 
Aristotle's philosophy : ov&kv 17 <t>vo-is p.art]v ivoiel. It 
is always worth while to work out compressed arguments of 
this sort, as well for the mental exercise, as for the sake of 
the principles up to which they lead us. 

(16.) 1. Kevrjv, empty in itself; par a lav, without result. 

(17.) 1. ayaObv k a\ a p i <r r o v, the good and the bravest, as 
we say; the same thing {summum bonum) viewed under 
different aspects. 

(18.) 1. opegiv. Eor the senses of opegis, see the note 40 on 
book iii. chap. ii. 

(19.) 2. f) yvaxris at to v. Mark the word yiwis, and compare 
book x. chap. 9. 1, where he speaks of the result of all the 




4 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. ii. 3-8. 

preceding part of his treatise as r6 yvavai. The Ethics is 
not a mere practical exposition of virtue, and the way to 
attain to it, but also, and rather, a search after it, and a 
proof of what it is in its practical, not its speculative, nature. 
~By such expressions as " reXos ov yvaa-is d\\a irpafys" on which 
so much stress is laid, it is meant that the Ethics is not a 
speculative enquiry into the abstract essence of virtue or 
happiness, without any further object ; but a moral enquiry 
into their practical nature as they exist in action, and with 
a view to it. 

(20.) 3. ru7TG) ye, at least in an outline, or sketch. 

(21 .) 3. ri 77 or i <tt t, what its nature is. 

(22.) 3. T IV O S T (0 V € 7T I (J TT) [A G> V rj dwd/XCOiV, to what 

science or system it belongs. eVicTr?^ is here both a science 
and a scientific art, with a definite subject-matter, such as 
politics, ethics, &c. ; 8vvap,is, an organic art, such as logic 
or rhetoric, which supplies formulae, more or less abstract, 
for any subject-matter. Of course, to whatever system, 
whether scientific or formal, the good belongs, the know- 
ledge of that science is necessary to its comprehension, and 
an enquiry into it is necessary to the completeness of that 
science. Hence ttoKitikt] includes ethics, and ethics is 7roXi- 
tikt] ris, a branch of the grand science of politics. 

(23.) 4. A d £ e i e $', would be held, or allowed, to be. 

(24.) 4. KvpKOTdrrjs, that to which most authority is given by 

nature. dpx lTCKroI/tK ^ s > * na ^ which is most practically 

directive. 

(25.) 5. (p a I v e t a i, evidently is. 

(26.) 5. d tarda- ae i andu7ro r a v r r\ v refer to KvpKordrijs : \ P a) " 

fJL€ VTj S and TT 6 p l€ X<> I O.V TO. T (OV O.W (H V tO dpxiT6KTOVtKrjS. 

— Cf. Pol. 1. 1. 

(27.) 7. tovt av eiij rdv pa>7Tiv ov ay ad 6 v. The dyadov 
of man belongs to the science of politics, inasmuch as the 
end of this science embraces all other ends under it, and 
therefore is practically the re\os ra>v npaKT&v. 

(28.) 8. ei ydp k.t.X. This is one of the instances of omission 
of the sentence to which ydp refers, which produces so much 
difficulty in following Aristotle's arguments. The sentence 



9. c. iii. 1—2.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 5 

must be worked out from the context, and supplied, before the 
bearing of the reasoning can be perceived. It might have been^, 

expected that the dvOpdoirivov dyaOov would belong to dvOpa>irivr) 

emaTTjfxr), and not irokiTiKt) : but this is not so, for in reality 

dvOpoiTTivq eniaTrjixT) IS the same as noXiTiKr}, and dvOpamivov dyaOov 

as irokiTiKov dyaOov, being different views of the same thing ; 
but noXiTiicr) is higher than dv6pa>ivivrj, as the 7rd\i? is higher 
than the individual, resting on higher grounds and aiming at 
higher results (cf. Eth., bk. vi. 8. 1) ; and therefore the good 
may be viewed either as noXiTiKrjs reXos, or npaKTeov reXos. 

(29.) 9. rovrav, either dvOpamvov dyaOov {==. -n paKrStv rtXos,) and 
noXiTiKrjs reXos (=7roXm/<6j/ dyaOov), or referring back to section 

3, rl 7TOT6 eort, Koi rivos to>v €7n(TTr) peov rj bvvdpeav. Looking to 

the beginning of chap, iv., it is probably the former of these. 

(30.) 9. 7roXiTiKr) ris ova- a. Being thus connected with poli- 
tics, and a necessary branch of that science which aims at 
the happiness of the state, or, in other words, the dya86v of 
the individuals composing it, the good of man belongs to the 
province of politics, and the knowledge of the former is ne- 
cessary to the completeness of the latter. The Ethics is 
the accidence of the Politics. 



CHAPTER III. 

(31.) Having now laid it down that the dyaOov of man is 
npaKTav reXos, and that it belongs to the science of politics, 
he would naturally proceed to the enquiry as to what this 
irpaKTGiv reXos may be ; but he first guards himself against 
those who would object to his system that it is not demon- 
strative, and to those who object that it is above their com- 
prehension. The one class would be of the philosophic, the 
other of the self-indulgent, careless sort. 

(32.) 1. Kara, proportionally to. 

(33.) 1. drjpiovpyovpevois, works of art. The perfection required 
differs according to the material, &c. 

(34.) 2. KaXd na\ Sinai a, the principles of moral and social 
right. 



G ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. iii. 2—7, 

(35.) 2. 8 ia<po pav, difference in different nations, n X d v rj v, 
vagueness, even where agreed upon in the general. From 
this statement we may deduce (partly) the influence of ora- 
cles, whereby the Greek endeavoured to supply the want of 
some certain standard and guide, and the necessity of reve- 
lation to correct and steady false, shifting views. 

(36.) 2. bone'iv v 6 fx 6) jx € v elvai <p v <r e i 8e firj. The So- 
phists are here generally alluded to, though, strictly speak- 
ing, they held that some naXd were cpvo-ei, others v6pa> : 
but that all dUaia were vopa, and none cpvaei. Plato, Legg. 
889. As a school, however, they practically get rid of the 
reality of all natural right and wrong. 

(37.) 3. Ka\ ra dy ad d, the principles and views of human 
good. 

(38.) 4. nepl toiovtuv, on such subject-matter. i< tolov- 
tcov, from such premisses. naxvX&s, roughly, roiavra, 

SC. ra cos eVi TO 7ToXl), 

(39.) 5. aKobexeo-Bai, to listen to the proof: we must, in pro- 
bable matters, be content with probability. 

(40.) 5. 7T€7raidevLi€vov. The man of a highly trained mind 
has the power not only of discerning truth when it is put 
before him, but of discerning how far truth is attainable : so 
he only will see that the proofs which Aristotle is about to 
bring forward give all the proof of which the subject is 
capable. 

(41.) 6. uplvei Ka\S>s a yivaxrKei. This faculty answers to 
o-vveo-is in morals. See bk. vi. c. x. 

(42.) 6. dnXas. The generic sense of dnXcos is "keeping out of 
sight the circumstances mentioned in the context j" here it 
is generally, leaving out rd <a6 y eKao-ra. 

(43.) 7. ol k fl os, the proper ; the most suitable. 

(44.) 7. tSi/ Kara rov f3iov tt pdt; e <ov, moral action. 

(45.) 7. en be k.t.X. The self-indulgent man will not compre- 
hend the real force of moral reasoning : he may listen to it, 
and possibly apprehend it with his reason, but it will be 
paraicos and dvtocpeXcos, because it will produce no effect on his 
practice. 

(46.) 7. eneibr) to re'Aos k.t.X. It is not implied in these 



8. c. iv. 1—4.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 7 

words that the Ethics is a mere practical exposition of vir- 
tue, and how to become virtuous. He does not say that he 
is not going to pursue the subject of morals with a view to 
the (as far as may be) scientific knowledge of virtue, but 
merely that he does not mean his treatise to end in mere 
knowledge, but in knowledge with a view to action. See last 
chapter, note 19, and also below, where elbevai is spoken 
of as profitable to those who know how to use it. 

(47.) 8. Trap a xp° vov ) from time. Or. Or. 637. 3, c. 



CHAPTER IV. 

(48.) Resumption of subject. If there is any agreement among 
men as to the good, whether viewed as dvOponnvov dya66v or 
noXiTiKrjs re'Xos, then the question is settled, and Aristotle 
might at once have proceeded to politics proper, or the con- 
sideration of the most perfect way of developing and securing 
this aya66v by legislation and government ; but such agree- 
ment does not exist. 

(49.) 1. dvaXafioPTes, resuming the subject, after the digression 
in the last chapter. 

(50.) 1. yvaxris refers to nokiTiKrj : Trpoaipeais to Trdvrcov dicpo- 
rarov tuv dyaOatv. 

(51.) 2. €vdaip,ovlap. Observe the notion implied in this word : 
compare it with Latin fortuna, from firs, and our happiness, 
from hap. 

(52.) 2. x a pi €VT€S >th e educated. See Lidd. and Scott. 
(53.) 2. ev £ijv refers to abundance of good things ; ev TvpaxTuv* 
to success and good fortune. 

(54.) 2. vnoXapPdvovo-i, conceive of. This is its usual mean- 
ing in the Ethics. 

(55.) 3. d7ro$i$6ao-iv, explain it. 

(50.) 3. Trap a ravra, besides and beyond. The Platonic Idea is 

here alluded to. 
(57.) 4. in nro\a£ov acts, most popular. Lidd. and Scott; 

literally, on the surface. 



8 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. iv 5. 

(58.) 5. n f) \av0avcTco. It is not to be supposed that Aristotle 
introduces this passage in the middle of his subject to give 
us a piece of information which belongs rather to logic, or 
possibly found a place in his Methodica ; but being about to 
examine human opinions as a possible source of truth, it was 
necessary to vindicate their right to be thus considered, as 
Plato and his school would look upon such materials as un- 
sound foundations, and inadmissible in the endeavour to build 
up truth. Aristotle therefore lays down the principle of the 
analytical and synthetical methods, and claims for each its 
proper position in true philosophy, quoting Plato himself as 
an evidence of the existence of both methods. The opinions 
of mankind are among the phenomena of the world, and a 
system based on them would be analytical, i.e. analyzing 
a confused (ra o-vyK€xvpeva: see Phys. i. 1. 2.) mass of facts, 
in order to arrive at the truth implied in them. The words 
analytical and synthetical are explained by the Schoolmen, 
and after them by Aldrich, in a different sense. This is only 
noticed to prevent students from confusing themselves by 
trying to explain this passage by what Aldrich says. 

(59.) 5. dp xv in the Ethics signifies a starting-point, whether 
in reasoning, scientific or moral, — or in action or choice, — or 
in his treatise. 

(60.) 5. apKreov ovv=f)dpxr) vi JLlv %&t<*>- He claims the right to 
proceed from curb t&v yvaplpav, from whatever presents itself 
as yvwpipov, whether matters of human experience, observa- 
tion, opinion ; or anXas, abstract principles, prior to and inde- 
pendent of such experience, &c. ; that is, whether a priori 
or a posteriori. Eor the difference between yvapifta &it\G>s 
and yvvpipa rjpTtv, see Phys. i. 1. 2 ; Anal. Post. i. 2. 10. 

(61.) 5. t (ro)s ovv k.t.X. The more usual, because the most 
accessible, sources of enquiry will be yv6pip.a rjplv, ra iyyvrepa 
rrjs alo-Srja-eas. The facts of moral life — whether these be the 
facts of our constitution, or the facts of life, as discernible in 
the actions, the opinions, language, habits of men, set forth 
either by the ol noXkoi, or the cpp6vip,os or o-novdalos, or 770X47-1x0$-, 
or 7to\itikti — all may be bases of truth, and furnish sound 
ground for further systems. The characteristic of Aristotle's 
method is that he claims the right to use both methods, as 
they may be within his reach. When he draws his arguments 



C, 7. c. v. 1—5.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 9 

from the abstract constitution of nature lie uses the former, 
but when from opinions of men, the latter; but he usually 
uses the analytical, because most suited to his subject. It is 
hardly worth while to enquire at length whether the whole of 
his treatise is one or the other ; perhaps, as he begins with 
the abstract principle of nature that the dya66v of every thing 
is in its epyov, and proceeds to shew that tjOikt} dperr) does 
perform the epyov, he may be in a certain sense synthetical ; 
but we may remark that he seldom or never brings forward 
an abstract principle without confirming it by experience. 

(62.) 6. 816 Set rols tdcaiv. As facts form the groundwork 
of moral science, and as moral facts are appreciable only by 
men of good morals, hence a right moral education is abso- 
lutely necessary for the profitable study of moral or social 
subjects, or, to speak generally, of politics. 

(63.) 7. 6 toiovto s, SC. 6 KaXws rois %6e<nv rjypevos. 



CHAPTEE V. 

(64.) He now examines the opinions of men on the subject, to 
see if they can give a satisfactory answer to his question. 

(65.) 1. o0ev, see end of sec. 4, last chapter. — ydp refers to the 
difference among the opinions which the last chapter mentions. 

(66.) 2. viro\ap.fidvG iv, conceive of ; form their notions of — £k 
tcov /3 1 at v,from the different sorts of life. — (p opriKararoi, 
the vulgar. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. 

(67.) 3. Tvyxdvova-i be \6yov, but they obtain consideration, or 
have a show of reason. 

(68.) 4. en iiroXaiore pop, too superficial ; too uncertain. 

(69.) 4. fxavT€v6pe6a } we feel : without going into the rea- 
son and proof, we have a sort of instinct about it. 

(70.) 5. y o v v introduces the proof of a foregoing statement. See 
Gr. Gr. 737, c. 

(71.) 5. nap' ols, sc. napd tovtois oh, before those by whom, Sfc. 
See Gr. Gr. 822 ; obs. 1. 

c 



10 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. v. G— 8. 

(72.) 6. Oeaiv bia(f>v\dTTG>v, maintaining a paradox. Top. i. 
9. 5, p. 107. 

(73,) G. iv ToTf cyKvKkiois. In my treatise on general subjects. See 
Lidd. and Scott ad v. Probably general questions on morals. 
These were two books of 7rpofi\r)p.aTa iyKvickia, a passage from 
which is quoted by Aulus Gellius, xx. 4 ; and from the cha- 
racter of this passage it seems probable that these are the 
treatises referred to here. See Fabr. Bibl. Grsec. iii. p. 392. 

(7i.) 7. iv rols ino nevois. The next chapter is devoted to 
a more particular consideration of the supposed avrb dya66v, 
which is the aim and result of the /3io? tiecop-qrucos with respect 
to the supposed science of happiness. These words are com- 
monly supposed to refer to the discussion in the tenth book ; 
but first, as the doctrine of the Ibea, which is the principle 
of speculative philosophy or (3ios OecoprfriKos, is, as a matter of 
fact, considered in the next chapter, it seems difficult to give 
any reason why these words should not refer to that chapter. 
Next, if we take the passages in which the words iv vols iirofie- 
vois occur, we shall find that they denote a more real and actual 
connection than between the first and last book of a treatise. 
Where he refers to some distant part of his book (as in 
Bhet. i. 10. 5), he generally gives a more distinct descrip- 
tion of the part referred to. 

(75.) 8. to, tr pore pov Xe^e^ra, SC. t^cWj) — Tip.r) — dperf}. 

(76.) 8. kcl'itoi 7to\\o\ \6yoi K.T.X. The other reading is Kal y 
which would mean that Aristotle had wasted many words on 
them ; and as this could hardly be said to be true, therefore 
Kairoi is the better reading. But even these do not appear to be 
final; and yet much reasoning has been spent with regard to them, 
i.e. to prove them to be rc'Xiy,— not by himself, but by others. 



CHAPTER VI. 

(77.) He now examines the opinions of those who look for the 
good in the OeaprjTiicbs (Bios, and hold that the only true hap- 
piness consists in, and is gained by, the mental realisation of 
the avro dyaOSv, — by the science of the good. It would be 
beside our purpose to go at length into an account of the 



c. vi. 1, 2.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 11 

Platonic theory of ideas : it is enough to say that the leading 
feature of it seems to be, that there existed in the Divine 
mind certain archetypal forms or qualities, which being 
communicated to, or at least present in, things visible, gave 
them these qualities, (Phsedo, 100, cf. Arist. Met. xii. 5, 
pp. 269, 270) ; and that these archetypal ideas being also 
impressed on the mind of men, were called out by men- 
tal exercise ; and when they were thus called out, the true ; 
qualities of visible things were recognised in their several , 
shapes and forms of existence. Thus a visible thing was 
good by virtue of the presence in it of the idea of good, and 
the mind could recognise and enjoy that good only by vir- 
tue of the mental development and realisation of the cor- 
responding idea. 

(78.) 1. KadoXov, sc. the Platonic idea, (Met. vi. 13, p. 155) ; 
called kcl66\ov, from its being the result of the highest ab- 
straction. It may be observed that in the Physics, 1. i., 
Ka66Xov has exactly an opposite meaning, viz. the whole fully 
exhibited in its details and phsenomena. 

(79.) 1. ra e'lbrj. Here the Ibiu, or abstract ideas: when op- 
posed to Idea, as below, section 10, it seems to mean the 
concrete to which the Idea by its presence gives form and 
quality. 

(80.) 1. otxiov 7T porifidv rrjv a\rj8eiav. This passage pro- 
bably gave rise to the Latinised saying attributed to Aristotle, 
"Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, sed magis arnica Veritas." 
Whenever Plato is spoken of, even when his theories are 
opposed, it is always with respect, and almost affection. 

(81.) 2. There are five ways in which Aristotle meets the doc- 
trine of the Ideal : — 

1. By taking some abstract principles of the speculative 
school, (2—4). 

2. By calling on them to define the difference between the 
avro exao-Tov and the thing itself, (5 — 7). 

3. By shewing that their distinction between good inde- 
pendent and good dependent does not help them, (8 — 11). 

4. By shewing that the common name of " good" does not 
necessarily imply a common idea, (12). 

5. By shewing that it would be of no practical use, (13 — end). 



12 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. vi. 2—5. 

(82.) 12. He takes as a major premiss, one of the Platonic dog- 
mas, and proves from it that there can be no one abstract 
idea of good. It would be quite waste of time to enquire 
either into the meaning of the Platonic dogma, or how far it 
is true. Aristotle allows, for the purpose of his argument, 
that it is true, and we may do the same. The argument is a 
simple negative syllogism in the first figure, and, as well as 
the other arguments in this chapter, should be worked out 
in full. 

(S3.) 2. KoiiLaavres. This may be translated entertaining. See 
Lidd. and Scott ad v. 

(84.) 2. X eye rat, is predicated in; that is, may, as a predicate, 
express substance or quality, &c. 

(85.) 2. fj ova la. The category of substance. For the other 
meanings of it, — the essence, the universal, the genus, — see 
Met. vi. 3, p. 130, where substance is also termed inroKeipeuov : 
see also Categ. c. 2, and 3, Met. iv. 8, p. 98. — *a0' air 6. 
The other categories can only exist iv vn-oKetpiva : they have 
no independent existence ; wherefore ko0' avro is a character- 
istic of ova la. 

(86.) 2. 7rapacf)vd8i, offshoot; av ju/3 e /3 rj k 6 r i, property. See 
Met. iv. 30, p. 119 ; see also iii. 4, p. 70. 

(87.) 3. laax<*s Xeyerai, sc. it is predicated in all the Cate- 
gories. A thing may be spoken of as good in respect of its 
relation to the end, or the time or place when and where it 
happened, and so on through the rest. Refer to the end of 
the second chapter of the Categories. 

(88.) 3. Kaiposj opportunity. This argument is an hypothetical 
destructive. 

(89.) 4. rj v a v, sc. if there is an idea of good. 

(90.) 5. An argument to shew that, waiving the question of there 
being such a thing as avro €Kaarov, the difference between it 
and the emarov itself is uureal, a mere play upon words ; that 
the Platonists themselves cannot define them in different 
terms. 

(91.) 5. k a i is emphatic : how they even wish to define, &c. 

(92.) 5. 6 avros \6yos. avOpanos and avro av$pconos are defined 
bv the same terms. 



6—12.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 13 

(93.) 6. This is an answer to the argument drawn from the 
eternity of the avro emo-rov. The essence of the thing is not 
altered by its greater or less permanence ; that which is 
white for an instant is as white as that which is white for 
a thousand years. It may, however, be answered, that per- 
manence being itself a good, a thing which is good for an 
instant is not so good as that which is so for a thousand 
years. 

(94.) 7. Snevcwnvos. The nephew and successor of Plato in the 
Academy, whom Aristotle represents as abandoning, in part 
at least, the Platonic theory, by making unity an exhibition 
or phase of good, rather than good a development and phase 
of unity. See Met. vi. 2, p. 129. 

(95.) 7. iv Tfj to>v dyadmv oruo-roi^ia. This <rv(TToixia was a sort of 
catalogue, or double list, in which ten sorts of good and their 
corresponding evils were placed over against each other ; 
such, as nepas — atveipov. nepiTTov — apriov. eu — Trkrjdos. K.r.A. 

See Met. i. 5, p. 15. 

(96.) 8. roij 8e Aex^eieri, sc. the arguments adduced by 
Aristotle. He now takes a modified form of the Platonic 
theory, which distinguishes between independent and de- 
pendent good, and applies the Idea only to the former. 

(97.) 8. icad* eu el 8 os, in one sort. 

(98.) 10. If the goods mentioned above are not independent 
goods, there can be none such, except the idea ; but then 
the elbos, or concrete, in which the form of good seems to 
reside, is a delusion, — has no reality : and therefore these 
are goods. (The argument is a sort of elenchus, whereby the 
consequent is denied, as aroirov) : and if these are all goods, 
properly so called, then the former argument is applicable, 
that there should be identity of predication. The passage is 
a sort of hypothetical sorites, depending on a reductio ad 
absurdum. 

(99.) 12. The identity of name, though predicated in different 
categories, furnishes an argument in favour of there being an 
Idea of good. Why, if goods thus differ, is the common name 
"good" applied to each and all? The three reasons given 
correspond to the later systems of the Realists, Conceptua- 
lists, Nominalists. t<5 dep' ivos ehai, by virtue of all proceeding 



11 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. vi. 12—10. 

from one, gives that of the Realists ; r<5 npos lv anavra avvre- 
X(7v, that of the Couceptualists ; y p,a\\ov ku6' dvakoylav, that 
of the Nominalists : and the words rj paXkop mark that Aris- 
totle took the last of the three. Of the three systems there 
is a short, but not on that account a worse, account in 
jlagee on the Atonement, vol. ii. p. 25, note. 

(100.) 12. 6pa>vvpois, Cat. i. 

(101.) 15. i it i a- t r] jx a i s, scientific arts ; the arts and sciences, as 

we see from the word rexvlras below. 
(102.) 15. to i v 8 e £ s, that which is wanting to tlieir perfection. 
(103.) 16. r r] v v y i e i a v, health in the abstract. ' 



CHAPTEE VII. 

Having thus in vain sought for a correct notion of the ayaQov in 
the practical and speculative views of men on the subject, 
he now proceeds to discover it for himself; and his mode of 
proceeding of course forms tlie characteristic feature of his 
treatise. Instead of imitating former philosophers, who, 
forming abstract notions of what happiness was, tried to find 
out what sort of life afforded tlie widest and surest sphere 
for it, Aristotle proceeds by stating what will lead to it, 
viz. that it will be the development of the epyov, i.e. of the best 
and highest tendency or principle of man's nature. 

(105.) 2. peraftaivav, changing its ground ; by a different mode 
of proof . In the first chapter the conclusion that npaKT&v 
reXos is the rayaQov was arrived at by referring syllogistically 
to major premisses ; here by induction and analogy. 

(106.) 3. He now gives some characteristics of the good, whereby 
evbaipovla is identified with it among the various reXrj in life, 
as being permanently rekeiov and avrapices, which latter is also 
a sign of the former ; and the conclusion he comes to is that 
evdaipovia is perfect, perfectly developed in itself; self-con- 
tained, requiring nothing external to complete it; and the 
highest end of human action. 

(107.) 4. bia rovd' alperov. tovto, SC. to pt]8e7TOT€ 8ia fiWo. There 

are three divisions : — 1. Things sought for their own sake 



c. vii. 2—10 ] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 15 

alone. 2. Things sought only for the sake of something 
else. 3. Things sought both for their own sake and for 
that of something else. 

(108.) 5. opyava, instrumental goods ; which are valuable only as 
leading to some end. — v ovv, intellectual power, talent. 

(108.) G. to avrb o- v fx j3 a l v e i v, the same result, viz. that evdaL- 
fiovia is reXeiov, and therefore the good. 

(109.) 0. e n e i 8 t] (jivorei tt o\ ir i k 6 s a v 6 p co it o s. Observe 
this principle, wliich is the keystone of Aristotle's moral 
philosophy. 

(110.) 7. tovtcov 8e \r)7TTe6s opos tis, some bound must 
be placed to these sympathies. 

(111.) 7. elaavOis, see ch. 11. 

(112.) 8. TvdvToav alper (ordrrjv. The highest object of choice, 
in its own essence, even when in its lowest degree, without 
any adventitious additions, as compared with anything else ; 
and yet alpercorepav, in its higher degrees, when increased not 
in essence or kind, but in degree, by the addition of acknow- 
ledged blessings, as compared with itself before those addi- 
tions. The change produced by the addition of external 
goods is in degree, not in kind. — pf) awapiBpovpevrjv, 
not reckoned as joined with anything else ; by itself. The 
word is used again Bhet. i. 7. 

(113.) 9. Xeyeiv. This word shews that what he has been doing 
in the preceding sections is to identify that which is called 

evdaipovia with the ayaQov. 

(114.) 10. It having been laid down that €vhaip,ovla will be 
attained by the development of the highest tendency of human 
nature, it is necessary to discover the epyov of man, as this 
will be the development of his highest and best tendencies ; 
and in it, by a general law of nature, the <■$ of man will be 
found. We here get at one of the major premisses of the! 
Ethics, — whatever devejopes the epyov, or highest principle or 
function, of man will be his ayadov. 

(115.) 10. The terms epyov, reXos, ev, dp errj, jfyaBov, Only 

present different views of the same state, ep-gov, the proper 
development of the proper nature; t e"kos,mie same state 
viewed as in its accomplishment; ev, vievf&dXas a simple 



r 



16 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. vii. 10—13. 

excellence ; dper rj, with the additional notion of obligation 
or tlie corresponding one of good desert ; dyaBov, with a 
farther notion of good or happiness resulting from it. 

(116.) 10. iv t(5 epya. We have here again Aristotle's recog- 
nition of the wise benevolence of nature, which has provided 
that everything and being shall find its dyaBov in the due 
performance of the function assigned to it by its constitution 
and position ; and thus human nature, rightly understood, 
will lead to human happiness. 

(116.) 11. d p y 6 v SC. depyov, without an epyov. 

(117.) 11. trorepov ovv r e k t o v o s, argument from analogy. 

(119.) 11. rj KaBane p, argument a fortiori. If each of the parts 
has an epyov, much more the w r hole. 

(120.) 12. (car} is not the same as /3tos, life without, or living, but 
a principle of life within : so the far] of man is afterwards 
stated to be yfrvxrjs ivepyeia. It may be translated nature, in 
the sense of a principle or part of nature ; and of course the 
epyov of man will arise from his peculiar fri). 

(121.) 12. Bpe-rrriKri. In bk. vi. c. 12. 6, he calls BpeimKr] the 
riraprov popiov : the other three being, the intellectual, the 
moral, and the alaBtjTiKf]. 

(122.) 13. XetTrerat marks the conclusion of a disjunctive syl- 
logism, which is implied in what goes before, though not 
actually stated. 

(123.) 13. npaKTiKr) Tis tov \6yov €%ovtos, the life of a rational 
agent. It does not mean here practical, as opposed to intel- 
lectual, nor a life of moral virtue and activity, as opposed to 
one of contemplation, for in the subdivision of 7TpaKTiKri £0077 
we find the intellectual energies included. It is opposed to 
BpenTLKr] and alo-Br)TiKr), and not to SiavorjTiKr). It is necessary 
to observe this, for it was long the fashion to construe this 
word practical, and to make it the link between rjBucr) apery 
and €vbaip.ovia. 

(124.) 13. rov rov be, sc. tov \6yov e^oi/ros. Of the rational 
agent one part is receptive of reason, the other is the state 
and energy of it. a> s, as being. 

(125.) 13. Ka\ Tavrr/s agrees with farjs tov ex OVTOS Ka ' Swvoov- 



13—20.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 17 

pevov, implied in the context: since the intellect may exist 
in a passive state (e'xov, e£is), or as an active energy, dtavoov- 
fievov ; the ivepyeia is preferred to the e£is. 

(126.) 13. tcvpiarepov. More properly and essentially termed 
the npaKriKr) far) rov \6yov i'xovTos. The word \eyea-6ai is some- 
thing more than merely spoken of, — rather predicated as a 
definition ; and therefore representing more or less accu- 
rately the essence. 

(127.) 14. Kara \6yov r) pr) avev \6yov. He does not here 
choose to define the exact proportion which Xoyos holds in 
this cvepyeta ^vx^s : it may be the governing and directing 
principle, or it may be merely an ingredient. Below he adds 
the words p.era Xoyov. 

(128.) 15. Kara rr)v oiKeiav dp€Tr)v, in accordance with — 
according to — the excellence proper to and resulting from 
its nature. It must be observed that dperr) here does not 
mean virtue in its technical sense of moral virtue, (for we 
find it afterwards divided into moral and intellectual,) but 
excellence, whatever it may be. 

(129.) 15. n TrXeiovs k.t.X. The great object, then, of his trea- 
tise is to discover what is the highest (dpia-rrj) and most per- 
fectly developed (reXetorar/?) dperr) of man. This furnishes us 
with the major premiss of the syllogism : " Whatever is the 
TeXeioraTrj dperr) developes the epyov of man." — reXetordrrj, 

that which most perfectly developes the epyov. See Met. iv. 
16, p. 110. 

(131.) 16. iv j3i'o> Te-A€ia>, implying both sufficiency of time and 
sufficiency of means, (see below, note 175,) though the pro- 
verb immediately following applies only to the former. 

(132.) 17. nepiyey pd(p 6 a>, be sketched, dvaypafyai, fill in. Sd£ete 
d y av Ttavrbs k.t.X. It would seem to be every one's duty, SfC 

(133.) 18. He now repeats his caution as to the contingent cha- 
racter of his subject, and of the sources whence his phe- 
nomena and principles are drawn. 

(134.) 19. op6r)v, either yaviav, or ypap,p.r)v. 

(135.) 20. t6 h' otl 7rpS>Top teal d p xh' I n t ne discussion 
of first principles the on is sufficient, for this is itself the 

D 



i^> 



KTHIOS.— BOOK I. 



[c. vii. 21. 



starting-point, beyond which it is not possible to go, and 
which it is not possible to demonstrate, or to require an alria 
for it : it has its own evidence in itself. See book vi. G. 



- Ttj* 



(186). 21. r a) v 8' a p x w v k.t.X. Of the various ways in which 
these generalised facts (on) are apprehended, Aristotle spe- 
eities three which depend more immediately on our senses. 

n. a t a 6 r? <j i s, an immediate perception of, and assent to, a 
general principle, as soon as suggested to us by the pheno- 
mena of nature, or the facts of life, or presented to us by 
others, (evidential) to deny which we feel (ixavrevofxeda) would 
be a contradiction of our very reason, or instincts ; not the 
same as, but analogous to, the perception of things by the eye. 

(Book vi. 8. 9. alaOrjo'is oi>x i) tg>v tSiW, dXX' or<u alaOavo/xeda 
on to cv jjia6r)ixaTiKols eo~x aTOV Tplyotvov,) hence termed aladrjcris ', 

such as in mathematics, " Things that are equal to the same 
are equal to one another." In morals, apart, of course, from 
religion, the generalised facts thus perceived are, from our 
inability to see clearly into human nature and human life, but 
few, and these comparatively uncertain, not in themselves, 
but in our convictions of them. 

"Whether these principles are innate and called out by the 
intellectual energies, or whether they are matters of expe- 
rience, it is beside our purpose to enquire ; it may suffice to 
say, that the difficulties started by the partisans of each of 
these theories against the opposite ones, may be disposed of 
by supposing, w r hat really seems to be the case/that we have 
innate powers of receiving them from nature, and that nature 
is fitted to convey them to us ;'so that wherever the intellect 
or the heart is in a right state, they are universally received 
and held, though not themselves innate. 

p. enayotyr). Where the principles are not self-evident, 
but are the result of experience, or at least require experi- 
ment and comparison to confirm them, such as " the dya66v of 
everything is contained in its epyoi/." It would be beside our 
purpose to go into the question of induction. 

eOto-pos, an acquired ato-^o-iy, the result of experience 
and practice, as where an experienced chymist detects laws 
and properties which escape other men's notice ; or as a 
man accustomed to measurements judges of distance almost 
instinctively ; or where an experienced lawyer sees at a 



o. viii. l.] J .Tim s— BOOK l LO 

glau :il point in i rhe (mon 

process of induction i ded ami supplied by i 

quired power. There is i sori of intuitive ami instantaneous 

induction.- Spa lway6fu I ml. i. 5, book vi. B, :». 

— 7 fini rgi hr a yvyrjs tmrifBtux >pi08, i. 1 

21. IXXai 5' <iXXu k -. This would include all those prin- 
eiples which do not come to us through the medium of aurAy- 
ais, tit' any such there be,) but arc developed by the refli i 

c of the mind in itself, or ere deduced from principles 
already formed, or by analogy ; all, iii short, where maOqais 
does Dot directly and immediately come in It was nut oe- 

isary for Aristotle to specify these, and claim his rigb.1 to 

use them, as Plato would Q01 deny their authority as sources 
of truth, which he would do in the Case of those which de- 
pended ow cuadqais. See Phssdo, 85, A. >,|. ; GG, A. 

(138.) 21. pcrtfvai 8e k.t.X. Observe the practical wisdom of 
Aristotle, who does not, on abstract grounds, slmt himself out 
from any sources of truth, but recognises the great principle, 
that truths are to be sought after according to the nature 
of their subject-matter. In the Topics, i. 12. 5, p. 110, he 
gives three heads of Trpordafis : rjdiKai — (pviriKai — XoyiKai. It is 
clear that the apxai in these three arc not to be sought for 
in exactly the same way. .Much confusion would have been 
avoided if writers on philosophy had imbibed from Aristotle 
a little of his comprehensiveness of mind. 

(130.) 21. 6p tadcoa-i, be set out clearly,— as well in thought as 
in terms. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

| 1 10.) The notions 0$ ttoaipowia were arrived at in the last chap- 
ter &0m the Constitutions Of nature, deductively (<< tov 
<ri'/i7rfpua-/xarof Km t£ Isv 6 Xoyoj) from the general law that the 

good of everything consists in the development of its ioyor s 

and from the particular tacts of human nature. lie I 

proceeds (according to his usual practice of combining both 
the sources of proof, where possible), to shew thai the opi- 



20 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. viii. 2—11. 

iiions of men agree with what he has laid down. The 
principal opinions of men are all combined in Aristotle's 
definition : — 

1 . Happiness resides in the soul = ivepyeia fax^s. 

2. Happiness is aperr) = kox' dperrjv. 

3. euros evrjpepia= iv j3i'o> reXeto). 

4. r]8ovfj naturally arises from this ivepyeia. 
(141. ) 2. r p i x v> ^at. Legg. 697, B. 

(142.) 2. Ka\ a>s av Xeyo it o, our definition would hold good. 

(143.) 3. ovtco yap k.t.X. It would belong to the soul,/or npagis 
implies both i'pyov (without), and 7rpoaipeo-is (within), — it is 
not only an act, but an action. 

(1 44.) 5. eV i£t]T ov peva 7r e p\ rrjv k.t.X. The further questions 
raised on happiness. The more particular requirements, as dis- 
tinguished from the more general notions of ra itepX yjsvxrjv, or 

TO €KTOS. 

(145.) 5. t<5 \ex0* VT h sc - n i s definition. 

(146.) 7. ovderepovs k.t.X. The principle here laid down seems 
to be the true rule in cases where there are two or more dif- 
ferent views, each supported by more or less of sound reason- 
ing, — both are true in some points, both wrong in others. 
It differs from eclecticism, inasmuch as truth is not compro- 
mised, but only sifted and harmonised. 

(147.) 8. ravTTjs yap k.t.X. For to this (virtue) belongs the 
energy according to it. 

(148.) 9. viv oXap.fi ave iv, to conceive of. 

(1 49.) 9. igTjpyijKOTi, in a torpid state. 

(150.) 9. oi n p d t r o p t e s, those who are active, — opposed to those 

who are egrjpyrjKores. 

(151.) 10. ra>v ^AvxtKav. Pleasure is an affection of the soul, 
and will arise on all energies thereof, according to the dis- 
position of the agent. 

(151.) 11. ra fjbea p. a x^ r a i, their pleasures are inconsistent. 

(152.) 11. bia to p.ri k.t.X. Work out the major premiss im- 
plied here. 



12— 1G ; c. ix. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 21 

(153). 12. ire pidiTTov tip 6s, as it were an appendage. Lidd. 
and Scott. 

(154.) 13. et 8' ovt(o k.t.X. From 7rpbs vols elprjpevois to aXXcou 
is in a parenthesis, so that ovroi refers to e^ei rjdovrjv ev iavra. 

(155.) 13. d\\a fir^v k a i, further. — airovhalos: properly a 
man who is in earnest, — a man who regards life seriously ; 
hence a good man. 

(156.) 13. Kpivci a) s eiTropev: SC. that they are dyaOal kcu 
KdXai. The argument is a simple constructive hypothetical: 
the hypothetical premiss being, " if the good man judges 
truly, they are what he judges them;" and the minor de- 
pending on a reductio ad absurdum, viz., dyadal na\ KaXal, " if 
he does not judge rightly, who can do so ?" 

(157.) 14. bia> p lo-rai, are not separated from each other. 

(158.) 15. cpaiverai, evidently is. He now turns to the opinion 
of those who hold sktos dyadd to be happiness. 

(159.) 16. o6cv. From this opinion, that ckt6s dyadd are happi- 
ness, and that the want of these impair it, some identify it 
with eiTuxta, while others insist on its being apcrrj, intel- 
lectual or moral, whereby, as they think, evdaipovia is placed 
above the accidents of life. 



CHAPTER IX. 

(160.) 1. oOev. Erom these two opinions arises a further ques- 
tion as to its attainment. Those who hold it to be intel- 
lectual virtue (aocpia), say it is \ia6j]r6v. Those who hold it 
to be moral virtue, say it is eOio-rov, or do-Krjrov. They who 

hold it to be etrrvx i'a, say it is Sid dtlav polpav, or rvyr)V- 

(161.) 1. padrjrov. See Plato, Meno 1. In more than one of 
his dialogues, such as the Protagoras, Euthydemus, &c, Plato 
holds this opinion. The conclusion to which he comes in 
the Meno seems to be meant as a piece of irony against the 
Sophists. See Stallb. Pref. ad Menon. 

(162.) 1. napaylvtrai, springs up, as it were spontaneously. 



22 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. ix. 4—10. 

(163.) 4. 7to\vkoivov, open to most; those only excluded who 
were 7T€7n] papevot. npbs dperrjv. 

(164.) 5. e'lnep to. Kara cpvorcv. Observe the reverential be- 
lief in the wisdom and benevolence of nature here laid down. 

ra Kara (pvo-iv, the productions of nature. ra Kara 

Texvrjv, those things which are in the province of art, or 
any other productive or directive cause (irdo-av alriav), 
are also produced in the best way (6 p.o La> s). 

(165.) 6. 7r\r) fifieXes, contrary to analogy; out of tune with the 
rest of the creation. 

(166.) 7. iK tov \6yov k.t.X. The question raised, i.e. how far 
happiness is matter of ti>xv, is solved by what has been said ; 
for it has been stated that in its essence it is a mental 
energy of a certain sort (n-ot'o ns), according to virtue ; while 
of external goods, some only exist, as adjuncts, (eWe ir po<r- 

bet a- 6 at rrjs TOiavrrjs evrjpepias, chap. xi. 17), and others Only 

are of the nature of instruments to it (chap. ix. sect. 15) ; and 
if yjsvxris evepyelat kolt dperrjv do not come from tvxv, neither 

Can ev8aip,ovla. 

(167.) 8. to 7 s iv dpxfj, to what was said at the beginning of 
the treatise. This is an argument drawn from the opinions 
of men, as seen in their practical legislation. The force of 
the argument lies in iroirjo-ai dyadovs, as shewing that dperrj 
does not come from rvxtj. 

(168.) 9. el hot <os. An argument from the opinions of men, as 
seen in their modes of speaking of animals and children. 

(169.) 10. The difference between €v8aifia>v and iiaicdpios seems to 
be, that in the former the mental state of the person spoken 
of is the leading notion, his being in possession of that 
which constitutes happiness ; in the latter, it is rather his 
happiness externally, so to say, in its relation to gods and 
men, — favoured by the gods, and envied by men. In Ehet. 
i. 9. 34, p,ctKapio-p6s and elbaipovia-pos are said to be in them- 
selves the same, but to differ inasmuch as evhaipoviapos im- 
plies the possession of dperrj, as comprehending enaivos and 
iyKoipwv : and this seems to lead us to the above distinction 
between pandpios and evbaipcov, which the words blessed and 
happy in some degree represent. The distinction, however, 
naturally enough, is not always observed, and they are often 



LO, 11 ; c. x. 1—6. ETHICS.— BOOK I. 23 

used indifferently, when it is not required to bring out the 
proper notion of either one or the other. This will obviate 
some difficulties from the use of this word in the next 
chapter. 

(170.) 10. 8 el yap k.t.X. The reason of what has just been 
said is, that the elements of happiness are its essence, aperf 
reAfi'a, and its adjuncts /3io? reXeios : for which see the next 
chapter. 

(171.) 11. noXXal ydp. It requires filos r eA <• to s, for a man's 
life may change, and, in the opinion of men, his happiness 
would, under great calamities, change with it. 

(172.) 11. evbaipov'i£ei. This introduces the opinions dis- 
cussed in the next chapter. 



CHAPTER X. 

(173.) The common feeling of men, to which Solon gave utter- 
ance, demands investigation. As the opinions of men were 
to Aristotle, generally speaking, tests of truth, he had to 
shew how far, and in what sense, it was true that happiness 
was not attainable in this life. 

(174.) 1. The questions or difficulties started are : — 

1. Are we unable to say that a man is happy as long as 
he lives ? 

2. If so, is he happy when he is dead ? — anopia ; " Happi- 
ness is an energy." 

3. Or is it only meant that we can safely say that he is 
happy when he is dead ? 

4. But supposing this, are the events which happen after 
death to have no influence on his happiness? airopla. 
"But this is contrary to the opinion of men," (boKelyap 

K.T.X.) 

5. But if they have such influence, then the dead man 
would be at one time adXiov, at another evdaLpeav. 

(175.) 6. The three first questions practically resolve themselves 
into another, — how far external reverses destroy happiness ? 



24 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. x. 1—5. 

This may be solved by observing that cvbaipovla consists of 
its essence (dperf] reXeia), and its adjuncts (/3ioy reXeios). The 
later means a life which has performed or arrived at the 
end for which it was given, (Met. iv. 16, p. 110) ; and this 
evidently is when the energies of happiness are exercised 
without let or hindrance, (bk. vii. 13. 2, ovbepla yap evepyeia 
reXeLos epnobiCopevr} k.t.X.) ; and to this end we require both 
sufficiency of time, (prj<os fiiov rikeLov, bk. x. 7. 7,) for the 
development and formation of the intellectual and moral ener- 
gies, and sufficiency of whatever is necessary or conducive to 
their exercise ; both the presence of those things which are 
necessary to the calm and continuous exercise of the energies, 
and the absence of whatever may distract or impede their 
operation. (Bios rekeios then includes both of these, — suffi- 
ciency of time, and sufficiency of external goods ; but these 
destructible things are not the essence (Kvpiai), but only the 
adjuncts, of happiness, and are neqessary, because the world 
is what'it is (n p o o-Semu S' avTGiv a avOpdyinvos /3ioy) ; and there- 
fore they do not affect its real essential existence. Happi- 
ness, in its essence, aperf reXeia, is indestructible, unless some 
great blow (UpiapiKri ™? tu^) should paralyse the powers and 
destroy the balance of mind in which dperrj consists ; and 
where this is the case, a sufficient length of time is required 
for the restoration of what has been destroyed, before happi- 
ness can be re-established. If misfortune takes away xop^yiu, 
happiness, though mutilated and hindered, is not destroyed. 
Questions four and five may be answered by observing that, 
as in personal happiness, only the greater fortunes have any 
influence, so the fortunes of relations are not such as to 
destroy the happiness of the dead. 

(176.) 1. It is perhaps needless to refer to Herod, i. 32. Solon's 
opinion, or perhaps the opinions of those who held it in an 
exaggerated form, are answered by shewing the airopiai which 
follow, that is, by a reductio ad absurdum. 

(177.) 3. el ,de plt) Xeyofiev, — not Xeyoipev. He means, that 
he does not allow it to be true. 

(178.) 3. p.r) al & 6 av o pe v a>, SC. ra £g>vti. 

(179.) 4. airo<TTT)pa<ri, removes, generations. 

(180.) 5. aronov. that is, supposing that a man cannot be said 
to be happy till he is dead. 



5-13.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 25 

(181.) 5. t6 npoTfpov dnoprjOe v, sc. whether a man cannot 
be happy as long as he is alive. — r 6 vvv iiriC^Tovpevov, 
how far the fortunes of descendants influence the happiness 
of the dead. 

(182.) 7. ray ruxaj avaKvic.\el<r 6ai, the wheel of fortune re- 
volves. 

(138.) 9. ?rpoo-8firaj. Observe the irpos, i.e. as adjuncts. — 
dvOpoan ivos /3 / o ?, the circumstances of human life, — not 
the far) tov \6yov €%ovtos. We might suppose a state where 
aperr) reXeia would produce happiness, independently of these 
accidents. 

(1 84.) 9. Kvptai, are the essence. 

(185.) 9. a! e pa ire at. The energies of vice are the essence ot 
human misery, (see sect. 13, ovbels av ylvoiro, K.r.X.) When- 
ever these compressed forms of opposition occur, it is im- 
portant to work them fully out, not being contented with 
carelessly construing ivavrlov contrary, but substituting for it 
the opposed notion which it represents. 

(186.) 10. r <S X o y <3, our definition of happiness. 

(187.) 10. evepyeias ras Kar dperrjv. It must be recol- 
lected that Aristotle is not speaking necessarily of " moral 
virtue," but the excellence of man, whatever it is. 

(188.) 11. ro £i7rov/aepop, SC. /3e/3atdr^?. 

(189.) 11. ififi€\5>s, suitably, gracefully. See Lidd. and Scott. 

(190.) 12. p,aKapia>Tepov tov /3t op, i.e. his external life. 

(191.) 12. to fiaicdpiov signifies the state as it is viewed by 
men externally, without any prominent notion of the ivepyeiai 
dpeTTjs, in which it really consists, though of course it implies 
these : it is evSat/tcop viewed from another point. See above, 
note, 169. 

(192.) 12. to Ka\6v, the instinctive sense of right, — the princi- 
ple of aperr), and therefore the test of its presence. In the 
Greek mind, and hence in their language, there was a strong 
connection between the physically and morally beautiful : so 
X dpis. 

(193.) 13. r r) s £a>r} s,— not tov /3/ou, — but the internal life of hap- 



26 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. x. 14— 16 j 

piness. — /xio-t/to, things of bad desert. iEschylus has ex- 
pressed something of the same sentiment, Eum. 550. 

(194.) 14. ovbe\s av yevoiro k.t.A. to p.andpiov implies both 

the essence and the adjuncts, and therefore, of course, ceases 
when the adjuncts cease. The evbaifxcov continues so long as 
the essence remains, even though the adjuncts be removed : 
he will not cease to be evdaipav until the essence is destroyed, 
i. e. until the balance of mind is disordered by some over- 
whelming calamity, and the inner man becomes incapacitated 

for the dpeTtjs ivepyeiai. 

(195.) 14. reXe/o). fiLos riXeios includes, as stated above, both 
length of time and sufficiency of means : here it evidently 
means the former. 

(196.) 15. r i ovv KcoXvet Xiyeiv. He now turns from the 
point, how far a man is happy while he is alive, to the ques- 
tion how far he may be called so. 

(197.) 16. fiaKapiovs §' dvOpaiiTovs, happy as men; as far as 
human life admits. 



CHAPTEK XI. 

(198.) Having thus settled the first point, by saying that he who 
has dperrjv reXeLav and (3iov reXeiov may be called happy, (always 
bearing in mind the uncertainty of human things,) he goes 
to the second question which arises from this, viz. whether 
the fortunes of descendants or friends affect this happiness 
and thus prevent our speaking of a man as happy. 

(199.) 1. rats Sogais ivavrlov. This explains why he enters 
upon this seemingly unpractical question. If these 86£ai were 
right, then happiness would be a shifting unreality, and no 
man could be secure of attaining to it. 

(199.) 4. 8ia(pepei. There is much more difference between a 
calamity happening to a living or to a dead person, than there 
is on the stage between the actual acting of horrors and 
the relating them as past. — n p o i) ir d p x c i v, be represented as 
past. Hor. Ars Poet. 182. 



c. xi. 1—6; c. xii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 27 

(200.) 5. ravTT], i.e. this difference must be concluded upon in this 
way, and perhaps still more decidedly (fiaXKov 'la-cos) the ques- 
tion whether the dead are sensible of good or evil, al. ravr^v, 
which does not make such good sense. — e k tovtov, from 
what has been said. 

(201.) 5. d 7r X & ?, in themselves. — ?) i ne ivots, or relatively to the 
circumstances of the dead person; — a great loss of money- 
would not be great if a man had died very rich. 

(202.) 5. 6t de firj: if it is heavy, then, nevertheless, it only 
touches them (duKveirai, supplied from above,) in such a 
kind and degree, &c. 

(203.) 6. firjT a\\o tg>v to io vt co i/, SC. e vn p a£ i a>v rj dvcr- 
7r p a £ i co v t co v <p i\ co v. — fi y] b e v, SC. cpaiveraL o-vfiPdWecrOai 

K.T.X. 



CHAPTER XII. 

(204.) 1. Having thus disposed of the current opinion that hap- 
piness was unattainable, he now shews that it does not 
depend on human opinion, (eVau/erd^,) but has an independ- 
ent value and existence (n'/xioi/). It was necessary that he 
should do this at once, for it would have been useless for him 
to have disproved the popular opinion about it, if, in its own 
nature and existence, it depended on popular opinion. We 
must every now and then remember, that what may be termed 
the philosophical cant of the day obliged Aristotle to enter on 
questions and to use reasoning of which we do not see the 
necessity or the force : such men he was obliged to meet on 
their own ground, and argue with them from the positions 
and dogmas which they admitted. At first sight it would 
seem as if this characteristic of dbai^ovia would have been 
discussed most properly in the sixth chapter, with rehewv, 
avrapKes, &c. ; but what is said above shews that there is a 
reason for its occupying this place. 

(205.) 1. Swdfieatv, things merely instrumental to good or 
evil; which have no definite character, but may be either 
good or bad. It must either exist as a good subjectively, 



28 ETHICS.— BOOK I. [c. xii. 5—8 ; 

(tiraiveTov), or as a good objectively, (rifuov) ; for it is not 
one of those things which may be either good or bad as it is 
directed by opegis or 7rpoaipe<ris. See Met. viii. 5, p. 180, eicelvai 

5e to)v (PavTioiU K.r.A. ; and xi. 2, p. 241, ttjv vXtjv 8vvap.evrjv afx<f>a> 

K.T.X. 

(206.) 5. Eudoxus (who in Aristotle represents the Epicurean 
philosophy) argued as follows : — "Whatever, being a good, is 
not praised, is the highest good. Pleasure, being a good, is 
not praised : pleasure is the highest good. 

(207.) 5. crwriyoprja-ai, to act as advocate for; to plead in fa- 
vour of. 

(208.) 7. Tols 7T € 7TOVT] fit VO IS 7T € p\ TO. € y K Q> /JL I a, those wllO 

have laboured on the subject of encomium, neirovrjo-dai: 
see next chap. sect. 2. 

(209.) 8. dpxrjv. The final cause is in one sense the starting- 
point of action. 

(210.) 8. Tavrrjs yap x<*P lv «t.\. Observe this principle. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

(211.) There are not many difficulties which require explanation 
or remark in this chapter. 

(212.) 5. Kara ttjv e| dpxrjs irpoalpecnv : our purpose at the begin- 
ning of our book, which was not merely av&pa>mvov dyadov, but 

alsO 7T0\lTlKTjS T€\0S. 

(213.) 9. iv toIs egarepiKols \6yois. Aristotle's treatises 
in general have been sometimes divided into eo-oTepiKot and 
egcorepiKoL, and certain subjects placed in the one division, and 
others in the other ; but the difference lay not so much in the 
subject-matter, as in the way of treating it. Oi e|orfpi<oi \6yoi 
treated it in a familiar, popular way, and were probably used by 
Aristotle in his more public disquisitions ; while the eV<ore- 
piKoX \6yoi went more into the realities and principles of 
things, and were used by Aristotle in his exposition to his 
more select circle of disciples. And that Aristotle had a 
twofold way of treating the same subject, — one a superficial, 



c. xiii. 5—20.] ETHICS.— BOOK I. 29 

popular method, the other more mysterious and deep, — may- 
be gathered from the correspondence with Alexander, (Aulus 
G-ell. bk. xx. 5 ;) where Aristotle, being reproached by Alex- 
ander with having divulged to the world the mysteries of his 
philosophy, answers that what he had said would only be 
understood by those who had heard his more secret exposi- 
tions. The passage in Aulus Grellius should be referred to. 

(214.) 10. r<5 Ao'y o>, nominally. 

(2 15.) 12. ok avBpanlvYj, not peculiar to man, quoad man. 
(216.) 13. nXrjv si 7J-77 k.t.X. Mark his notion of the origin of 
dreams, — as if they were the vibrations of our waking feelings. 

(21 7.) 13. rvxovTiov, ordinary men. 

(218.) 15. dr e x» a> $ <a6 air e p '. SO the Platonic drexvios &<T7rep, 
just like. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. 

(219.) 1.7. o-axppovos *a\ dvdpelov: these are mentioned as 
being the most important virtues ; one being of the concu- 
piscible, the other of the irascible, part of the aXoyov. 

(220 .) 18. iiridvp,r)TtKop ical oX a> s opeKTiKov: opeKTiKov 
would include the impulses of the irascible as well as the 
concupiscible part. 

(221.) 18. t£>v p,a6r)fxaTiKa>v: aswe apply the terms e'xeiv 
\6yop to the intellectual energies of a scientific man. This 
is an argument drawn from language. 

(222.) 19. kv picas, in a proper sense. 

(223.) 20. twv egeav ras iiraiverds k.t.X. This is a pro- 
perty of virtue, and a test of it, — not part of its essence, but 
joined to it ; and this is a good instance of a definition tov 
Siopifav, as distinguished from one tov Seacvvvai ova-lav. The 
standard of obligation — that whereby obligation and actions 
were to be weighed was in Aristotle's system eVan/oy, — not 
the mere praise and blame of a fickle multitude, the whim of 
the moment, the mere passing breath of a mob, but the sen- 
tence of the collective conscience of mankind ; and as, in 
Aristotle's system, obligation was owing to man in a social 
state (ttoXis), so it followed that the collective voice of man 
should be the standard of obligation ; just as conscience, or 
the voice of Him to whom our obligation is due, is to us 
the standard of actions. 



30 ETHICS.— BOOK II. [c. i. 1—6, 



BOOK II. 

CHAPTEE I. 

In this book he discusses the nature of human virtue generally, 
and, with the exception of the first section, the practical 
nature of moral virtue; proving it to be a fie a- orris or* 
fiea-rf e£is, preparatory to shewing that it developes the 
epyov of man as a social being. 

(1.) 1. Of neither part of the soul is the perfection given us by 
nature, but it is the result of our own exertions and training. 

(2.) 2. e£ e6ovs. An argument from the opinions of men ex- 
pressed by etymology ; SO also o-axppoavvriv, i. e. crafaaav rf/v 
(ppovrjo-iv, bk. vi. 5. 5. bUaios, from dlxa, v. 4. 9. 

(3.) 2. It is worth while to work out these arguments syllogis- 
tically. The first is in the second figure, with the major 
premiss supported by some of the particulars of the induc- 
tion, which it implies, stated as examples. 

(4.) 3. it a pa <pvo-iv, contrary to nature. nefyvKoo-i, fitted by 
nature for it. So Cicero uses natus. This fitness consists in 
the (pvo-iKr) dperr), which will be treated of more at length in 
bk. vi. chap. 13. So Cicero, Tusc. Qusest. iii. 1, semina vir- 
tutum. The passage is worth referring to. 

(5.) 4. en ova k.t.X. Another syllogism in the second figure. 
— k op.i£6fie0a, we enjoy. 

(6.) 5. Argument from the opinions of men, as expressed in legis- 
lation. — <a\ biacpepei k.t.X. Observe this test of a good 
constitution and government. — idiCovres, gerundial par- 
ticiple — by habituating them. 

(7.) 6. eri in rS>v a v r S> v k.t.X., from the same source, (viz. 
7rd6ri, &c.,) and by similar means, (viz. actions). An argument 
consisting of a simple statement of a fact, supported by the 
analogy of the arts. 

(8.) 6. (pBeiperai, i.e. nava yiverai KaKta. This word is used be- 
cause the notion in Aristotle's mind was the destruction of 



7, 8 ; c. ii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK II. 31 

<j)vo-iKrj apery, or the dpxn of right action. See bk. vii. chap. 8, 
sect. 4. 

(9.) 7. 6pyds. . The opyal, though coming under tivfioudes, (see 
Top. iii. 7. p. 133,) are to be distinguished from dvpos, which 
has nivdvvos for its object, the principle or source of bravery, 
in its various shapes ; while opyai are those emotions of re- 
sentment which have okiycapla for their object, and are the 
sources of irpaoTys : 6vp6s is rather opposed to fjdovfj or eVi- 
Ovpla — see chap. iii. 10, — opyrj to (pikia or irpaorrjs. 

(10.) 7. 6 polos: similar, that is, to the energies of the habit 
itself. 

(11.) 8. Kara yap k.t.X., i.e. for on different energies different 
habits result. 



CHAPTEE II. 

(12.) Moral virtue being thus the result of action, it is necessary 
to find out the rule of action wherein the virtue consists ; 
and this as well in order that we may find out the practical 
nature of virtue, as that we may learn how to become virtuous. 

(13.) 1. irapova-a npayparela, the present treatise. — ov 6 ca- 
pias eveita. There is nothing in what Aristotle says here 
to justify the assertion that his Ethics is merely a practical 
explanation of and guide to virtue. It really is a scientific 
treatise, or a proof that virtue is the epyov and dyaOop of man, 
and intended to have a practical result upon life. It is not 
a mere speculative enquiry into the abstract nature of virtue, 
for the sake of Oeapla, and nothing more, the result of which 
might be some such definition of it, as that it was the agree- 
ment of man's soul with the Divine will, or the intercom- 
munion of the soul with the Divine nature, or the soul being 
in harmony with the intentions and will of nature, without 
any further result, such as Discipline Theoretical (axnrep al 
a'XXcu), the science of mathematics, or metaphysics ; but an 
enquiry into its pure practical nature, as exhibited in and 
governing action, and capable of being carried out by any 
one who will. 



32 ETHICS.— BOOK II. [c. ii. 1—6. 

(14.) 1. xvpiai, they decide. 

(14.) 2. Kara /x(i/ opdbv \6yov. Kara, in conformity with; 
in obedience to. The sense of Kara, according to, will vary, as 
that to which it is applied is viewed as a lifeless pattern 
or a living agent ; it gives the prepositions great clearness 
of expression to bear this principle in mind. — v ttokc io-0a>. 
This may be laid down for the present as a general (kolvov) 
definition ; and he will afterwards enquire into it more accu- 
rately : but it is not sufficiently particular and practical for 
his present purpose, therefore lie proceeds to investigate its 
actual phenomena, as seen in action. Another reading, of 
equal authority, is xmepiceicrOa) : but vnoK^adai is the Aristo- 
telian word, which he uses to lay down what he means to 
be a settled fundamental definition or point, or at least one 
which does not need at present further discussion. 

(15.) 2. tio-repov, bk. vi. 

(16.) 3. ovdev ia-rrjKos ^x € h have nothing fixed. He does not 
mean in themselves, (objectively,) but in our perception and 
application of them, (subjectively). — r a iv n pdgeo- 1, morals, 
ra <rvp.(p€povTa, politics, and r a vy i e iv a, that is, the 
whole moral and physical nature of man. He again in- 
sists on the uncertain nature of his subject, because he is 
again about to refer to the shifting particulars of human 
action. He is anticipating the objection that his science 
was no science at all, owing to its not arriving at certainty. 

(17.) 3. vyieivd. Aristotle's early medical education makes him 
delight in medical illustrations. 

(18.) 4. tov Ka66\ov \6yov, the question in general. — 6 nep\ 
rS>v KaO' eKaa-ra \6yos, the question when it goes into 
particulars. — ir apayyeXiav, professed system of instruction. 
The irapayyikiai were the promises held out by professors, 
and especially the Sophists, to make their pupils (or victims) 
perfect in such and such a subject. 

(19.) 4. avrovs, the agents themselves — r a nep\ rbv <aip6v, 
the circumstances of each particular act. 

(20.) 6. t o i a v t a, i. e. ra iv rais npageo-i. Observe 7re(pvKev.— <p 6 e L- 
p e a- 6 a t, to be brought into a bad state. — r £>v d <f> a v S> v, sc. 
this moral virtue, into the nature of which he is enquiring. 



6-9 ; c. iii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK II. 33 

This is a simple statement of the principle of argument from 
analogy. 

(21.) 6. o-vpneTpa, the exact point or quantity. 

(22.) 7. <rax})po(rvvr]s /cat av&pelas. These two virtues are 
here and elsewhere particularised, because the former is the 
dperrj of the concupiscible, the latter of the irascible, (6vpo~ 
elde s,) part of our nature. They are frequently thus joined 
by Plato. See also dpbpeia, bk. iii. chap. 6. 

(23.) 8. ov povov a I y eve a- e is k.t.X. Butler's theory of 
active impressions and active habits will illustrate much of 
what Aristotle says in this and the following chapter. — at 
yev eo-€Ls ku\ at av£r)<reis, habits of virtue are formed j 
cpOopai, habits of vice. 

(24.) 9. Kai y€v6pevoi } whenwe are so. 



CHAPTER III. 

(25.) 1. When pleasure results from our acting in any particular 
w r ay, apart, of course, from the consequences of the action, 
(avT<o tovtg) x a ip a>v )) it is a, sign of the habit being 
formed ; and for this reason : pleasure being the result of 
energising according to our nature, (Kara rrju vndpxova-av cpvo-w, 
Rhet. i. 10,) and habit being a second nature, it follows that 
pleasure results from it as a matter of course ; — and again, 
virtue being the right regulation of our pleasures and pains, 
and vice the wrong regulation thereof, it follows that in 
either case pleasure (good or bad) will wait on the actions 
proceeding from a good or bad habit. 

(26.) 1. rols epyois, acts, as distinguished from actions (ivpa&is): 
the latter imply npoalpea-is. 

(27.) 1. 7T6pi fjbovas Ka\ Xvnag: not merely about pleasure 
and pain, but the regulation of pleasures and pains, — of the 
impulses and checks of the compound principle of the higher 
self-love ; one urging us to, the other keeping us from, cer- 
tain actions. To each of the naBr), which are the sources of 
the several dperai, there is an 1760^57 or Xvnrj attached to the 

p 



31 ETHICS.— BOOK II. [c. in. 1, 2. 

gratification, and another r}8ovr) or \inrr) arising from the sense 
of Ka\6v or alo-xpou, which balance one another ; and when 
these are rightly balanced or regulated, right action follows. 
(See the particular virtues.) It must be remembered that 
tjbovr) has a twofold sense : it is either the feeling, tendency, 
instinct which is the motive cause of action, or the satisfac- 
tion which is the final cause of action ; or perhaps the two 
may more properly be said to be the same thing looked at 
from a different point of view : at all events, they imply 
each other; but there are some passages where the context 
requires one notion or the other to be more prominently 
brought out. Aristotle insists on dperfj being 7rep\ r)8ovas koI 
\vnas, because Plato would give a different view of moral 
virtue, which he would make to consist in the subordination 
of the irascible to the rational, and the total subjection of the 
concupiscible ; and therefore Aristotle takes pains to prove 
that the subject-matter, the raw material, as it were, of dperr) is 
the several f)8ovai and Xinrai attached to our nature. See Plato, 
Eep. Ml, 442 ; Phgedo, 68, c. 

(28.) 1. The proofs given are eight : — 

1. They are the motive causes of human action. 

2. They are the results of human action, in. the regulation 

of Which aperr] Consists (3). 

3. In governments, pleasure and pain, in the shape of re- 
wards and punishments, are used to counteract vice, 
and to encourage virtue ; and as all remedies act by 
contraries, it shews that what punishments are used to 
counteract is pleasure, what rewards are used to coun- 
teract is pain : therefore, in the opinion of men, the re- 
gulation of pleasures and pains produces right action (4.) 

4. They are the productive causes of virtue and vice (5). 

5. They comprehend all the final causes of human action 
(6, 7). 

6. They are innate principles of our nature (8). 

7. They are, more or less, the practical standards and 
rules of action (9). 

8. Virtue is either nepl 6vp,6p, or nepl r)8ovr)v : it is more 
difficult to grapple with and subdue the latter, and 

therefore aperr) is ivepi r)bovr)v (10) . 

(29.) 2. o) s 6 rrXdrcoj/ cferjcrlv. ~L>egg. 653, where he speaks 



4—7.] ETHICS.— BOOK II. 35 

of the aperf of children as consisting in a right perception of 
ydovrj and Xv-nt] : cppovrjais and d\rj3els d6£ai being the privilege 
of a more advanced stage of life. In the cultivation of this 
right aio-drjo-is of pleasure and pain consists naideia. The pas- 
sage should be referred to. 

(30.) 4. a I KoXda-eis. Observe this notion of the true nature 
and object of punishments, as being larpcicu. — 8 t a r£>v ivav- 
Ti<ov: see bk. x. 9, 10. 

(31.) 5. Ttporepov: See last chap., sect. 8. — it p 6 s ravra Kal 
77 e pi ravra rrjv cpvar iv e^u, is ofa nature correspond- 
ing to these, and has these for its subject-matter. 

(32.) 5. i 7T 6 roi) \6yov S to p I £ e r ai, or in as many points as 
reason distinguishes in such matters. 

(33.) 5. 6pl£ovrai, sc. the Cynics, and after them the Stoics, 
to whose view Plato somewhat approaches, when he speaks 
of the perfection of the passions consisting in their total 
subjection to reason. Speusippus used the term dox^^o-la 
to express cmaBtia. 

(34.) 5. drraBeias Ka\ rj pep las, states of freedom from affec- 
tions, and of repose. See Butler, Sermon v. "p. 82 : — " In 
general, experience will shew that as the want of natural 
appetite to food supposes and proceeds from some natural 
disease, so the apathy the Stoics talk of, as much supposes or 
is accompanied with something amiss in the moral character, 
in that which is the health of the mind." And yet there was 
truth in it, if they had but said freedom from certain affec- 
tions, at certain times or ways, &c. 

(35.) 7. rpia>v ovr<ov k.t.X. These are the three final causes 
of human action, — duty, advantage, pleasure : the last com- 
prehends all, for the other two present themselves to us 
(cpaiverai) as objects of pursuit under the shape of fjdv of 
different sorts. To the ko\6v is attached the rj8v of good 
desert, whereby it operates onus as a motive. These three 
motives, when viewed in their highest character, are identical 
in every action of the really good man : a true duty, a true 
and real expediency, and a true and right pleasure, coincide, 
just as truly as the piety and benevolence and self-love of 
Butler. 

(36.) 7. alaxpov is not merely shameful or base, but rather bad. 



3G ETHICS.— BOOK II. [c. iii. 9—11 ; 

As Ka\6v is the concrete of apery, so alaxpov is the concrete 
of KaKla, and implies a breach of moral obligation, viewed as 
if it were a deformity. 

(37.) 9. ttjv iracrav it p a y /x a r e i a v, the whole matter. 

(38.) 10. x a ^ €7r ^ re P ov ' The argument seems to be, — virtue 
must be a regulation of fjbovt] or 6vp.6s, and of these rjBovt] is to 
be preferred. This refers to Plato's notion, that dperrj con- 
sisted in the submission of 6vp.6s to \6yos, and the suppression 
of rjBovrj by the combined efforts of these two ; making it 
belong to the irascible rather than the concupiscible part of 
our nature. 

(39.) 10. 'HpaxXeiToj: Heraclitus's saying was x a ^ e7r ° v 7"P 

6vp.a pax^o-Oai. Pol. V. 11. 

(40.) 10. rfi dp err} Ka\ t fi 7ro\iTiKj} } Ethics and Politics. 

(41.) 11. fir/ ©cravrws yevopivav, i. e. as those whence vir- 
tue springs. 



CHAPTER IV. 

(42.) It is necessary to modify, or at least explain, what was laid 
down as to acts producing habits, for the analogy of the arts 
would seem to suggest that he who does acts of virtue is 
already virtuous. 

(43.) 2. ?*/ olb' in \ tS>v rex vS)V k.t.X. This is an example of 
the modes of refuting an argument from analogy, — either by 
denying the resemblance of relations on which the argument 
is founded, or the fact which it is attempted to apply from 
one side of the analogy to the other : here both are used. 
It is denied that, in the case of the arts, a mere act makes 
a man an artist ; and even if it did, the arts and virtue do 
not stand on the same ground, (en oide 6p.oi6v ea-nv): 
the productions of art are artistic, whatever may be the 
mental state of the artist ; while real acts of virtue imply 
and presuppose a particular mental state and intention, 

(n u> s ex^v). 

(44.) 3. nas exovra, of a certain sort. 



c. iv. 2-6 ; c. v. 1—3.] ETHICS.— BOOK II. 37 

(45.) 3. dfxeTaKivfjTois, i. e. whenever occasion- offers ; so, " pray 
without ceasing." 

(46.) 3. ras ciXXXas rix vas - This does not mean that the 
virtues are arts, nor is rex^as used for eget,s ; but ras <L\Xas is 
used in the sense of, " to the others above-mentioned, the 
arts;" aXkas agreeing with revets by attraction. Michelet 
illustrates it by the French " nous autres hommes." — awa- 
pifyielrat, t alien into account. 

(47.) 6. iirl top Xoyovy to reasoning, theories. 



CHAPTEE V. i 

(48.) 1 . fM€Ta Se ravra. Some editions, following the majority 
of MSS., omit these words. He here distinctly enters upon 
the enquiry rt ecmv aperr/, though in chap. 2 he had said, ov 

yap iv* el^cofxev t'l ianv f) dperrj, o-KCTrropeda. It need Only be 

repeated that it is into the practical, actual nature of dperr) 
that he enquires, and not into its abstract essence, such as 
the agreement of the soul with the will of God, &c. See 
note 13. 

(49.) 1. iv rfi yj/vxv rpia. These are three phases or shapes 
which the soul possesses or assumes ; — looking at the moral 
part of the soul, it presents itself to us as a simple hvva- 
fiis, (susceptibility of anger,) or as that dvwpis called into 
being, (rrdOos, anger,) or the habitual operation of that nddos 
(e|tff, npaoTrji). He here uses yjrvxn for the aXoyov part of it ; 
for though reason is a Svvapis, the energy of reason, or 
hidvoia, is not a nddos : and therefore, if we were here to 
include the intellectual under the term ^x?;, it would not 
be true that these were only rpid iv rfj ^vxv- — dwdpets. 
See Met. iv. 12, p. 103 ; viii. 1, p. 175. 

(50.) l.'The argument of the chapter is a disjunctive, the par- 
ticulars (denied in the minor) being disproved in the second 
figure. 

(51.) i l. rrpbs ra irddr], with regard to the irddt], their nature 
and objects. 

(52.) 3. or i ov XeydfieOa, argument from opinions of men, 
expressed in their modes of speech. 



38 ETHICS.— BOOK II. [c. v. 4—6 5 

(53.) 4. 7rpoaip€<T€is t 1 v e s, acts of Trpoalpeveis. 

(54.) 5. 7T a o- x e 1 1/, to be affected. 

(55.) 6. X e I ir e r a i. Observe this form for tlie conclusion of a 
disjunctive syllogism. Though e£ets may be translated habits, 
it must not be forgotten that it is not a mere phrase, but 
implies the notion of a state, consisting in certain princi- 
ples, or operations, or actions : thus egis diavorjriKT) is the 
mental exercise of certain powers, and the conscious pos- 
session of certain truths; eg is tjOlkt} is the possession of 
certain moral principles, and the operation of certain moral 
powers. In all such words it is important to realize to our- 
selves what they imply, so that the familiarity of the word 
may not deprive it* of meaning. 



CHAPTER VI. 

(56.) 1 . no la tis, in logical language, the difference. 

(57.) 2. p r] t i o v ovv. Observe his definition, or rather his 
description, of aperf) generally. This furnishes us with a 
test of aperf] ; it is the development of (d tt o t e X e 7) that of 
which it is the aperf, so that it is in a good state, (a v r 6 ev 
ex<>v,) and produces goodness of operation, (<a\ r6 epyop 
avrov ev d it o 8 I 8 a> <r i v) : whatever does "this, lookiug to 
the constitution and final causes of the thing or being in 
question, is its aperf. Whatever, then, does this for man, 
looking to his nature, and the intentions of nature respect- 
ing him, is his dperrj ; and the standard of this is (as he told 
us in the last book) eiracvos, or the opinion of men. See note 
223, bk. i. Michelet quotes from Cicero, De Leg. i. 8, " est 
autem virtus nihil aliud quam in se perfecta et ad summum per- 
ducta natura. dperrj is connected with^Ap?^; warlike strength 
and courage being, in the earlier generations of the world, 
the most esteemed excellence. 

(58.) 3. dyad 6s is the concrete of dperfj, when applied to per- 
sons, as KaX6v is, applied to actions. 

(59.) 4. nG>s, i. e. by repeated action. — rj8r], bk. ii. 4. 3. 



c. v i. i_o.] ETHICS.— BOOK II. 39 

(60.) 4. <j)v<ri5. This word is used in Aristotle in various ways, 
just as the designs and operations of nature may be recog- 
nised in various parts of the universe, and in different stages 
of the development of any being. See Met. iv. 4, p. 90. 
Thus — 1. In its widest sense, rpvo-is is the point up to which 
Aristotle could trace the governing power of the universe, 
and is spoken of as being that governing power, full of wis- 
dom, benevolence, and intelligence. 2. cpva-is is used to 
signify that subdivision of this nature in the widest sense, 
which is opposed to dvdytir] and r^, the general order of 
nature. See bk. iii. 3. 7 ; vi. 4. 4. 3. When speaking of 
the nature or constitution of any being or thing, cpva- is 
is used — a, for the properties and tendencies which that 
being or thing possesses, (Phys. ii. 1. 10) ; b, for the ener- 
gies thereof, (Phys. ii. 1. 14) ; c, for the perfection thereof, 
(Phys. ii. 2. 8 ; Pol. i. 2). 

(61.) 4. (Twex 6 ' «' Statperw, in everything which has parts 
and is divisible; in everything, that is, which implies the 
notion of quantity. The proper sense of avvexys is con- 
tinuous, where the parts or members of the thing spoken 
of follow in regular succession on each other, such as the 
parts of a line, or a solid body ; while 8iaiper6s is where 
there is no such succession or continuity of actual parts, 
as in numbers ; so that these two words may be taken as 
opposed, and expressing two different sorts of magnitudes, — 
" in everything which is continuous, and in everything which 
is not continuous ;" but it seems better to take them as ex- 
pressing together the characteristics of all magnitudes. In 
the notion of continuity is implied the notion of parts, and 
SiatpeTos may simply be translated divisible ; and so the Para- 
phrast (quoted by Michelet) takes it. Any ndBos and npagis 
may both be viewed as containing parts and divisible, both 
in regard of time and degree. 

(62.) 5. t ovto, the latter, i. e. to npos rjpds. 

(63.) 9. e7rto-T?7/A77, here used loosely for "system," which pro- 
ceeds on rules, as distinguished from empiricism, which acts 
without rules. 

(64.) 9. rj Se dp err), argument a fortiori. — aKpi^earipa k.t.X., 

" proceeds more upon rules. 



40 ETHICS.— BOOK II. [c. vi. 10—18, 

(Go.) 10. oX co s rj o- 6 rj v a i k a\ XvTrrjOrjvai. Inallof the 

affections given above there is a principle of pleasure or 
pain, and this it is which is really regulated by the dperrj : 
it is important to keep this in mind, in order to understand 
the real meaning of aperf being nepl fjdovds ko\ Xviras. 

(QQ) 13. peadTTjs apa k.t.X. He here gets to his full defi- 
nition of r)6iKr] dperrf. — peororrjs, viewed with regard to the 
mental state implied by egis, and when dperr) is viewed as 
being nepl irddrj, is a balance of the compound principle of 
self-love, pleasure and pain, which finds place in each of the 
several ivdOrj. If aperf is viewed as being -rrepl npageis, (which 
are also implied in e£i?,) then it is a mean point in action, 
equally removed from the too much and the too little ; in 
the former sense it is aroxao-TiKr) rod peo-ov, in the latter it is 
to peo-ov itself. 

(67.) 14. as ol Uvdayoploi c'UaCov, figured it. See Met. i. 5. 
rov air e ipov is a characteristic of the airtipov. 

(68.) 15. as av 6 cppovipos 6p i crete. He makes the Xoyos 
of the cppovipos the standard, — cppovipos, the morally wise. 

(69.) 16. evp io-Keiv kq\ at pelcrOai: the former is an effort 
of the understanding, the latter of the will. — iv re rots 
7rd6eo-i Ka\ rals n page a i. See above, note 66. 

(70.) 17. rbv to tI rjv etvai, the definition declaring its es- 
sence, — the to etvai t\ rjv, the being that which it was 
laid doion to be, (see Gr. Gr. 398, 4,) as conceived of in the 
mind, the notion we form of it, as distinguished from that 
which it is in actual nature, (tL io-Ti). See Anal. Post, 
ii. 6. 1. 

(71.) 17. aKpoT-qs: in itself it is a peaoTrjs ; in relation to all 
other moral states it is an dupoTrjs. 

(72.) 18. evOvs \aiv6pao~Tai crvv e iXrj p p ev a k.t.X., are con- 
nected, as soon as named, with the notion of badness ; imply in 
their very names the notion of badness ; instead of o-vvei- 
Xyjtttcu evOvs oovopacrpha. This interchange of the finite verb 
and participle is not uncommon in Gfreek, in certain phrases. 
See Gr. Gr. 696, obs. 7. 

(73.) 18. Xe'yerai r at cpavXa etvai. Bekker reads (on the 
authority of two MSS.) yyeyeTai', but the words, as they 



18—20 ; c. vii. 1, 2.] ETHICS.— BOOK II. 41 

stand, have a definite meaning : " all such are predicated of 
(as bad) by virtue of their essential and moral badness," (to> 

elvai <pav\a). 

(74.) 18. dXX' ov% al v7repf3oXa\ K.r.X., SC. \eyovrai <pav\ai. 

(75.) 18. e v t<5 fjv t)el k.t.X., "in the category of the proper 
person, or time, or mode, as in the case of anger." 

(76.) 19. ofioiov ovv k.t.X., "it is the same as if one was to 
lay it down that there is a mean," &c. 

(77.) 19. eo-rcu yap ovrtos: every vneppoXr] and eXXet^is would, 
on this supposition, have a vnepPoXr), peiroTrjs, eXX«\|ar in itself. 

(78.) 20. fiia to pecrov etval ir a> s a K p o v I the notions of 

imepfioXrj and eXXeiyp-is are excluded from dvdpiia, (for example,) 
because, though a pecrov, it is also an anpov or aKpor-qs, a fixed 
point of perfection. A man cannot have too little dvbpela, 
or too much, and still be dudpelos ; so those states or actions 
in the other extreme, which are fixed points of badness, are 
not bad from being in vnepfioXr) or eXAeix/ap, but simply from 
their own nature. A man is not cLSikos from being too much 
so, but simply from being so at all. 



CHAPTER VII. 

(79.) 1. KcvaiTepoi: another reading is Koiporepoi, which would 
mean that such arguments have a wider application, and 
thus have their advantages, but particular arguments are 
more accurate and true ; while if Kevcorepot be read, there is 
no opposition between the two clauses : koivos is used in this 
sense in ch. ii. 2, koivov /cat viroKeio-Oa ; and Michelet quotes 
De Anima, i. 1. The Paraphrast undoubtedly read kow6~ 

repot. 

(80.) 1. t)iaypa<pr)s, a sketch, a table, or tabular view: the 
latter is the best. This table should be drawn out. — en- 1 
tovtcoj/; " in the case of these particulars" the universal 
arguments must hold true. Or. Or. 633, 3, c. 

(81.) 2. It will be found that each of these several peo-oTTjres is 
a regulation, or balance, of the various instincts of pleasure 
and pain — the impulses to, and the checks from, certain 



42 ETHICS.— BOOK II. [c. vii. 2—14, 

actions — by the ko\6v, which acts by virtue of the pleasure 
attached to it, (see bk. iii. note 15,) or by the pain attached 
to the ala-xpou. These peo~6-n)Tes are, as we shall see more 
fully in the following books, regulations of the instincts, of 
6vfx6s, of bodily pleasure, of love of money, of love of power, 
social instincts, and of the sense of shame, which constitute 
the heart of man. 
(82.) 2. (f>6@ovs Ka\ Bdpprj. There seem to be four vices be- 
longing to this fieo-orris, as also to the Soon? Kal \^is to>v XPV" 
fidrau, but in reality there are only two ; but these may be 
looked at from different points of view. There are two in- 
stincts (<p6@oi and Odpprj) belonging to this pea-orris, (from 
either of which it may proceed,) which exist in different 
degrees of strength in different constitutions, though the 
former is by far the most common, and therefore, in the 
particular discussion of dvbpeLa, it is viewed almost exclu- 
sively as a regulation of <£d/3os by mXov : but as one or the 
other instinct is viewed as the motive cause, the extremes 
are called the excess and deficiency of either the oue or the 
other. 

(83.) 2. 7roXXd eo-Ti d v aw p. a. Human language not having 
recognised them, is a sign that practically they never, or at 
least very rarely, exist, cpofios is an universal instinct. 

(84.) 3. fjTTov -rrepl rds X v n a s. Temperance consists rather 
in acts of abstaining from pleasure than endurance of pain ; 
hence, in the third book, it is almost exclusively treated as 
7re/H rjdovds. See bk. iii. 10. 1. 

(85.) 3. oi Trdw, not at all. Soph. (Ed. Col. 142. 

(86.) 6. &ia6c<reis = e|«ff. 

(87.) 8. nepl p,iKpd 8ia<pepovcra, having its difference in 
being about small things. 

(88.) 10. vcprjyrjpevov rponov, literally, in the way which is our guide. 

(89.) 11. tva pdWov tar id a pep k.t.X. : that is, that this pe- 
<t6tt)s is the dperrj of the moral part of the soul ; for he has 

before laid down tu>v 8e e£«oi/ tcis inaLverds operas KaKovpev as his 
standard of dperr). — en a iverov, object of good desert ; yp-eKrd, 
objects of bad desert. 

(90.) 14. ev to Is ir d 6 e a- 1, in the mere affections, which are not 



16; c. viii. 1-8.] ETHICS.— BOOK II. 43 

exhibited in any definite irpdgis. Thus aldws is an instinct 
rather than a virtue ; veneris and cmxaipcKctKla are feelings. 

(91.) 16. a\Xd<9t, sc. Ehet. ii. 9. 

(92.) 16. oi>x dnXSys Xtyer at, is not spoken of in one sense 
only. 



CHAPTEE VIII. 

(93.) This chapter and the next are rather practical : having 
shewn his q&fo) aperf to be a pea-oTrjs, he gives us practical 
directions as to its attainment. 

(94.) 1. tv a <r a i n a cr a l s avriKelvrai tv a> s. o-a>(ppoo~vvr), for 
instance, is opposed to dicoXao-ia ; dicoXao-la is opposed to 
dvaiaOrjcria. 

(95.) 2. air a 6 ovvr a t, push him further from themselves. 

(96.) 6. npos de to p e a o v k.t.X. Each virtue being the regu- 
lation of the impulse of fjbovr), by the check of Xi/nr}, or vice 
versa, the extreme, which is an exaggeration of the regu- 
lating principle, is less opposed to the mean than the other : 
thus in dvbpeia, the Xvirrj ((pofios) is regulated by the ydovrj, 
(dappos, arising from a sense of koXov,) and hence Opao-vrrjs, 
which is an exaggeration of Bappos, is nearer dvdpela than 
SeiXta : so in o-<o(ppoo~vvr), the r^bovrj is regulated by the Xvnrj 
arising from a sense of alo-xpdv, making us decline pleasure ; 
and hence dvaio-O^o-ia, which is an exaggerated form of de- 
clining pleasure, is less opposed to o-axppoavvrj than aKoXao-ia. 

(97.) 7. 6 poiorepov. See last note. 

(98.) 8. ire pa 8' ig rjpeov. The passion which, from our con 
stitution, is the one which rises up first within us, is the one 
to be regulated ; and therefore, from what was said in note 
96, the extreme, which is the development of this emotion, 
is more contrary to the mean than the other, which is only 
the regulating principle carried too far. *— 

(99.) 8. olov avrol k.t.X. There is here a recognition of the 
corruption of human nature. 

(100.) 8. inlboo-is, properly, "that to which the greater in- 
crease accrues," i. e. that to which we are mostly inclined, — 
tendency. 



Le 



44 . ETHICS.— BOOK II. [c. ix. 1—8, 

CHAPTEE IX. 

(101.) 1. IkclvS>s c'lpTjrai. He speaks as if be had sufficiently 
proved the point that tjOikt) dperr) is a peo-oTrjs : it now remains 
for him to prove that this fxea-orrjs performs the epyov of man. 

(102.) 2. inaivcTov refers to the opinion of others; KaXov 
to our own sense of right. 

(103.) 3. KaKvyjra). A curious instance of Aristotle's memory fail- 
ing him : it was Circe who gave the advice which Ulysses 
refers to in the lines quoted from Od. xii. 219. 

(104.) 4. Kara top devrepov, cpao-i, ttXovv: a proverb, applied to those 
who having tried and failed, try again, or, according to 
Eustath. Odys. p. 1453, ore dirorvx^v tis ovpiov Kotirais irXcji 

Kara Uavaavlav. See Stall, ad Plat. Phaed. p. 99, D, — as our 
next best. 

(105.) 5. els Tovvavriov k.t.X. One would hardly expect to 
see self-distrust and self-denial so fully and practically recog- 
nised by a heathen philosopher, at the same time with the 
distinction between resistance to and total suppression of 
the passions. But here, as elsewhere, Aristotle's knowledge 
of human nature and human circumstances, and his sound 
practical sense, led him right where others went wrong : 
mark, too, the practical wisdom of making 77801/77 and Xvn-7 
the test of our disposition, iavrovs is omitted in some 
editions : on its use for r^pas avrovs, see Or. Or. 654, 2, b. 

( 1 06.) 6. ev wavTi 8e cpvXaKriov r6 778 v. Aristotle, though 
of course unacquainted with the doctrine of the corruption 
of man, had too practical an eye to overlook its actual results 
on men's hearts and actions. 

(107.) 6. dbeKao-Toi, unbribed. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. 

§eKa£o). — onep ovv. II. y. 158. — e n 1 X e y e 1 v, to repeat. 

(108.) 7. ol yap pabiov k.t.X. The whole of this passage is 
a striking instance of the practical wisdom of Aristotle's 
views and system. 

(109.) 8. T<5 X d y o), in a general argument or principle. 

(110.) 8. ovde yap aXXo ovbev tcov al(rOr)T <bv. He here 

fully recognises the variable nature of all objects of sense ; 
but he does not, for that reason, discard all that they tell us, 
as valueless to the philosopher. 



8, 9 ; c i. 2.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 45 



(111.) 8. iv tj) alo-dr^a-ei r) k p I <r 1 5. He seem s here to recog- 
nise a moral sense, which is able to recognise right and wrong 
in particulars. He connects this alo-drja-is with cppovrjo-is in 
bk. vi. ch. 10. 9. How far this moral sense is, in his opinion, 
given us by nature, or acquired by experience and instruc- 
tion, is a disputed point; but on the whole, he seems to 
recognise it as a faculty of our nature, which is improved 
and developed by education. — — " 

(112.) 9. S 77X0 v: another reading is brjkoi, which is used intran- 
sitively. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. ii. So much, then, is 
clear. 

(113.) 9. on 17 fieo-r] egis k.t.X. He speaks here as if he had 
quite concluded this part of his subject, viz. that this peo-6- 
tt)s, or pear) cgis, is the virtue (kiraiveTr)) of the moral part of 
the soul. 



BOOK III. 

CHAPTEE I. 

(1.) In this book Aristotle discusses the voluntariness of human 
actions, and the consequent responsibility of man as a moral 
being ; and then enters into the particulars of the principal 
virtues of the irascible and concupiscible passions, {avbpda 
and o-axppoo-vvrj,) partly to support what he had before shewn, 
that r)6iKr) dperr) is a peo-orrjs, and partly to prove that in each 
particular this peaorqs performs the i'pyov of man, and puts 
him in right relations to himself and others, which was the 
test of his dperr), as given in the second chapter of book ii. 

(1.) 2. Before it can be shewn that r)BiKr) pea-orrjs is the i'pyov of 
man, it must be proved that human actions, whether good 
or bad, are voluntary, or rather, the vague theories of certain 
philosophers to the contrary must be overthrown : for if 
these are true, and moral action, right or wrong, virtue or 
vice, is not voluntary, but determined by some overruling 
influences, (men being mere puppets of the caprice of fate,) 
the notion of \6yos would be excluded, and thus moral virtue 



46 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. i. 3—6 5 

Could not be the true dpert) rrjs {arjs tov \oyov c'xovtos ; the 
epyov of man must be looked for elsewhere : besides which, 
it has a practical use for politicians, in theory as well as 
practice, for the adjustment of rewards and punishments. 

(3.) 3. The major premiss of dicovaiov 81a /3tW, which he takes 
first, is — Whatever is fiiaiov has its dpxh egcodev. — 6 n pdrrmv 
r\ 6 7rd<rx«>v does not mean the agent and patient of the 
same action, but the patient of the /3ia, whether active or 
passive. — k vpiot ovres, having power over lis. 

(4.) 4. oo-a be 8 1 a cj> 6 @ o v k.t.X. It has been said that there 
is a contradiction between what is said here about kcAov and 
what is said in sect. 1 1 ; but he is talking here of actions in 
themselves involuntary, which are very different from what 
he is considering in sect. 1 1 ; and the immediate motives to 
such actions are either a feeling of fear or a sense of duty : 
these act one against the other. A man sometimes does 
something which fear would make him decline, from a sense 
of duty ; sometimes something to which his sense of duty 
makes him averse, from fear. 

(5.) 4. 7r p a £ a v r o s, sc. avrov, supplied from the general context. 
See Gr. Gr. 696, obs. 3. 

(6.) 6. p.iKTa\ it page is, compound actions. "Where there is a 
mixture of willingness and unwillingness, though the mere 
fact of the action being done proves that willingness prevails, 
(paXkov $' eoucep eKovaiois. Sect. 10,) yet unwillingness exists 
in the abstract (arrkois, icad' avro) ; but willingness, looking at 
the circumstances : and acts thus done, are to be judged by 
the state of the will at the moment of action ; and hence 
they are voluntary, or at least partly so, as no action can 
take place without the will, for some cause or other, con- 
senting (jrpdgeis §' ev rols Ka6' e/cacrra, ravra d' eKovaia. Sect. 
10). There are four such npageis here given : two of nega- 
tive suffering, where cpofios is overruled by kq\6v ; two of posi- 
tive action, where koXoV is overcome by cpofios. The nature 
of these pinral irpdgeis, and the view taken of them, vary ac- 
cording to the thing done and the motive for doing it : 
where eKovaiov is evidently the strongest element of the com- 
pound, there enaivos or yjroyos is awarded ; where aKovanov is, 
from the very nature of the action, very strong, even though 
overpowered, we grant o-vyyvcopi]. 



7_9.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 47 

1. Where shame or pain is borne for the sake of some 
great real ko\6v — enaivos. 

2. Where shame or pain is borne for the sake of no ko\6v 
at all, or no equivalent ko\6v — \jr6yos. 

3. Where <a\6v is violated to escape some horror, virep 

avOpoonov — (avyy vooprj). 

4. Where ku\6v is grossly violated to escape something 
less horrible — \js6yos. 

Michelet instances Zopyrus and Regulus for the first ; — we 
might add Lady G-odiva. ala-xpov is here used in the sense 
of " shameful" rather than, as usually in the Ethics, of wrong, 
as opposed to koKov. Numerous instances of the three other 
sorts will be found in the histories of any Eastern rule, such 
as Gibbon's Rome, or Creasy's Ottoman Empire. In our 
own history, the first is illustrated by the martyrs refusing 
their pardon at the stake ; the second by Quakers prefer- 
ring to go to prison to taking off their hat in court ; the 
third by Cranmer signing his recantation; and the fourth 
by any traitor who has turned king's evidence to save his 
neck. ' 

(8.) 7. dv an a\ i v, SC. orav alcrxpov rj Xvnripov VTropeuaxriv dvrl Tiva>v 
prj peydXau fj KaXfov. 

(9.) 8. 'AXicfiatai/a. Alcmaeon is made to kill his mother on 
the plea that his father imprecated curses on himself and his 
country if he did not do so. 

(10.) 9. Observe how Aristotle refuses to dogmatise in cases 
where each action must assume its particular hue from the 
circumstances. 

(11.) 9. ok yap k.t.X. The force of the yap is difficult to discover 
at first, especially in connection with what follows, Sdev k.t.X., 
but the whole may be paraphrased thus : " It is difficult to 
abide by one's deliberate determination, (rots yvcao-Oclcriv,) for 
the struggle is, for the most part, between duty, which for- 
bids cu<rxp«, an( i f ear > which urges to them ; fear makes us 
give up what had been, from a sense of duty, resolved on : 
and hence praise and blame arise on such actions, for the 
struggle thus being, for the most part, between fear of pain, 
a wish to avoid ra irpoo-hoKa>pcva Xvnrjpd, and a sense of duty, a 
wish to decline a dvayKa&vrai alaxp a " ("'^XP" ^ s nere used 
for something "wrong" not merely "shameful;" it is here 



48 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. i. 10—14, 

opposed to \v7rrjp6v, before it was joined with it ;) " and these 
being balanced one against the other, then if alo~xpdv is pre- 
ferred, it shews that the will is more disinclined to KaXov, 
and ylroyos is attached to it ; if Xvmjpov is preferred, it shews 
that the will is rather inclined to KaXov, and erraivos ensues ; 
where Xvnrjpov is too great to be borne, then there is o-vy- 
yvd>p.r), for there is no proof of any lack of inclination to 
KaXov, as far as is practicable for man ; where there is no real 
KaXov, as in 2, note 6 above, the very act of enduring Xinr] 
or alaxpov unnecessarily is wrong, and hence yjfoyos." 

(12.) 10. a it X S> s, without reference to the puKral npdi-eis. 

(13.) 10. Ka\ f) dpxy, SC. o)V f) dpxr]' 

(14.) 1 1 . The argument is an elenchus, which it may be as well 
to work out, as well as that in the second figure, immediately 
following. 

(15.) 11. KaXov p,e6' Tjdovrjs. This is the pleasure which fol- 
lows on right action, in the shape of self-approbation. 

(16.) 11. yeXolov 8r). This argument need not be reduced to 
a strictly logical form, as it is a simple appeal to common 
sense. Another reading is be, but brj marks a new argument, 
as well as a conclusion : see Grr. G-r. 721, 1 . He refers to a 
modified form of the former theory, which makes rjbv alone 
fiiatov. 

(17.) 13. to be Si' ayvoiav. Bekker here begins chap, ii., 
which is perhaps the more natural division ; but for the con- 
venience of other editions, the sections will be numbered as 
if in continuation of chap. i. 

(18.) 14. ere pov be eoiKe k.t.X. The difference between doing 
an action St' ayvoiav, and ayvo&v, is that in the former the 
ayvoia is the direct cause of the act, in the latter the ayvoia 
is not the direct cause of the act, but of the p,oxdr]pia, whence 
the act proceeds. This is illustrated by bk. v. chap. viii. 

sect. 12, ocra yap p.r) povov dyvoovvres dXXa <a\ d i' ay- 
voiav ap-aprdvovo'i avyyvcop.oviKa. — ocra be p.r) 8 i ayvoiav dXX* 
dyvoovvres p.ev b i a tv a 6 o s be ov crvyyvcop-oviKa. The nddos may 
make the agent dyvoelv what he is about, but it is itself the 
cause of the action, and not the ayvoia ; — ayvoia is but the 
accident of the action. 



11-14.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 49 

(19.) 11. The ayvoia, which does not take away responsibility, 
is either rj Ka06\ov, ignorance of some general principle of 
morality, which ought to be known, as, " Honesty is the 
best policy ;" or 17 b> rfj rrpoaipeo-ei, ignorance shewn in the act 
of choice, where, through the bad moral state of the agent, 
he fails to discern the character of the particular action, but 
puts sweet for bitter, and bitter for sweet ; such as where 
a man fancies that what is called a white lie is not dishonest. 
In this case the ayvoia is not the immediate, but the remote, 
cause of the action ; indeed, it is not properly the cause of 
the action at all, for this springs directly from the p.oxBrjpia, 
or wicked tendencies, which partly consist in this absence 
of moral principles, and, in particular cases, in the want 
of moral perceptions. Thus, if a man does not think im- 
purity wrong, this is a result of guilty demoralization, a 
want of moral principles; or if he does not think obscene 
language to come under the category of impurity, this want 
of moral perception does not make the action cLkovo-iov; in 
either case it is not the cause of his doing something which 
he does not intend, but it is the a'inov rrjs noxfypias, of his 
intentionally doing what is wrong, inasmuch as the bad 
moral habit is caused by his not knowing better the nature 
of right and wrong ; and thus fioxOrjpla leads him wrong, 
though it might not have acted had he known the real 
nature of the matter better. Hence the importance not 
only of moral principles, but also, and, if possible, still more, 
of right and clear moral perception in particulars. 

The case of the ayvo2>v, however, who is ignorant not of the 
moral character of the particulars, (17 iv rrpoaipeo-ei ayvoia,) but 
of the particulars themselves, (ayvoia 17 Kad' eKaa-ra,) is very 
different : here the ayvoia is not the cause of his intentionally 
doing a wrong action, (rrjs noxOrjpias,) but of his doing some- 
thing which he does not intend ; as where a man shoots a 
friend from not being aware that the gun in his hand was 
loaded. But in both cases the degree of blame or sympathy 
would vary with the consideration whether the ignorance 
was such as might or ought to have been avoided, or the 
strength of the rrdOos which overruled the moral knowledge or 
perceptions, (see note 18). But on all these points Aristotle 
refuses to dogmatise. 

(20.) 14. did ri k.t.X., through the drunkenness or the anger, 

H 



50 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. i. 14—18, 

or, as others interpret it, through i)8oi^, or some such motive, 
not through ignorance of right from wrong. These are in- 
stances of tov dyvoovvTu trpdrrtiv'. but the to dyvodv of the man 
who is in those states does not relieve him of responsibility, 
though the moral knowledge which would have restrained 
him is, by his own fault, suspended. A man indeed, in an 
angry or drunken fit, might strike his father, not through 
ignorance of its being wrong to do so, but having mistaken 
his father for some one else. In such a case there is <rvy- 
yvco/iq, when the state of blindness is considered ; but when 
the person is viewed as having wilfully, and contrary to mo- 
rality, brought himself into this state, dmXa eiriripia ensues. 

(2L.) 14. dyvoel. Mark the state of ignorance in which Aris- 
totle conceives the bad man to be : and if this plea were 
allowed, there would be no such thing as blame attaching to 
any bad action, onep cLtottov. Michelet remarks on the con- 
trast between Aristotle and some modern philosophers, who 
hold that a man is excused in whatever he does, if he does 
but think it right. Conscience is objective, as well as sub- 
jective. 

(22.) 15. (HovXerai \eyeo-0ai, claims to be defined as. The 
meaning of it is — X eyerai, simply predicated ; fiovXerat 
Xeyeo-dai is in theory predicated. — t6 <rv p.(f>epov. The 
political dyadov is viewed as implying that of the individual. 

(23.) 15. r) lv rfj tt poaipeo-ei a y v o i a, ignorance at the mo- 
ment of choice of the character of the particular. — ^ ku66- 
Xov, ignorance of the universal. 

(24.) 15. ev ofj, the circumstances; nepl a, the particulars. 
The former would be when a man shot his friend not know- 
ing he was near ; the nepl a, when he did not know the gun 
to be loaded. 

(25.) 16. ov x €l P 0V > it wiM ne as we M' 

(26.) 17. e Knead v a vtovs, it had escaped them unawares; 
they had let it fall. — &o-nep rj Mepom] : see Poet. c. 14. 
Merope is about to kill her son in ignorance, but recog- 
nises him in time. 

(27.) 17. Sel£at, to exhibit in any way. — dKpoxeipi£6pevoi } Anglic^, 

with the gloves. 
(28.) 18. eu toIs kv p i a rdro is, in the most essential points 



20—27 ; c. ii. 1, 2.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 51 

of the action, — those that most decide its character. — h oh 
f} npagis, the circumstances of the action. 

(29.) 20. This definition of Uova-iov, the result of the foregoing 
chapter, will now be applied to human action. 

(30.) 21. ydp refers to an objection against this definition, on 
the ground that actions from concupiscible or irascible im- 
pulses, though iv ai>To>, are involuntary. 

(31.) 22. The argument is an elenchus. 

(32.) 24. bet S£ <a\ dpyi£e<r0ai. For the final causes of anger 
here recognised by Aristotle, consult Butler, Sermon viii. 

(33.) 25. Argument in second figure. 

(34.) 26. t(S dKova-ia elvai. "What difference is there in faults 
committed from reason and those committed from desire, in 
respect of their being voluntary ? — it cannot be predicated of 
the one without being predicated of the other. 

(35.) 27. o&x tJttov dv 6 p <oiT i Ka civai to. aXoya irdBrj. 

This is the key-stone of Aristotle's moral system, discern- 
ible whenever he treats of man, his nature, position, duties, 
— as in the Rhetoric, for instance. He looks upon him as 
being of a compound nature, made up of reason and pas- 
sions : in fact, he looks upon him as he is, and not as he 
might have been, had he been created differently. 



CHAPTEE II. 

(36.) 1. 7T€ p\ 7rpoaipeo~ea>s: by an examination into the mo- 
tive cause of human action he will shew it to be volun- 
tary. 7i p oal pea- 1 s is the deliberate act of choice; not the 
general principle which directs the choice, but the choice 
of some particular, directed well or ill by the reason, as the 
agent is good or bad. 

(37.) 1. o I k e 1 6 Tar oi/, most nearly connected. — rS>v Tvpaf-cav: 
npci^Ls is here used in a loose way for epyov, as, strictly speak- 
ing, 7Tpa£is includes Trpoalpea-is. 

(38.) 2. fyaiverai, evidently is. — earl ir\clov: it is a species 

of ckovo-iov. 



52 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. ii. 3, 5, 

(39.) 3. ol 8e Xeyovres. He proceeds to shew, by an analysis 
of npoalpeo-is, that it is not a simple mental impulse or act, 
but a compound motion : it is not an impulse of the irascible 
or concupiscible parts of our nature, nor is it merely an 
opinion on moral matters, in any of which cases it might 
more or less lose the character of ckovo-iov. 

(40.) 5. This chapter and the following one will be more clearly 
understood if we trace the course of an action of our concu- 
piscible part from its first beginnings in the soul of a rational 
agent up to its completion. 

e 7r i 6 v fi i a (De Anima, p. 32, — rjbeos opegis), a general 
latent appetite or propension towards 1781;, resulting either 
from the Xinrr} of (pvaiKal evdetai {koivclL), or from particular 
propensions of fjBovfj tfdiai, eVttferoi), existing differently in 
different individuals, as the several nddr) exist in them in 
different degrees of strength. 

aia-Brjo-is, presenting to the iinOvpLa, by means of the 
(pavraa-ia, (see De Anima, p. 30,) an object suitable to the 

epBeia or iraOos. 

iiriOvpia, existing actively, (rovde tov fjbeos opegis,) — a sen- 
sible propension, — appetite in motion. 

o p e £ 1 s = iiriOvpia, directed towards some definite object, 
appetitive ; — Slagis, an appetite, a seeking after ; — ope|ts, a 
stretching forth after. 

86% a, a judgment of the moral reason as to the pursuit 
or avoidance of the object in question. 

j3 o v X tj a- 1 s, will, — an act of the will consequent on the 
decision of the reason that the object is a proper one for 
pursuit, — a choice of the end, — will of the end : povkrjo-is tov 
ayaOov. 

o peg is, again, — confirmed by the assent of the reason, — 
rational 8ia>|is : bk. vi. 2 ; putting in motion, 

/3ovXevo-is, a deliberation as to the means proper for 
the attainment of the object, — will of the means : tov <Tvp,<pe- 
povros ayaBov ye ovtos. 

TTpoalpeo-is, will of the action, — purpose; a deliberate 
choice of the whole action and means, combining PovXtjo-is 
and fiovXevais. 

opegis again, under the shape of irpoaipecris, (opeyopcda Kara 
rfjv fiovXcvo-iv) : see end of chap. v. 



5.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 

There are then three sorts of 8pf£is : — 

1. The energy of imOvpia, appetitive, (De Anima, p. 32,) 

tov rjbeoS' 

2. The energy of the imBvpla confirmed by reason,- 
rational, tov reXovs. 

3. Of the whole action, — determinate, ttjs 7rpd£cm a>s dya- 

6ov kcu rjSeos- 

It must further be borne in mind that when the character 
is rightly formed, that is, when the agent is a good man, all 
the steps previous to povXrjo-is are merged in the impulses 
towards action ; are rational impulses of the ?}8os towards 
good, inasmuch as nothing presents itself to the desire as 
good or pleasant, but what the reason simultaneously ap- 
proves of as really good and pleasant. Here the opegis and 
pov\r)<ris are synonymous, and the act of desire may be 
termed either opefrs or PovXrjo-is: and this probably is the 
reason why Aristotle not unfrequently interchanges these 
terms, using the one for the other. This, though founded 
on a true view of the phenomena of human action, will 
confuse the student, unless he is careful to distinguish be- 
tween cases where a difference, as given above, is made 
between them, and where they are viewed, as in the case 
of a good man, as practically identical. "Where analysis re- 
quires strict accuracy, e n- 1 d v /* t a may be translated desire or 
propension, — o pegis, appetite, — /3 ovXtjo-is, will ; — these terms 
being used in the sense given by Hooker, bk. i. vii. 3 : " The 
object of appetite is whatever sensible good may be wished 
for; the object of will is that good which reason teaches us 
to seek." So PovKrjo-is, rather than opc&s, would be the term 
for a desire after those things which reason, rather than 
uo-Btjo-is presents as r}8ea, such as a present sacrifice for future 
gain ; but even here opcfrs might be used to express that 
assent and energy of the irrational part towards the qSv, 
without which an action cannot arise. In this case, the 
course of the action would stand thus : — 

(3ouX)/(riy, presenting the ayadov as rjdv. 

ope£is, stretching out after it. 

The next stage, the definite pov\r)<ris of an ordinary action, 
is of course merged in the former impulsive act of fiovkrjo-is. 
The fact is that the irrational part, as the motive cause, 
must operate in every action : where the irrational presents 



54 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. ii. 3, 4, 

the object, reason follows and directs ; where reason pre- 
sents the object, opegis, the act of the irrational part, adopts 
it as a motive : and further, where the motive power of the 
end is rather considered than its quality (right or wrong), 
opegis is the word used, rather than fiovXrfcris. Hence, when 
speaking generally of an action, (as in bk. vi. chap. 2,) it is 
said to proceed from fiovXevcns and '6 peg is: when viewed in 
relation to the intellect, povXrja-is is the proper term. '6pe£is, 
properly speaking, takes cognizance of the end as f)8v ; /3ou- 
Xrjcris as aya66v. 

PovXtjo-is, again, has degrees, and corresponds both to wish 
and will, as used in English Ethics : when the object is in 
itself unattainable, it is a mere imperfect fiovXrj&is, or wish; 
the question of bvvarov is not taken into consideration; in- 
deed, this properly belongs rather to fiovXevo-is : but when the 
object it decides upon is attainable, then it is a perfect $ov- 
Xrjo-is, or will. 

emOvpiia, again, is apparently identical with rjbovrj in its sense 
of a principle of human nature, which impels us to pursuit 
of the sensible t)8v, but it has Xinrr] attached, as implying 
an evSeia (p.€Ta Xvnrjs yap 17 €7n8vp,la, chap. xi. 6) ; and in bk. vii. 
7. 3, it is distinguished from it : as imOvfiia is rather a passive 
feeling, created by ivhelai, and drawn out by temptations ; 
rjbovrj, a general tone, or temper, or mind, in which the motive 
cause of human nature consists, — (see bk. vii. 7. 3,) — in its 
bad sense, a tendency towards self-indulgence, either general 
Or particular, which creates temptations and opportunities 
for itself: it is this which Aristotle is warning us against 
at the end of bk. ii. It is believed that an attentive con- 
sideration and development of what is here said will enable 
the student to assign to these terms, wherever they are used, 
their real meaning and value, and to solve the seeming con- 
tradictions which the use of them in different meanings 
produces. 

(41.) 3. e7rt,6v[iiav. It is not a simple energy of our concu- 
piscible nature — ^ Ovfiov, nor of the irascible — ft /3 o v X 77- 
aivy nor of the rational will — rj nva 86gav, nor of the 
moral intellect : in any of these cases, it might be said it 
was sudden and involuntary. 

(42.) 3, 4. It is not eVt^i'a, by arguments in the second figure. 



5-17.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 55 

(43.) 5. €7ri0vfiia 8' eTTiOviila ov. It seems at first sight as 
if desire could be opposed to desire ; but we must recollect 
that the opposition here in question must be " de eodem :" 
there is such an opposition de eodem, and at the same time, 
between irpoalpccns and em0vpia : but a man cannot desire the 
same thing and desire the exact contrary at the same time, — 
a man cannot be hungry and not hungry at the same time. 
— % Se'oy <a\ £ n i X v n o v, i. e. iindvfxia is moved either by the 
presence of some f)8v, or by the pressure of some pain such 
as hunger : so in bk. vii. 7. 3, he speaks of Xvnrjv rrjv dnb 

ttjs entdvpias. — w p o a I p e <r i s looks upon an action as dyaQov 
or kclkov : in the case of the good man, ndkov is coincident 
with dyaQov, alaxP° v with kclkov ; to the aKoXacrro?, Or man of 
reprobate mind, it is the reverse, — alaxpdv is his dya06v, 

KaXov is his KCLKOV. 

(44.) 6. 0vp,6s en r/TTov. He shnply appeals to the common 
sense of mankind. 

(45.) 7. (njveyyvs, akin to it. — ^ovXrj o~ is io~n ra>v ddvvd- 
Ttov. that is, imperfect fiovXrjo-is, or wish, as stated above. 
The consideration of dhvvarov belongs rather to pov\evo-is, 
but real povXrjo-is, actual will, nevertheless does not exist 
where dhvvarov is manifest. All these arguments may be 
resolved into the second figure, though perhaps we con- 
clude differences between things which have different ob- 
jects from a process of perception, rather than of actual 
reasoning. 

(46.) 10. 8 6 £ a, a mere intellectual act. 

(47.) 11. 8 6 g y tiv i, an act of the intellect on moral subjects. 
This 86ga enters into a moral purpose, as shewn above, but 
it is not the whole of it. 

(48.) 13. rj r<3 6p0S)s. ff is "or" not "than;' 1 as p,3X\ov pre- 
ceding might suggest. 

(49.) 15. See vii. 7. 4 ; and below, 4. 5. 

(50.) 17. per a \6yov k.t.X. X6yos, properly, reason; 8ia- 
vo i a, exercise of the reason: see De Anima, p. 69. 



56 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. iii. 4—8. 



CHAPTER III. 

He now examines one of the elements of npoaipea-is, — the will of 
the means, fiovkevats. 

(51.) 4. on do-vpperpoi, that is, that the side and the diago- 
nal of a square have no common measure. This is a favourite 
illustration of Aristotle's. It probably was a problem then 
in vogue in the learned world, like squaring the circle with us. 

(52.) 4. Bid rtva aWrjv alriav. He here leaves room for 
the opinion of those who distinctly held a Divine Providence 
separate from nature. 

(53.) 7. ravra 8e <ai eVri Xoitrd, and these are what are left, i. e. 
when the other causes of action are excluded. 

(54.) 7. atrial k.t.X. This is Aristotle's usual theory of causa- 
tion, in things physical. In the Ehetoric he divides dpdyKrj 
into <f>v(ris and /3ia : but dvdyKrj there is only used popularly 
to express the plea of involuntariness, which does away with 
the responsibility of the agent in a trial, which he is laying 
down in the passage in the Rhetoric : see also An. Post. ii. 
10, p. 217. 

(55.) 7. <p v a- 1 s, in its widest sense, as the whole system of things 
natural, is divided elsewhere, as here, into — 

1. dvdyKrj, where the connection between cause and 
effect, or even antecedent and consequent, is invariable 
and perceptible, — t5>v del, — such as fire and heat. 

2. (pva-is-, where this connection is perceptible and gene- 
ral, but not invariable, as clouds and rain. r&p «rt to 
noXv. Eth. vi. 4. 

3- T v X Vi (atria aopiaros,) where this connection is neither 
invariable nor perceptible, — r£>v ur)re del urjre £>s eVt r6 ■ 
ttoXv. See Met. p. 228; Top. p. 130 ; Phys. p. 35. 

(56.) 8. aKptfiels, of which the laws are well ascertained. — a v- 
rdpKeis, where they do not depend, in part or whole, on 
some other science or art for their realization : where they 
do thus depend, there may be deliberation as to what science, 
or what operations of that science, are necessary to them, as 
producing or co-operating cause. 



9-17.] ETHICS.-BOOK III. 57 

(57.) 9. tjttov 8irjKpt/3<uTai, as its principles are less accu- 
rately ascertained. 

(58.) 9. nepi re x pas k.t.A. : we deliberate more on the appli- 
cation of principles than the principles themselves ; and more 
on scientific arts than on abstract sciences. 

(59.) 10. iv ols aStdpitrror: SC eVri. — a v /z/3 o v Xo v s 8 e. 
Proof of the nature of fiovXevo-is. 

(60.) 11. dXX« Bipevoi k.t.X. Mark carefully this analysis of 
fiovXcvms, in every step of which the voluntariness of the 
action is evidenced. When he considers ev@ov\la in bk. vi., 
he adds to this analysis that the means thus chosen must be 
right means : see evftovkla. 

(61.) 11. wp&Tov airiov, the first link in the causation. — dva- 
X v e i v is to resolve anything into its simple elements or parts. 

(62.) 12. Sxrnep did.ypap.pa, SC. &o~rc€p ns dvaXvav bia.ypap.pa. 

If a puzzle were placed before us, we should take out piece 
after piece, till we had gone backwards through the process 
of putting it together ; and when we proceeded to put it 
together, the piece which had remained till last (e<rx arov * v 
^TTjo-ei) would be the one we should begin with, (np&rov iv 
yeveo-ei). But this is rather an illustration than an explana- 
tion of the text, as didypappa is a geometrical figure. If a 
person resolve a geometrical figure into its simple elements, 
— a hexagon, for instance, into six triangles, — afterwards 
wish to construct it, the last step in the analysis would be 
the first in the reconstruction. 

(63.) 15. €olk€ $* k.tA. refers to fj yapdpxr) iv rjplv, just above. 
He is shewing how it is that these points, which depend on 
others, arc subjects for /3ouX^. — a I 8« 7rpa£e«f, sc. rrj? 
(BovXijs : those which @ov\r) takes cognizance of. 

(64.) 16. ra Ka& eKaa-ra: not particulars and their simple 
qualities, but their fitness for or relation to the end in view. 
See bk. vi. 8, fin. 

(65.) 17. depapto-pevov, determinate. When by povXevais the 
eaxarov iv {r)Tr)<rci has been discovered, and is in our power, 
then there arises a determinate purpose to perform the action, 
and further, a determinate opegis, called irpoaipso-L*. 

(66.) 14. bC ov, through what means, bid ni/o's, through whose help. 

(67.) 17. r r] v dpxx)v t the starting-point of the action, — the 

i 



58 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. iii. 18; 

ir p&tov iv yeveaei. When this point is found to be 
something immediately depending on oneself, and is ap- 
proved by the judgment, (aiiTov to rjyovpepov, the to npocupov- 
pevov,) or power of moral choice, which decides on pursuit or 
avoidance. 

(68.) 18. apx^iav it o\ ire i S>v. This is rather introduced as 
an ornamental figure than as any actual proof of what he is 
saying. Homer (II. E. 53,) has introduced the chiefs de- 
claring to the people what they had thus decided upon as 
things to be done. The process was ended when irpoaipeats 
had taken place in their councils. 

(69.) Deliberation, then, is a process of enquiry carried on by 
the reason, with its various powers and functions, set in 
motion by the presence of some opegis, (approved by reason 
=Pov\rjcns,) beginning with the end in view, and proceeding, 
link by link, through the chain of means, till it reaches the 
point in our own power, and which our judgment approves. 
When this is reached, povkevo-is ceases, and the act of choice 
or purpose supervenes. 



CHAPTEE IV. 

(70.) He now proceeds to consider the other element of irpo- 
alpeo-is, the will of the end, or fiovXrjo-is. 

The first question is whether the will has for its proper 
object the real good, (rdyadov,) or that which presents itself 

to US as good, (to (paivopevov dyaOov). 
(70.) 2. to (SovXrjTOV, the object of pov\r)<ris. 

(71.) 2. a- v p. j3 a I v e t, it follows. He states the difficulties of the 
several notions on the subject. 

(72.) 4. The question is solved by saying that (d7rXa)s) in its own 
nature the t dyad 6 vis the proper object of will ; but as this 
presents itself differently to different individuals, practically 
and accidentally, not from its own desirableness, but from 
the weakness and blindness of human agents, that is to 
each (3ov\t)t6v which presents itself as such : so that there is 
a proper object of choice, though it is realized by none but 
the good man. He here again introduces one of his favourite 
medical illustrations. 



c iv. 2-5 ; c. v.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 59 

(73.) 4. 6 o-Trovdalos Kplvei 6p6ws. Here is an act of 86£a 
as to the character of the f)8v proposed by opegts : so in bk. 

vii. 8, he says that apcrf) rj (pvcriKr) 77 r)6ucr) is tov dpdo8ot-elv irepl 

ttjv apxqv. "When the moral character or moral sense is 
formed in its first stage, (as we shall see hereafter, bk. vi., 
addenda,) nothing presents itself as i)bv which is not dyaBuv f 
and the choice of good is instinctive, (Spdv) : earlier, the 
opegis presents many objects which the moral reason rejects 
as undesirable because bad. 

(74.) 5. And herein is one great (if not the greatest) difference 
between the good man and the bad, — that to the good man 
the true good presents itself (<£>cuWat) as good, and an object 
of pursuit, — the dya66v presents itself as r)8v ; while to the 
bad man the rjbv presents itself as dya06v : the views of the 
rjdv and the <a\6u are affected by the tone and state of mind 
(e£«>). The view we take, then, of the several ends we propose 
to ourselves depending upon our frame of mind, (e£ts,) this is 
an dpxn ev fjpiv ; and therefore the choice of ends is voluntary. 

(75.) 5. dia rrjp T]8ovr)v, the propension to pleasure, as plea- 
sure, which exists in us, as we should say, by nature. Aris- 
totle would ascribe it rather (though not entirely) to bad 
education. 

(76.) -Trpoaipeo-is, then, as described by Aristotle, is an act of 
deliberate choice, by a moral agent, of a certain end, by cer- 
tain means : the whole action lies before the mind, and is 
resolved upon in all its details ; the choice of the end, the 
selection and adoption of the several means, implies volun- 
tariness and responsibility on the part of the agent. On this 
act of deliberate choice follows the carrying it out, of which 
more will be said in the latter part of bk. vi. It may be 
added here, that there is no more accurate description of a 
virtuous moral action than that given in the second collect 
at Evening Prayer, — holy desires, good counsels, just works. 
"Why irpoaipevis is generally used for " good counsels," see 
note 79 : for the effect of character on our moral judgment, 
see bk. vii. 

CHAPTEE V. 

(77.) Having thus shewn that each of the parts of npoaipeo-Ls is 
iv rjplp, he now uses this to shew that the actions proceeding 



60 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. v. 1, 2, 

from it are voluntary. Plato held the contrary opinion, De 
Legg. ix. 860, D, oi kukoi names eh ndvra el<r\v a<ovres naicot: 
and again, Prot. 343, D, ouSely rcov o~o(p<ov dvbpa>v ^yelrai ovbeva 
avOpcoTTcov eKovra igapaprdvetv, ovbe alcrxpd re ml mm eKovra epyd- 
£e<r6ai : TimseuS, 8 1, D, mms pep yap eicoiv ovbeh, 8ia de novrjpdv 
et-iv tov aSparos Ka\ aTtaibevTov Tpocprjv 6 kokos ylyverai KaKos- 

(78.) He considers four pleas of necessity : — 

1. Absolute predestination, or controlling power, fj apx7 
e%a>6ev : to this he answers by his proof that vpoaipeo-is 
in itself and its parts is an dpxf\ iv fjfxiv. 

2. Natural desires, corruption of nature : the dpxr) is iv 
fjplv, and therefore the action voluntary. 

3. Acquired habits, — dpxfj iv rjpiv, and therefore voluntary. 

4. Wrong impressions from external things, the apxo is 
egcodev : he answers this by shewing that as this impres- 
sion ((jyavTaaia) arises from our character and tone of 
mind, as well as from external things, we are responsible 
for it, as having formed that character and tone ; and, 
further, that this <pavrao-ia, supposing it to be sudden 
and irresistible, only affects part of the action, — the 
choice of the end, — and does not take away the volun- 
tariness of the choice of the means. Contrast this mode 
of treating the subject with that of Butler, who sup- 
poses the plea of necessity true, and shews that, even 
on this supposition, it would not do away with human 
responsibility, or the notion of a supreme Grod. 

(79.) 1. (BovXtjtov pev tov reXovs, fiovXevT a>v be Kal 
■n poaiperav k.t.X. It is to be observed, both here and in 
some other places, that he confines 7rpoaipeo-is to the choice of 
means, whereas, in reality, it is a choice both of ends and 
means. The reason of this is, that where the first stage of 
the moral character is formed, the right end is chosen instinc- 
tively, without any effort on the part of the intellect, rdya- 
66v presents itself as f)bi>, and then the function of the intel- 
lect in the choice of the action is confined to the choice of 
proper means : see bk. vi. chap. 12. 

(80.) 1. The first argument is in the first figure ; the result of 
the analysis of irpoaipeo-is, which has occupied the three last 
chapters. 

(81.) 2. In the Magna Moralia, i. 9, it is said that Socrates uses 



3—17.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 61 

this opposition between kukIu and aperf to shew that as Ka/a'a 
is involuntary, so must apcrf) be. 

(82.) 3. tovto 8' rjv k.t.X. should be in a parenthesis. This is 
a formula for the reference to a former admitted definition 
or position : see bk. v. i. 12, Gr. Grr. 398, 4. — d y a 6 o 7 s : the 
dative is in attraction to i$> f)plv. 

(83.) 4. Aristotle here alludes to a proverb, wherein, by a plau- 
sible antithesis, the truth of the one true clause is made to 
throw a shadow of truth over the other, and quietly disposes 
of it by pointing out which is true and which is false. 

(84.) 5. He then refers to another argument of the fatalists, that 
a man's actions cannot be said to proceed from him, — that a 
man is not the source whence his actions flow, — that they 
proceed from his nature, which he cannot help, — plea of ne- 
cessity in a man's nature. — r ols vvv elpripevois: what 
has been said about irpoaipea-is, fiovXcv vis, j3ovXij(riy, 
and the conclusions drawn therefrom. — d vayayelv, trace. 

(85.) 6. Tavra. =ra vvv elprj/xeva — <j) a i v e r a t are evidently SO. 

(86.) 7. tovtois. He has hitherto drawn his arguments from 
the nature of irpoaipscns : he now (7, 8, 9,) confirms them by 
the opinion and practice of man. This is much the same as 
Butler's practical argument. 

(87.) 10. Responsibility not taken away by the plea of acquired 
habits. 

(88.) 10. Analogy of bodily defects, which arise from former 
carelessness or dissipation: if they are blamed, they are 
looked upon as voluntary ; and therefore, if mental habits 
are blamed, they are voluntary likewise. 

(89.) 13. firj fiov\e<r6ai. It was argued that a man could not 
wish to do himself harm, and therefore could not do so 
voluntarily. 

(90.) 17. Another plea of the fatalists is, that the external world 
conveys certain impressions to the mind, which it cannot 
help receiving ; and therefore the actions proceeding from 
these are to be considered as caused by the external world 
acting on the mind, and not by the mind or will of the agent. 

(91.) 17. (pavraala, the impression which external things make 
on the mind, (^aiverai,) or the power which receives, and, as 



62 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. v. 17—20, 

it were, daguerreotypes such impressions : in either sense the 
meaning is the same, — either that we have no power over 
the impressions from external things, or no power over the 
faculty which receives them ; in either case, we cannot help 
receiving them. In the Rhetoric it is called a'tadrjais ns da-Be- 
vrjs : it is used again, in bk. vii. 3. 11, for the impressions 
from sensible objects of which beasts are capable ; and again, 
bk. vii. 7. 8, for the impression which men follow hastily, 
without stopping to consult their reason. In the De Anima, 
p. 61, it is joined with ata-Brjareis — al (pavrao-iai kcu al alaBrjaeis ', 
and <J)dvTao-fia is the impression of the a'iaBrjfia upon the mind, 
avev ttj vXrjs, of which (pavTacria is the power : see De Anima, 
p. 76. It is important to understand the real meaning of 
this word in this passage, as it is sometimes translated 
" imagination," which, in the usual sense of that word, does 
not give its sense. 

(92.) The answer to this argument is, that if the external world 
conveys wrong impressions, the tone of the mind must be 
prepared to receive them ; and for this tone the agent is 
responsible : and further, if the first step, the object of de- 
sire, be necessarily impressed upon us by the external world, 
every subsequent step in the action is voluntary. 

(93.) 17. el de tls Xeyot, The apodosis, " this is my answer," 
is suppressed. — e I Se pr), ovBe is : another reading is, el 
oe firjdeis, making this another protasis, without its apodosis, 
and referring both to the answer given in sect. 18 ; both are 
supported by MSS. The reading in the text makes it a re- 
ductio ad absurdum to suppose that we are not cpavraalas ainoi ; 
the other would refer more directly to Plato's words on the 
subject, and place the false pleas in a string, to be answered 
in sect. 18. 

(94.) 17. f) be rod reXovs ecpeo-is. This is another theory 
of the fatalists. 

(94.) 19. 7r a p avrov, from himself, nap avr <S, al. : but see 
Grammar, 637. iii. 3. d. 

(95.) 20. Ka\ el p,rj iv t <o reXei. Another reading is, <a\ 
t^ reXeito, as it is to the good man. There is something to 
say for and against both : the former alludes to the argument 
above, that the means are in the agent's power, even sup- 
posing the end not to be ; the latter, to the frequently re- 



22; c. vi.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 63 

peated proposition, that the bad man has it in his own power 
to act or not, as well as the good. Against the former, el nai 
is the proper form of introducing an admitted supposition ; 
but Aristotle may have wished to mark that he only ad- 
mitted it for argument's sake : against the latter, a-irovbaios 
is the term we should expect, not reXeios. 

(96.) 22. 17 irpoo-Oeo-is, the accumulation. It would almost seem 
as if sections 21 and 22 had got transposed. Section 23 
evidently fits on to 21. 

(97.) Aristotle's mode of treating the great question of human 
responsibility is very simple and practical. Without entering 
into metaphysical or psychological abstractions, he analyzes 
the source whence human actions proceed, and demonstrates 
that, if there is such a thing as voluntariness, it must exist 
in such actions. He points out some of the absurdities which 
are involved in the contrary theories, and the practical wit- 
ness which human opinion and human institutions bear to 
man's responsibility as a fact. 



CHAPTEE YI. 

(98.) In this consideration of the several virtues, Aristotle has it 
in view to explain the nature, the subject-matter, and the 
mode of each, and, at the same time, to shew, as part of the 
proof of his book, that each several pea-orris is the aperr) of that 
particular part of human nature of which it is the develop- 
ment and regulation. 

(99.) As r)0iKr) dperr) generally is nepl rjoovas ml \1ma9, — the regu- 
lation and balance of the impulse and checks of action, so 
each particular is the regulation and balance of some par- 
ticular t)oovt) and \v7rr), — of self-love, directed towards some 
particular object, in some particular sphere, — of some par- 
ticular impulse or check, operating in some particular pur- 
suit or avoidance. Where the check would lead from what 
ought to be done, it is regulated and balanced by the sense 
of honour and duty arising from t6 koXou, partly residing in 
the feelings, partly recognised by the reason, to which Xvnrj 
is attached. Where the impulse would lead us wrong, it is 
regulated and balanced by the sense of shame, arising from 
the same source, to which r)oovr) is attached. The sense of 



64 ETHICS.—BOOK III. [c. vi. 1—3, 

good desert and bad desert counteracts and controls within 
due bounds the natural impulses of pursuit and avoidance. 
Where either the original or the counterbalancing impulse 
operates too much or too little, then we are in one or other 
of the extremes. 

(100.) 1. avSpeia, the fiea-orrjs between (pofios and Odppos, and 
a co (p poo- vvt), the peo-oTrjs irepl crcopariKas vfiovas kcu \vnas 
come first, because they are respectively the principal virtues 
of the irascible and concupiscible natures, which was the 
usual view taken of man's impulsive constitution by the 
philosophers of the time ; and because in these the impulses 
and checks are most apparent, as being most readily and 
instinctively acted upon by external things, and therefore 
most effective in producing and influencing action. And 
dvdpela before o-ooqbpoo-vvT], because, of the two, the impulse of 
fear is the most instinctive and effective. We can suppose 
a person to have an appetite for rjdovr], and yet be too indo- 
lent to allow it to move him to pursuit : but where the Xvm] 
of fear comes, avoidance follows almost instinctively, even 
where regulated by Odppos into dvbpeia. That dvbpela belongs 
to the irascible part may be seen from <p6(3os being placed 
under the 6vp,o€i8es, Top. iv. 5, 4. p. 170, 6 be cpoftos iv ra 
Bvpoeibel, cf. ii. 8. 4. p. 133. It must be recollected that, in 
Plato's theory, the dvpoeibes was the basis of the moral cha- 
racter, as far as the aXoyov part of the soul contributed to 
it ; its function was to assist the reason in suppressing the 
concupiscible impulses. 

(101.) 3. tvia ydp del cpofielvdai. He here recognises cer- 
tain final causes of this feeling implanted in us. Eemember 
to translate koKov, right, the sense of duty, or rather, perhaps, 
the sense of honour, which, where positive religion is not the 
guide, does in some sort supply its place, — alaxpov, wrong, — 
keeping in mind, at the same time, the connection between 
physical and moral beauty, — the beauty of holiness, which 
the Greeks embodied in several words and notions. When 
Ka\6v is loosely translated "honourable" and alo-xpov, shameful 
or base, the real notion in Aristotle's mind is lost. 

(102.) 3. errieiKrjs, as applied by Aristotle to express goodness, 
and not merely justice or equity, is scarcely to be represented 
by any English word. Its meaning is derived partly from 
its primary, partly from its secondary, sense ; it signifies 



5—12.] ETHICS.-BOOK III. 65 

that the agent is acting as he ought, and therefore justly ; 
but, further, it signifies that there is something beautiful and 
attractive in what he does. — A seemly person, — from whence 
it probably was used for equity. — a 1 8 rj p. a> v, possessed of a 
sense of shame. — Xe'yerai k.t-X., SC 6 /lxt) <po(Sovpevos. /xera- 
<popdv: from genus to species. 

(103.) 5. oifi' 6 1 Bap pel k.t.X.: because dbo£iav Bel (popelo-Oat. 

(104.) 6. <f>ofie pararov de 6 Odvaros. This notion, that the 
meeting death with firmness is the final cause of Odppos, and 
the perfection of dvbpeia, harmonizes with his view of man as 
a citizen designed for the good of the state. — ire pas yd p. 
Stress must be laid, in this passage, on the word bond, to 
mark that it was the common opinion of which Aristotle was 
speaking, not his own. See De Anima, i. 5. p. 25, 8okc7 yap 

paXXov f) ■v/^i'X'7 T o a-wpa avue^eiv : i^eXdovo'rjs yov dianvelrai Kal 
af)7T€Tai. The word dumveirai is taken from the Phsedo, 80, c. 

(105.) 11. ov priv dXXd k.t.X. The dvdpelos will be dberjs in storm or 
sickness ; but still his dvbpela will have no sphere for exercise. 

(106.) 11. oi>x ovtg) de wf BaXdrnoi. The man who is sick 
and the sailor in a storm look upon death nearly in the same 
way ; and the latter is used to illustrate the absence of dvhpcia 
in both cases — ol p.ev, ol 8 e, may be two sorts of OaXdrTiot. 
That is, in the case of the OaXdmoi, there is either (ol p.ep) 
utter despair of life and a dislike of a death in which there 
is no koXov, or (ol &?) there is a hope of escape, arising from 
their skill or experience : or oi p. e v may be the dvdpeloi, and 
ol 8e the OaXaTTiot. — o i pkv referring to the dvdpelot, being, 
with reference to this particular case, ddeels, (though in a 
different way from the OaXdrnoL,) and not dvhpeioi. The dv- 
8pfios is not here dvdpelos because there is no koXop; and 
though his tone of mind prevents his fearing death, yet he 
would escape it if he could, whereas the dvbpehs would not. 
The sailor is dfcfjs, because his experience prevents death 
from threatening him as it does the landsman. Neither case 
is that of death being willingly met, when it is possible to 
avoid it, for the sake of the t6 koXov. In real dvSpeia there 
must be within reach a means of averting death, (oXkt),) and 
a counterbalancing motive to meet it. 

(107.) 12. dvhpl&vTai, act bravely. 

K 



ETHICS-BOOK III. [c. vii. 1—6, J 



CHAPTER VII. 

(108.) The conditions, then, of true avSpela are: — 1. The pre- 
sence of the really <£o/3epdV, (i. e. death). 2. cpofios, an impulse 
(see chap, ix.) arising from it, to avoid it, (Xwrrj). 3. A means 
of averting it, (olXkt)). 4. tidppos, (f)8ovf),) arising from a sense 
of KaXoif, — an impulse towards meeting it. 5. irpoaip^is. 6. 
egis, (see chap. viii. 15,) it must be ready to act on emer- 
gencies, without reasoning and persuading itself on each par- 
ticular occasion. The absence of any one of these conditions 
destroys the character of avbpeia. 

(109.) 1. In dvdpeia the Xvttt) comes first, and is balanced by r^bovT] ; 
alo-Brjo-is presents the <popep6v, and there is an impulse to 
avoid it : this is checked and regulated by Bdppos, suggested 
by KaXoV, which acts as a motive, by virtue of the t)8ovt) of 
good desert attached to it. 

(109.) 2. as av6 pair os, as far as humanity can bear. Mark 
the sound practical wisdom which Aristotle shews in all his 
views of the nature, the position, and the duties of man. 

(110.) 2. a s 6 \6yos, SC Kekeve i. 

(111.) 3. tovto yap reXos rals a pera? s. So the 6dppos y 
which is to regulate the <j>6(3os, must not be mere animal 
courage, nor yet a mere fear of shame, but must be suggested 
by a sense of KaXdV. The final cause which should set men 
on right action is the na\6v, to which the sense of good desert 
is attached, so that it shall be f)8v : see iii. 1. 11, to Se dia. — 
koKov ped' r}8ovf]s. The koK6v in the Rhetoric is defined as 
having a twofold source, — either our internal impressions, 
6 av ayadov bv, rjdv 17 on ayadov, or the praise of men, o 
alperov ov, enaiveTov ecm. The notion of icakov embraces both 
these, — one in its sense of beautiful, the other in its sense 
of honourable. The *aXdV, as the motive of virtue, must be 
an internal sense of right and good desert, (see note 101,) 
not only iiraiverou : see chap. viii. sect. 1. 

(112.) 5. (tar* a £ I a v. == as 0V1 in section 2, — with the additional 
notion of " as becomes him. 11 

(113.) 6. 7r a o- x * * tai ^parrei, both enduring and doing, — 
passive as well as active. Leonidas would be an instance 



0—12.] ETHICS—BOOK III. 07 

of the latter ; a martyr, to whom a pardon is offered on con- 
dition of apostacy, of the former. 

(114.) 6. reXos Se k.t.X. The h€o-6tt)s between the two extremes 
fulfils the conditions of aperf, a Set, &c. He now shews more 
definitely that it has for its object t6 kcc\6v, because that 
which is in accordance with the habit (r6 Kara rrjv egtv) is the 
re'Xo? ; that is, if the egis is koXov, this is its reXos, — if the egis 
is alaxpop, al(Txpov is its reXos : and dvdpeia is Kakou, therefore 
the reXos is koXov, for everything takes its character (6pt£cr<u) 
from its reXos ; so that if you know the character of the reXos, 

you know the character of the e£is, and vice versa Zkckttov 

yap k.t.X. This is a sort of prosy llogism to the sentence, 
reXos 6e 7rdo-r}s ivepyeias k.t.X., which seems to have struck him 
as necessary when he had worked out the argument. 

(115.) 7. tu>v 8e vn€ pfiaXXovrav. Each of the extremes 
stands in a double relation,— an excess of one principle, a 
deficiency of the other ; and hence vireppaXXovrcov is 
used for both extremes. Even d(pofila (the deficiency of fear) 
may be viewed as an excess of ddppos, though different from 
the real excess, (6pa<rvTT)$,) inasmuch as it would consist in 
the absence of an instinct inseparable from human nature in 
its proper state. And, as was said in the second book, one 
of these extremes is less opposed to the mean, and is better 
in itself than the other : it will be found that the excess 
of the regulating principle is the better. Thus in dvbpda, 
<p6fios is regulated or counterbalanced, by Odppos, the excess 
of which is Opao-vrrjs, and this is better than beiXla. — e v rots 
irporepov. bk. ii. 7. 2. 

(116.) 9. iv t o v t o t s = iv ols bvvarai p.ipel<x6ai. 

(116.) 13. iv ols etprjTai, sc. tots p.eyi(TTois : see chap. viii. 6. 

(117.) 10. ku\ iv rals XvnaLs. deiXia is rather passive than 
active : it is not that the deiXos has no instincts towards 
bravery, but that the prospect of pain influences him too 
strongly ; hence it is viewed rather as a vncppoXf) of (poftos 
than a deficiency of Odppos. 

(118.) 12. 7T€p\ ravrd, al. irepX ravra : but the former is the 
better, though there is MSS. authority for the other. — o v- 
X6p,evoi, ready and eager. 



68 ETHICS.-BOOK III. [c. vii. 13 ; 

(119.) 13. The suicide is not dvdpe7os, because one of the con- 
ditions for dvdpela given above is wanting, viz. the kq\6v as 
a motive. 

(120.) 13. oti is to be taken after alpetrai kcu inropevci. — vno- 
p e v c c, SC. BdvaroVf oti kclKov eort. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

(112.) Each of the spurious imitations of dvbpeLa considered in 
this chapter is deficient in one or more of the conditions of 
dvbpela given above. 

a. f) ttoXitikt]: the true internal koKov wanting, and its 
place artificially supplied by external honour and dis- 
grace. 

b. e£ i [iireip ias : no (poftepov. 

c. iK 6v fiov: no <popep6v, — it is overlooked ; no KaXoV, 

rather diet irdQos ; no Trpoaipeo~is. 

d. tG>v cv€\7rl8a>v: no (pofiepov, — there is however a 8«- 
j/dz>, which distinguishes these from the next sort. 

e. e £ dyvoias : no cpofiepov, or rather no beivov. 

(122.) 1. fj no X it ikx). It is difficult to find any equivalent 
word for this; "political" does not convey the required 
meaning; it may be called the courage displayed by citi- 
zens, as citizens, i. e. which would not influence them if they 
were removed from social life. — p dXia-ra yap eomev: first 
TroXirtK^, for this is most like the true. — e k tS>v v6 pav: 
see Thuc. ii. 39. 

(123.) 2. IlovXvddpas k.t.X. : see II. xxii. 100. Aiopr}8rjs: H. 
viii. 148. 

(124.) 3. bi* dpeTrjv. It arises from a good state of mind, viz. 
respect for oneself and others, (alSS),) and the desire for KaXov 
in the shape of honour ; but not like dvbpcia, from that inter- 
nal koKov which is its own reward. 

(125.) 4. els tcivto, SC. Tots ttoXitikoIs — ov 8e k.t.X. II. j3. 391 ; 
and quoted again Pol. iii. 14. — r v n r o v r e s : see Hdt. vii. 223. 

(126.) 6. 86 ev Ka\ k.t.X. Protagoras, 350 ; Laches, 195. 

(127.) 6. Kevd, al. Kawd: both have MSS. authority. Michelet 
quotes from Tacitus, Hist. ii. 69, " inania belli ;" and Cicero 



c. viii. 1—16.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 09 

ad Att. v. 10, " scis enim dici quaedam iravim, dici item ra 
Kcva tov 7roXf/xou." Koivd, on the other hand, is supported by 
Thue. iii. 30, r6 naivbv tov noXtpov : so Dion. 40, r 6 Kai- 
vbv tov noXepov fj pir ao-e : and again, Diod. Sic. xx., 

dXrjdes etvai oti ttoXXgi to. k. a i v a tov iroXepov. If the former is 

preferred, we must translate it " vain alarms ;" if the latter, 
"surprises." Section 15, "iv to Is a<\>vih lots <£d/3oi?" 
seems to favour naivd. — a v v e co p d k a a i v, take in at a glance. 

(128.) 7. TToirjo-ai: sc. kcikov, act on the offensive — oirola dv c'itj: 
the av belongs to the clr), — which may be. Gr. Gr. 832. 

(129.) 8. I b t a> r a i s, amateurs. 

(130.) 9. Ta ttoXitikcl, forot 7roXir at, opposed to the merce- 
naries, o-Tpa.Ti£)Tai — tVl T<p 'E pp. aim. Onomarchus of 
Phocis having occupied the Hermsean plain, at the city of 
Coronaea, the levies of the citizens fought to the death against 
him, while the Boeotian auxiliaries took to their heels. 

(131.) 10. I t r) t i k a> t a r o v : see Arist. Nub. 445 : so hai and 
hapol, Plato. "O prj pos: II. xvi. 529 ; II. v. 510 ; Odyss. 
xxiv. 317. 

(132.) 10. 6vp6s is the animal instinct, which, when regulated 
and elevated into a rational instinct, and directed towards 
the koKov, may become dvbpela : it is the natural instinct 
towards doing and suffering. — <r wepyei: cf. Plato, Eep. 
440, B. 

(133.) 12. e£co-ev at pa: Theocr. xx. 15. — (f>vo-iKcoTaTi], en- 
grained in our nature. — f) bid tov 6vp6v, sc. Xeyopevrj dvbpeia. 

(134.) 12. to bi dXyrj b 6v o s, SC. ret Orjpia. — did t a v r a, for the 
sake of Xvnrjpov in 6pyf), and rjbv in Tipcopia. 

(135.) 13. did ra 7rpoeipr)peva, SC. bid to KaXov koi a>s 6 Xoyos. 

(136.) 15. rfTTov i< irapao-Kevrjs, less a matter of prepara- 
tion. — rd be e£ai(f)vr)s k.t.X. That is, Xoyiapds is merged 
in the egis, so that the impulses of passion and the sugges- 
tions of reason are both lost in the rational instinct. 

(137.) 16. d^i'w/Lta, no notion of their own powers.— exei i/o i Se, 

SC. exovai-d^iapa. 

(138.) 16. oi 'Apyeiot: Xen. Hell. iv. 10. The Spartans, arm- 
ing themselves with the shields of the vanquished Sicyonians, 



70 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. ix. 1—6 ; 

advanced upon the Argives, who, taking them for Sicyonians, 
received them with contempt, but when they found out who 
they really were, fled. 



CHAPTEE IX. 

(139.) In this chapter he shews that Xwi/ and rfbovr} are the real 
springs of dvbpeia, and that it is the regulation of the Ximrj, 
(<p6fios,) by the f)8ovr], (Odppos). 

(140.) 1. paWov nepl r a cp o (3 <■ p d. It is <p6(3os which strikes 
on the mind from external objects : the Bdppos is supplied 
afterwards from within, as a corrective to the cpopos. 

(141.) 2. to Kara r rj v dvSpeiav TeXos, SC. to koXov. This 
connection between the KaXov and fjbv is recognised in " dulce 
et decorum est" &c. — vtto tS>v kvkX<*, by circumstances. — 
e 1 7r e p adpKivov, if they are flesh and blood. — 7r as 6 novos, 
SC ecrri \vTrrjp6v— TaxiTa : to. iv kvkXoo. 

(141.) 3. K al Zkopti: see Gr. Gr. 599. 3. 

(141.) 4. t<5 ToiovTto. Compare this with what Socrates says 
in the Phsedo, 62. 

(142.) 5. ov 8f] k.t.X. ov 817, al. olde, not in all: it does in 
o-axppoo-uin], for instance, in which there is enjoyment in 
moderate indulgence, besides that arising from the koXov. 
In dvbpda it arises from the Ka\6v alone. — e^oirrfTai, at- 
tains to : to evepye7p is the supplied nom. Michelet, — " aliter 
quam in fine positum est." 

(143.) 6". Srpanwraj k.t.X. Take these Words, ovbev KeXevei 
Kpario-Tovs e I v a 1 (rrparicoras, prj tovs toiovtovs, (sC, tovs dpeTrjv 
e'xovras irdo-au) dXXd k.t.X. " There is no reason why the best 
soldiers should be, not these above-mentioned but, those 
who, though having less dvdpeia, have less to lose in dying." 



CHAPTER X. 

(144.) cracppoo-vvrj, which, as it is treated of here as one of the 
virtues, is the regulation of the animal impulses of pleasure, 
has, both in Aristotle and in strictly classical Greek, especially 



c. x. 1, 2.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 71 

in its adjectival form of aaxppwv, the far wider signification of 
self-control : so that araxppav is sometimes used almost in the 
same sense as cppopipos, and it has this signification, — first, 
in a metaphorical or applied sense, — for as aperf generally is 
nepl rjdovas koL Xvnas, SO crcocppoo-vvr] is 7rep\ fjdovas Kai \v7ras in 
their simplest form ; secondly, because the regulation of the 
animal impulses is so difficult, that he who has really won 
the mastery over them must have arrived at a considerable 
degree of moral virtue ; and thirdly, because, since all wrong 
actions spring from wrong notions and conceptions of fjdovrj 
and \v7rrj in general, the right regulation of the all-powerful 
motive seems right action, (<rd>£ei ttjv cppovrjaiv : bk. vi. 5. 5). 

(145.) 1. avr a i, sc. <r co<p pocrv v ij and dvd p e la : the one is the 
principal virtue of the concupiscible, the other of the iras- 
cible, parts of the soul ; they spring directly from the very 
instincts of our animal nature, which no one is without ; so 
that where they are supposed to be wanting, he is obliged 
to coin the words dvaio-drjo-la and d<f>o(Sia. The objects which 
excite them are presented simply by a'lo-drjo-is, without the 
intervention of reason (a'Xoya) ; while the impulses of the 
other virtues, such as ambition, are taken cognizance not by 
a't(rdr)(ris alone, but by a'tcrBrja-is and reason, (oidev TrdaxovTos tov 
crcapaTos a\\a pdWov rrjs biavolas). They are votjtlkoX opegeis, 
which could hardly rise up in an animal who was without 
some share or shadow of reason or intelligence. 

(146.) 1. 7rep\ rjbovds. As in dvdpela the Xxnrrj (cpopos) is regu- 
lated and counteracted by the rjdovrj, (Odppos,) so in o-cocppoavpr} 
the r]8ovrj is counteracted and regulated by the Xvirrj arising 
from a sense of the ala-xpdv, which is, so to say, the negative 
side of the na\6v : (chap. xii. 1, rj peu yap 8i* fjdovrjv, — f) 8e Bid 
Xvvrjv). Eirst of all a desire arises,— if it be a bad one, there 
arises almost coincidently a sense of the bad desert which 
will wait upon it ; and this acts, or ought to act, as a check 
upon Our passions ; hence it is yjttov ml ovx opoicos nepl Xirrras. 

(147.) 1 . aKoXao-la. Mark the derivation. The state where no 
correction can avail, — thorough depravity, — where all sense of 
alarxpdv is lost. — <p alverai evidently is. 

(148.) 2. Mark his practical appeal to the general language of 
men. 



72 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c x. 2—11, 

(149.) 2. 8 ly pr)<r&a><rav. The division here of rjbovai is: — 1. 
o-coficiTiKal and \^ux tKCU - 2. crccifxaTLKal is divided into those rrjs 
d(j)r)s which arise from the organs of sensation, (alo-QrjTrjpia,) 
and which we share with animals, and those arising, not 
directly, from ala6r]Tf]pia, but from some higher sort of ai'o-fy- 
<ris, (taste,) in which our intellectual nature bears some part, 
as of beauty and harmony, &c, whether presented to us by 
the eye or the ear, — what are known in modern philosophy 
by the name of aesthetics, in which, though not directly 
the result of reasoning, our intellectual nature bears some 
part, and which may be formed and improved by study. 

(150.) 6. Kara (TVfi^e^rjKos, in a metaphorical or applied 
sense, i. e. arising from the associations accidentally con- 
nected with the objects on which sense proceeds, and not 
from the sense itself. — in i6v firjTaiv, al. in i0v /it] p.dr(ap, 
the objects or acts of their desire. 

(151.) 8. Kara, in; literally, corresponding to : see Gr. Grr. 629. 
11.3, b. — n\r}v Kara crvfifieprjicos, except as an accidental result ; 
by an accidental association with some other merely animal 
perception. — r tjv 8' a 'i a 6 rj a- 1 v, SC. ttJs fipaxreGiS. 

(151.) 10. ot ye aKoXao-roL. The thoroughly depraved man's 
habits will be without even the elegance and taste which 
sometimes disguise vice : he will get drunk on anything, so 
that he gets drunk. 

(152.) 10. 6-^o<pdyos. Some editions give the name &i\6gevos 6 
'Epvgios before dyjsocpdyos, but Bekker omits them. Athenseus, 
p. 6, b, (1. 10,) — iKelvos inipep.(p6pevos yap ttjv (pvcriv els ttjv 
dnokavcriv r)v£a.To nore yepavov ttjv (pdpvyya cr^eli' : and again, 
341, d, (viii. 26,) — $t\6gevos no& a>$ \eyovcr, 6 KvOrjpios yvgaro 
rpicov ex* lv Pdpvyya nrjxecov. — avra, al. avra: see Grr. Grr. 656. 

1, and obs. 

(153.) 11. rj £S> a. This gives at once a simple and yet complete 
definition of the subject-matter of o-cocppocrvvrj. — rpi'^ewy, 
friction. — e pfiaa-las, warmth, as in a bath. 



c. xi. 1—5.] ETHICS.-— BOOK III. 73 



CHAPTER XL 

(154.) Having thus discussed o-axppoo-vvr) in its relation to the 
affections, and explained what sorts of pleasure and pain 
come properly within the sphere of o-axppoo-vvr), he now goes 
on to shew how far propensions or desires are regulated by 
this habit of mind. — iniBvpla, when distinguished from ybovr), 
differs from it, in that it springs from eVdeta, and therefore is 
painful : see below, sect. 6. 

(155.) 1. icoivai, universal, generic. idiat, peculiar and indi- 
vidual. €7ri6eTol acquired. 

(156.) 2. Tjfxerepov, to be of our own making; nevertheless, 
Nature has some hand in it. — I via k.t.A. Every one has 
particular objects which are to him more pleasant than ge- 
neral ones. 

(157.) 3. e(j) ev, in one direction, viz. in quantity ; while in the 
ifitat emdvfilai, as he tells us below, the vTrepfHokr) is not only in 
indulging too much, but indulging at wrong times, &c. ; 
all which shew the passion within us to be stronger and less 
under control than it ought to be. 

(158.) 3. avrrjv, SC. yaoripa, Or rr)v (fivoiKrjv imdvpiav. 

(159.) 4. 7rcpi tcls Id i as t &> v f)bov£>v. 7)dova>v IS used 
here instead of imOvpiStv, because, in reality, the peculiar pro- 
pensions are not from the ivoelai of nature, but from parti- 
cular views of pleasure ; these give rise to emOv/iicu : see chap. 
i. note 40. In the other sort, emOvpla exists previously to 
any notions of pleasure whatever. 

(160.) 4. I) to> [xaWov fj ms oi TroXXot, more than most 
men do ; x a ^P eiv <» s °' L noXkoi could never, in Aristotle's view, 
make a man aKoXao-ros. — r) ws: for fj, see Gr. Gr. 779, 

obs. 2. 

(161.) 4. p,Krr)r6v is to alcrxpov what iirawerov is to Kakov ; the 
one referring to the disapprobation of others, the other to 

that of our consciences. 

: 

j (162.) 5. He first takes the two habits of mind in relation to 
178014 and then to 6Vi%u'a.— ^ e k t 6 v is evidently a less strong 
term than /xio-^rdV : it expresses the opinions of men, while 

L 



74 ETHICS.— BOOK III. [c. xi. 6-8 ; 

the other expresses their feelings. — 7repi ras Xvnas. aa>- 
cfipoavvrj is not, like uvbpda, the regulating and counteracting 
of pain by pleasure, but of pleasure by pain. Pain does 
not enter into the composition of cruxppoovvr), as presenting 
objects whence the moral action springs : o-axppoo-vvr) is not 
resistance to an attack of Xvnr), nor aKoXaaia the yielding to 
it. As far as Xv-irr] is concerned, the aKoXao-ros feels pain when 
he fails of his desire ; and to the adxppcov the absence of the 
object of desire is accompanied by pain. And so far pain 
is connected with these states of mind ; but rjdovrj is the 
essence of them. 

(162.) 6. 6 pev ovv k.t.X. In the matter of imBvpia, again, the 
aKoXaa-Tos is its slave, and as every ZinOvpia is a painful feeling, 
the success as well as the failure of the aKokaaros causes him 
pain ; and hence may be seen the folly and absurdity of such 

a man, (^citottco Se 'ioiici). 

(163.) 7. Asceticism was unknown to Aristotle. What would 
he have said to those who refused the good things of Grod's 
providing merely because they were good ? 

(164.) 8. The araxppav has his notions of rjbovrj purified and 
chastened ; his imdvpiai moderated and directed. 

(165.) 8. oo-a de ir p 6 s k.t.X., al. a. The final] causes of these 
bodily appetites are evidently the health and [well-being of 
the body. Whatever the o-axppcov seeks will either contribute 
directly to these, or, at the least, not binder them. This rule 
for cases where positive laws are not laid down, is of uni- 
versal application, and one much to be remembered as a 
practical law of action. 

(166. ) 8. our cd? e^cov, SC. opeyopevos tcdv aXXcov f}bea>v, epnobicav 
tovtols. — v ir € p t T) v o v cT I a v, beyond his means. 



CHAPTEEX II. 

(167.) It might be argued that there was some excuse for aico- 
Xcio-tos, inasmuch as he was ^hurried away by passion, while 
the beiXos acted more slowly. In this chapter Aristotle, who 
always shews a peculiar abhorrence of dKoXaala, proves the 
contrary. 






c. xii. 1—9.] ETHICS.— BOOK III. 75 

(168.) 1. fj /x€v yap k.t.X. dicokao-ia is the excess of the influ- 
ence of r)8ovf), unmoderated by the Xvnt] of shame ; SeiXla is 
the influence of \v7rrj, uncontrolled by the i)bovrj of koKov. 
— a IpcTop: hence aKoXao-la is more voluntary. 

(169.) 2. dio Kal iiroveibio-Toirtpov Kal yap k.t.X.: being 
voluntary, it is a reproach to any one who falls into it, for 
he must do so voluntarily ; and it is easy to habituate one- 
self against it ; for there are so many f)8ea in life that a man 
may, without much trouble, exercise himself in temperance : 
while dvdpeia, from the comparatively rare opportunities for 
its exercise, w r hich are to most men few, and always attended 
with pain and risk, is less easily attained. 

(170.) 3. dogeie re k.t.X. Voluntariness is mostly tested by the 
to. koB' emo-Ta : and hence, as no one wishes to be SetXo'y, 
and only is so under pressure from without, it is less volun- 
tary at the moment of action than aKoXao-la, where the motive 
cause of the evil is eVitfu/Ata and opegis from within. aKoXao-la, 
however in the abstract, is as little an object of desire as 
beiXia, (to 5' oXou tJttov ovdels yap k.t.X.) : in this respect both 
are equally (if at all) involuntary. — r olj Kaff eKao-Tov: the 
dative marks the middle term of the argument : Gr. Gr. 
609. 5. 

(171.) 3. avrf], SC a-KoXao-La. 

(172.) 6. fieTevr)V€x8ai } to be applied. — iv tovtois, SC 7rcu3tot9. 

(173.) 7. e v 7T€ lS e s, the 110111. IS to aio~xp<*>v opeydjxeuov. — Kal 7rav- 
raxo ev, from whatever quarter it comes. — t6 avyyeves, that 
which is kindred to it in the soul, or that whence it springs. — 
Michelet, " that which is in our nature." 

(174.) 7. The notion of the struggle between l-mBvpla and Xoyos, 
so frequently spoken of by Aristotle, the key-stone of his 
Ethics, as applied to education, would suggest the great 
problem of all systems of education, — how to subdue the 
passions to the reason, — the great difficulty of right action, 
and, even apart from the Scriptures, the best proof for the 
necessity of divine grace. 

(175.) 8. avTas, SC. imOvpLOiv evepyeias. 

(176.) 9. ap.<po1v } — rrjs craxppoavurjs Ka\ Xoyov. 



76 ETHICS.— BOOK IV. [[c. i. 3, 






BOOK IV. 

CHAPTEE I. 

(1.) The virtues of fortitude and temperance are the regulation 
of the animal appetites, instincts of human nature, the imme- 
diate impressions of the senses. Those in the fourth book 
are the regulation of other human appetites or instincts, 
with which the senses are less directly concerned, — love of 
money, love of power, love of honour, — the instincts towards 
social intercourse in every-day life. Thus they are no longer 
those of the man as an individual, but as a social being : for 
fortitude and temperance relate rather to the well-being and 
right action of a man in his relation to himself ; liberality, 
&c, rather refer to his relations and behaviour towards 
others. Hence the notions of rjSovr] and \\m-q come in less 
visibly, though not less really, inasmuch as actual pleasure 
and pain have less to do with such actions* But still there 
is an fjSovrj and \vnr], an impulse towards, or a check from, 
a certain course of action, (see chap. i. 28) ; and which- 
ever of these is, from the constitution of the agent, or 
the nature of the circumstances, the prevailing motive, is 
regulated, as the case may be, by the Xinrrj or the fjdovr) 
arising from the sense of alaxpdv or na\6v : and as in araxfipo- 
Kivvr] and dvdpela the better of the two extremes is that which 
is the excess of the regulating principle, so in many of 
these virtues, where there is any general tendency towards 
one extreme, (where we are avpcpveo-Tepoi paXXov,) there the 
error in the other extreme is the better; while in others 
of these virtues the impulses and checks are not the same 
in all men, but vary according to character and circum- 
stances : so that if the better extreme is specified at all, it is 
not from its being the excess of the regulating principle, 
(for either extreme may be this, according to character or 
circumstances,) but e£ avrov tov updyp-aTos, — the nature and 
effects of the thing itself. 

(2.) 3. emcpe popev o- v p.7r\e k o v t e s, we apply, in connection 
with other notions. 



5—27.] ETHICS.— BOOK IV. 77 

(3.) 5. /3 o u A e r a i el vat, properly is ; claims to be. 

(4.) 5. 8 i a tovtcov, SC. xPVPUTtoiv ; implied in ovcrias. — e/cSe^o- 
pe$a, we use the term. 

(5.) 9. Ka\ 6 €7raivos 8 e, and praise too : see Gr. Gr. 7G9. 2. 

(6.) 9. ro yap oIkcIop tjttov jvpolcvrai puXXov. paXXov 
belongs to the whole sentence, tjttov to irpoUvTat. It is easier 
not to take than to give ; for men have a reluctance to give 
away (t)ttov irpoUurat) what is their own, rather than (pdX- 
Xov ?;) not to take what does not belong to them. 

(7.) 10. ovx tjttov, rather; so ovx fjicio-Ta, most. Lidd. and 
Scott ad v. 3. 

(8.) 11. Ttov an dpeTTJs, i.e. (nrovbaicov : see Gr. Gr. 620. 3, b. 

(9.) 15. TOV prj T I p CO V T O S TO. ^ p 7? /A d T CI, al. T O V TiptOVTOS, 

— but there is no sense in this. The same characteristic as 
that in the text is given again in sect. 26, and more fully 
m sect. 20, — pr) Tipa>VTa 6 i avra to. xpw aTa * 

(10.) 18. to vne pfidWe iv. This has no connection with the 
i>7rep[3o\r), ( going beyond the mean,) but simply to give largely, 
— more than most people would, or more than what might 
have been expected of him. 

(11.) 19. to yap pr) fiXeireiv. Here, again, we have the ab- 
sence of self as an ingredient of virtue. — o vbiv 8e K<oXve i. 
This is one distinction between iXevdeptoTrjs and peyaXo7rpe7reia. 
— The widow's mite will, of course, occur to every reader. 

(12.) 20. e\€vdepiu>T€ poi k.t.X., are, it would seem, more given 
to liberality. — n apaXafiovTes, inheriting it. 

(13.) 21. iyKaXeiTai: neuter passive : blame is thrown on. 

(14.) 23. ao-a>Tos: from a and crw^co. — tv pdvvovs, monarchs. 

(15.) 24. enopevai, thus connected with each other. ivavTiai, 
opposed to each other. 

(16.) 25. Xynrja-eTai. This will shew /xera/xeXeia, and make the 
action ovk (Kovaiov. 

(17.) 26. hvvaTai ad i k el a 6 ai, is open to wrong. 

(18.) 27. Sipcovidr]. He was notorious for his love of money : 
see Rhet. iii. 2 ; Arist. Pax, 698, Sipcovlo'Tjs ; irm ; 6ti yepwv &v 
Ka\ o-airpos Kfpbovs ff/cart kciv mti pinos nXeoi. 



78 ETHICS.— BOOK IY. [c. i. 29—40, 

(19.) 29. 7t\t)v earl piKpols, but in small matters, or with petty 
objects. Liberality is displayed in large gifts as well as 
small ; but illiberality shews itself in petty gains. Where 
the wickedness is on a large scale, it is hardly illiberality, 
but rather nXeovegia: see sect. 44. — rot ttjs do- cot Las, the 
actions of da cot i a. 

(20.) 30. en- ci. Michelet rightly observes that «rei does "not 
always require an apodosis, but can stand independently for 
moreover, then, thus : see bk. vi. 8. 6. This may be an elliptic 
construction for "since this is so, then," &c. — ov -ndw 
<rw8vd£eTai, do not always go together; cf. bk. viii. 4. 5 : 
o-wav^erai, on the authority of several MSS. 

(21.) 30. olive p. The aacoTos is a man who outruns his private 
means : see above, sect. 23. 

(22.) 31. ex ci ydp k.t.X. dacoria is nearer the mean, inasmuch 
as it is only an exaggeration of the virtuous principle. Men, 
by nature, are prone to think of self, and to feel reluctance 

(Xvm],) to give to others, — (37, avpcpviaTepov toIs dvdpconois : cf. 

44) : the regulating principle, the fjBovr) of the ko\6v attached 
to giving, comes in; and this, if carried too far, i.e. beyond 
the kuXov, becomes dacoria. The nakov never occurs to the 
dve\ev6epos as f)dv, and is therefore no principle of action, — 

(cf. 34, 8ia t6 prjbev tov ko\ov (ppovrl^eiv). 

(23.) 33. KaOairep e'iprjTac, as is implied in what has been 
said. 

(24.) 35. ovde tov rov e v € k a, SC tov Ka\ov. 

(25.) 36. 7ropi£ovaiv, dat. plur. 

(26.) 36. els t av t a: aKo\aala — dairdur] — rjbovtj. 

(27.) 38. 6 X 6 k X t) p o s, in all its forms. 

(28.) 39. Tiva eirieltceiav, a sort of rectitude, differing from 
the real, because it is not from love of koXou, but from the 
inferior motive, a cautious, selfish fear (evkdfieiav) of alaxpdv. 
— alaxpou is not a legitimate motive of right action, where 
positive koKop should come in : alaxpop here is "disgrace" not 
" wrong." 

(29.) 39. co v 6p a a r a i,— sc. KvpivoTrplaTrjs, this name is thus pro- 
verbially applied. 

(30.) 40. Ka-d piKpbv in\ n o X X <p, al. pucpd : those who lend 



41, 44; c. ii. 1—10.] ETHICS.— BOOK IV. 79 

in small sums at high interest. Kara pucpbv, — Gr. Gr. 629, 1 1 . 
3, f. — al. Ka\ to. fiiKpd. Michelet interprets it, "who give 
small things for large," joining it with ipya£6p.evoi. 

(31.) 41. fV avrols : is a term common to these : see Gr. Gr. 
634. 3, a, fin. 

(32.) 44. e7n Tavrrjv, in the direction of this. 



CHAPTEK II. 

(33.) 1. ev fieyeOei n pen ova- a dcnrdvrj. Alcibiades' Speech 
furnishes a good illustration : Thucyd. vi. 

(34.) 2. 7rp 6 s air 6 v. The three points in the peyaXoTrpewrjs are : 
• 1. the man's own rank and character; 2. Zv a, the cir- 
cumstances in which he is placed ; 3. nep \ o, the matter in 
hand, the sum expended, — al. kcu a : that is, Alcibiades was 
fxeya\o7rp€7rris in his magnificent display at the Olympic games, 
for the Olympic prize. He would have been fidvavo-os, had 
he made the same display at an insignificant meeting, or for 
an object of mean repute. An Athenian of lower rank would 
have been pdvavcros, had he made the display anywhere ; — all 
the conditions of the npenov would have been violated. 

(35.) 4. an e i po Ka\ia, want of taste. 

(36.) 5. e n lo-rrj p.ovi e once, is as it were a man of knowledge, — 
inasmuch as the Ith(ttt\\iu>v can, in physical truth, discern the 
true point ; so can the p.€ydXonpeirr)s in his habits of life and 
expenses. — e fifieXcos, in Jit proportion. 

(39.) 6. rj e£ts opi^erai rat? ivepyeiais (sc. raj npknovn Iv <w kcu nep\ o) 
kcu hv ecrnV, (sc. r&> npenovn npbs avrov.) — r rj v t) an dvq v t SC 
d£lav eivai. 

(40.) 10. o to v piyeOos. This is a difficult passage: the best 
interpretation seems to be to join it with eXevdepiorrjTos : u In 
these the p,eyd is the characteristic of the p,ey aXon penrj ? ;" 
as it were an increased degree of liberality, which has the same 
subject-matter ; or if ravra be read : is on these matters. eXevde- 
piorrjs, on a large scale ; or it may be : "But in these points 
the peyd of the fieyaXonpenrjs comes in, as if it were a great- 
ness of something ; the notion of greatness is^ implied in the 



80 ETHICS.— BOOK IV. [c. ii. 10—20 ; 

very term of magnificent. The peyaXonpeTr-qs has the character- 
istic of greatness, though iXevdepiorrjs is concerned with the 
very same actions." 

(41.) 10. Kal a no r ?j s 10-77? k.t.A. : and not only when the 
thing done is greater in itself, " but even when the expense 
and pains are equal, the ixeya\o7rpenf}s will produce something 
more magnificent." Aspasius, quoted by Michelet, illustrates 
this by saying that the Olympian Jupiter of Pericles was 
more magnificent than if, at the same cost, he had made a 
smaller statue, but more richly adorned : in this case, too, 

the peyd of the fieya\o7rpe7rr)s exhibits itself. p.eydk<mpeivi(TTepnv 

seems to have here the sense it would have anywhere else, 
without any peculiar technical reference to peyaXoTrpeneia. 

(42.) 10. ov yap f] avrrj K.r.A. : for the iV/7 bairavr] does not 
make an equality, as it would if both were Krfjpara, which 
are valued by their cost ; but the nature of the action and 
character of the agent come into account. 

(43.) 12. to tLs &v, the question who he is : see Grr. Grr. 457. 

(44.) 14. ra t iav t a, such actions. — hv avrols per e o~r iv, 
those in whom they have some interest, — such as living rela- 
tions, &c. 

(45.) 15. tcov be lb lav o o~ a, SC. jueyaXo7rpe7T77 eari. 

(46.) 16. ivravda, that which, in this or that case, is great, falls 

under p.eya\o7rpe7reia. 

(47.) 19. evvrreppXrjTov, is not to be surpassed; that is, it is 
as great as it can be. — k a l refers to to yap toiovtov, not to 

evvir£pfi\r)TOv. 

(48.) 20. nap a jne'Xoy: literally, out of tune ; unsuitably rrop- 

<p v p a v. In comic exhibitions the Tt-apaTreTacrpa (or curtain 
to decorate the scene) was usually of leather, not of purple 
cloth. — & anep ol Mey a pels: they were proverbial for 
their bad taste, and probably had committed some such sole- 
cism as that in the text. 



c. iii. 1—25.] ETHICS.— BOOK IV. 81 

CHAPTEE III. 

(48.) 1 . eouccv ctvai, we should suppose to be. 

(49.) 4. o-a><£pa>i/, a man of well-ordered mind ; modest. This word 
has a generic sense of controlling in some one way or other 
and restraining our natural tendencies; and the particular 
sense varies according to the context. 

(50.) 5. do-re lot, natty, and well made. 

(51.) 6. 6 8e fxe i (6 v co v rj agios ov nas \avvos. The 

essence of x a vvos is that he is dvdgios fieydXav : — if a man is 
agios fxeyd\a>v, and thinks himself agios p.cyiaroav, this is rather 

a Spurious p.eyaXo^rvxia than x a ^votr)S. 
(52.) 7. a v 8 6 g e i e v, SC. p.iKp6^rvx os ehat. 
(53.) 8. ol d e, the others. 
(54.) 9. 7rept ei>, SC. 6 6eo\s diroveixofi€v = rip.rjv. — r) b* dgia k.t.X. 

This is put in to confine it to its particular subject-matter, 
viz. some one of i-a Zktos dyaOd. 

(55.) 11. avcv \6yov, without argument, — of itself. 

(56.) 13. ov firjv top yc k.t.X. SC ivpbs top ye k.t.X. 

(57.) 15. 7ra/3ao-et(raj/Tt, demissis manibus ; wringing his hands. — 
fte'ya, of consequence. 

(58.) 16. Koa-fio s, the setting of the virtues. 

(59.) 17. tg> fir) exciv: dative of cause considered as instru- 
ment : see Gr. Gr. 607. 

(60.) 20. a 8' a fi (p (o t SC. fj dperrj Kai rd egtodev dyaOd. 

(61.) 21. eKeivav pep, others. — a vroi, they themselves do what 
they fancy ; their life is without rule : hence they are vnc- 

pOTTTCll. 

(62.) 24. 6 v u d p g a s, he who first did him a kindness. 

(03.) 25. ovs av: ovs is in attraction, while Z>v in the next clause 
depends directly on p,vrjp,opeveiv. 

25. Qenv. II. a. 503. — oi AaKwcs. The interchange of 
the infinitive, (Xe'yeti/,) and finite verb, (eXeyop, implied after 
AdKoves,) is curious : in the former, the notion in Aristotle's 
mind was that Homer had not made Thetis Xf yew, &c. ; in 

M 



82 ETHICS.-BOOK IV. [c. iii. 26-37, 

the other, that ol Adiccoves did not, as a fact, recount, &c. : or 
it is possible that in the former construction 816 is equi- 
valent to tovto cutiov eVrt, after which X£ye«> would follow 
naturally. 

(64.) 26. ri poyis, or very reluctantly. — ev ineivois, al. eV, but 
not so well. 

(65.) 27. a XX' fj, except. 

(66.) 28. The former reading of several MSS. — Trapprjo-iaa-riKos yap 

Oia to KaraCppovrjTiKos eivai, kol Trapp-qo-UMTTiubs Be bio KaraCppovrjTiKos 

Ka\ dXrjdevTinos k.t.X. — is evidently corrupt. The reading in the 
text is given in one MS., and makes good sense. Perhaps 
to Kara(ppovr)TiKbs elvai might have been substituted from the 
majority of MSS. for naracppovelv ; and the following words, 
which really create the difficulty, may have easily crept in, 
by some carelessness, from the preceding line. 

(67.) 28. n\riv oo-a pi), except what ; after the analogy of itXtjv 
« pr], except — o o~a prj Kai = el prj nva. — e X p ov a, al. el pa- 
ve lav. He does not think it worth while to say what he 
really means to the common sort. 

(68.) 29. 7rp6s a\\ov £r)v: literally, to live looking to another ; 
to order his life by another. 

{69.) 31. avBpa>i?6\oyos, he does not talk of men or human life, 

but of something higher. 

(70.) 32. o- 77 o v b d £ o v r o s, of one who cares for such things. 

(71.) 34. Xe£ts orrao-t/xos, and his style stately. — o- vvtopos, 
eager. 

(72.) 33. oi8' ovtol: see chap. ii. 22. 

(73.) 35. duvTjpoi, lazy; not caring to take the trouble to act 
worthily of themselves; al. poepoi, sharp, i.e. looking too 
sharply into themselves ; al. v <o p o i, stupid = iavrovs 
dy v o o v vr e s. 

(74.) 37. ylverai p.a\\ov, there is a greater tendency to it ; 
men are more apt to act below themselves : so that xavvdr^y 
is merely an excess of that proper pride which regulates and 
elevates self-distrust into self-knowledge, and, where true 
merit really exists, leads to the self-esteem wherewith the 
peyaXoyf/vxos regards himself (in a human sense, not impro- 
perly) as the possessor of virtue* 



38 ; c. iv. 1-5.] ETHICS— BOOK IV. 83 

(75.) 38. The peya\6^vxos is doubtlessly, at first sight, contrary 
to Christian humility, and contains many repulsive features ; 
but we must remember that a Christian is to walk worthily 
of the vocation wherewith he is called, and that there is 
nothing unchristian in what Leighton speaks of in Serm. xiv. 
vol. iii. p. 256 : " It is a thing both of unspeakable excellence 
and usefulness for a Christian often to consider the excellence 
of that state to which he is called. It cannot fail to put him 
upon very high resolutions, and carry him on in that divine 
ambition of behaving daily more suitably to his high calling 
and hopes ;" and again, Serm. xv. p. 271 : " There is a great- 
ness and height of spirit in the love of Grod and union with 
Him that doth vainly swell and lift it up, but with the 
deepest humility joins the highest and truest magnanimity." 
Who can read the end of Montrose, and say that his peya- 
\o\lfvxia made his death less Christian ? The peyakoyfrvxia of 
the heathen is founded on his own merit, — that of the Chris- 
tian on the position in which he is placed by God ; but with 
this distinction, the peyoXo^vx^o: of Aristotle contains a great 
principle of Christian ethics, which it is much to be wished 
might be more recognised, especially by the young. It must 
be borne in mind, too, that the peyakoyjrvxos must be agios 
before he can pay respect to virtue in his own person ; and 
that it is revelation only which teaches us distinctly that we 
never can be personally agioi. The features which are so 
repulsive and ridiculous in this character are its accidents, 
and arise from the fashions and notions of the time, which 
made them seem proper ways of exhibiting one's self-esteem 
before the world. 



CHAPTER IV. 

(76.) 1. iv rols it patro i s. Bk. ii. 7. 8. 

(77.) 1. a&o-Tao-i, lay no claim to, — have nothing to do with. 

(78.) 1. t i prj s o p e £ e i. In peyakoyj/vxia there is no opegis Tiprjs : 
the really magnanimous is content, whether he is praised 
or blamed by those around him. 

(79.) 4. €ir\ t6 at to, we do not refer it to the same standard. 
(80.) 5. i p r) fir) s, SC peaoTrjTOs. — k a\ to p c a o v, BC. Vti, where 



84 ETHICS.— BOOK IV. [c. iv. 5, 6 ; c. v. 1, 

there are extremes, there is also a mean. — d va>vv po s, an evi- 
dence of such a character being practically unrecognised. 

(82.) 5. (paiverai Se k.t.X. "When contrasted with (fiikoTtpla, 
such a well-regulated desire of honour would seem short of 
what was proper ; when with d^iXorifiia, it would seem to 
exceed it ; while contrasted with both at once, it would 
seem, in some way or other, to combine both : it would 
seem to be either, according to the light in which it was 
held. 

(83.) 6. eoiKe k.t.\. This, it seems, is the case in the other 
virtues, — the mean is opposed to each and both the extremes, 
while the extremes are only accidentally opposed to each 
other, as being each opposed to the mean ; but here the 
only apparent opposition is between the two extremes, as 
the mean, though really existing, is not practically recog- 
nised : hence over-ambition seems to be directly opposed 
to under-ambition ; but in reality each is opposed to a 
well-regulated ambition. 



CHAPTEE Y. 

(84.) 1. fxea-orrjs irepi opyds. The regulation of those emotions 
of our irascible nature, (Top. iv. 5, 5. p. 172, r) hi opyrj iv t<3 
6vtxoeideL : cf. Top. ii. 7. 4. p. 133,) which are created by the 
actions of others towards us, and in which 0vp.6s, with r)bovi) 
attached to it in prospect, (see Ehet. ii. 2. 2,) furnishes the 
impulse, rather than any pleasurable opegis : it is 6'/>efis pera 
Xvnrjs, not peff r)bovr)s, (sect. 10, Ttfiwpla rravet rrjs dpyr)s, noiova-a 
rjbovrjv dvrl Xvntjs). For the meaning and function of Bv/ios, 
see bk. iii. note 10. 

(85.) 1 . dvavvfxov ovtos k.t.X. There is some difficulty in treating 
of this virtue, because it does not seem as if there were three 
distinct degrees or forms of anger; both opyrj and npaoTrjs 
which are the only recognised forms in which this nados 
shews itself, being rather simple affections, than affections 
controlled or uncontrolled : hence ivpaoTrjs is by some men, 
and under certain circumstances, looked upon as the right 
habit of mind, and at other times, 6pyr) : but Aristotle contents 
himself with shewing that in their praise and blame men do 
recognise a mean between rage and insensibility*; that this 



3-14 ; c. vi. 2, 3.] ETHICS.— BOOK IV. 85 

mean or regulation of anger, which he calls 7rpa6n]s, is stamped 
as the virtue of these instincts of our nature by that appro- 
bation of men which in the end of the first book he laid 
down as the standard or sign of virtue, (see sect. 14, infra : 
to ye roaovrov br/Xov on f) p.ev pear] e£is i-naiveTi]), 

(86.) 3. |3ov\fToi yap- see bk. iii. note 15. 

(87.) 6. to 8e npoirrjXaKiCofievov k.t.X. It is scarcely neces- 
sary to call attention to the contrast between this feature 
of heathen ethics and Christianity. — nepiopav, sc. 71730707- 

XaKi£opevovs. 

(88.) 7. oXoKXrjpov, occupied the whole character ; or was developed 
in all its points. 

(89.) 8. avTcnrobiboao-iv, return the injury ; al. airobiboao-w. — 
17 (pavepoi e I o- 1, in the way in which their anger is felt, (see 
Ehet. ii. 2. 1, and 3. 16). Michelet takes it, " so that through 
their sharpness of mind they discover their anger ;" but it 
seems better to join 8th ogvTrjTa with avrcmohtboaa-tv, and to take 
?; cpavcpoi as above, especially when we refer to the charac- 
teristic given in the Ehetoric, as to the necessity of their 
revenge being felt to come from them : they do not wish to 
do a harm secretly, but openly. 

(90.) 12. Tjj irpaoTrjTi-. the lack of anger is merely an excess 
of the controlling principle ; for anger is the instinct which, 
being properly regulated, becomes irpaoTrjs, — p.b\XXov y [ve- 
ra t, SC. r) vnepftoXr). 

(91.) 14. The mean, though dva>vvp.os, is recognised by the praise 
of men generally as the virtue of this part of our nature. 



CHAPTEE VI. 

(92.) We come to the virtues of the social, or what perhaps may 
be more properly called the sociable, instincts of man. 

(93.) 2. toIs e'vTvyxavovaiv, in whose society they may be. 

(94.) 3. oTi f] p.ecrr) e g t s iiraiveTr). The point proved in this 
chapter likewise is, that the mean is recognised as the virtue 
of the sociable instincts, considered apart from </3iXta, or the 
social affections. 

(95. 3. airohe&Tai, he will approve. 



86 ETHICS.— BOOK IV. [c. vi. 5-9 ; 

(96.) 5. tw toiovtos elvai, from his social instincts being 
properly regulated, and in the mean. — ovS' av Av7reTi>, to 
grieve for them. 

(97.) 6. kg66\ov k.t.X. : speaking of it generally in its abstract 
character, it is merely habitual propriety in social intercourse ; 
but when we consider how far it takes cognizance of what is 
individually or socially right, (dvafopav npbs to ko\6v kcu to 
crvfxfiepov,) we shall find that it is habitual propriety in 
regard of the sympathies of social life, and the pleasures and 
pains attached to them ; that such pain and pleasure is the 
subject-matter of it, and that the mean consists in the regu- 
lation of our natural desire to please and sympathize with 
others, (<a6* avro pev alpovpevos crvvrjdvveip,) by the higher con- 
siderations of private and public good : that when it is for 
another's good, he will not hesitate to give pain by not 
sympathizing with the evil or harmful pleasures of others, but 
rather opposing them. And this virtue, as given by Aristotle, 
is no small ingredient in the practical Christian propriety 
which refuses to join in the scoff or the jest of ribaldry ; and 
which, knowing that such things are worthy of death, can 
find no pleasure in those that do them. There are few 
points of practical Christianity more habitually needed, few 
more neglected. It is a jewel both precious and rare. 

(98.) 8. rols Se dnofiaivovo-iv k.t.X., following its accidental 
results ; that is, private or public good. 

(99.) 9. The apea-Kos or nokag seems to be the only contrary to the 
dvo-epis, through the mean to which really both are opposed 
having no name ; dvo-epis is opposed to Ko\a£, and both to the 

p.€(TOS. 



CHAPTER VII. 

(100.) 1. 7rpoo-7roiT]p,a(ri, pretensions. 

(101.) 2. rtbv ev86£<ov: of what might be, but is not. 

(102.) 4. av8eKaaTos, simple, straightforward; without pre- 
tence ; just what he really is : Eud. iii. 7, dkr]$rjs rat dnXovs 
ov KaXovatv av 6 e kclct to v. 

(103.) 8. en teiKri s, a good, honest man. 






c. vii. 1—13.] ETHICS.— BOOK IV. 87 

(104.) 9. ctf\ to '4\arrov ktX. The fiaWov belongs to dno- 
k\lv€i : he rather tends to make things seem less than they are. 
10. o v yap ay, SC. el prj ovtcos t\v. 

(105.) 12. ovk Iv rfi dwdpci. The same phrase occurs in 
the Ehetoric about the sophist, on reference to which, and 
the context, its meaning will be seen to be, that the sophist 
has no separate formulae, or false system of logic, (ov Kara 
ttjv emarrjfxrjv) ; but he uses true logic as well as false if it suits 
his purpose, {irpoalpea-is tov <paiveo~dai ao<p6s) : so here the d\d- 
£a>v has no formulae or system to guide him in the choice 
and treatment of his subject-matter; but uses whatever 
comes to hand, just as it may for the time suit his purpose, 
of making him seem a greater man than he is : what he says 
is not even always false, but simply so said as to produce false 
impressions about the greatness of his own merits. Others 
translate rfj bwdpei by what he can do, by his having the 
power to do so, — referring to Top. iv. 5. 7, p. 170 ; but the 
passage seems to refer to something else, — to the cases where 
the person has been blamed merely because lie has it in 
him to do wrong, whereas the will (jrpoaipeo-is) is the point 
in question. — r w toio o~8 e elvai, i. e. by his disposition, 
(irpoaipeaei). 

(106.) 12. axrirep Kai yfreva-TTjs, k.t.X. as the liar is SO, i. e. Kara 
rfjv €%iv Kai ra> roi6o~de dvai ; — one sort lying for the mere sake 
of lying, the other from his tendency to ambition or covetous- 
ness, (86%r)s opcyopevos rj Kepbovs) ', or axrtvep Kai ylrevcrrrjs may be 
in a parenthesis, as the liar proper, and 6 piv and 6 be refer to 
two sorts of d\d£ove s, and not of -v^eOcrrat. 

(107). 13. o2 p,ev ovv k.t.X. Supply eariv after icf> ols', after 

k e p $ o v s, Supply aka^ovevopevoi 7rpo(moiovvTai roiavra %>v Kai 
k.t.X. — bia\ade\v which may be undetected, if they do 
not exist: pretensions which cannot be tested; as a false 
prophet, or a quack, can always give reasons why their 
predictions or their remedies turn out wrong — pdvnv 
a-ocpov, al. pdvnv rj <ro<p6v, i. e. two persons, a seer, or a 
sophist or philosopher. In the reading in the text, aocpov 
is only an ironical epithet of p.dvTtv, like our wise man 
for a fortune-teller. 
(108.) 13. roiavra, such things as; SC pavrelav, o-ocpiav, la- 
rpeiav. — t a e I p rf p. e v a, SC. dof-a, aTroXavcrt^, \a6elv. 



88 ETHICS.— BOOK IV. [c. vii. 15, 16; c. viii.; 

( 109.) 15. ftavKoiravovpyoi, affected fellows : dnb ra>v QavKibav 
o eaTiv eibos vnob^pdrcov 1q)vik<op. 

(110.) 15. olov f) rS>v AaKo>va>v ecr6f}s: the ultra-simplicifcy 
of the Spartan costume is in reality not modesty, but conceit. 
Cf. Xen. de Rep. &c, ii. 3. 4. 

(111.) 16. ifi7To8 6v, be/ore one's feet, — obvious. 



CHAPTEE VIII. 

(112.) 1. 6 fiiXla e/i/ifXijy, a certain well-timed sociability. 
Another virtue of social life consists in the proper regu- 
lation of the instincts towards relaxation and society. 

(113.) 3. p&fAoXoxoi'- properly, those that waited about the 
altars to get the refuse of the sacrifices ; a lickspittle, buffoon. 

(114.) 4. evrpdneXo i, witty. We have a similar metaphor in 
our welt-turned jest, compliment, &c. — x aptcvres, amusing, 
pleasing. 

(115.) 4. €7ri7roXdCovros, being very common. Cf. bk. i. 4. ras 
fiakiara irnnoXa^ovcras bogas. 

(116.) 5. e iv 1 b e £ 1 6 t r) s, neatness, tact. 

(117.) iv ir ai8ias p <•' p e e, jestingly, in sport. 

(118). 6. vnovoia, the under or hidden sense; wit, jest, play on 
words. 

(119). 9. e'Set i<r g>s /cat a k a> it t e i v, perhaps they ought to have 
forbidden joking a person. 

(120.) 10. tjtt(ov eo-Ti k.t.X., is a slave to his jest. 



CHAPTER IX. 

(121.) 1. TrdOei. This albas is one of the elements of <pvo-iKr) dperrj. 

(122) 2. aTroreXetTat, its results are of like nature with those of 
fear and danger ; literally, it is perfected, or develops itself, in 
much the same way as fear ; i. e. both are aapanKa. 

(123.) 3. V7r6 rrjs alb o vs. Here we see the function of albas: 
men are also hindered by the fear of alaxpov : but this rather 
is a rational, the other an instinctive, emotion. 



c. ix. 1—7; c.L] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 89 

(114.) 5. ovderepa irpaKrea, avoid the very appearance of 

evil. 
(115.) 6. ro 8e ovtcos ^x €lv &r.\. The notion that shame, or 

sorrow for vice is the same as being virtuous is absurd, for 

the notion of virtue implies abstinence from indulgences or 

actions on which shame would follow. 

(116.) 7. e'lrj av: " shame would be the feeling of a virtuous man on 
the supposed case (e£ v7ro$eo~ea>s) of his doing what was wrong ;" 
but this is really and practically impossible (ovk. e<m fie tovto 
7repl ras dperds) : i tt i e i k o v $• would be a better reading, were 
there MS. authority for it. 



BOOK V. 



CHAPTEE I. 



(1.) Having now treated of the particulars of our moral obligation 
separately, and shewn that in each part of our moral nature 
the fxeo-orrjs, or balance of the impulses and principles proper 
to that part, is the aperf and performs the epyov thereof, — he 
now proceeds to our social nature, and shews, first, that look- 
ing on diKaioo-vvrj as a habit of mind, these dperai of our moral 
nature are collectively the performance of social obligation, 
which is the highest law to which man, as man, is subject ; 
and secondly, looking on biKatoo-vvr) as a political system, that 
as the perfection of man's nature lies in the mean, so does the 
perfection of the state. The fj iv fiepei diKaioavvr) is not, as we 
shall presently see, primarily a balance irepl rjdopas koX Xwas, 
as the other virtues are, but n-epl 'Lvov koX aviaov in a social 
system. The former completes the proof of tjOlkt] aperf being 
the proper epyov of man's nature, — 

diKaioavvT} developes the epyov of man, (is dperf) reXeiorarr) : 

see bk. i. c. 7) ; 

rjdiKrj dperrj is bimioo-vvr) ; 

r}0iKq dperfj developes the epyov of man ; 
while the latter is an additional proof in the way of analogy 
that the moral excellence of man lies in the mean habit : for 
in ancient philosophy, so close an analogy was conceived to 

N 



00 ETHICS.— BOOK V. [c.i.2— 4, 

exist between the state and the individual, that if the ex- 
cellence of the state were not in a mean, it would have been, 
according to the rule of the scholastic philosophy of those 
days, an almost conclusive argument against a fxeaorrjs being 
the dperrj of the individual. 

(3.) 2. opupep Se ndvras k.t.X. The most usually received 
notion of butaLoo-vvq views it as a habit of mind which makes 
us just both in will and act. We must examine in what just 
action consists. He takes the opinions and notions of men 
on the subject, just as he had referred to them in forming 
his notion of evbaipovia, and in discussing the several dperai, 
{Kara rrjv avrrjv peOobov rots 7rpoeipr)pevois). 

(3.) 4. ovde yap k.t.X. The y d p refers to some such suppressed 
sentence as " this general outline of the nature of the two, and 
the opposition between them, will kelp us to define justice, for, #c." 
dvvapis ydp k.t.X. In the sciences or formal arts, oppo- 
site results proceed from the same system, as logic is equally 
used by the logician for a good and by the sophist for a bad 
end ; so that a bad result is no evidence of a bad science or 
art, but only of a misuse of a good one; while in moral 
matters, opposite actions must proceed from opposite habits : 
and thus from bad actions a bad habit is proved to exist, and 

1 from good actions a good habit ; hence, from unjust actions 
"" we may argue the existence of dBucia, and dBucia must have a 

contrary habit (BiKaioovwj), whence just actions arise ; and 
from knowing what is uBlkov we may find what is dduda (ai 
egets dno roav viroKeLpevuv), and from knowing ddiKia we may 

find out BinaLoavvT] (yvcopi^erai r] ivavria e$-is dno ttjs ivavrias) : 

and in this case this is the easiest and most certain way ; for 
biKaioo-vvr) embraces so much, and is so high a perfection, that 
men have scarcely formed any positive notion of it, while 
dBiKia is so much a matter of every-day life, that there is no 
difficulty in pointing out what men hold to be unjust ; and 
this done, we easily get at a positive notion of abulia, and 

thence of the ivavria egis, viz. BiKaioo-vvr]. 

(4.) 4. o v, sc. SoKet etvat, t£>v ivavriatv : the opposite habit does not 
belong to opposite results, i.e. an habit which has some 
other habit opposed to it, cannot produce the results which 
belong to that opposite. Thus health cannot produce the 
same result as sickness, but the art of medicine may be used 






6—11.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 91 

to produce either. Some commentators leave out ov; i. e. 
"but the contrary habit is of (i. e. has) contrary results." 
The sense is much the same. 

(5.) 6. irXeovax&s Xeyrjrai, spoken of in more senses than one. 
— o> s iv\ to noXv, not in all cases : the Paraphrast in- 
stances <pi\elv and fxiaelv, where pio-elu has not all the mean- 
ings opposed to <piXeu>. 

(6.) 7. a\Xa fiia to o~v v eyyv s k.t.A. For opcovvpla, see Ca- 
teg. i. 1. Where the identity of name arises from a close 
similarity between the things, the difference between them 
is apt to be overlooked. 

(7.) 8ia(f)opa. ff Kara rrjv I S ea p, the generic difference. 

(8.) 8. ac a I 6 apco-off, al. Kal tidiKos ; but the former is the better, 
dividing a8i<os into irapdvopos, 7t\€ov6ktt]s and avio-os : the two 
last are afterwards combined. 

(9.) 8. en- el 8e KaL He gives his reasons for omitting TrXeoveKTrjs 
in his division of the abiicov and BUaiou just given, though 
spoken of by men as a sort of injustice. Kal is omitted in 
some MSS. 

(10.) 9. oi 8' avOpconoi down to dyadd is in a parenthesis. 

(11.) 9. Set d° ov, dXX' evx^o-Oai k.t.X. Aristotle here seems 
to recognise the necessity for some change of heart: men 
have wrong notions of aya66v ; they do not recognise the real 
aya66v as good to them. This ought not to be so ; their 
notions of good ought to undergo some change. This can- 
not be done by themselves, but they must pray for it. 

(12.) 10. dXX' on boicei k.t.X. He is merely explaining why 
there is no such term as peiovt&a. 

(13.) 11. tovto yap Tre p te %e i k.t.X. The term avio-ov em- 
braces both TrXeoj/e^'a and peiove&a. Michelet reads the 

passage, eon yap civio~os, [tovto yap 7repie^ei Kal kolvop,) Kal 
napdvopos' tovto yap, (17 napavopla tjtoi rj dviaoTrjs,^) 7repie^et nacrav 
dbiKiav Kal kolvov e'trrt ndarfs dducias ', but this is probably a gloss. 
Cardwell's edition has ko.1 napdvopos before tovto yap nepiexei, 
but this destroys the meaning of the passage, which is to 
shew that avio-os comprehends and is applicable to both 7rXeo- 
ve£La and peiovcgla. This is fully stated in what follows in 
some editions, but is probably a gloss, {to yap avurov ?gci Kal ™ 
iiKkov Kal to (XaTTOv). 



92 ETHICS.— BOOK V. [c. i. 13—15, 

(14.) 13. oi Be vofxoi k.t\.: biicaiov in this its widest sense and 
sphere embraces the whole political system, — every thing 
which is 7toit)tlk6v or (pvXaKTiKov ttjs ev8aip.6vias Kai tg>v p-opioov 
avTrjs rfj 7rokiTiKrj Koivcovla. — This is 0X77 8iKaio(rvvr), which com- 
prehends under it the diKcuoavvr) /car' dperrjv, and r) iv p.epei 

BlKaiOO~VVT). 

(15.) It may be as well to give at once the scheme of diKmoo-vvij, 
as it will throw light on what is coming : — 

a. o\t) biKaioarvvT), (given in ch. i. 13,) the whole system of 
political arrangement (v6p.ipLov), the dBiKia of which is irapd- 
vo ov in its widest sense. 

/3. t) Kara rr)v oXrjv dperrjv, (ch. i. 14 and 19,) ordering and 
encouraging habits and acts of the several virtues ; the 
ddinia of which is not avio-ov, but napdvopiov, though this in its 
wider sense comprehends both divisions. This exists first as 
an habit energising in the performance of virtues considered 
as duties towards others ; secondly, as a political system of 
laws, rewards, punishments, guiding to such an habit. 

y. t) iv fiepei rrjs oXrjs, (ch. ii.), regulation of political union ; 
the dbiKLa of which is avio-ov. This exists first as a political 
regulation of the principles of political union, and of distri- 
butive, retributive, catallactic arrangements, (napd ttjv aperr]*); 
secondly, as a habit of mind or disposition towards acting on 
such principles, {iv p.ipei dper^s,) a regulation of the covetous 
tendencies with especial view to others : hence it is that this 
8iKaioo-vvr) is said at one time to be irapa ttjv dperqv, (ch. ii. 7,) 
and at another, iv p.ipu dperrjs, (ch. ii. 1). 

(16.) 13. 7T do- iv, democracy : d piarois, aristocracy ; rj to?s 
kv p io is, or the governing body. — rj ko.t dWov r tva rpo- 
7tov toiovtov t) KaT d p € t rj v, selected for virtue or some 
other principle, such as wealth, birth, &c. The difference 
between the apto-roi and the Kvpioi nar dperrjv would be, that in 
the former the interest of the better sort, whether in office 
or not, would be consulted ; in the latter, the interest only 
of those who in consequence of their merit hold office : the 
latter would be rather oligarchical, fj <ar dperrjv is omitted 
in some editions, and in one MS. 

(17.) 15. avrt) p.ev ovv 5 i <a 10 o~ v vrj. This is the biKaioo-vvq 
which answers to r)6iKr) aperr), and performs one part of the 
function of dinaioavvr} generally, (the general prosperity of the 



15—20.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 93 

state,) by enjoining and encouraging virtue, (to 8e iroir)riKa 
rrjs o\rjs dperr)s eo-ri oca pei>op.oderr)Tai rrepl rraideiap, ch. ii. 11). 

(18.) 15. dp err} reXela. Here then is solved the question 
started at the outset, (bk. i. ch. vii. 16,) and this gives the 
middle term for the syllogism of the book : — 

"Whatever is reXetorarjy dperr) performs the epyop of man ; 

tjOikt] dperr) -rrpos erepop is this (for it = ducaioo-vprj, which is 
reXeioraTrj dperr)) ; 

rjducr) dperr) TTpos erepop performs the epyop of man. 

In the after-part of this book he shews that there is no higher 
law, or epyop, than diKaioarvpr), as he has before shewn that 
each particular fieaoTrjs performs the epyop of the passions or 
tendencies to which it belongs, making the habit of mind 
good, with relation to oneself and to others. 

(19.) 15. oi>x affXws, not without some limitation ; not in its most 
literal sense. — oiiff "Eo-nepos k.t.X. This saying is ascribed to 
Euripides, Theognes, or Aristotle himself, all equally without 
authority. 

(20.) 15. reXela pd\io~ra: because it is social, which is the 
highest standard we can take for man, as man. r)6iKrj dperr) 
taken dnXcos could not have been the dperr) of social man, but 
it becomes so when it is connected with diKaioavprj. 

(21.) 16. dpxv &vbpa dci£ci: cf. Soph. Ant. 175. 

(22.) 20, ear i yap r) atrr): in themselves, they are identical ; 
each being the possession of the same habits and the per- 
formance of the same duties. — r6 p'l/rot elpai: their 
essence is different ; they will be differently denned. dperr)= 
the possession of the habits and performance of the duties 
with reference to individual or moral perfection, (cm\a>s)', 8i- 
Kaioo-vprj=t\ie possession of the same habits and performance 
of the duties with reference to social perfection, (v-pos erepop), 
to ehai is used in Aristotle in different senses, (7roX\axa>s yap 
rd ehat Xeyopep, Met. xii. p. 264) : when opposed to \6yos, it 
signifies the actual objective existence of anything, as opposed 
to a verbal or merely subjective notional existence, (Met. xii. 
2, p. 263) ; in another sense, (as here,) it means the full 
mental notion or definition of the thing, as opposed to an 
accidental, incomplete view of it. So De Anima, iii. 2, r) be rod 



94 ETHICS— BOOK V. [o. ii. 1—6, 

al(r8r]TOv ivepyeia Kai rrjs alaOrjaem f) airy pev ian Kai pla — to be 
ehai ov ravrbv avrais) : accidentally, the reception of the image 
of the alo-OrjTov and its transmission from the alaOyrov are the 
same; but in essence they differ, inasmuch as one is an 
energy of the subject, the other of the object : so the words 
spoken are the same to the hearer and speaker, but they 
would be differently denned in relation to each. 



CHAPTEE II. 

(23.) 1. There is some difficulty in determining the exact relation 
in which f] iv pepei biKaioavvr) stands to biKaioavvr) in general, 
and to r)6iKri apery ; whether the iv pepei refers to its being 
a subdivision of bi<aioo-vvr), or as contained under ydiKr) dperq: 
either of these views seems at variance with expressions used 
in these chapters. tjOiktj apery and biKaioo-vvy are not con- 
vertible terms, as that would exclude the y iv pepei biKaioo-vvy 
in its function of a regulation of biavopy and xP e ' ia ' I* ^^u be 
found best, I think, to adopt the general division given above, 
and to view y iv p.epei biKaioo-vvy as a subdivision of o\y biKato- 
trvvy when considered as a regulation of the above principles 
of social life, and as contained under o\y apery when viewed as 
a habit of mind ; so that y iv pepei dbi<la is irapa.vop.ov in its 
widest sense of a violation of the whole v6p.1p.ov, as well as in 
its lesser sense of a violation of yducy apery. The twofold 
nature of y iv pepei biKaioo-vvrj as a social arrangement and 
mental habit, necessitates this seeming cross-division; had 
there been a separate term for each, this of course would 
have been avoided. — e v pepei apery s: as being an habit of 
mind, it falls under the general class of dperr) ; it is a parti- 
cular virtue. The arguments here fall into the second figure. 

(24.) 3. rov nap a rbv vop.ov: in the widest sense of napd- 
vopov, in which it is opposed to voptpov, to the whole system 
of political arrangement. 

(25.) 4. The argument here is also in the second figure. 

(26.) 5. in ovdepLiav p.ox^v p lav : no moral vice. 

(27.) 6. napa rrjv SXrjv: as being a political regulation of bia- 
vop.rj and xP et ' a > an d thus having a different subject-matter 



8-11.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 95 

from aperfj. — i v p.* pen as being an habit of mind, or ha- 
bitual disposition to act fairly in these points, — a regulation 
of the Tjbourj dno tov Kepbovs- 

(28.) 8. diapia-rai k.t.X. This may be thus paraphrased : — "SUaiov 
being divided into napdvopov and ta-ov, there is a dtKaioo-vvrj 
and ddiKia proper to each, which we must discuss ; and the 
ddiKia and diKaioavvr) of these two stand to each other in the 
relation of whole and part." The object is to shew how it is 
that, though avio-ov and napdvopov are contrasted divisions of 
abiKov, yet one falls under the other as a subdivision, and of 
the two sorts of SUaiov corresponding to these, one is con- 
tained under the other, (ev pepei dperfjs,) just as nXeov and 
avia-ov, though likewise contrasted divisions of abiKov, stand 
to each other as part to whole. — j? n pore pov e\pr\p.evr\ 
dbiKta, SC. that which is opposed to XPW 15 °^V S aperrjs. 

(29.) 9. ico I to cLSikov kcl\ fj dhiKta k.t.X. The way to con- 
strue this is: " the abiKov and ddiKia of the irapdvopav and avia-ov 
(eKcivav referring to the division given above of bUaiov into 
irapdvopov and avurov,) are different ; the former includes as a 
whole the latter, just as avia-ov includes as a whole the irktov" 
Some editions read itapdvopov for 7rXeoi/, which confuses the 
passage : the MSS. vary ; but the reading in the text is the 
best. 

(30.) 9. t^s ev fie pei biKaioavvrjs: see above, note 23. — 

avTrj rj d 8 i k i a, SC. nepl to aviaov. — oXrjs ddncias: that 
is, the violation of oXrj aperf. The words " \jseyopev yap" in 
the first section shew that he is speaking of this particular 

aSiKia as a part of the violation of 0X77 apery, (Jv p,epei Kauai). 

(31 .) 10. npaTTOfxeva, al. 7rp oo-rarro/xeya. 

(32.) 11. airXas, generally, properly speaking; considered as an 
individual. — vo-Tepov: briefly in the last chapter of the 
book, but at length in the Politics. — tj ire pas: sc. whether 
education should be of public or private concern. 

(33.) 11. ov yap 'la- as k.t.X. There maybe, indeed are, states 
in which the rewards and punishments of the law do not 
coincide with the impulses and checks of conscience, nor 
even with the recognised duties of a moral being. It would 
be easy to give instances in which this is the case. In the 



96 ETHICS.— BOOK V. [c. ii. 12, 13 ; 

fiekTio-TT) TroXn-eia, the model state, they would coincide. The 
matter is discussed in Pol. iii. 

(34.) 12. The motive powers of the state, answering to rj&ovr) and 
Xv7ri7 in an individual, are diavofirj and xp eia: > an( ^ Aristotle 
proceeds to shew that the perfection of the state is arrived at 
by a mean, and thus to confirm his view, that the perfection 
of an individual lies in a mean. 

(35.) 13. Tavyap <r vvaXXay fidr a>v k.t.X. The eKovcna belong 
to catallactic, the a.Kovo-ia to diorthotic or corrective justice, 
so called from its correcting evils : distributive justice would 
exist even in the deXrio-TT] iroXireia, as being an adjustment of 
the common property which must find place in every society ; 
but the other would cease to exist where diKaioo-vvrj was super- 
seded by (f>i\ia, in that ideal state to which theorists thought 
it possible to mould society, and with a view to which they 
would admit (as Plato in his Republic) such institutions as 
community of property, wives, children, &c. 



CHAPTEE III. 

(36.) 1. eVet k.t.X. Since the aducos is avuros, it is further to be 
observed that there is a mean (fxearov) implied in the notion 
of avia-ov, (as containing a nXeov and eXarro*>,) viz. the 'lo-ov ; and 
the abiKov being aviaov, it follows («| ivavTioiv) that there is an 
'Lvov : bUaiov is this 'Lvov, and hence also pio-ov ; it is not only 
an absolute equality (iW), but also a relative equality (/ieVoi/), 
as equally removed from nXeov and cXarrov : where the equality 
is absolute, the bUaiov will be simply 'lo-ov, but being iVoi/, it 
will also be a [ieo-ov ; where the equality is relative, the diKaiov 
will be a pea-ov between -nXeov and eXarrov, and hence also 
'lo-ov : in both cases it is dlmiov ruriv ; hence the following 
arrangement holds : — 

Distrib utive justice. 

rbUaiov tio~lv = general, soldier. 

| ne<rov tiv5>v : things in which, looking to the posi- 

BUaiov is -^ tion of the parties, there is in the Siavofii) neither 

nXeov nor J iXaTTov, but a /xeVoj/, — relative equality: 

^see sect, 12. 






c.iii. 1— 11.] ETHICS.-BOOK V. 97 

Catallactic justice 
bUaiov tktiv. 

Xa-ov bvoiv, absolute equality between two things, 
dUaiou -l without reference to their character, (see ch. iv. 
sect. 3,) but still, as being 'to-ov, it is a /aeow, (see 
iv. 6). 

(37.) 6. orav rj taoi prj to- a k.t.X. Here are given the two 
faults which prove olicelai cpQopaL to a constitution admitting 
them; — the French system before the revolution is an in- 
stance of the former, and the American constitution of the 
latter. 

(38.) 7. iXevdepiav, i.e. that every free man is entitled to an 
equal share. — e iyivciav. This was the principle of the old 
constitutions of Athens and Rome, in which the belonging 
to certain tribes or families was the a£ia of the constitution. 

(39.) 8. fxovadiKov dpiBfiov, number proper, such as 1,5,10, 
&c, by which we count ; 6Xa>s dptB p,ov t numbers generally, 
— wherever the notion of quantity exists. 

(40.) 9. dXXa na\ rj a-wexh^'- this is merely to answer a 
plausible eWrao-ts against his statement that all analogy has 
four terms. In arithmetic this continuous proportion may 
occur, (as 3 : 6 : 1 6 .* 12,) but in geometrical proportion, 
(eKarepov irpbs eKarepov u>s oXov npbs oXov,) which is the propor- 
tion of distributive justice, the same term cannot be used 
twice, and therefore it is not continuous : see sect. 13. 
Michelet thus illustrates this : — 

indrepov npbs eicdrepov 

Achilles Ajax Nummi Achilles Nummi Ajacis 
8:4: 6 ; 3 

€vaXKd£ 

Achilles Nummi Achilles : Ajax Nummi Ajacis 

8 :: 6 :: 4 3 

oXov npos SXoVf onep 17 vopf) <rvvdva£ei 
Achilles et Nummi Ajax et Nummi Achilles : Ajax 

(8+6=) 14 : (4+3=)7 :: 8 : 4 

Hence to oXov npbs oXov «os eKarepov npbs eKarepov. 
(41.) 11. ivaXXdg, interchanging them. — a- v v 8 v d { «. The act of 
distribution attaching the proper proportion to each person, 
forms by combination the oXou, Achilles and his share, (o + y); 
TTpbs SXovy Ajax and his share, (/3 -J- d). 

o 



98 ETHICS.— BOOK V. [c. iii. 12, 13 ; 

(42.) 12. rod napa to dvaXoyov, of the abiKov which is con- 
trary to proportion. The syllogism is — 

dvaXoyov is /LteVoj/, — as being the point between irXeov and 

eXarrov ; 

8i.Ka.iov IS dvaXoyov ', 

bUaiov is pecrov. 
(43.) 13. yea>iX€TpLK^: G-org. 518, A. 
(44.) 13. e v dyaOov Xoya y iv er at, is regarded as dyaOov. 



CHAPTEE IY. 

(45.) 1. to be XoL-rrov €v: divided into two — corrective and 
catallactic, — each diopOaTmov as correcting existing inequali- 
ties. 

(46.) 2. e I o- e v e x @ * v t a, the terms introduced. 

(47.) 3. ov8ev yap biacpepei. There may be cases where the 
character and circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant 
respectively are taken into consideration in estimating the 
amount which will make them equal ; that is, the (rjpia suf- 
fered by one, and the nepdos gained by the other, (ttjv tov 
fi\d(3ovs diacpopdv) : as, for instance, in an action for libel, a 
minister of state or a clergyman would, from his position, 
suffer a greater frpia than another person would from the 
same act, and therefore the amount of damages would pro- 
perly be greater ; but supposing the right value to be thus 
fixed for the C-qpla, then the damages would not be assessed 
according to the proportion existing between the parties. 
Thus, supposing a plaintiff in one case to = 4, and the de- 
. fendant 4, that is, both to be in respect of station, &c. ex- 
actly equal, the frpla might be represented by 3 ; while in 
another exactly similar act, where the two parties were un- 
equal in their position, as plaintiff = 6, the defendant = 2, the 
(jifiia might be represented as 10; and this would be the 
damages : whereas, if proportion was introduced, the balance 
would be struck thus, as 6 .* 2 : 30 ; 10, and the defendant 
would have to pay, not 10, the actual fr/ua, but a threefold 
one, — and this is what Aristotle is guarding against here. 

(48.) 5. Tiaiv, to some cases. — o lov, as if there was icepSos. 

(49.) 6. dXX' oTav k.t.X. The most proper application of these 
terms, though even this is improperly used in some cases, is 



c. iv. 1—13.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 90 

of profit to the agent, loss to the patient; but when (d XX' 
orai/) the nddos has been estimated, that which the agent 
restores to the patient is called $7/ua, as well as the loss 
which the patient suffered at first. He seems to be ac- 
counting for the phrase 777 C^iq lo-dfriv, inasmuch as the 
term Cw' ia i s properly confined to the injury inflicted on 
the patient, and not to the restitution made to him. 
(50.) 12. This may be illustrated by the lines given in the 
text : — 



« 



7 



Then from yyS must be taken -yS, and added to ae, to make 
it equal to 0/3. The patient's and agent's case is represented 
by act, yy : 00 is only used to set the inequality clearly 
before us. — r 6 i(j> & v. This cannot properly be applied to a 
single line. It seems to have crept in either as part of the 
formula, or by a clerical error. If it is omitted, then to yd 
answers to t<3 ae ; and below we have t<5 yd. The passage 

beginning, ecrrt fie tovto kcu eVt T<av aWcov k.t.X., down to Kai 

toiovtov, occurs thus in all MSS., but it does not belong here : 
and it occurs again in the next chapter; whence probably 
it was carelessly or ignorantly transferred by transcribers or 
commentators. 

(51.) 13. adeiav, liberty to act as one will. 

(52.) 13. d\X' avra oV avrfov yevrjTai. This is a difficult pas- 
sage. Michelet suggests that akkd is to be taken for "prce- 
terquam, except when," and translates it thus: — " When there 
is neither excess or deficiency except when they are caused by them- 
selves, (taking bC avratv as masculine,) i. e. by consent on both 
sides;" and he quotes a passage in De Anima, i. 1. 17, 

p. 5, for this sense of dXAa tj ovk eVri tis 6 nepl to. Trd6r) dXX' 

(except) 6 cfrvcriicos. There are some others in Xen. Yect. iii. 6, 
Anab. vi. 4. 2, (given in Gr. Or. 773, 4,) which might bear 
out this meaning of " except :" if it is adopted, a stop should 
be put before and after dXX' avra 8i abrav ; but it does not 



100 



ETHICS.— BOOK V. 



[c. v. 1—8, 



seem to be the sense required ; and I would rather explain 
the fit' avTvv by the sense of bid in such phrases as Sta <pd/3ov, 
to be in fear, — one thing being in another, (see Gr. Gr. 627. 1, 
3, b 3 ) — and construe it, when they (the two sides) are contained 
in themselves, i. e. self-contained; do not encroach upon each 
other, and thus are equal. He is shewing that there is a 
middle point to which neither fopta nor <ep8os is applicable. 



CHAPTER V. 

(55.) 1. Ilvdayopioi. They defined justice to be dpiBfios lo-dius 
ttros, (Magna Moral, i. 1). 

(54.) 3. et Ke ivdQoi, placed by G-aisford (Poet. Min.) among the 
Fragments of Hesiod. 

(55.) 6. o-vvexei k.t.X., is the principle or bond of. — to dvn- 
n eirovd 6 s kclt* dvaXoylav, taking into consideration the 
value of the things to be exchanged, (koI prj kclt lo-oTrjra) ; not 
giving one for one, or two for two. They are considered, 
not with regard to quantity, but quality. 

(56.) 6. t<3 dvr iiroielv k.t.X. The state is said by Aristotle, 
in different passages, to depend upon an interchange of 
offices, — on demand (xp^'a,) — on cpikla. The first is the 
practical view of the working of social life ; the second views 
it as arising from the mutual needs of men ; the third from 
the instinct towards social life. — r 6 k a k S> s, sc. ttoicTlv. 

(57.) 7. Xapircov lepov, moral beauty expressed in physical 
beauty. The number of the Graces represents the threefold 
sense of x<*P ls > — * ne feeling of kindness, the kind action, the 
kind feeling in return ; while their being interwoven repre- 
sents the inseparable connection which does, or at least ought 
to, exist between the three. 

(58.) 8. rj Kara 8 id /xer pov <rv£ev£is: such as exists between 
A and 0, or E and I, in the logical scheme of opposition, 
cross combination, De Interp. x. p. 81, thus : — 

Jeweller = 10. Shoemaker = 2. 




Eing = 20. 



Shoe = 4. 



8—10.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 101 

The jeweller takes the shoe, the shoemaker the ring ; — the 
difference between them being 16 : the shoemaker gives four 
more pairs of shoes, or their value, to make the exchange 
equal. 

(59.) 8. irp£>Tov, at first; at once; that is, if before the exchange 
takes place, the value of the two things is considered rela- 
tively to each other and to their producers, and then an 
exchange is made, (elra to avTiTrenovObs yevrjTai,) that (fair 
exchange) we speak of (to Xeyopevov) will take place ; — or to 
\ey6fievov may refer to the proverbial expression mentioned 
above, to dUaiov to avTineTrovdos dX\a>. — tov eKeivov epyovi 
partitive genitive ; al. to e<elvov epyov. 

(60.) 8. el 8e prj, if the quality or value is not first considered, but 
only the quantity or numerical value, fyc. — ovde a-vpphei, sc. fj 

7ToXlS Or TO blKCtlOV. 

(61.) 9. earn be tovto. This relative equality, and not an abso- 
lute equality, obtains in all arts of life. The value of an 
article is not settled by the seller or producer and his produc- 
tion alone, but relatively to the consumer and his wants and 
wishes. " An art would be destroyed unless, of whatever sort or 
in whatever quantity, the producer (rd noiovv) produced, the con- 
sumer also (jvaaxov takes this sense as the patient of noiovv) 
wanted this thing in that same quantity and quality." That is, an 
exact exchange, where each offered to the other exactly what 
the other offered to him, such as bread for bread, could not 
go on : nor where there was no way of equalizing products 
of dissimilar quantity. Others make r6 iroiovv and to nacrxov 
refer to the same person, — the former as producing some- 
thing, the latter as receiving something of the same quality 
and quantity in exchange for it ; but the interpretation given 
above is the better. Others, again, make these two words 
refer to the giver and receiver : that arts would be destroyed 
unless the consumer (to irao-xov) was willing to suffer (i. e. to 
give, €Trao~xe,) as much as the producer had earned; but this is, 
I think, the worst of the three. 

(62.) 10. 8 16 k.t.X. : hence there must needs be some way of com- 
paring the value of these dissimilar articles of commerce, viz. 
money, which thus represents the difference (vnepPoXr) and 
eWeiyjns) between two articles differing in value and kind. 

(63.) 10. ir 6 a- a arret: this depends on perpel. — orrep k.t.X. 



102 ETHICS.— BOOK V. [c. v. 11, 12, 

The value will be determined by the materials, time, and 
labour of each, and the demand for the thing produced : as 
the time, labour, materials, and demand of the architect ex- 
ceed those of the shoemaker, he will want so many pairs of 
shoes in exchange for his house ; he will want some means 
of equalizing the pairs of shoes and the house, or there will 
be no KOLvavla. 

(64.) 11. r} x p e * <*• This is supplied by the market value, and its 
representative, money. If, in the market, a house will fetch 
so many times more than a pair of shoes, the difference be- 
tween them is immediately found; and a means of stating and 
equalizing that difference is supplied by the common measure 
of value, "money." 

(65.) 11. rj iravra (Tvi/e^ei, is the bond of social union, viewed 
as arising from the reciprocal wants of men. Thus Cicero 
views it — v TrdWayixa, the representative. 

(66.) 12. onep (tkvtoto fios k.t.X. The relative position and 
character and skill of the two parties are to be taken into 
account in estimating the value of the production of each : 
the higher the art, and the greater the learning and skill, &c. 
it requires, the higher will be its value, supposing the mate- 
rials employed and the time occupied in each case to be the 
same ; but the value of each work once being ascertained, the 
relation between them is not to be taken into account at the 
moment when the balance is struck ; nor can it be expressed by 
the <rxw a avakoyias (geometrical proportion), when the ex- 
change has been made, (6rav dXkdgavTai : see Gr. Grr. 842. 6,) 
though the previous process of estimating the value of their 
respective productions may be so expressed. When once this 
has been ascertained, they are to be made actually, not rela- 
tively, equal. Thus, supposing the jeweller to be worth six 
times as much as the shoemaker, the jewel would be worth 
six pairs of shoes, — jeweller = 6, shoemaker 1 ; then the jewel 
= 12, the pair of shoes 2, the relative value of the ring 
and the shoe stands thus, as 6 : 1 : *. 12 : 2 ; and the value 
of six pairs of shoes (= 12) must be given by the shoe- 
maker. If they were to be made relatively, not absolutely, 
equal, then as : 12 : 2 :: 72 : 12; and on this principle 
the shoemaker would have to give the value of 72 instead of 



13—18.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 103 

12, and he would thus have an extreme on either side of 
the just mean, i. e. an excess of labour and expense, and a 

deficiency of profit, (dp,<fioTepas e£ei ras v7repfio\as to erepov 

aKpov). — r 6 avrcov : their proper share. 

(67.) 13. on 8' f] xp et ' a k.t.X. That mutual wants are the bond 
of commerce is clear from the fact, that where these wants 
are lacking in both or either of the parties, there is no deal- 
ing. Thus, if one person needs some wine, and can give 
nothing but some of the produce of his fields, (onVov igaywyfjs,) 
of which the other at the moment is not in want, money 
comes in as a surety (eyyvrj-riis) that when he does want it, he 
will be able to get it.— i gayayrjv, al. ; but the partitive 
genitive is best. 

(68.) 14. Trao-^et k.t.X. The value of the precious metals some- 
times varies: the expected results of the gold discoveries 
illustrate this. This is parenthetical. — fiovXeTat, has a tendency 
to remain fixed. 

(69.) 15. <rv fip,cT pias, common measure. 

(70.) 15. e£ virotieareas, is conventional; it is not so actually, 
but is accepted as such. — v 6 pi a- p. a, i.e. tS v6fia>, con- 
ventionally, 

(71.) oIkIcl icj) fjs, al. ; but the weight of authority is against it. 
— rj di-ia: the rj refers to to-ov, equal, or of the same value. 

(72.) 17. ov top avTbv Tpoirov: in its most prominent cha- 
racter, it is not 7rep\ f)8ovas Koi Xinras, a regulation of pleasures 
and pains, but irep\ biavoprjv koL xP e ' LCLV i a regulation of the prin- 
ciples of social life ; secondarily, as a habit of mind, (kv fie pet 
dp€Trjs,) it is a disposition to act on these principles of fair dis- 
tribution and exchange, arising from the proper regulation of 

the rjboprjv dno tov Kepdovs* 
(73.) 18. f) S' ddiKia, SC. Kad' rjv Aeyerat npaKTiKos tov ddiKOv. — 
TovvavT Lov, SC. diaveprjTiKos tov dvtaov k.t.X. — r ovto } SC. to 
abiKOV. 

(74.) 18. V7T6 pj3o\r)s Ka\ iXXeiyjreSs ecrTiv k.t.X.: because 

it is of the nature of vnepfioXr) and eXXeiyjns. "With regard to 
oneself, it is always too much of the good, and too little of 
the bad ; with regard to others, the d§i/a'a, which is a violation 
of rjBiKr] dpeTrj, (to pev o\ov,) is always the taking too much 
good, or not enough evil, — seeking pleasure, or shunning 



104 ETHICS.-BOOK V. [ c . vi. 1, 4, 

pain at another's expense. — 6 polas, sc. to the case of ifi 
avrov just given. In the distributive injustice (to iraph to 
avaKoyov) it may be either vnepfiokr) or tWei^ns of good or 
bad, as the case may be, (SrroTepcos ervxe). It may be giving 
too much good, Qr too little good, or too much or too little 
evil, to another. 



CHAPTER VI. 

(75.) He now distinguishes briefly between unjust acts and in- 
justice, and proceeds to shew that the only dUaiov, or law 
of obligation, really binding upon man as an individual, is 
that 7to\ltik6v diKaiov which is equivalent to t^Qikyj aperf) ; the 
other sorts of bUaiov are only so in a secondary and ana- 
logical sense, and form no element of the dperrj or epyov of 
man. 

(76.) 1. 6 7roIa, a!. oiTola. — ovtg>, sc. looking to the acts only. 

(77.) 4. del 8e fxfj \av6dveiv k.t.X. The following is an 
analysis of DUaiov, as laid down by Aristotle : — 
The principles. — Natural justice. 

Blkcuqv 

airkSas bimiov. 



koivoSj aypacpos vopos '. Rhet. 

i. 10, i. 13, ii. 3. 



TToklTlKQV dUaiOV. 

tdios, yeypappevos vop.os : Rhet. 

i. 10, i. 13. Ii. 



a. imeiKeia. | /3. virepfioXr) dperrjs. cpvoutov \ vopiKov. 

| yeypappevos | aypacpos. 

aypacpos \ yeypappevos : Rhet. i. 13. 11. 

Common law. Statute law. 
Rhet. i. 13. 11. 

1. dUaiov in the abstract, existing prior to any formal 
declaration of it by states or individuals. 

2. That part of the SUaiop which is adopted by the legis- 
lator and embodied in the laws and institutions of the state. 

3. That part of the dUaiov which the legislator did not or 
could not transfer to his laws or institutions, consisting — 

a. of the spirit of the laws, which he could only take im- 
perfectly, — ine'iKeia. 

0. the principles or quasi duties which he did not take, 
(vTreppoXr] dperris) ; works of imperfect obligation. 






4.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 105 

4. (ftvariKov, that part of tvoXltikov which is drawn directly 
and positively from the abstract dltcaiov, (i.) divided into — 

c. That which is ordained by actual statute, {statute law). 

d. That which has obtained by consent, (common law). 

5. vojxikov, that part of tvoXitikov which is not drawn di- 
rectly from natural justice, but arises entirely from the wants 
or whims of men ; care being taken that it is not contrary to 
natural justice. This, too, is divided into statute and com- 
mon law. 

(78.) 4. to £t]Tovixevov, sc. Kvpiws SiKaiov ; that St'/catoz/, the vio- 
lation of which would make a man uSikos. 

(79.) 4. tovto Se k.t.X. The only justice or law of obligation 
really binding upon man is the tvoXuikov ; that which is em- 
bodied in the laws and regulations of a social state, and 
w r hich is represented in the individual by qducri aperf ; for real 
obligation cannot exist except where there are social rela- 
tions. He proves this by the following argument : — S Ik a toy 
can exist only where there is v 6 po s, (eem yap dtKciLov oh /cat vopos 
irpbs avrovs,) vopos where there is dbiKia, {vopos 5' iv ols dbucia,) 
a 8 t k i a where it is possible to take too much good and too little 
evil, {tovto S' ia-TL to irXeov avrto vipxiv) ; and this can only be 
where there are social relations, — common properly and inter- 
change, (eVt koivcovcov fiiov Tvpbs to elvcu avTapKeiav,) — SO that where 
these social relations do not exist there can be no real diKaiov, 
but only icaO* 6 po i ottjt a. 

(80.) 4. eXevOepcov <a\ t o- a v k.t.X. , where there are some 
relations of equality between the persons in the state : either 
absolute equality, as in a democracy w r here each man is 
on an equality with the rest, (kcit' dpiBpov,) or relative 
equality, (/car d v a X o y t a v,) where the several parties in 
the state are equal according to their several claims arising 
from a principle of blood, as in an oligarchy of families ; 
or education, as in an aristocracy ; or property, as in a 
timocracy. — p 77 i o-t 1 tovto, sc. Koivoavla.— d XX d t 1 down 
to 6 poioTrjTa is parenthetical. ~^_^ 

(CI.) 4. vopos iv ols dbiKLa. This may best be understood 
by tracing society from its simplest to its most complex 
form. In good old patriarchal days, when persons of the 
same family lived naturally together in mutual love, there 
was no mention of bimiov, no notion of rights; as time went 

p 




106 ETHICS— BOOK V. [c. vi. 5—7, 

on, and the ties of blood daily became less close, and interests 
more distinct, the notion of personal rights took the place of 
affection ; injuries or invasions of these rights took place, 
the notion of bUawv was evolved, and the question was re- 
ferred to the Kpirrjs, who decided between right and wrong, 
and by his decision gave a definite existence and shape to 
dUaiov, which was then, as society became more extended, 
embodied in the vopos. The order of things was this : kol- 
vavia, cj)i\ia, ciSikov, diKatov, Kpiais, vdjios ; hence vdfxos is an evi- 
dence of the existence of bUmov, and can only exist where 
there is kolvcovio., for where this is not, the question of abmov 
and dtKaiov cannot arise. This is illustrated by the history 
of the early Church : at first they had all things in common, 
((piXia,) then complaints arose, then bUaiov stepped in, and 
called for the appointment of arbitrators, (deacons,) and the 

operation of a vopos. — tov to be eVn, SC. aStKt'a. 

(82.) 5. bio k.t.X., wherefore, ( = a proof of dbiKia being this 
taking to ourselves the good, is that) fearing dbiKia, we do not 
entrust the supreme power to a single mans will, — because we are 
afraid of his doing this from the natural impulses of human 
selfishness ; but we place ourselves under the government of 
reason expressed by law, of which the chief magistrate is the 
interpreter and administrator] - And the chief magistrate, to 
whom we thus intrust the state, is ex officio the guardian of 
justice and of that equality which excludes the notion of irkeox 
avTu> vipeiv, therefore it is clear that dbiKia, against which we 
are thus guarding, consists in ttXIov alra vipeiv \ hence we 
see that it can exist only where this inequality is possible, 
i. e. in Koivcovla. He seems to be bringing forward men's 
notion of government as an evidence of his proposition, that 
true biKaiov exists only where Koivoovia exists. 

(83.) 5. 6 apx<0V' Some persons make apx<ov refer to Xoyos, but 
this breaks the connexion with what follows, where he is 
evidently speaking of a person. 

(Sis.) 6. inei. The apodosis being some sentences off, is in- 
troduced by a pa', piadbs lipa tis boreos. — ovbev avrco K.r.X., 
there seems to be no advantage to him to be ap^cov. 

(85.) 7. Bra be prj k.t.X. Whosoever is not content with this, 
but tries to seize upon an unfair share of good, commits 
dbiKia, and becomes a Tvpawos. In the case of the &px&*$ 









8, 9 ; c. vii. 1-3.] ETHICS.-BOOK V. 107 

aStKi'a, which is embodied in the very notion of rv^awos, would 
arise from the attempt 7r~keov avT<o vepetv. 

(86.) 8. There are certain relations of life in which quasi justice 
obtains, viz. the deo-iroT i<6v and the nar piKov : in the 
former, the slave, being merely a chattel, has no Koivwla, 
no claims or rights whatever, and therefore acts which are 
unjust in themselves are not unjust towards him ; and a 
child may be viewed in the same light, as one who has no 
rights as against his father. 

(87.) 9. rj v, it was laid down to be, Gr. Gr. 389.4 : so rjo-av, below. 

(88.) 9. ols v-rrdpxei k.t.X. There must be some relations ex- 
isting between the governors and governed ; in other words, 
a constitution on some principle of equality. 



CHAPTER VII. 

(89.) 1. to [iev cpvo-iKov. Whoever framed the constitution 
and laws for any social state would take from natural justice 
such principles as w r ere suitable to his purpose, and these, 
when adopted by the public voice, either expressed or implied, 
fall under nokiTiKbv cpvoiKov, or that portion of the social 
arrangements and laws which are drawn directly from the 
law of nature, — enactments of moral obligation. The other 
sort are only of positive obligation. 

(90.) 2. ra yjsrjcpio- ixaToadr), matters of special enactment. 

(91.) 2. do ice 2 Se evlois. The argument is in the second 
figure, and Aristotle meets each premiss with an evarao-is ; 
denying that all natural things are invariable, and that all 
justice is variable. It should be w T orked out at length. 

(92.) 3. nap a rols Oeols. In the /3eXnW?; iro\irela which may 
be supposed to exist among the gods, those principles of 
justice, which among men are variable, may well be believed 
to be fixed and invariable. 

(93.) 3. Kivqrbv pevroi nav. In Eth. Eudem. we find klvtjtov, 
ov fievroi -nav, — putting the stop before ot; but this is not sup- 
ported by the majority of MSS. It gives, however, a very 
good sense. If the reading in the text is to be preferred, 
Aristotle is drawing a distinction between the avrobUaiov 
of the gods and the diicaiov of men. This latter, though 
variable, is, in some cases, at least, from nature, and not 
merely conventional. 



108 ETHICS.— BOOK V. [c. vii. 4-7 ; 

(94.) 4. <f)vo-€i. His constant definition of things c/juo-a is tos 
eVi ro 7roXv, being a subdivision of that higher cpvais which 

comprehends to de\, (dvdyKrj,) as well as coy eVt ro 7roXii, ((fiixrei). 

— 8 rj X o v : that is, it is not matter of proof, but of per- 
ception. 

(95.) 4. e7r£ rav aXXcov, sc. in matters of pure physics, where 
vo/aikois and o-vvdJ]Krj do not come in, it is equally true to say 
that some things which are natural are variable. — fj 8 egia 
k.t.X.: an eWracns from a particular. See Analyt. Prior, ii. 28. 
p. 140. 

(96.) 5. ro o-v pcpe pov, that which merely depends on human 
expediency : as in a place of wholesale trade, (ov mvovvtcu,) 
a nominal cwt. is practically 1121b., and in a retail shop 
(ov nozkovo-iv) only 1005b., and yet the measure which thus 
varies is in itself the same ; so there is a similar variation 
in olkcilo'j depending on the caprice or convenience of men, 
and it varies as the constitutions to which it is attached 
vary. These constitutions are not the same everywhere, 
and consequently 8lkciiov is not in its practical details the 
same everywhere, though there is such a thing in the de- 
signs of nature as a constitution, and consequently dUaiov, 
which ought to obtain everywhere. 

(97.) 6. As you cannot argue from particular to universal, neither 
can you argue from the variableness of the single phenomena 
of justice, as seen in the particulars of action, (to. TrpaTTopeva,) 
that the principle whence they proceed is variable also. 

(98.) 7. 8ia<pepet k.t.X. ahtKov is injustice in the abstract, — 
the principle ; ah'iK-qpa, the act ; dSuia, the evil or vice. — 

6 p. o i co s k.t.X.: SO 8lko.lov, diKaicopa, 8iK.aioovvri ; or for 8iKalcopa 

we may better use oLKaioTTpayia of the act, for ducaicopa is 
rather the remedying injustice, and therefore is not properly 
applied to every sort of just act. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

(99.) Lots yap k.t.X., SC. npaTTOvaiv TavTa, oh o-yp^ej3r]Ke kt.X. 

(100.) 3. dy vou, v is here used in the sense of 8C ayvoiav, bk. iii. 
ch. 1. — tis Xafieov x ei P a avTov. avTov refers to the per- 
son whose hand some one has taken, and struck another 
with it. — r 6 r o iovt ov 8 1 co p l a G a, let the same distinction be 



c. viii. 1-10.] ETIIICS.-BOOK V. 109 

drawn also as to the motive; sc. to decide whether the act is 

4koihtiov, or not. 

(101.) -1. ear i ft 6 p. o l co s k.t.X., the o-vpfie&rjKos also (jcai 
omitt. al.) is the same, i. e. it prevents what is seemingly a 
just or unjust aetiou from being so. 

(102.) G. r p t co v ovacov k.t.X., SC. aru^r;/Lia, dpdpTrjpa, d$LKT)pa. — 

/3Aa/3cof, as distinguished from d8i/a'«, which is a fourth case, 

orav £K Trpoaipeaews . Ill llhet. i. 13, 16, dbiKrjpa includes the ddiKia. 

Of course, the distinction here drawn suggests to every one 
the words of our Litany, — sins, negligences, ignorances. 

(103.) 7. aw((3r] oi>x ov iveiea coi^, a result happened which he had not 
thought of as the end. 

(104.) 8. oaa re 8ui 6vp6v k.t.X. The passion, which hurries 
the agent so rapidly away that he has no time to reflect, is 
the cause of the action, not KaKia. See bk. hi. 1. 21, where he 
says that desire or anger do not abstractedly destroy Uovaiov. 
Here he looks at what accidentally and occasionally accom- 
panies them. 

(105.) 9. dvayKoia, hunger, thirst, &c. ; <pvo-iKa, love, anger, &c. 

(106.) 10. en S' ov8e. If in a court of justice an enquiry arises 
as to whether a man who committed some wrong act under 
the influence of anger is accountable for it, the question is 
not whether the act was committed or not, but whether the 
anger was justifiable ; whether there was any dftiKla cpaivopevr} 
to justify the anger : it is not the act which makes a man 
aStKo?, for that is admitted, but the mode and manner of it. 

(107.) 10. 6 8" ejrtjSouXevo-ar. The man who has attacked an- 
other even under the influence of anger cannot plead ayvoia. 
— co o- r e k.t.X. Hence, the fact being allowed, one party 
looks upon himself as injured, the 6pyr) being unjustified; 
the other denies it, pleading the provocation; and this is the 
question to be settled : and hence it is clear that npoaipeo-is 
is necessary to the notion of d8ncla. Michelet takes it dif- 
ferently, making the clause 6 <V enifiovXevaas ovk dyvoei, a paren- 
thetical statement of the difference between the act done 
from anger and one done from npoalpecns. The angry man 
may plead ayvoia, but the 6 emfiovXevo-as cannot. And con- 
ceiving the question to be, whether the angry man who 
retaliates an injury is just or unjust, he makes the words 
& are k.t.X. to mean that he upon whom the angry man 



110 ETHICS.— BOOK V. [c. viii. 11, 12 ; 

retaliated thinks he has been injured by the angry man, 
while the angry man denies it; but this both destroys the 
force of the passage, and is, I think, contrary to the sense of 
the words : for eTri$ov\evaas is not the same as npofiovXevo-as ; 
and it is clear from the words eVi cpaivopzvrj dbiKia r) 6pyr) io-riv, 
that the question is not whether the angry man has irpoal- 
peo-Ls, but whether the <pa.ivop.evrj aSiKta by which his anger was 
provoked had it so as to make it really dSiKwz, and therefore 
to justify the anger. Aristotle seems to mean that it is not 
pretended that the person who provoked the anger by an act 
of aggression (j7ri@ov\ev(rcit) can plead excusable ayvoia of 
particulars, so that he may on this plea deny the injustice 
which the other asserts, but he can do so on the plea of 
want of 7rpoaip€o-Ls to do an unjust action : the act of ag- 
gression (t6 €7n{3ov'heveiv) is admitted ; the question is, it 
was done whether e* 7rpoaipe<rea>s, with a deliberate intent 
to be unjust, so as to justify the anger of the other party. 

(108.) 11. fjtjT), sc. where there is irpoa'ipeo-is. 
(109.) 12. r a> v 8' clkovo- icov. He uses this word in a looser sense 
than in bk. iii. 1. 2, (where he says, 'lo-as yap ov Ka\a>s Xeyerat 

dicovo-ia etvai ra dia Bvpbv r) §C e7Ti6vpiav: see note 104,) for any 

actions done without definite Tvpoalpea-is, even those which 
arise from ignorance of the general principles under the im- 
pulse of irdBos ; such as where a starving man, under the 
pressure of hunger, loses sight of his knowledge of the 
nature of theft, and his abstract npoalpeais against it ; his 
act does not arise from a bad irpoalpeais, but from the pres- 
sure of the hunger, which obscures, for the time, his irpoaL- 
peais : it is therefore avyyvcopovLnov. Where the ndOos is less 
urgent it is not so. — hi ayvoiav : see bk. iii. note 19. 



CHAPTEE IX. 

(110.) The questions discussed are as follows : — 

1. Can a man be injured if he consents to the act ? (npaTov 

pev — eKovres). 

2. Is the recipient of an injury always injured ? (eneL — 

biKaicm payovvros . ) 

And this latter one branches off into two other points, 
(sect. 9). 



C. IX. 



1—3.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. ill 



a. Whether he -who receives, by an unjust sentence, more 
than he ought, is himself unjust ? 

/3. "Whether a man can injure himself? 

dr on cos, paradoxically. 
(111.) 2. cv\oyov avriKclo-Bai ofioicos. The opinion that 
dbacelaOai is not always the same, either voluntary or in- 
voluntary, but sometimes one, sometimes the other, accord- 
ing to circumstances, arises from the consideration that 
though biKaioirpayfiv is always invariable in respect of volun- 
tariness, yet biKaioio-6ai does not follow it, but is sometimes 
voluntary, sometimes involuntary (frtoi yap biKaiovvrai oi>x 
€kovt(s); and it might reasonably be expected (cvXoyov) that 
dbiKelodai would stand in the same relation (avTiKeio-6<u o/Wco?) 
to dbiKelv as bLKciiovo-Oai does to diKaiorrpayelv, and therefore, as 
8iKaiovo-6ai is variable, so would dbiKeloBat. be also, and hence, 
though ddiKew is always voluntary, yet it might be sometimes 
voluntary, sometimes involuntary. 
(112.) dvTLKeladai op-oicos : — 

dbiKelv biKaion payelv 



abiKfiooai bu«uovo-Uui. 

dbucelaBaL and biKaiovo-dav dvTtKetvTai as occupying similar 
positions in this scheme of opposition, each being the patient 
of their respective agents ; so in this sense in the logical 
scheme of opposition I would be said avriKelo-Oai. to O. The 
questions stated in the first four sections arise from the 
opposition and relation of the several terms to each other. 
(113.) 3. 6 tibiKov neTTovOas: not only the sufferer, but the 
recipient of an act of injustice ; so that under this head fall 
both the questions a and /3 above, note 110. The dnopia here 
is, whether 6 abma ndo-x^v always dducelrat, or whether it may 
not be sometimes Kara o-vpfcQrjKos, as £m rod TTpuTretv, where 
the agent acts unknowingly; the answer is, that it may be 
so when he is injured voluntarily ; then tlbixov Truo-;^, but ov< 

dSi/ceirai. 

(114.) 3. Kara (rvplBc^rjKos K.r.X. In the case of biKaiov the 
act may be Kara <rvp(3e[3r)K6? in respect both of the agent and 
the patient (eV dp.(porepcov) ; so we may expect it to be the 
same with abiKov : whether it is so or not is the question to be 
discussed below. 



112 ETHICS.— BOOK V. [c. ix. 3— 16 



(115.) 8. opnicos §e Ka\ en\ rov biKaioTrpayelv k.t.A. Again a similar 

question arises with regard to these, for a patient implies an 
agent, and as dducelv being Kara avp^f^Kus makes the cifii- 
KeurBai Kara avpjSe^rjKos, so likewise may we suppose that if 

(TVixde^rjKos obtains in dLKcaonpayelv, it does also in diKaiovaOai. 

(11G.) 8. 8vo : involved in question 2, above, note 110. 

(11/.) 9. to irpOTEpov Xe^Sev, SC. ei ddiKel 6 velpas. 

(118.) 12. vopiKov = uoXitlkou : he is considering the case .of 6 

veifxas rrapa rrjv a^lav. — r o tt p a> r o v = hiKaiov an\(i>s. 
(119.) 13. 8 i a ravra, SC. X^P LV or Tipcoplav. — e7r' e k e iv a>v, in 

the case of those who divide the unjust spoil between them. 

(120.) 14. bovvai k.t.X. This is an act of liberality equally easy 
with the acts of vice mentioned in the same sentence ; but to 
do a liberal action, which supposes a certain state of mind, 
and certain circumstances, is not easy. — ovt eV avrols. 
Aristotle here recognises the great fact in human nature, — 
the weakness of the will for good. 

(121.) 16. Erom supposing that every wrong act is a vicious 
action, every unjust act an act of injustice, it is said that a 
just man may act unjustly : but not so ; for though, under 
certain circumstances, a just man might act in the same way 
as an unjust man, or a brave man act as a coward might, it 
would not be an unjust or cowardly action, unless it was done 
in the frame of mind and purpose which are necessary to in- 
justice or cowardice. — en Snorepaovv, right or left ; al. onore- 

pavovv. 

(122.) ean be k.t.A. Justice and social obligation exist among 
koivwvoI tcov anXcbs dyad&v. — e x o v a i is dative plural agreeing 
with tovtols : who are capable of having too much or too little 
thereof. Justice cannot exist among the gods, for having all 
things, they cannot be supposed to have too much ; nor 
among the reprobate, for being incapable of having anything, 
they cannot be said to have too little : but as men in general 
occupy a middle position, they are capable of it ; wherefore 
it exists among men in a social state, and is the epyov of man 
as a social being. Some editors omit ovk before ia-nv iirep- 
/3oXj7, understanding Aristotle to say that the gods are above 
these human dnXas dyadd : the anXas kukoI are below them. 



c. x.; xi. 1,4.] ETHICS.— BOOK V. 1L3 



CHAPTEE X. 

(123.) 1. cn-tctxeia represents the spirit of the natural dUaiop, 
which the legislator was unable to transfer to his system of 
polity; and as it provides for those cases in which that system 
is wanting, it is the enapopBapa or complement of the dUaiou 
popipop, which here=7roXiTiKoV : see also Ehet. i. 13, 12. — «ri 
tu aXXu emcpepopcp, we refer in our praise to something besides 
justice. 

(124.) 2. dta ravr a, for these reasons,- anavra, all these. — vire- 
vavrLop, these have nothing contradictory to themselves. — 5 1- 
icaiov t iv 6 s ov, belonging to a sort of 8 1 k a i o p } sc. natural 
justice. 

(125.) 4. cidvs,"from the first." 

(126.) 5. <rvfx(Sfi eVi tovtov, and there happens in this particular case. 

(127.) 6. T l V 6 s 8 i k a I o v, SC. 7To\ltlkov. 

(128.) 6. dia to a7rXaiff, the fault arising from its generality. 

(129.) 7. rrjs Ae a (3 i as ol Kodo p,las. In Aeaftla olicodopia the 
stones were rough, and the Kavav poXifibipos fitted itself to the 
inequalities of the stone : — 

iEsch. Eragm. 70, aXX' 6 pep ns AeV/3ioi/ 

Kvp ep Tpiyatpois e/arepatz/era) pvOpols. — Kvpa, a waved moulding. 
(130.) 8. eXarrcoTiKos, yielding. 



CHAPTEE XI. 

(131.) 1. (f> ape pop e K t 5>p elprjfiepap, first, from what has 
been said, it is clear that he who commits suicide injures 
somebody, for he violates the law ; secondly, that it is not 
himself whom he injures, for he does it willingly, but it is 
the state. 

(132.) 4. The question whether a man can injure himself is im- 
portant ; for it might be urged, that if a man put restraint 
on himself for the sake of others, he might be unjust to him- 
self, and then i)6lkt) aperf would be in this view wrong. There 
is no law of obligation to a man's own self which obliges him 
to take care of his own interests in preference to those of his 

Q 



114 ETHICS —BOOK V. [c xi. 4—9 ; 

neighbour. The contradictory notion is embodied in popular 
expressions, and more or less covertly in several moral sys- 
tems of ancient and modern times. The only sense in which 
a man can be said to injure himself, (and then only by a 
metaphor ;) is when the lower part of his nature governs 
the higher. 

(133.) 4. Kaff o. Even under the view that he who commits merely 
an unjust act is unjust, though not bad in its widest sense, 
one cannot injure oneself. 

(134.) 4. rovro yap a\\o ineivov, (I mention this) for this is 
different from the former case, where injustice is considered 
as a violation of right generally, — as abi<la napa. rfjv 5\rjv 

dperrjv. 

(135.) 4. ea-Tt ydp k.t.X. This means, there is an f) h pepu 
abinia, which is merely nXeovegla, and not even in this sense 
can a man injure himself; for being both the patient and 
agent of the injustice, he would both gain and lose by the 
same act. — 8 irep ddvvarov: there must be more than one 
party in an injustice. 

(136.) 5. Ka\ ir p ore pov: a man, to be unjust, must be the 
aggressor; for retaliation is no injustice. — airoj 8' avrov, 
SC. d8iKa>v. — a pa: SO that it is not rrporepov. 

(137.) 6. Trphs be tovtois k.t.X. : no one acts unjustly with- 
out committing some particular, definite act of injustice, and 
this a man cannot do towards himself: a man cannot steal 
his own property.— o X a> s, generally, as well as by the settled 
principle ovx eKovra dbiKeio-Oai. 

(138.) 7. fj iyyvs, or bordering on it—; it is not in every case i 
reXeia Kaula, for in some cases, though the action is voluntary, 
it is not complete abulia, as where there is excusable Zyvoia. 

(139.) 8. oidev /ze'Xei k.t.X., to the act or system. Medicine, as 
a system, takes no cognizance of the accidental character of 
the matter in hand. 

(140.) 9. iv tovtois yap \6yois, on these theories or views. — 
dieo-Tr] ice, is separate from. — i v r o v t o i s, sc. the two parts 
of the soul. 



c. i. ; ii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 115 



BOOK VI. 

CHAPTEE I. 

(1.) Haying now practically proved that rjdiKfj apery is the tpyov of 
man, both as being the right operation of our several feelings 
and instincts, and also as agreeing with that diKatoavvrj be- 
sides which there is no duty really binding on man, he now 
proceeds to consider in what kind and in what degree the in- 
tellectual part of our nature is an ingredient of this fjOiKff 
dperr). That it is so in some kind and degree was before 
implied, when 6p66s \6yos was said to be our guide to right 
action. He now considers what this 6p66s \6yos is, and in 
what faculties or habits of our reason it consists. 

(2.) 1. opos rav /if a oTrjTav, the limits or sphere of the mean 
habits. 

(3.) 3. tovtcov tLs 6 opos: what is its definition or nature. 

(4.) 5. vnoKe Lo-600, let it be laid down that there are. 

(5.) 5. ofjLoioTrjTa, the adaptation of the powers to receive the 
impressions and conceptions of the several objects of percep- 
tion and thought. olKeiorrjTa, the affinity between them. 
This is rather a trenching upon the higher metaphysics, and 
probably, like some other similar passages, was used by 
Aristotle as a recognised principle, which would compel the 
assent of those, who received it, to the point he wished to 
prove. 

(6.) 7. f] 8' apcTT): that is the excellence of anything which 
developes its epyov ; we must therefore discover what is the 
i'pyov of the two parts of the soul. Cf. bk. ii. 6. 2. 



CHAPTEE II. 

j (7.) 1. The end of the logistic part of the soul is right moral 
action ; we must therefore discover what produces this. 

| (8.) 1. There are in the soul three powers of moral truth, {irpd- 



116 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. ii. 2, 3, 

£eo>s Kol ak^Belas,) scil. cuo-Brjcns, vovs, ope£is : in one of these 
three the epyov and the aperrj of the logistic part mnst reside. 

(9.) 2. TovTcav — (cotVwveiv. Of these, perception need not be 
considered, as it is no immediate cause of moral action ; it 
merely conveys to the senses an object which may lead to a 
moral action, if the recipient be capable thereof; but if not, 
as in the brute creation, it produces nothing but a mere 
sensual act. 

(10.) 2. eo-rt 5' onep k.t.\. The other two powers of moral 
action, vovs and opegis, are intimately connected. The assent 
and dissent of the vovs are what pursuit and avoidance are in 
the opegis, and they mutually imply each other. As, therefore, 
the 7rpoalpeo-is is made up of opegis and Aoyos, (or vovs,) if it is 
to be good, the vovs must be a\rj6r]s in decision, and the opegis 

op6r\ in its pursuit, (ra. avra rbv pev (pdvai ttjv 8e 8ia>Keiv). The 

opegis cannot be dpdfj unless the vovs be akrjdrjs, nor can the 
vovs be oXtj6t)s unless the Spegis is 6p6rj : if the vovs assented to 
a wrong opegts, it would be ^ev^s ; if the opegis accepted a 
false decision of the reason it would not be 6p6f]. (See bk. iii. 
note 40) ; hence, as a good irpoaipccns is made up of opegis 
and X6yos, or vovs, it follows that the dX^eia vov, working with, 
and implying, a right opegis, is the epyov of the logistic part 
of the soul, as producing, and securing, (or combining to 
produce,) right action. 

(11.) 2. iSo-r inciSf) k.t.X. Since, then, right action implies a 
good act of choice, and this good act of choice is simply a 
true decision and a right end, it follows that SXrjdeia tov vov, 
which, as we have seen, implies both, will produce good moral 
action : he assumes, as he has a right to assume, that right 
action, and therefore right irpoaipecns, is the epyov of the 
logistic part of the soul. 

(12.) 2. dia ravra, for these reasons, viz. the nature of apery 
and Trpoaipeo-is, and the connection between the reason and 
the desire given above. 

(13.) 2. avTij fxev ovv: this, then, is the moral intellect and 
moral truth, which performs the epyov of the logistic part. 

(14.) 3. ttjs 8e BeaprjTiKris: of the pure intellect, truth is the 
acknowledged epyov : see Met. ii. 1, p. 35. — r ov be tt paten- 






4, 5.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 117 

kov kci\ b iav ot)t ikov, of the moral intellect, truth corre- 
sponding to and implying a right b'pegis ; hence truth, moral or 
intellectual, is the epyov of both parts of the soul. 

(15.) 4. To shew that ivpoaipco-is is not merely an intellectual act, 
as some would have it, nor yet a mere orectic appetite or 
desire, as others hold, but a combination of the two, we may 
examine the efficient and motive powers of human action. 

(16.) 4. it page as. The motive cause {66ev rj kIvtjo-is) of right 
action is npoalpeo-is ; the material cause or constituents of 

7Tpoaipe<ris are ope£is and Xoyos 6 eveKa twos ; not mere opegis, 

but ope&s approved of by \6yos. The first point proved is 
that ope&s by itself is not enough. 

(17.) 4. 8io. This being the nature of 7rpoaipeoriy, it is clear that 
the intellect is an ingredient of right moral choice ; not 
merely the intellect (vovs) as being a necessary ingredient 
in the act of an intellectual being, but the actual exercise of 
that intellect (S«Wa) in acts of choice and pursuit. 

(18.) 4. ot»S' avcv rjBiKTjs e £ e a> s : this is not the same as 
ndOos, but it is that right moral state which has the intellect 
worked into it, and therefore implies the moral truth as one 
of its elements. 

(19.) 4. evirpagla ydp k.tX. : for right being and acting, which 
is the object of irpoalpeo-is, cannot exist without the action of 
the intellect and that right moral state in which the intellect 
and ndBr) are combined, (rjdos). 

(20.) 5. It being thus clear that the bidpoia is an active cause of 
right action, it now must be proved that it is not the only 
one, but that op^is must be joined with it. 

The mere intellect (pidvoia avrrj) is not properly motive cause 
at all, (ovdev Kivei) ', it is true that the moral intellect is con- 
cerned in action, (npaKTiicr),) and when it is working towards 
an end (eW*a roO) is such a motive cause, for it sets in motion 
(apx«) the contriving faculty ; that is, when the intellect in 
the shape of (3ov\r)<ns and ^ovXevo-is has decided on the end, and 
that such and such steps are necessary and practicable towards 
the end proposed, then the productive or contriving faculty 
(noirjTiKr)) commences its operations ; when the Ctjttjo-is is ended 
the npa^is begins, (to tvyaTov iv ttj dvakvcrei npooTov iv rfj yeveo-ei, 



118 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. ii. 5, 6 ; 

lib. iii. 3. 12) : it cannot be the pure intellect which thus works 
in morals, for every one who contrives, necessarily contrives 
to an end ; and though the moral intellect is the motive cause 
of these contriving powers, something must have preceded 
it, for the subject of the contriving powers (jtoit]t6v,) which is 
thus supplied by the moral intellect, is a rekos only in a 
secondary sense, (oi>x cnr\a>s,) and only relative (npos ™) and 
subordinate (nvos) to some further end, but the subject of 
moral action is the real re'Xos- (dXX' to npaKrov) ; this is cinpa^ia, 
and this end is supplied by opegis, which is thus shewn to 
be as necessary an ingredient as the moral intellect itself. — 
d X X' ov to n paKTov,&\. dXka to irpaKrov, which must be con- 
strued, but it is not the subject of moral action, for this, Sfc. 

(21.) 5. bidvoia alrf) ovOkv Kivel. There is a point of view in 
which this seems to be wrong, viz. where the object of desire 
is not perceptible by the senses, but by vovs, such as some 
future good : but this perceptive vovs which performs the 
functions of alo-drjcris where the thing is invisible, is not really 
the dpxh of the action ; it is only a channel whereby the fjdv 
reaches the ndBos. There are two sorts of cpavTao-ia which 
present the fjbv to the opegis ; one (alo-OrjTLxr)) of visible, the 
other (votjtikt}) of invisible, objects : see ch. vii. 9, where he 

Speaks of a sort of a vorjTiKt) aio-drjo-is, ovx fj t5>v iSiW dXX' ota 
K.r.X. : SO bk. vii. ch. 6. 1, rj be i-mOvpla, iav povov 6177-/7, on rjdv, 
6 \6yos rj a'lorBrjo- is: see also Met. vi. 10, p. 148. 

(22.) 5. Sid k.t.X. : whence npoalpeo-is may be viewed as vovs ac- 
companied by opegis, or as opegis assented to by vovs, (see bk. iii. 
note 40) ; at all events, it implies both these as necessary : 
and this complex principle of action is humanity, (77 Toiav-n} 
dpxh avOpanos) : whatever habit of mind, then, secures, as far 
as it is in the province of the intellect to do so, that these 
two shall be right, secures right irpoaipeais, right moral action, 
and therefore is the i'pyov of the logistic part of the soul ; 
and in the beginning of the chapter we have seen that 

akridsia tov vov does this. 

(23.) 6. ovk eo-rt k.t.X. upoalpecris has nothing to do with that 
sort of TrpaKTiicr) Siavoia, the subject of which may be moral 
action, but which has no end beyond its own exercise, as 
that which considers past events. 



c. iii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 119 

CHAPTEE III. 

(24.) 1. Truth, then, in one shape or the other, being the epyop 
of both parts of the intellectual faculties, we now proceed to 
investigate what is the state or habit of mind which most 
perfectly and certainly arrives at truth in each. 

(25.) Things or notions are said to be true in different rela- 
tions : — 

1. In respect of their corresponding to the designs of 
nature, things are said to be in a true state : Physic, i. 8. 1, 
d\ij0 e tap Ka\ rfjp <p v a- i v t g>v 6vt<ov ; see Hooker, Sermon 
on Justification. 

2. In respect of their correspondence to the external 
natures which they profess to represent, notions and con- 
ceptions of the intellect and reason are said to be true, — 

dXrjdevei f] ^v;^. 

3. In respect of their expres nng real relations between 
the subject and predicate, judgments and propositions are 
said to be true. 

4. In respect of its operating as nature designed, and so 
as to discover and represent truth to the mind, the reason is 
said to be true, — X 6yos dXrjdrjs, and X 6 y o s ^evSfc, ch. iv. 6. 

(26.) 1. dp gdfxevoi k.t.X. Having thus cleared the way, we 
may consider the habits or states of mind whereby the intel- 
lectual faculty arrives at truth in its decisions, and is in a 
state of truth (dXrjdevei). These are five in number : neither 
scientific knowledge, nor intelligence, nor art, nor moral 
wisdom, nor wisdom generally, admit of falsehood. They 
vanish respectively into their contraries when falsehood en- 
croaches upon them. 

(27.) 1. v7ro\r)\lrei ical 8 d £ # k.t.\. vTr6\r)tyis is a general 

Conception, (Met. i. 1, p. 2, orap i< rroW&p rrjs epneipias evvorjpd- 
Ttov pia ykpryrai nep\ tcop opoieop v n 6 X r] ^ i s : Anal. Post. i. 16,) 
right or wrong, of the nature of any thing, arising from aio-tfq- 
cris, Or povs, or avWoyicrpos, (Anal. Post. i. 16. p. 172, orav diet. 
(rvWoyiapoi) Xd/3»7 rfjv vnoXrjyjnv : ibid., orav an\S>s v7ro\d(3r) virdp- 
\eiv rj prj vndpxeip l ibid., rrjs aTrXcos vnoXrjyjreois d-rr\rj rj dTrdrrj, rijs 
de dia o-vWoyia-pov nXelovs,) and may be quite false, and yet 
would be an vnoX^is: so in ch. ix., the distinguishing epithet 
dXrjdrjs is applied to it. So d6£a is a judgment (cpdo-is) on a 



120 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. iii. 2, 3, 

matter of probable truth, of which though it took a false 
view, it would still be a 86ga, (Anal. Post. i. 33. p. 199, sq., 
and ix. 15, 8) : v n 6 X rj yjs i $■ differs from 86ga inasmuch as the 
latter is a (pdais, and implies a subject, copula, and predicate, 
while the former conceives of the subject and predicate as 
a whole, Avithout the intervention of the copula ; 86£a is of 
two notions separately, vnoXyj^ns is of the two notions com- 
bined. The mental process may be thus represented : aiadrj- 
ens, (pavrao-ia, vorjais, efjnrepia, i)7r6Xrj\jns } then doga on contin- 
gent, cf)p6vr)(ris on moral, eVto-T^/i?; on necessary, matter. The 
complex idea contained in dpio-pos, the to tL rjv elvai, is an V7rd- 

Xt)\J/ls : SO Anal. Post. i. 33, V7r6\r)\jfis rrjs dpeaov npoTcio-ews. 

(28.) 2. emo-Tripr). This word has two senses: — 1. an intellectual 
state, or habit; 2. a scientific system, or collection of principles 
and laws of necessary matter. It is, of course, in the former 
of these two senses that it is used here. — t a I s 6 /i o i d r 77 o- 1. 
See Anal. Post. i. 2. 1, for spurious sorts of science. 

(29.) 2. \av6dvei el e a t i fj prf, (cf. Met. vi. 15, p. 158): 
therefore they are not fit subjects for emarripr} ; and hence 
the subject-matter of eVio-r?^ is e'£ dvdyKrjs, things necessary 
and unchangeable. Aristotle recognises in the order of things 
which he expresses by <pv<ns in its higher sense: 1. dvdyKrj, 
t5>v del, where the connection is invariable and perceptible ; 
2. (pvais in a second sense, (rav as eVi r6 iro\v,) where the con- 
nection, though perceptible, is variable, (ra iv8exdf*eva aWas 
exeu>) ; 3. rvxn, where the connection is variable and imper- 
ceptible : b6£a belongs to the second and third, emorr/pri to 
the first. 

2. a it X 5> s, to speak generally. 

3. ra dtdia k.t.X. : we here get his views of the past 
and future eternity of the universe. 

(30.) 3. en be StSaKr^ k.t.X. Science falls under teaching, 
as whatever may be known scientifically may be taught and 
learnt : as teaching and learning presuppose certain principles 
from which to start, it follows that science implies having 
such principles to refer to ; therefore science is a habit, or 
habitual state of the intellect, which is able to refer what it 
knows to certain principles or atrial, (egis anodei/cnuf) ;) or 
rather, speaking more accurately, as a state or habit of mind 
is only the presence of certain emotions, perceptions, con- 



3, 4.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 121 

ceptions, or principles in the mind, science is the principle or 
universal conception itself, (ch. vi., 17 Zmo-Tripr) ncp\ t&v Ka66\ov 
co-tip vTToX^yjns,) it is the certain conscious possession of fixed 
conceptions or principles (dpxai), and their application to less 
abstract, and apparently less evident, truths. Thus the cm- 
o-Trjuav in mathematics would possess the principles of mathe- 
matical reasoning laid down by others, (\ap(3dva>v &>$• rrapa £wiev- 
ra>v, Anal. Post. i. 1, p. 145,) and be able to apply them to the 
various theorems and problems following therefrom, which, 
not self-evident in themselves, would become certain to him 
from their resting on principles of fixed truth : of this the 
instrument is syllogism, referring back these problems or 
theorems to their principles or alrlai. — iv rots dvaXv- 
tikoIs: Anal. Post. i. 1. 

(31.) 3. fj fiev 8rj iirayayr). This passage would be enough to 
shew Aristotle's view of induction, and its relation to syllo- 
gism as necessary to it. There are numberless passages of 
the same sort throughout his writings. Among others, see 
Anal. Post. i. 18, ii. 15. 7 ; Anal. Prior, ii. 25. 8, p. 139. 

(32.) 3. hv ovk earn. <rv\\oy mt fx 6 s. Syllogism is not the 
only channel or evidence of truth. There are certain fixed 
truths which, so far from being arrived at by a syllogistic 
process, furnish to that process its starting-point and foun- 
dation. So great and so entirely un-Aristotelic is the mis- 
take of those who would wish to reduce all the processes of 
arriving at truth to the syllogistic form. 

(33.) 4. e£is anodeiKTiKr}. dnodeigis is the proving some fact 
or position in necessary matter, (cf. Met. v. 3, p. 100; Top. 
i. 1. 4, p. 15,) by referring it back to the avriop, or cause of 

it : imo-TaaQat bk olopcda Zkckttov cbrXttS, (i. e. bia d7ro$ei'£«os : see 
end of sect. 3,) orav rrjv alrlav oloopeBa yvapi£eiv, Anal. Post. i. 2, 

the whole of which chapter should be read in connection with 
this passage. See also Phys. i. 1 ; Anal. Post. i. 31 ; Met. 
i. 3. — iv toIs dvaKvTiKols: Anal. Post. i. 2, sqq., 33. 
(34.) 4. iiria-Tarai: he stops in his enquiry. This is the way 
in which enio-Taa-OaL comes to signify "to know." — See Phys. 

vii. 3, p. 166, to yap qpeprjcrcu k.t.\. 

(35.) 4. Kara. a-vp,^€^rjK6s: he will indeed know that, the 
possession of which is in itself knowledge; but it will not 
be knowledge to him, for if the principles are not more cer- 

R 



122 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. |_c. iv. 

tain to him than the deductions, the deductions will have 
nothing to rest on; there will be no amov of their being 
true. True science says, " This is true, because the other is 
true ;" Kara av[xj3((3r)K6 s science will say, "This is true" when 
it has no apx*) to rest on : or " This is true if the other is 
true," when the apxh is not more certain than what is re- 
ferred to it. See Anal. Post. i. 2. 



CHAPTEE IV. 

(36.) Another energy of the intellect is contrivance; and when 
this faculty is so strengthened and sharpened by its use as 
to discern with truth and readiness the nature of the result 
required, and the instruments and combinations necessary 
to produce it, and is able practically to call it into being, 
then we are said to have Art, or the productive habit. This 
habit arises from experiment and experience, (Met. i. 1, yl- 
verai 8e re^vrj orav i< noXkcov rrjs epneipias vo-qpaToav KaOokov fiia 
yevrjrai nepl tcov opoioiv vnoXTjyjns : cf. Anal. Post. ii. 15,) and its 
functions are, 1. to produce results similar to those of nature ; 
2. to develope what nature has left, as it were, in embryo, 
(Phys. 11. 8. 5, oXcos re f) T€X VT ) r " P* v eVereXei a f) cpvais ddvvarei 
anepyd^o-Oai, ra de /xt/zetrat) ; 3. to detect the laws and powers 
latent in results apparently accidental, and by arrangement 
and combination to make them matters of rule and compara- 
tive certainty. It differs from emo-Tripr) as it regards the 
things and laws of nature, not in their abstract essence or 
relations, but only so far as it may arrange and combine 
them with a view to production. Hence those things which 
are subject to an invariable law of nature {dvdyKr]), such as the 
motion of the heavenly bodies, are out of its province ; or 
those things wherein, whenever they occur, nature works for 
herself, and by her own inherent motive power (cpvo-is), as 
in the production of rain from clouds : art has to do only 
with such things as it is in the power of man to call into 
being, or not, as he likes. It investigates, indeed, and re- 
flects (0ea>pel) on the properties and laws of the universe, but 
not as a mere speculation ending in itself. This knowledge 
of the properties and laws is not properly its subject-matter, 
but only accidentally, as being conducive to production. It 



2-4.] ETHICS— BOOK VI. 123 

is this mental power which is most cultivated and most prized 
at the present day, and has hence almost appropriated the 
word "philosophy." We must not, in reading what Aristotle 
says of rexvr), expect to find his view of it agree with our con- 
ceptions of it as drawn from what it is now ; for it has made 
so much progress since that time, and its functions and sphere 
are so much enlarged, as to make it difficult to understand 
how it can be said that the universal or general laws of the 
universe do not fall within its province ; as, though many 
are excluded, yet others again (such as the production of 
an electric current) are evidently now matters of art, or the 
contriving faculty. 

(37.) 2. e garcpiKols \6yois: see bk. i. note 213. 

(38.) 3. This is an instance of the universal conclusion, per sim- 
plicem enumerationem. Architecture, and every other intel- 
lectual habit of production, is an art. 

Every art is an intellectual habit of production, conse- 
quently these two are identical. 

(39.) ovtc roiavrrj is merely a repetition of the other side of 
the induction, ezrel be rj olKobopiKr). 

(40.) 3. Zgis pera \6yov 7toit]tikt]. The word "habit," though 
it may be conveniently used to express e£is, yet does so very 
imperfectly, egis noirjTiKq is not so much a habit of produc- 
tion, as the productive faculty trained and exercised to ha- 
bitual operation, "E£tr denotes that power of the mind, to 
which it is applied, as in a particular state of development^ 
and perfection, and might perhaps be expressed by the word 
power, as opposed to faculty; and in using the word " habit," 
we must be careful not to lose sight either of the faculty 
itself, or of the state of development in which it is. 

,(41.) 3. \6yov d\rj6ovs : true, inasmuch as it judges rightly of 
external things, and their fitness for the particular object of 
our contrivance. 

(42.) 4. eo-r! be rex vr l K ' rX - ^ n tne Metaphysics, p. i. 1, he 

says, ylverai r] rex vr l ° Tav eK 7T0 ^^ V efX7reipias ivvorjpaTcov KaOoKov 
pia yevrjrai 7rep\ ru>v 6/xoiW vnoXrjylns. Art is the possession 

and application of the general principles of production : of 
course things necessary, or out of our power to produce, are 
excluded. "YVe must be careful (as in the case of eVtor^fy) to 



124 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. iv. 4—6 ; 

distinguish between the word rtx vr i "when used to denote a 
state or power of the mind concerned in contrivance, and 
when used to express a system, or collection of rules for the 
production of any given result. 

(43.) 4. 7rept yeveo-iv, the production of something as its 
re'Xo?, and the contriving the means thereto (jexva^eiv), and 
considering what they are {6ea>pa.v). They seem to be placed 
in this order because looking at the object of rex^n as com- 
pleted, and going backwards as it were in process of com- 
pletion, (yevevis,) comes first, then rexvd^iv, or the active 
part of rexvt], and then the reflective, deliberative process of 
6ea>pe7p, or examining into the nature of the object, and the 
powers or combinations which will produce it. 

(44.) 4. r&v i£ av ay Kris k.t.X. In this chapter we have the 
division given above, (note 29,) of <pv<ris into avayKrj, cpva-is, 
rvxn : see Met. x. 8, p. 228. 

(45.) 5. iv avrois yap k.t.X. The same notion of the inde- 
pendent, self-moving powers of nature we find in Phys. ii. 8, 
fxaXia-ra 8e drjXov orav iavTov iarpevrj 6 tarpos, tovtc* yap eoLKev r) 
(pvais. 

(46.) 5. 7T€p\ ra. avrd k.t.X. : IVIet. i. 2, r) pev ipneipla Texvrju 
tiroirjo-tv r) b y dneipia Tvxqv : cf. Plato, Gorgias, 448. Many of 
our most valuable discoveries in art were made by chance 
combinations and results. These being observed and experi- 
mented upon, the connections between cause and effect dis- 
cerned, the art was gradually called into being. The well- 
known history of the discovery of glass-making is an instance 
in point. 

(47.) 6. are xv la. The contrary habit, or rather the want of 
the contriving faculty, consists in the reason judging falsely 
of the nature of the end to be pursued, of the combinations 
or instruments necessary for the work, and thus failing in 
the object. 



CHAPTER V. 

(48.) "We have examined the faculties and habits of contempla- 
tion and production ; we now proceed to those of reflection 
and action, and to the consideration of (pp6vr)o-is, or moral 



c. v. 1—3.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 125 

wisdom ; a term which, as the mental state it expresses 
differs according to its different functions, is used in different 
senses. The chief difficulty of this book is to reconcile what 
he says of cppovrjais in one place with what he says of it in 
others. The difficulty will be removed if we get a clear 
notion of the functions of cppovrjais, and are careful to observe 
the particular one in which it is at the moment spoken of. 
For this the reader is referred to the table at the end of the 
book ; and it will suffice at present to call attention to the 
following distinctions : — 

1. Between perfect and imperfect cppovrjo-is. In the latter 
the reason acts outside, as it were, of the passions, directing 
and checking them so as to mould them into virtues. In 
the former it works in the passions, so that they operate 
rightly by virtue of the rational instinct which arises from 
their union, or rather amalgamation, with the reason. 

2. a. The practical knowledge of the right principles of 
moral action, (apxiTeKTovutr)) . 

/3. A right judgment on each particular of choice and 

action, (77 irepX KaO' €Ka(TTa). 

3. a. A right judgment in particular objects of pursuit 
and avoidance, with regard to the end, {cppovrjais tov riXovs — 
tov ea-xarov). When this is perfectly developed, the simple 
term vov$ is applied to it. 

/3. A right judgment on the means, (wfiovXLa.) See ch. xi. 2. 
For another sort of cppovrjo-is, arising from dawn??, see 
notes on ch. xii. 

(49.) 1. ev £r)v, well-being, according to his proper £<a>i), whatever 
that is. 

(50.) 2. hv prj eVrt rix vr )-> f° r which there are no rules laid down. 

(51.) 2. cppovifios povXcvTiKos. The most usual notion of 
(ppovrjais, as an intellectual operation, is the consideration 
of the means towards a good end, which is presented to 
us as an object of pursuit by i)6iKr) dperr), in its first stage, 
(see ch. xiii. 6) ; but cppovrjais has to do, not only with fiovXevais, 
or the ra irpos reXos, but with the reXos itself. See ch. ix. 7. 

(52.) 3. naura, SC. TOtavra hv ai dpxai ei/Se^oi/rai a\\a>s c^eii/. 

(53.) 4. nep\ to. dv0p6>n(p dy a 6 d k.t.X. The connection be- 
tween these paragraphs is this : — In noirjais we arrange well 



126 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. v. 4—6, 

certain materials with a view to produce some end ; in right 
7rpagis we arrange and regulate certain actions, not with a view 
merely to evnpagia, for such arrangement in itself is evirpagla ; 
so that the energy and the end are one and the same thing : 
wherefore 4>p6vrjais has to. dvOpamw dyadd for its subject-matter, 
though this is at the same time its reXos : if cppoprjo-is were 

noirjTiKT], it could not be said to be nepl ra dvOpoanois dyaOd, but 
Trepl rd dvOpdouiva npos rd dvOpanrois dyadd. He seems to be 

accounting for his making it nepl ra dvOpayrrois dyaOd ; but we 
must recollect that many of these short arguments in the 
Ethics, and, indeed, more or less, in all his works, seem ob- 
scure and needless at first sight. It is not easy to see why 
they are introduced, but it is probably with reference to 
some subtle theories or distinctions of one or other of the 
schools of his day, which he answers thus parenthetically. 

(54.) 4. 77 o it] <r e a) s erepov to reXos: the end of 7roir)o-is IS 
something beyond the ttou^tov, and therefore its end and its 
subject-matter differ ; not so with cppovrjo-is, for, &c. 

(55.) 4. Tr}s it page as ovk av e'lrj. Michelet reads ovk del, 
following four MSS., and on the ground that there are some 
7rpdgeis of which this is not true, sc. where they are in- 
strumental to some higher rt'Xos ; but still it would be true 
of them qua npdgeis, and they would be complete in them- 
selves, though there was something beyond them. 

(56.) 5. Sia tovto, as a proof of this. — ev6ev. Erom cpp6vrjo-is 
enabling a person to judge rightly on human action, the word 
acocppoo-vvT] has been formed. 

(57.) 6. to lavrr] v, i.e. an V7r6\i]\lns 7rep\ ra Trpaurd, or 7repi ra 
dv6pa>7T(o dyadd, for it secures right notions of pleasure and 
pain ; and these notions are the causes of human action : 
wherefore that which o-cocppoo-vvrj preserves is right notions 
on human action. — to oil eveica ra irpaKTa, the final cause 
of the action. 

(58.) 6. ev6vs, ipso facto. The right motive to action, the right 
view of good and evil, will in action not present itself to 
one who is thoroughly demoralised by pleasure or pain ; and 
this is what the contrary habit (o-axppoo-vvr)) preserves and 
improves ; whence cppSvrjcris preserves a right view of good 
and evil in action. 



6, 7; c. vi. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 127 

(59.) 6. ovbe 8elv tovtov e v e k e v. That this right end is 
the true final cause (tovtov eWxa) and motive (Sm tovto) of 
moral action and moral choice (ov (paiveru). — cp 6 a prim) d p. 
XV s: hence (pdciperai is used in bk. ii. for the formation of 
habits of vice. See note 8, bk. ii. — p era \6yov d A ^ ?} : 
not merely pera dXrjBovs Aoyou, as Texyrj. 

(GO.) 7. Tf'x^j dpeTT). There are degrees of development in 
art, and consequently an excellence of it ; while of eppovrjacs, 
properly speaking, there are no degrees, — it implies perfection 
in itself. He who is truly (ppovipos has all the virtues, and if 
be fails in any one, so that his <pp6vr)o-is is defective, he can- 
not be said to have <pp6vr)o-is, but only to approacb to it. 

(61.) 7. cv pev t€xvtj. Another reason why cpp6vrjo-is is the 
dpcTr) of the logistic part of the soul, rather than r/;^, is 
that it has the characteristic of virtue which Ttx vr ) has not, 
viz. that voluntary failing in it is worse than where it is 
involuntary ; whereas, in art, if a man makes a mistake on 
purpose, he is not the less master of his art for that. 

(G2.) 7. d\\a prjv. Moral wisdom is not merely an intellectual 
habit or faculty, as r^v or eVto-r^?/ are, for it is so worked 
into the ndOrj and the ivdO-q into it, that it becomes an energy 
of our whole nature rather than merely of the intellectual 
part of it ; it is a part of our self-consciousness and self- 
existence ; so that it is not possible that it should be for- 
gotten, — Ttjs TOiavTrjS (p€Ta Xoyov povov) e£eo)s \t]dr) (?o~tlv } <$)povr)- 
o~e<os §' ovk ecrrtv. 



CHAPTER VI. 

(03.) 1. vovs, or the intellect, is the foundation of the whole 
reasoning process, and yet in a less strict sense is used 
for the whole of that process; it is the power of Sidvoia, 
(a diavooCpeda, Be An. iii. 4, p. 69), but it is here used for 
that power of the mind which intellectually perceives par- 
ticular objects and their invisible qualities, compares them, 
and evolves from them the general notions and the general 
principles which are involved therein : it resembles ato-drjais, 
inasmuch as it is an intellectual perception of things and 
qualities invisible ; while at<r6ri<ris is, properly speaking, con- 



128 ETHICS.-BOOK VI. [c. vi. 1, 

fined to objects of sense and visible qualities ; but as it is 
an intellectual alo-Orjais, that word is used sometimes for it, 
and the verb alo-davopeSa for voovpcv. No£}y is the intellectual 
eye, and its characteristic is that it sees whatever may be 
presented to it. The act of intellectual vision may be more 
or less acute and searching, just as powers of sensible vision 
differ in kind as well as degree. Its use in the Ethics is, at 
first sight, somewhat wide ; but all its meanings are con- 
nected together by its general sense of the intellectual per- 
ception of the qualities of things ; and its functions may be 
stated to be : — 

1. The VOVS TO)V dpX(DV TJ]S i 7T LCTT T] fir) s, — vovs rrjs 

dfiea-ov irpordareios, the perceptive and inductive power which 
perceives or works out the immutable qualities and laws of 
things necessary ; and this again (as well as that given be- 
low, 2.) is divided into what is called ato-drjo-is, where the laws 
and principles are self-evident ; or inaycoyr), where a process 
of comparison and combination is necessary ; or idio-pos, where 
the intellectual eye of the soul has been so sharpened and 
perfected by use as to discern dpxal instinctively^ (Eth. i. 
7, tS>v §e dpxp>v al p.ev alcrdrjcrei 6e<opovvrai ai 8e €7raycoyfj } at 8e 
i8icrp.(d rivi). 

2. The vovs tS>v dpx&v in morals ; the moral intellect ; 
the perceptive and inductive power, which perceives the moral 
qualities and works out the moral laws from the moral world 
in general, on which cppovrjo-is is founded, (tov iaxdrov <a\ iv- 

dexofievov Kal t rj s e r e p as irpordcf oy, ch. xi. 4) ; which, 

when it has the shadowy notions of ko\6u and alo-xpou worked 
into it, and is itself worked into the irdOr), becomes (see be- 
low, 3.) the moral sense. 

3. The vovs tov t e\ov s *. tov icrxdrov kol ivdexopevov = 
<pp6vrjo-is tov iaxdrov, perception of the moral quality of any 
object of desire ; where the <pp6vr]o-is has been so perfected 
in its first stage, that a right choice of the end is an intel- 
lectual hvvapus or instinct, rather than the result of an in- 
tellectual operation. 

Hence we may see that aLo-6r)o-is + the intellect = vovs : 
vovs as the moral sense = eppovrjo-cs tov eo-xdrov : hence cuadrjo-is 
is sometimes used for vovs, and vovs for this (ppovqais. 



2 ; c. vii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 129 

Observe that vovs is not said to be tw npbs to re'Xo?. This 
is the office of deliberation, Siavolas, which implies a longer 
and more complex intellectual process than Aristotle assigns 
in the Ethics to vovs. Could this process (the cppovrjais tS>v 
irpos to tc\os) become instinctive, so that a man could at a 
glance see the right means, it would be termed vovs : of course 
vovs is employed in it as enabling us to see the nature of 
the means which fiovXevo-is suggests to us as desirable. 

(64.) 1. [i€Ta \6yov yap: as eVtcTTJ^/xj; USCS \6yos, and Xoyos 

starts from certain principles, there must be some power to 
arrive at them. — n e p\ £ v i a> v, sc. t&v TipKOTdToav. 

(65.) 2. \e17rcTa1, conclusion of disjunctive syllogism. 



CHAPTEE VII. 

(66.) 1. In the study and contemplation of things immutable, 
we have seen that there are two separate habits or powers 
of mind : the one discerning, tracing, and laying down fixed 
laws and principles from the shifting particulars in which 
they operate ; the other discerning the connection between 
these first principles and results, and what follows or de- 
pends upon them. The one is the inductive, the other the 
deductive, or, perhaps, more properly retro due tive power, 
because it refers back principles and phenomena to the 
higher and more fixed principles on which they depend. 
There is, however, another habit or power, in which both the 
others are combined ; whereby a man becomes thoroughly 
master of that which is within the compass of human know- 
ledge, — at one glance seeing the laws, and their results. 
This man is the o-o<p6s; he has ideas in each particular 
branch, and is completely master of the subject ; while the j 
universal o-ocpos is master of everything within the compass 
of human knowledge which is worthy his attention, and 
especially the higher and more eternal subjects, such as the 
laws of the material universe, (e£ Z>v o-iWor^Kev 6 Koapos). In 
mathematics, for instance, Euclid would be a o-o<p6s, as having 
both invented and applied the laws of mathematics ; while the 
professor who thoroughly understood the connection between 
the laws of Euclid and the problems and theorems which de- 
pend on them, would be cnio-Trip&v. 



13 o ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [o. vii. 

(67.) 1. rhv Se ao^Lav k.tX. The word is loosely applied to 
excellence in the several arts ; but besides this, which is re- 
cognised as well in common speech as in the verses of Homer, 
its & most proper and highest meaning is accurate and perfect 
knowledge, not only of the truths which may be referred back 
to higher principles, but of the highest and most ultimate 
principles themselves. The imarrrni&v accepts these ultimate 
principles as starting-points, and believes in them, the ao<p6s, 
as it were, detects them ; they have to him not only a sub- 
jective, but an objective reality; they are not merely convic- 
tions in his own mind, but facts which he realizes in ex- 
ternal nature. 

(68.) 3. jc^aX^v e' X ™<™> containing within itself, or the summing 
up, or the perfection : it may be taken either way.— r 5> v 
rnxicorarcov. vroXm^ and <j>p6vn™, though the highest ex- 
cellencies of man's social and moral nature, are nevertheless 
not the highest attainments man is capable of, inasmuch as 
man, their subject-matter, is inferior to the immutable and 
eternal elements and powers of nature. In ancient philosophy, 
permanence was a main standard of excellence, and the short- 
lived man, with his shifting and perishing societies and affairs, 
naturally seemed inferior to the apparently everlasting things 
of nature, of which no one knew the beginning nor the end, 
and which had outlived so many ages of humanity. 

(69.) 4. e I 8 f] k .t.X. If, then, the bodily and moral good of man 
is variable, and the physical properties, such as whiteness and 
straightness, always the same, it would be also («iQ allowed 
that t6 <ro<t>6v, which contemplates the former, is as invariable 
as its subjects, and that r6 cppdv^ov, which contemplates shift- 
ing particulars, is variable, and therefore both different from j 
and inferior to a-ocpia. 
(70) 4. bib nal k.t.X. That 4> P 6vrj<TL S has for its subject these 
particulars of shifting life, is clear from its being applied 
even to those animals who shew in any degree a faculty for 
providing for their every-day lives. (There is a curious 
passage in Metaph. i. 1, on the application of this term to 
animals : <pp6vipa fih &vev rov p.av6avuv oaa rf bvvara yjrocpccu 
aKoveiv, olov p.i\iTTa Kal el toiovtov aXKo yivos frofiw eori.) 

(71.) 4. 4>&r<pov U k.t.\. Plato, Rep. 473, holds the contrary 
theory : iav jun?— % ol <P^o<rocpos /3a<nXevowiz/ h rals 7roXe<n % oi 



5 j c. viii. 6, 7.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 131 

(3acriXr}s — <piXo<pr)cr(>>cn yvr)aia>s Kcii iKavcos kcu tovto els tcivtuv crvp,- 
7recrr] dvvcifxis ttoXitikt) kcu cpiXocrocpia — ovk eari kokcou navXa rais 
noXecri k.t.X. 

(72.) 5. it e p i r t d, superfluous matters. 



CHAPTEE VIII. 

(73.) 6. rj de (ppovrjo-ts. It would seem as if cli. viii. ouglit to 
begin here. He lias finished the examination of a-ocpia, and 
now proceeds to a further examination of that intellectual 
virtue which has to do with morals ; but inasmuch as he is 
contrasting cppovrja-is with o-ocfiia, it may also be viewed as 
properly belonging to ch. vii. 

(74.) 7. cppovrjo-Ls is divided into the knowledge of general 
principles and the knowledge of particulars, and their rela- 
tion to those general principles ; it is not merely a Ka96Xov 

v7rdX^^ts, but Trepi ra Kad' eKacrra. 

(75.) 7. el yap el be It]. If one has the general principle, but 
is ignorant of the nature of the particular, it is not so prac- 
tically useful as if one knew the nature of the particular. 
Therefore cppovrjais is rather nepl to. eKacrra, though both are 
desirable. 

(76.) 7. e'er) 8' av k.t.X. It is probable that there will be some 
governing power or system to direct and inform this par- 
ticular (ppovrjo-is. The following scheme of the relation be- 
tween cppovrjcns and 7roXiTiKr) will set this forth clearly : — First/N, 
we must observe that ttoXitikt) and cppoprjcns are practically 
identical; the propositions and principles of which they 
consist are the same in themselves (r) avrr) fxev e£is,) though 
both these habits themselves, and these principles would be 
defined differently, (to pivroi etvai ov ravrbv avrais). Thus 
(ppovrjcns, consisting of a number of general principles on 
human good, might be defined to be the science of moral 
good, while tvoXitlkt), consisting of exactly the same principles, 
might be defined to be the science of social good. Such_aJ 
principle as " honesty is the best policy," which belongs alike 
to TToXiriKr) and <pp6vr)cns, would, with regard to one, be said to 
be a principle of social, to the other, a principle of moral, wis- 
dom. Now the two habits of mind being in themselves iden- 



132 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. viii. 2, 

tical, and the same principles existing in both, it is evident 
that their practical connection must be very close. 

Now we shall find that <pp6vr}o-is is deficient in the power of 
forming moral principles for herself. Yery few, if any, men 
would work out for themselves a perfect, or even a partial sys- 
tem of moral Wisdom, (kcu'toi 'io-cos ovk zctti to avrov ev avev oIkovo- 

pias ovS' avev noXiTelas : cf. Plato, Legg. 874, E. Preller, p. 223). 
She requires to be informed : for this she goes to ttoXltikt], 
whose function it is to lay up and hand down in laws and in- 
stitutions these general principles of human good ; while, on 
the other hand, noXtriKr] is deficient in the power of carrying 
these principles out in the every-day particulars of life. She 
can pass decrees, and create rewards and punishments, but 
still she cannot compel any one to obey. This can only be 
secured by the existence and energies of cppovrjo-is nepl ra Kad' 
eKao~Ta in the minds of the individuals. "Where this exists, 
the individual carries out the principles of uoXitikt) vi naturce, 
and thus each supplies what the other lacks, 

7r68as xPW as oppara xp^crajuei/oy. 

Thus the full scheme of moral and social wisdom would 
stand thus : — 

(naBoXov (ppovrjo-ii) it oXit ikt) ko.6 6Xov 

rj 7T€ p\ t a kclQ* e Kaa-T a (p p 6vr\ <r i s — 17 nepi to. Ka&* 

€Ka(TTa TToXlTlKYj. 

The KadoXov (pp6vi]cns is supplied by 7toXltlkt}, — the particular 
noXLTLKrj is supplied by particular <pp6vr)<ns ; and thus does 

noXiTLKr} become dpxireKTOviKr) to (ppovrjo-is, while (ppovijais is TTpaK- 

tikt) to noXinKr) : (ppovrjais has rather to do with particulars, 
ttoXltlkt) with principles. 

(77.) 2. vo podenKr). This answers to the cppovrjais KadoXov, as 
its function is to lay down in laws the general principles 
whereby the social good is to be attained. 

(78.) 2. t) Be cos to. KaB' eKacrra. That which answers to the 
particular <pp6vr)cns has appropriated to itself the common 
name ttoXitlkt), as it is in the attempt to frame decrees and 
create institutions for the carrying out of the general prin- 
ciples laid down in the laws, that the 7toXltck6s busies himself. 

(79.) 2. avrr] Se npaKTiKT] k.t.X. This particular 71-0X11-1*77 is 
-rrpaKTiKT], inasmuch as it frames and passes decrees, which are 



3-G.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 133 

the nearest approach to practice of which ttoXitikt) is capable, 

(to yap \jrr](pio-[xa npaKrov coy to err^aroi/). 

(80.) 3. SoKfi 5 e. As noXiTiKf) is rather concerned with the ge- 
neral principles of good, so is cppovrjcris rather concerned with 
the application of those principles to oneself; and hence this 
has appropriated to itself the name <pp6vr)<ns, though it pro- 
perly includes the general principles as well as the parti- 
cular application of them. 

(81.) 3. €K€ivcou. From iicetvav to Sucao-nicr} is parenthetical. — 
€K€iv<ov 9 sc. the divisions given above, — the diiferent sorts 

Of TToklTlKT) I 

oiKovopia, the system of family government. 

vop,o6eaia, the laying down general principles of social good. 

7t6\itikt), the practical application of these principles, — 

a. by yj^rjcpiapara — fiovXevTLKr). 

/3. by rewards and punishments, (Si/catm*^). 
(82.) 4. €i8os k.t.X. This is to be connected immediately with the 
sentence in which cppovrjo-is is said to be ircp\ avrbv kcu era ; and 
Aristotle goes on to shew that this particular cppovrjais really 
requires that knowledge of the general principles of social 
good which is supplied by noXiTiKr], (kclLtoi 'la-cos ov< «m t6 
avrov ev avev olnovoplas ovb* avev 7roAireias). 

(83.) 4. ex ravrrjs k.t.X. From this received notion, that the 
<pp6vtp.oi mind their own affairs, the 7toXitikol the public affairs, 
it has resulted that particular (ppovrjo-is is supposed to be the 
only (ppovrjo-is, although general principles are needed to enable 
a person to see and to carry out his private good ; and these 
being supplied by ttoXitikt), the fj mdoXov cppovrjo-is is lost 
sight of. 

(84.) 5. rot) ei p r) p.ev ov, sc. that (ppovrjo-ts practically is rav Ka& > 
etcao-Ta : that it is not merely the possession of moral principles, 
but the acting on them in particulars, is evidenced by the fact 
that the young can become paOr^parLKoi, but cannot become 
<pp6vipoi, — the point which they lack being experience in the 
particulars of every-day life. 

(85.) 6. eTTCl Kd\ TOVT CLV TLS CT K € \J/- a I T O K.T.X. That this 

arises from the particular nature of the subject may be seen 
from the fact that the same observation holds good in those 
sciences or systems which depend for their principles on 



134 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. viii. 6—9, 

experience. A boy may be a mathematician, because mathe- 
matics start from abstract principles, (Si' d<ficupeo-eais,) and 
not from experience ; he cannot be a philosopher, because 
that implies an acquaintance with particulars as well as prin- 
ciples ; nor yet can he study physics, for this too is the 
science of the phenomena of the natural world. 
(86.) 6. Si* dcpaipe ere a> y, abstract. 

(87.) 6. rwv be to ri lariv ovk adrjXov. Abstract prin- 
ciples of mathematics are in their very nature to be received 
before they are understood, for their nature and meaning is 
hidden ; but matters of experience must be comprehended to 
be received, as their nature and meaning is not hidden, but 
manifest. It is no proof that a person has not abstract 
principles because he does not understand them; but if a 
person does not understand matters of experience, he evi- 
dently has no experience of them. 

(88.) 7. en k.t.X. This passage seems rather to be connected 
with what he said above, (sect, iv.) as to the necessity of 
knowledge of the general principles furnished by olKovopia 

Or TToXlTlKT). 

(89.) 8. on S* f) (ppovrjo-is k.t.X. This is a difficult passage, 
and requires much attention to master it. — t ov io-xarov, 
i. e. TeXovs: of the particular object of a particular Trpoai- 

peens, (ov rj cppovqcris dXt]6r]S vTroXrjyf/is eaTiv, ch. IX. fin.). The 

first function of the moral reason is to direct us in forming 
a right judgment (86ga) on the true nature of any object of 
desire, (tov eo-xdrov,) and in deciding whether it is to be sought 
or declined. "When this function is by practice become habi- 
tual, it operates instinctively, and is called vovs, as being an 
immediate perception of a moral fact, of the moral quality 
of an action or thing, which is one of the functions of vovs. 
See note 62. 3. 

(90.) 9. dvTiKeiTai k.t.X. This does not mean that it is op- 
posed to vovs as a contrary, but that it stands over against 
vovs, and is analogous to it. (See Metaph., p. 100.) Thus : — 
Moral action. Intellectual operation. 

L L . 

(ppovrjCLS tov TeXovs. vovs tcov opcov. 

(91.) 9. He is shewing why the term vovs is applied to this moral 
perception, cppovrjais. (ppovrjo-is stands (aimVeirai) to moral action, 



9.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 135 

as vovs does to scientific operations, supplying the starting- 
point to morals, as vovs does to science : vovs, as used here, is 
reason without reasoning ; so (ppovrjons, when the first stage of 
the moral character is formed, is moral reason without rea- 
soning, (rational sense), vovs is used (ch. xi. 2.) to denote 
this <pp6vr}o-is when it has become so instinctive as to ope- 
rate as a dCva/xis, (like aia0r}<ns of things visible,) to see in- 
stinctively and immediately the qualities in any object which 
make it fit to be pursued, and to accept it as an object in- 
stantaneously and without any effort or deliberation. 

(92.) 9. vovs t£>v opcov lav ovk eo~Ti X o y o s. vovs, as we 
have seen in ch. v., discovers the apxai or principles which 
are not capable of demonstration, but are perceived by aia- 

6t]o~is, Or ediapos, or inayoiyr]. 

(93.) 9. r) 8e tov €o~xarov: that is, of the particular T eXos, with 
which i7riaTr}pT] has nothing to do, but which is matter of 
alo-drjaLs; not the simple aladrjo-is of visible properties, such 
as whiteness in an object, (ovk % t5>v Idicov,) but that sort 
whereby we perceive some invisible quality, (uAX' o'la alcrOa- 
vopeda k.t.X.,) and in which vovs operates instinctively, — as, 
when seeing a triangle by simple alo-drjo-is we see its visible 
shape, and also by vorjTiKr) alo-drjo-is, (cf. Anal. Post. i. 31. 8, 
p. 197 ; also De Anim. iii. 3. 1,) by the power of an habituated 
vovs, we recognise its invisible quality of being the simplest 
figure, and capable of no further resolution, (6Vt r6 iv pa6r]p.a- 
tlkoIs eaxarov rpiyavov) ; for when we have arrived at a triangle 
we stop, knowing instantaneously and immediately that we 
cannot go further, (o-Trjo~€Tai yap KaKeT). 

(94.) 9. a XX' avrrj k.t.X. This latter, the instinctive power of 
vovs to see the invisible and remote qualities of material ob- 
jects, is not called cppovyo-is, but alaOrjo-is, for it resembles the 
perception of visible properties more closely than it does the 
perception of moral qualities, (paXXov aladrjo-is rj cppovrjo-is,) 
both being supposed to be instantaneous and immediate ; 
but the former, cppovrjo-is, (the perception of moral qua- 
lities,) belongs to a different species of intellectual per- 
ception from aiadrjo-is, (eKeivrjs 5' tiXXo eldos,) and therefore^ 
having nothing to do with sensual perception, is not simply 
called a'Lo-Qrio-is, but vovs. We shall see in ch. xi. that this 
<pp6vr)(ns tov TiXovs is simply called vovs. 



136 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. ix. 1—3, 

CHAPTER IX. 

(95.) 1. (f)p6vr]<ris being thus viewed as a simple instinct of 
the moral intellect, an dXrjdrjs vttoXtj^ls tov reXovs, Aristotle 
now proceeds to consider that intellectual process which 
directs us in the choice of the means. 

(96.) 1 . Trorepoj/ imo-Trifiri : whether it is a purely scientific 
intellectual process of the reason alone, directed to moral 
action. The syllogism whereby this is answered is in the 
second figure. 

(97.) 2. evo-roxta, a mere instinct, — a lucky knack of guessing 
at the right means ; implying much natural talent, but no 
intellectual process. This too is answered in the second 
figure. 

(98.) 3. ay xtv oial Anal. Post. i. 34. 1, r) be dyx^void ia-TLv 
eixTTOx^oi tls iv aa-KeTTTcp XP° VC ? rov pto~ov. — o v b e br) b o £ a : 
nor, again, is it a mere intellectual decision on moral action. 
— a XX' end k.t.X. As error always attaches to bad counsel, 
and correctness always to good, it follows that good counsel 
is a certain correctness, (dpBoTrjs). This argument is from 
the perception of a certain quality inherent in a certain 
subject, tested and confirmed by the perception of the con- 
trary quality in the contrary subject. 

(99.) 3. i7Tio-Tr)fir)s. Science does not admit of error ; if error 
comes in, science ceases : therefore we cannot talk of any- 
thing as the correctness of that which is essentially right. 
There is no such notion as 6p$6rT]s 6p66rr)Tos. 

(100.) 3. 8o£j7$-. Opinion is liable to error, and therefore has 
an opdorr/s ; but this is dXr)deia, and therefore not et>/3ovXia. 

Again, boga is the result of an intellectual process. When- 
ever boga has taken place the matter is settled, (apa be koi 
copio-Tai fjbr) ndv ov boga ioriv). It is a decision more or less 
certain on some point, (i) boga ov ^ffnja-is dXXa <pdo~is ns 
fjbr],) while ev(3ov\la is evidently the seeking for a decision, 
(6 be fiovkevopevos — CrjTel n) ; but then evfiovXia is an intel- 
lectual process, (dXXa pr)v ovbe avev Xoyov t) etfiovXia,) and it 
must be either an 6p6oTr]s imaT^firjSf or bogrjs, or biavoias : it 
is not of the two first, therefore it remains that it is of the 
last, i. e. of some intellectual operation or process, (XeiWai 
apa biavoias,) — Xei7rerai being constantly used to denote the con- 



4-7.] 



ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 



137 



elusion of a disjunctive syllogism. It is hardly credible that 
for a long time this was, and perhaps is still, construed, "// 
is therefore inferior to the bidvoia." — diavoias: see the De 
Anima, iii. 4. 

(101.) 4. lire i 8e k.t.X. There are different senses of dpOurrjs : 
as applied to tvfiovXia it means correct judgment towards a 
right end, and by right means. Thus the aKpaTrjs or <pavXos has 
an dfjdoTTis (SoiAf;? inasmuch as he takes right means towards 
his end, but his end being bad, he has not evfiovXia, because his 
fiovXr) is not ayaOov tcvktikt). Again, a man may have a good 
end and attain it, but by means not good or proper : he has 
not evfiovXia any more than a man who arrives at a right con- 
clusion by a faulty syllogism is a logician. 

(102.) 5. dXX' eo-Ti K.r.A. Some persons perplex themselves 
needlessly by trying to refer this to the moral syllogism 
which he speaks of in the seventh book as preceding moral 
choice or moral action, but it seems best to take it merely 
as an illustration drawn from logic. 

(103.) 6. ovkovv. AVhere the process of deliberation is slow 
and tedious the power of evfiovXta is not yet formed, though 
there is some progress made towards it. 

(104.) 7. ov j) (ppovrjcris aXrjdrjs VTroXrjyjris icrriv. (ppovrjcris 

is here viewed as perfect in its first stage or function of 
choosing the right end, to which evfiovXla considers and 
chooses the means. 



CHAPTER X. 

(105.) The intellectual processes or habits necessary to an act of 
good irpoaipecris, viz. the choice of a good end and right 
means, being thus laid down, it remains to consider two 
other faculties or habits which are aids, or, as they are 
termed, handmaids, to moral wisdom. The first of these is 
avveo- is, or apprehension, whereby, being unable to form for 
ourselves right moral principles, we are able to apprehend 
them, to go along with them (awui/ui) when stated by another 
person, {SKkov \iyovros,) and to decide upon their being right 
or wrolig, (spinier),) so as to adopt the one and reject the other. 

T 



138 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [ex. 2, 3, 

Of course, now, when teaching is carried on by books, rather 
than orally, ciWov Xiyovros must have a wider sphere than in 
the time of Aristotle, (oAAou \eyovros rj y pdepovros). Things 
of dvdyKTj or rvxn are not taken cognizance of by aweais, but 
whatever is matter of deliberation. It has therefore the 
same subject-matter as typovrjais, from which it differs inas- 
much as <pp6vr)cris has a directive function which avveais has 
not. Nor, again, is avveais the possession or formation (ex«" 
t) Xapfidveiv : see Anal. Post. ii. 15, p. 231.) of (ppovrjais, for 
the former is cppovrjais itself, the latter is a function of 
the moral vovs ; but as in matters of science a person is said 
awUvai when he goes along with his teacher, when he uses the 
science he has so as to apprehend a subject laid before him, 
so in morals, a person is said awUvai when he uses his moral 
intellectual powers on contingent matter (86ga) to judge in 
moral matters, whether what is advanced by another person 
(qAXov \eyovTos) is right or wrong, true or false, — so that we 
can apprehend and learn truth from the teaching or direction 
of another ; and hence the name, for avvievai (to go along with 
what another person says) is often used for pavOdveiv. 

(107.) This avveais is the ear of the mind, — " he that hath ears 
to hear let him hear," — and depends on the moral state or ten- 
dencies of the individual. If a man's moral state, as far as 
it may be developed, is good, he will apprehend and adopt 
truth, and if not, he will not be able to comprehend it ; so in 
every subject he who is not Treira.ibevp.evos, paraicos aKovaerai. 
Cf. bk. i. ch. iii. 5. 

(108.) Many persons suppose avveais to be an intellectual virtue, 
consisting in a habit of judging of a person's character from 
what he says ; whereas Aristotle throughout is talking of 
the powers of the mind which are concerned in producing 
right moral action ; not those whereby and wherein a person 
judges of another, but those whereby he guides himself. 

(109.) 2. eniraKTiKT]. Aristotle did not recognise the judicial 
function of conscience. 

(110.) 3. oxire t6 e'x^v. So in Anal. Post. i. 2. 9, p. 148, 
elbevai, the possession, is distinguished from gwievai, the 
comprehension, of knowledge. 

(111.) 3. ovre Xappdveiv. So in Post. Anal. ii. 15. 4, p. 231, 



3,4; c. xi. 2.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 139 

Xapfidveiv rather denotes the formation of principles for one- 
self ; avveais IS pavddveiv cppovrjaw rather than Xapfidvav, 

(112.) 3. aXXov Xeyovros. So Dem. G7. 14, aXXov Xeyovros 
gvveirjre: Eth. X. 9. 7, ov yap av aKOvo-ete Xoyov dnoTperrovros 
ouS' av ^vveirj 6 Kara naObs C<»> v '■ see ibid., sect. 20. 

(113.) 4. Xeyopep ydp k.t.X. That awuvat is to judge of what 
another person puts before us, and to receive it from him, is 
clear from its being frequently used as synonymous with 
\iav6dvew. 



CHAPTEE XI. 

(114.) The next habit which is necessary to moral wisdom is, 
that we should be able to apply rightly to our own particular 
selves and circumstances those principles which by crvveais we 
have received from others. This power is yv d>p.rj, discretion, 
discernment ; as o-vyyvwur) is the fair and right application of 
general principles to the persons and cases of others, so drop- 
ping the <tvp, (which in this compound word gives the notion 
of others,) yvcopr) by itself is a right and sensible application 
of general principles to ourselves ; and thus yvaprj corrects 
possible errors into which we might be led by adopting ge- 
neral principles from others. 

(115.) 2. elo-l be navai ai e^fu k.t.X. These four habits, 
as we might expect from their nature (evX6ya>s,) have a re- 
lation and bearing towards the same point, that is, any moral 
action. Their functions are as follows : — 

vovs, perceiving the character and quality of any reXos which 
presents itself = cppovrjo-is tov reXovs. See note 91. 

(ppovrjo-is, choosing the right means towards such an end. 

a-vveacs, supplying us with principles by enabling us to 
judge of, and apprehend rightly from others, the principles 
of right and wrong. 

yvvprj, enabling us to apply these principles rightly to our 
needs. 

On this we must observe : — 

J . That vovs is substituted for that cppovrjo-is which is dXrjdrjs 
vTroXrjyj/is tov reXovs, because cppovrjais, being perfected in its 
first stage as the right choice of the end, becomes a rational 
instinct, or hvvapus, whereby, without any intellectual pro- 



140 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. xi. 2, 3, 

cess, the moral eye of the soul perceives right or wrong in 
particulars, just as a'ladrjo-is perceives some visible, or vovs 
some invisible, attribute of an object. In fact, this func- 
tion of moral perception is exercised directly by vovs morally 
instructed ; it is a simple energy of the intellectual eye, 
operating instinctively and immediately. We now see the 
meaning and bearing of the passage (ch. viii. 9.) beginning 

" aVTlKeiTCLl TCO vc5." 

2. e v /3 o v X [ a is omitted and (pp6vr)<ris substituted for it, be- 
cause the first stage of (ppovrjo-is being thus perfected, so that 
the slow deliberation of moral wisdom is supplied by the im- 
mediate energies of a moral intellectual perception (vovs), the 
only intellectual process that remains — i. e. the proper func- 
tion of (ppovrjais as an intellectual process — is concerned with 
the means. It may be observed that this is the moral state 
of most, or rather of all, men. The choice of the end is very 
often matter of instinct, and immediate, — in fact, where a man 
is good at all, it must be so, more or less, — that of the means 
very seldom, if ever. It is almost impossible practically to 
conceive a man so good, so thoroughly exercised in virtue, 
that the means as well as the end should present themselves 
to the eye of his soul without any effort on his part. 

Practically, then, the good man does not arrive at a higher 
degree of moral perfection than an instinctive choice of an 
end and a slow, deliberative choice of means : and Aristotle, 
with his usual faithful portraiture of human nature as it is, 
assigns the several functions necessary to right moral action, 
to the habits or powers which practically perform them. 

(116.) 2. dwdfie is. In proportion as they become matters of 
habit, and perform their functions invariably and rapidly, 
and truly, they become powers or faculties whereby we 
choose the end, or the means, or learn rightly the principle 
of others, or apply them to ourselves. 



(117.) 2. ra yap eViftK?). Supply " is not confined to 

(ov rov dinaiov p.ovov dWa) KOivd k.t.A." 



(118.) 3. ra>i/ icrxdrcov. The rAos is termed eo-x a t o v as being 
the extreme point of the whole moral action, where it stops 
and it is also used to denote t6 *a0' exao-Tw, or to irpaia-ov 
as being the tcXos. 






3, 4.] ETHICS.— BOOK VT. 141 

(119.) 3. Kal 77 avvfiTis k.t.X. Though avveais is the reception 
of general principles from others, yet it is of general prin- 
ciples with reference to particular actions, and hence it is t&v 

eV^tircoi/ as well as (ppovrjais. 

(120.) 4. This difficult passage may be mastered with a little at- 
tention. Noh has to do with extremes in both science and 
morals : in science it lias to do with first principles, whence 
scientific reasoning starts, or to which it returns. These 
cannot be arrived at or proved by reasoning (Xoyo?), but are 
perceived by vovs. But in morals, vovs (=cpp6vrjo-is rov rekovs) 
is of the shifting particular rov io-xdrov (eaxarov as being rekos) 
Kal ivdexofievov, because by it we perceive immediately the good 
or bad in what presents itself to us as an end, and pursue or 
avoid it accordingly; and also of the major premiss, (rrjs ircpas 
irpoTciaeas,) which is applied instinctively in that energy of 
the moral vovs : for the sources of the ov eve<a, that whereby 
anything becomes an ov evem, a final cause of action to us, 
are these : 1st. the principle or standard of pursuit and avoid- 
ance, (in which pursuit is predicated of certain qualities,) and 
2ndly. the perception of these qualities in some particular. 
It is from these two combined that anything becomes to us 
an object of pursuit or avoidance, (dpxal rov ov eveKa avrai,) 
thus : — 

irav Kakov Sicoktov, general principle, laid down by the vovs 
of ourselves or others. 

tovto icrri Kakov •, perceived by vovs in its moral function. 

tovto ecrrc 8lq>kt6v, that is, tovto becomes an ov eW/ca to us. 

(121.) 4. he pas npoTao-eeos. It is generally assumed that frepa 
npoTao-ts is the minor premiss. In Anil. Prior, i. 8. 1, it is 
either one of the premisses. But the fact is, that it is the pre- 
miss which has not been spoken of before ; so that it is only 
the minor when the major has been mentioned or implied :. 
here the eaxaTov koi ivbex°l ievov -> t ne shifting particular, clearly 
indicates a minor premiss ; so iripa npoTaais is the major. 

(122.) 4. eft tS>v Kaff tKao-Ta ydp: 1. Anal. Post. i. 31. 5. 

This yap refers to the ere pa npoTao-is : vovs is of the ere pa irpo- 

raais as well as of the particular, because this irepa Tvporao-is is 
formed (Jk t&v Ka6' eKaara) by that intellectual alaBrjais which 
is Called vovs, — avrr) S' eoTi vovs> 



142 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. xi. 5, 6 j 

(123.) 5. Si6 na\ ipvaiKa. As a proof of this, that these 
powers of moral action do not spring from or belong to 
aocpia, bnt are of ra Ka(? eKaara, we may remark that they 
are conceived of as more or less natural gifts, which o-o<pia is 
not ; and a proof of their being natural gifts is found in the 
notion that they are held to be attached in different degrees 
to different natural states and ages of life, (a-qpclov 8e ort km 
rats r}\t,Kiais olopeda aKoXovdelv k.t.A.,) as if nature was the au- 
thor of them. This passage is in a parenthesis. 

(124.) 5. 8i6 Ka\ dp xv Ka * reXos vovs. This 816 refers to 
the passage preceding the parenthesis. 

vovs is the dpxr) as forming the major premiss inductively 
from particulars. So Anal. Post. ii. 15. 8, f) ph dpxr) rijs dpxrjs 
av e'lrj. 

It is the reXos as applying deductively the principle so 
formed instinctively and almost unconsciously, so as to judge 
at sight of the character, good or bad, desirable or unde- 
sirable, of an action. 

(125.) 6. €K tovtcov, SC. ra Kad'eKaaTa. — ai air oh e I ge i s, moral 
reasoning, — e k t o v t <a v, as data ; tv e p\ t ov r a> v, as con- 
clusions. 

(126.) 6. &o~T€ S el k.t.A. Since moral reasoning is mostly about 
the particulars of moral action, the qualities, good or bad, of 
particular actions, men of experience, or age, or moral excel- 
lence, are enabled to judge, as it were by sight, of moral 
actions, and therefore their axioms and opinions, even though 
not supported by reasons, are to be followed as guides with 
as much confidence as the conclusions of the moral reason of 
ourselves or others who are not thus qualified. 

(127.) 6. U t^s efiTreipias Sp,fia: cf. St. Matt. vi. 22, 23; 
Heb. v. 14. 

CHAPTER XII. 

(128.) The question now arises, what is the use or advantage of 
these intellectual perfections, scientific or moral? Wisdom, 
it is urged, has no practical value, for it leads to no action; 
while moral wisdom, allowing it to lead to action, is not ne- 
cessary to right action ; for, first, if moral wisdom consists in 
the knowledge of right and wrong in action, of what advan- 



c. xii. 1-C] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 143 

tage is this knowledge? for the virtues are habits, and when 
we have them we act from that habit, and not from the 
knowledge which may be implied therein : so in bodily health, 
we are not more healthy or strong for knowing medicine or 
gymnastics scientifically, (sect. 1). Or, secondly, suppose we 
allow that moral wisdom does not merely consist in the know- 
ledge of right and wrong, but also plays an important part in 
the formation of the habits, then it may be asked, of what use 
is it to those who have the habit ? and even those who have 
it not can form it under the direction of others, as in matters 
of health, (sect. 2). 

And again, it is absurd to suppose that moral wisdom, in- 
ferior as it is to intellectual perfection, is to govern it, as will 
be the case if w T e assign to moral wisdom the supreme direc- 
tion of our lives, (sect. 3). These points Aristotle answers. 

(129.) 1. tovto fieu, SC. yeveaiv elvai 7rpd£e<ov. — Suaia, social 

good, (benevolence) ; KaXd, individual excellence, (piety) ; dya6d, 
{individual good), self-love. — o era p,rj r <o not el v. whatever 
are matters of npd^s, and not of r^vr). 

(130.) 4. npeoTov fiev ovv. First, they are desirable ingredients 
of human happiness, as being human excellencies, and this 
even if they actually contributed nothing productively to that 
happiness ; but, secondly, they do contribute something, — 
they are ingredients thereof, the essential causes : as health 
is the cause of being healthy, though it is not the productive 
cause of it as medicine is, so is intellectual perfection a cause 
of happiness, as existing and operating in it. 

(131.) 6. cti k.t.X. With regard to moral wisdom, it is actually 
one of the productive causes of moral excellence, for it is 
concerned in the development of the epyov of man ; for take 
that stage of moral development in which a right Choice 
of the end is made instinctively, by the so far formed moral 

habit, rjdiKr) dperr) (17 pkv yap dperrj rbv (TKonov nocel 6p66u,) then 

moral wisdom, in its function of evjBovXUi, judges of, selects, 
and determines on the means, (fj Se (ppovrjats rd npos tovtop,) 
and this is necessary to the whole moral action. 

(132.) 6. tov be rerdprov k.t.X. The dperai of the other three 
parts — the strictly scientific, the moral intellect, the aesthetic, — 
having been mentioned under the names of eWr?//^, (ppovrjiTts, 



1U ETHICS— BOOK VI. [c. xii. 7, 8. 

apery (r;#i>o;), be is induced to mention parenthetically the 
fourth principle or part of humanity. The perfection of the 
aesthetic part is here represented by dperfj, because that stage 
of the moral character is here supposed to be formed, in which 
aperr) operates instinctively, as a sort of aladya-Ls, in distin- 
guishing a good end from a bad one. 

(133.) 7. 7T€pl Se tov p-qdev k.t.X. He now turns to the other 
point put by the objectors, viz. that if cppovrjais is useful for 
the formation of yOucr) apery, it is useless as soon as the habit 
is formed. He recapitulates (pL<p6v avooOev dpKreov) what he 
has said as to virtue not only consisting in action, but in 
action deliberately chosen (<ka TrpoaLpeaiv). Now supposing 
the moral character completely formed, there is an instinc- 
tive, though rational, choice of the whole action, both end 
and means, by the operation of the moral habit, (jyv pev ovv 
7T poai p e a iv dpdqv Ttoiel 77 dperrj). The whole action then 
being supposed to be the instinctive operation of the per- 
fectly formed character, the question now comes of what 
further use is cppovrjats ? It must be remembered that this is 
a supposed case. The moral character is rarely so perfectly 
formed as to choose both means and end instinctively : the 
usual stage is that which Aristotle recognises elsewhere, viz. 
where the end is chosen instinctively, and the means are still 
matters of deliberation and doubt. In section 6 it is said 
that, aperi) 7roieI t6i> cr kott ov 6p66v : see also ch. xiii. sect. 7 : this 
instinctive choice of the end being the first stage of the moral 
character, which in the passage before us is viewed as in a 
further stage of perfection, the (ppovycns of the means being 
merged in the moral habit as well as that of the end. 

(134.) 7. cppovrjaiv t a> v Ka\u>v <a\ biKaicov. IMoral know- 
ledge, and moral sense of individual and social right ; or the 
genitive may depend on TrpaKTiKoorepovs. — S C ayvoiav. where 
ciyvoia is the cause of the action. 

(135.) 8. ra 8e 6 a a k.t.\. Supposing the whole action to be 
deliberately chosen by the instinctive moral habit, it yet re- 
mains to carry it out into act, — to contrive and execute 
the means which we have selected. This is not within the 
province of apery, even when most perfectly formed into a 

Bvvapis, (cvk earn ttjs dperrjs aXX' erepas dwdpeus). xV O moral ex- 
cellence can give a man this power, and therefore some fur- 



9,10.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 145 

ther consideration is necessary, (Xenreov 8' fmo-T^a-aai (more 
careful/}/ : see Lidd. and Scott ad v.) o-acpearcpov irepX avru>v). 

(136.) 9. That (ppomjo-is which recognises and selects the right 
end and means, whether together or separately, springs 
from vovs in its function of perceiving the moral qualities 
and uses and tendencies of things or acts ; but there is 
another function of the intellect, or, it may be said, another 
function of vovs, which has the distinct name of 8 e i v 6 r -q s, 
which perceives (not the moral, but) the useful qualities of 
things ; sees how these necessary means may be carried 
out and obtained, (wore ra rrpbs rbv o-kottov o-vvreivovra 8v- 
vaadai ravra n p arr e iv koi riiy^ai/f ty air S>v: cf. Magn. 
]VTor. i. 34, p. 48, rrjs be beivorrjros aKt^raaOai i< rivSiV av 
eieao-rov y e v o i r o ra>v TrpaKTOiV koi ravra npdrreiv',) and from 
this tivvapis of deivorrjs there springs a second sort of </>po- 
vrja-Ls, which is able to devise, carry out, obtain the means 
predetermined upon towards a good end; for unless the end 
is good, the habitual and deliberate exercise of this con- 
triving faculty is not (pp6vr)ai$, but navovpyia. And it is very 
important to the understanding of this chapter, to keep in 
mind the different nature and functions of the cppovrjais which 
springs from vovs, and that which springs from Seivorrjs ; that 
which chooses the means because they are good and right, 
and that which carries such good and right means out : hence 
it is seen how moral wisdom, or cppovrjais, is necessary even 
after the habit has been perfectly formed, see note 133, — 
as perfectly as it is possible to conceive it, — more perfectly 
than it practically can be, — certainly than it ever has been, 
except in the single case of Him Who had our nature with- 
out our imperfections. 

S e i v 6 r r] s. Soph. Ant. 332, noWa. ra 8 e i v a. Kovbkv av9ponTTOv 
deivorepov 7reXet. Our word cunning represents Seivorrjs 
more fully than any other, but still it does not give the 
notion of fear which exists in 8av6s. Cunning is used 
in old authors both in a good and bad sense, though in later 
times it is mostly confined to the latter, — a tacit evidence 
of the way in which the faculty is generally used. — navovp- 
y o v s : SO we call both cppovipoi and -navovpyoi d € iv o L 

(137.) 10. eo-ri $' 17 cppovrjo-is k.t.X. cppovrjais, when thus ap- 

U 



146 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. xii. 10 ; 

plied to the carrying out our choice, is not the same as this 
faculty ; for, first, it implies a greater degree of intellectual 
exertion, as beivorrjs is rather an instinctive power ; and 
secondly, cppovrjais implies a good end, while beivorrjs is in- 
different to the character of the end : but still Seivorrjs is an 
ingredient of active moral wisdom, for without it we should 
choose, but not act ; our moral character would remain un- 
productive, from our inability to carry out our determinations. 
Practically, we do meet such people not unfrequently, to 
whom nature seems to have denied beivorrjs, and hence, though 
they have cppovrjais as moral knowledge and moral perception, 
their light is hid under a bushel ; indeed, in this world, as it 
is at present ordered, their very moral excellence often makes 
them shrink from doing what is necessary to secure their 
end. It must be remembered, that though the cppovrjais of 
the end often becomes actually instinctive, and the cppovrjais 
(choice) of the means can be conceived of as instinctive, 
the cppovrjais which consists in a rational and right use of 
deivorr/s cannot, from its nature, ever become an instinct, and 
therefore remains even when the moral character is looked 
upon as perfectly formed ; see note 133. 

(138.) 10. r) de e£is k.t.A. The habit of contriving and carrying 
out the means to a good end arises to this eye of the soul, 
when to it is joined aperr) ; for the end must be good, or else 
it will be navovpyia, and good ends do not present themselves 
(as good) except to those who have aperr). 

(139.) 10. op, pan rrjs "^vx^s may either be cppovrjais dnb rrjs 
deivorrjTos, or deivorrjs : in either case the meaning is the same, 
viz. that to the exercise of this practical faculty moral ex- 
cellence is necessary. 

(140.) 10. ol yap avWoyiapoi. In acts of moral choice there 
is a reasoning process more or less distinct ; a reference of 
the particular to some principle, some standard of right, 
which may be syllogistically stated. This standard of right, 
this major premiss, by reference to which we draw our con- 
clusion as to the pursuit or avoidance of the particular ob- 
ject in question, is not known except to the good man. The 
man without aperr) has a bad standard by which he measures 
acts in the moral syllogism, (see bk. iii. 4. 4, 5,) and there- 



c. xiii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 117 

fore his end is wrong, and his tWorq? becomes iravovpyla, 
and not cppovyais ; therefore without apery we cannot have the 
(ppovrjais d-rro rrjs deivoryros. 

(141.) 10. coo-re ahvvarov k.t.X. This seems to be a mere 
repetition, for the greater part of the book has been occu- 
pied in shewing the way in which cppovrjais and apery are con- 
nected : but he is speaking, not of the (ppovyo-is which works 
in j3ov\r]cris and ftovXevais, but of the (ppovyais dno rrjs heivoryros, 
and shews that to the development of detvorys into cppovya-is 
it is necessary that apery should exist, (ppdvya-ts dnb vov re- 
quires deivorrjs to carry it out, otherwise it would have eyes 
but not hands ; but in the case supposed above, and con- 
sidered here, where the r)6iKy apery secures both the right 
end and right means, the <pp6vyo-is ano rrjs beivoryros is the 
only definite energy of (pp6vyo~is, as the operation of the 
moral intellect, distinguished from moral sense. 



CHAPTEK XIII. 

(142.) 1. y dp errj it a p anXy cr ico s e^f k.t.X. heivorys stands 
in such a relation to the cppovyo-is which belongs to it, that 
the latter is a development of the former by the addition 
of certain ingredients ; so does cpvo-iKy apery stand to Kvpla, or 
rjdiKr) dperr], as the latter is likewise developed from the former 
by the addition of certain ingredients. This (pva-iKy apery con- 
sists in certain instinctive impulses towards good, (Sppal avev 

\6yov : Magn. Mor. 1. 34. 49, olov oppai rives ev e/ccicrrco avev Xoyov 

npos ra dvbpela k.t.A. : — the passage should be read, as it illus- 
trates what is said here : see also Eth. x. 9. 8, del 8y r6 y6os 
ivpovTrdp-^eiv na>s oiKelov rr/s dperrjs arepyov ro KaXov Ka\ Si/cr^e- 
palvov to alcrxpov,) — certain shadowy visions of mXov and 
alaxpov, which, float indefinitely before the mind of every one 
who possesses human nature, unless, perhaps, we are to ex- 
cept those savage nations or individuals whose nature has by 
long corruption and degeneracy fallen below even the original 



148 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. xiii. 1—3, 

fall. The shadowy instincts, residing in the imagination 
rather than the reason, are the guide of the child while yet 
his reason is dormant: as his powers in course of nature 
unfold themselves, these shadowy instincts impregnate his 
reason, and become rational, (p,era \6yov ova-ai,) until, as the 
child grows into the man, instinct is no longer his guide, but 
reason; he knows why he avoids the evil and seeks the 
good, and thus cpvaiKr} dperr], which resides in the irdOrj (espe- 
cially in alb&s) by the admixture and impregnation of the 
reason, becomes r)6iKr) ; and this again, as has been before said, 
the nearer it approaches to perfection, becomes in its opera- 
tion more instinctive, more a hvvap-is. 

(143.) 1. dXX' avev vov k.t.X. (pvaiKr) dperr) then IS dperr) mmUS 

vovs. — ovtco Kal kvravQa. These shadowy feelings some- 
times lead one wrong. — iav be Xo/3?/ vov v. It is not by 
the addition of beivorrjs that (pvo-ucr) dperr) becomes Kvpla, but by 
the addition of that cppovrjo-is which springs from vovs. 

(144.) 2. r) be eg is Spot a ova- a. Both (pvo~LKr) and Kvpla dperrj 

consist in avoiding what is wrong and doing what is right ; 
but the latter energizes thus upon rational grounds. 

(145.) 2. ware KaQditep k.t.X. As in the moral intellect there 
are the two powers of beivorrjs and cppovrja-is, which are so 
connected, (at least as far as cppovrjo-is is considered as an 
habitual and rational exercise of the contriving and acting 
power,) that beivorr/s becomes cppovrjo-is by the addition of 
dperr), so in moral action these states <j)vo-inr] and Kvpla dperr) 
are similarly related, inasmuch as (pvaiKr) by the addition of 
(ppovrjo-is becomes Kvpla. 

(146.) 2. avev (ppovrjo-ecos. Here (ppovrjo-is is that moral wisdom 
which arises from vovs, (see above, iav be \a(3rj vovv): dperr) 
r)6iKr) can exist without the cppovrjais dno rr)s beivorrjros, (see last 
chapter, sect. 8,) though it cannot act. 

(147.) 3. Sionep k.t.X. From this admixture of the intellect 
in the moral habit some persons think that the virtues are 
wholly intellectual. — <ppovr)o~eis, acts or energies of cppo- 
v r\ a- 1 s. — 77 da- as r a s d p e r a s, the whole of the several 
virtues. 



4-6.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 149 

(148.) 4. o-rjfxdov 8e. That lie was partly wrong and partly 
right is proved by the way in which men speak of any virtue 
as egis Kara top 6p66v \6yov, which shews on the one hand that 
6p66s \6yos is not the whole, and on the other that it is 
part of it. 

(149.) 4. [xavreveo-Bai, to feel. It is applied to those convic- 
tions or impressions which we have without being able to 
give any definite reason for them, which come over the mind 
as the supposed inspirations of the prophet. Ehet. i. 13, 

p.avT(vop.eda yap ndvTts k.t.X. 

(150.) 5. p. era (3 rj v at, to change our ground. — ov yap p.6vov 
k.t.X. apeTT] is not only the irddr} under the government of 
reason, as of some power external to them, (Kara tov 6p6bv 
\6yov,) but it is a compound state of which 6p66s Xoyos is an 
essential ingredient, (jit e r a tov dpBov Xoyov). It is not 
the moral governed by the intellectual, but it is the moral- 
intellectual. It may be said to be Kara Xoyov with regard to 
the subordination of the passions to the reason, but pcTa 
6p6ov Xoyov when viewed as an e£ty, or state of mind made up 
of certain emotions or energies. 

(151.) 5. epdos 8e \6yos k.t.X. This marks the distinction 
between the two sorts of cppovrjais, — f/ dno tov vov and 17 071-6 
ttjs 8eivoTr)Tos. The latter would very inadequately express 

opdbs Xoyos nepl irpaKTcov. 

(152.) 5. Xoyov s, acts 0/ reason; peTa Xoyov, in which reason is an 
ingredient ; i7naTr)pas, states of the pure intellect. 

(1 53.) 6. olhe (ppovifxov. From there being a sort of <pp6vT)o-is 
which arises from deivoTrjs, and which is not in its idea inse- 
parable from right action, it might be supposed that a man 
might be cppovipos without being aya66s, but from what has 
been said it is clear even this sort of <pp6vr)<ris implies aperr). 

(154.) 6. SiaAex0ei'?7, argue. 

(155.) 6. €v(pv € (tt aT o s. The ciXoyoi oppai, in which <pvo~iKr) apeTT) 

mainly consists, are not all equally strong. In fact, the dif- 
ferent nature and strength of these makes different dis- 
positions. — dirXcos, strictly, properly. 

(156.) 6. a p. a yap r fj (ppovrjaei. Until (ppovrjcris is formed, 

and is in active operation as the guide of every-day life, the 



150 ETHICS.— BOOK VI. [c. xiii. 7, 8, 

virtuous acts we may perform are only the energies of 
(frvo-iKri apery more or less advanced towards aperrj Kvpla. 
"When (ppovrjais is formed, it operates throughout the whole 
7rd0r), and moulds them into virtues by proper regulation. 
So St. James : " If a man offend in one point, he is guilty of 
all." That is, disobedience to God in one point proves the 
want of that faith which conforms the whole man to obe- 
dience. The virtues may exist separately when they are 
only in posse, as the man is advancing towards moral ex- 
cellence ; but they cannot when they are in esse, inasmuch 
as virtue does not consist in this or that action, but in a 
particular frame of mind exhibiting itself in action, <pp6vr)<ns 
is a focus which collects the several scattered rays of light, 
and transmits them through itself the same, though changed. 

(157.) 7. He now sums up his answer to the difficulties started 
in the 12th chapter, by saying, that even were it true that 
<pp6vr)<ris was not concerned in moral action as a productive 
cause and necessary ingredient, yet, as being an excellence 
of part of man's nature, it would be a part of happiness : 
but it is a productive cause and necessary ingredient. JSTor 
is any superiority or authority given to it over o-ocpla hereby, 
— for it is merely with relation to man that its functions are 
thus assigned it, — any more than medicine is superior to 
health because it exercises authority over it, but with a view 
to it, — any more than because we say noXiriK^ is the highest 
science with regard to man, we mean that it is to direct the 
gods. 

(158.) 8. f] be to. npbs to re\os. <fip6vr)o-'is is here considered 
again (as in ch. xii. 6.) as it practically exists and operates 
in men ; the moral character giving the end, the means being 
found by the slower intellectual process of cppovrjo-is. 



V o v s. — (p p 6 vq o~ is. 

As one of the difficulties in this book is the different senses 
in which the words (ppovrjais and vovs are used, it may be as 
well to give them. Their being used sometimes as different, 
sometimes as the same, arises from the functions of the one 
being in certain parts and stages of the moral character the 
same, (see ch. viii. 8,) in others different. 



8.] ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 151 



1. Perception of the invisible physical qualities of things, 
whence and whereby the dpxai of scientific reasoning are 
perceived or formed; differing from aior^o-iy, which is the 
perception of the visible qualities of things. 

2. Perception of moral qualities of things, whence moral 
premisses or principles are inductively formed, (aprf, ch. 
xi. 6). 

3. Perception of the moral quality of a particular action, 
by an instinctive reference to, and application of, a moral 
principle ; instinctive perception of the end, (tov reXovs, ch. 
xi. 6,) followed by cppovrjo-is in its shape of cvfiovXla, (ch. xi. 2,) 
which is also ascribed to dperrj, (ch. xii. 6,) inasmuch as it is 
by the existence of apery in the soul that this rational per- 
ception is able to operate as an instinct towards good, and in 
it the apery rov rzXovs CO#sists. 

a. <fi p 6 vi) <r i s a no vov. 

1. The possession of moral principles. 

2. The application of these principles to a particular, 
called also vovs, because the intellect sees instinctively the 
moral quality, as vovs proper sees the physical quality, 
(ch. viii. 8). In this sense it is an dXyOys vnoXyyfns rov reXovs, 
(ch. ix. 7). "Whenever the cppovyo-is is thus worked into the 
ndOt}, a moral sense is formed. 

3. The discovery of the right means by the perception of 
their moral qualities, as well as of fitness for the purpose 
in hand. This is the proper function of (ppovyais when, 
in its first function, it has become that moral intuition which 
is called analogously vovs; and it is its usual function in 
most men, because it rarely happens that the perception of 
the means becomes intuitive ; hence it is used for cvfiovXla, 
(ch. xi. 2). 

/3. <p p ovrj o- is a Tib ttjs b e iv ott) t o s. 

The perception of the way in which the means determined 
on are to be accomplished, and the end obtained, coming in 
after the npoaipeais of the end and means : this would remain 
a definite energy of the intellect in every action, even if the 
above Trpoaiprjo-ts could become an instinctive energy of ^#4*17 

apery, (ell. xii. 8). 



152 



ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 

Formation of the moral character. 



[c. xiii. 8, 






Antagonistic 



principles. 



i 

imdvpia — r)hovr) 
and Xvtti] working 
in the nd3r]. 
rj Sv dy air rjro v. 

Actions of simple 
selfishness impreg- 
nating vovs. 



Neutral vovs, 
at first dormant, 
but daily de- 
veloping. 




becoming 

alcrdrjriKrj (mcrrr) prj , 
Tvdv r)bv di(OK.r6p, 

7TO.V XvTTTJpOV (peVKTOV. 

yaKoXao-ia, bad end, 
ybad means, or only 
^accidentally good. 




)eivoTr)s. 



Tvavovpyia. 



Shadowy sense of 
koKov and alo-xpdv. 
(pvcriKT) aperi), With 

an r)8v of self-ap- 
probation attached. 
Instinct towards 
good ends ; alaxpov 
pto-rjTov — KaXov dya- 

7Tr)TOV. 

Actions of koKov 
impregnating vovs> 



Kvplcos imaTrjpr], Or (ppo- 

vrjo-is. (Seebk. vii. 3. 33.) 

irdv Kakbv dicoKrov. 
Ttdv alcrxpov (pevKrov. 

1. Choice of ends. — 
povXrjo-is, directed by 

(fipovrjcris. 

Sense of koXov and alo-- 
Xpdv gradually superseded 
by a rational apprehension 
of them, — 7rd0r) submitting 
to it. 

(ppovrjo-is rod reXovs, gra- 
dually merged in nddrj, 
choosing right ends in- 
stinctively, rjOucr) dperr) tov 
(tkottov = dvvapus of moral 
vovs* 

2. Choice of means. — 
(BovXevais, directed by cppo- 
vrjo-is: if by practice merged 
in rjOos, becoming also a 
mere bvvayns — character 
perfectly formed : 7)611$ 

dperrj tt)v irpoaipeaiv iroiei 



<pp6vrjai$ devrepa. 6p6r)v, (supposed case). 



ETHICS.— BOOK VI. 153 

The undeveloped nature of man seems to have been viewed 
by Aristotle as consisting, — 1. Of the tendencies of rjSovrj 
and Xvnrj, residing in and working by the several irdOr), more 
or less strongly in different individuals. 2. Of the antago- 
nistic instinct of <pv<riKj) dperf), — a shadowy sense of ku\6v and 
alo-xpov, chiefly the latter, residing in the imagination, and 
not in the reason, with the rjbv of self-approbation attached 
to them as a motive. 3. The neutral power of vovs, or intel- 
lect, as first dormant, but daily developing itself. 

From the first of these proceed the actions of simple self- 
ishness ; from the other the actions of koXov ; and as vovs is 
developed it is impregnated by one or the other of these, 
and whether it is by the one or the other settles in the main 
the question of the future character. If the passions have 
their way, and the vovs is impregnated by them, its judgments 
and views are simply sensual, and it results in the alo-OrjTiKrj 
cirioTTJpr), (the law of the members,) which holds ndv f)8v 8kokt6v 
i — nav Xvnrjpov (pevKrov. If, on the other hand, the shadowy sense 
of koKov and alaxpov controls the passions, the vovs is impreg- 
nated by it. These motives daily find their way more and more 
into the reason, and the reason apprehending and receiving 
them, the result is Kvpiag cirio-Trjpr), — a rational apprehension 
of the principles of ko\6v and alaxpov, as facts in morals and 
as motives of action. This shews itself first in (Sov\r]o-is, 
which, under the direction of cppovrjo-is, makes a right choice 
of the end, judging rightly of the fitting objects of pursuit 
and avoidance, as well as of the nature of the objects pre- 
sented for its decision, (JjBuc^ apcrr) Kara \6yov) ; and when this 
has become habitual, it impresses itself in the iin.6vp.iai, 
gives right notions of pleasure and pain, so that the true 
rjbv alone presents itself as rjdv, and the motive and cause of 
action in its shape of ^ovXrjo-is becomes an instinct, with this 
difference, that it is now a rational instinct, (rjdtKrj aperr) //era 
Xoyov) ; not only the mere shadowy sense of koXov and alo-xpov, 
but an instinct founded on the views and judgments of 
reason. The first stage of the moral character (cppovrjo-is rod 
tiXovs) is now formed, and this is the highest stage of per- 
fection to which men can ordinarily rise. The second function 
of(pp6vr)o-is is that of choosing the right means, (fiov- 
\evo-is,) and this also we may conceive of as being merged in 
the moral character, so as to act instinctively; but it is 



154 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. i. 

practically impossible, or at least nearly so, for mere men. 
Should it take place, then the second stage of the moral 
character is completed, — and f) dperf) ttjv 7rpoaipe<riv (not 
only (tkotvov) 6p6f]v noLel, — and the man has as perfect an egis 
or rjdos as we can conceive him to have : but men generally 
(may we not say of mere men universally?) are incapable of 
this, and this function of (ppovrja-is remains as a distinct in- 
tellectual operation, capable, of course, of various degrees of 
perfection, as the nature of things is better and more in- 
stinctively understood, and therefore the choice of the means 
carried on with greater readiness and truth. But there is 
yet another function of cppourjo-is, arising from feivarris, which 
is necessary to the ivipycuai of the good man, and which is 
developed and formed coincident with the other two : for this 
see note 136. 



BOOK VII. 

CHAPTEE I. 

(1.) In the theory of moral virtue, as laid down by Aristotle, the 
intellect has only a limited authority over the passions. His 
virtues are not merely acts or states of the intellect, but of 
the passions and intellect combined, each contributing its 
share to the action. Hence, as it practically happens that 
the proper relation between the intellect and passions is 
seldom attained, it might be argued that the Platonic theory, 
which assigns a more despotic authority to the intellect, would 
remedy the contradictions which arise from the rebellion of the 
appetites against the reason, and that in the Aristotelic sys- 
tem the intellect was not sufficiently developed, being liable 
to be dragged about by the passions at their will. And that 
(ppovrjo-ts which allows itself to be thus dragged about by the 
passions is not really knowledge, for it is impossible to act 
contrary to such knowledge. In answer to this, he shews 
how it is that <pp6vr}o-i.s, from the inseparable conditions of 
human action, fails always to obtain the proper degree of 
mastery, and how it is that a man may act contrary to his 



1, 2.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 155 

knowledge ; and in explaining this he at the same time com- 
pletes his portraiture of our moral nature. 

(2.) 1. aWrjv -rroiTja-aixevovs dpx^v, taking afresh starting- 
point. He has discussed the nature of moral virtue, its 
relation to the epyov of man, and its connection with his 
intellectual nature ; he now proceeds to fresh ground — to 
the examination of certain difficulties in his moral theory, 
and certain facts in our social position, with a view to illus- 
trate still further the relation between moral virtue and the 
destinies and happiness of man. 

(3.) 1. There are three stages of moral evil, — vice, incontinence, 
brutality ; and it is the second of these whence the difficulties 
which present themselves in our moral theory arise. aKpao-ia 
is but vaguely rendered by incontinence, but for want of a 
better the term may be retained, — care being taken that it 
represent to our minds, not the notion whicli is conveyed by 
its ordinary English meaning, but the more technical one of 
its Greek original, — want of power over oneself. 

(4.) 1. Or) piorrjs. In dp err] the rational perception of Ka\6v 
agrees with the impressions of ^Sv ; in iyKpdreia the im- 
pressions of fjdv differ from, but succumb to, the percep- 
tion of m\6v ', in the rfj 6rj p i o> 8 e i dvr id € pevrj e £ i $• the 
whole being and nature is above the mere rational per- 
ception of KaXoV, and exempt from any impulse of rjdv ; while 
in KaKia the rational perceptions of right and wrong are 
so distorted, that the ala-xpov presents itself as fjdv : in d k p a- 
aia the rational perceptions of koXou differ from, and are 
overcome by, the impulse of rjbv ; in 6rjpiorr)s all rational 
perceptions of right and wrong are lost, and the desires, in 
consequence of the obscuration of reason, are so utterly de- 
praved, that they belong to a nature lower than that of 
man. 

(5.) 2. el KaOdnep <p a cr I v k.t.X. Mark the use of the indi- 
cative mood, not the conditional. It is not at all impossible 
but that this passage really represents Aristotle's impression 
on the subject. 

(6.) 2. ku\ yap Sxrirep ov8e Orjpiov k.t.X. The brute creation 
are, from their lack of reason, incapable of that choice of 



156 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. i. 3, 4, 

good or evil winch constitutes dperrj or Ka<ia, while the gods 
are removed from that sphere of action in which alone these 
habits can exist. 

(7.) 3. erepov tl y e v o s KaKias: not a different sort of k a k i a, 
but a sort different from KaKia. 

(8.) 3. Seloy: Lac. for 0eios. 

(9.) 3. iv toIs papfidpois. In such people there is no culti- 
vation of the reason, and therefore the passions, left to them- 
selves, grow more and more degraded. 

(10.) 3. voo-ovs Kal 7r rj p <b <r e i s. Where the reason is deranged 
or impaired, and the natural tastes and desires vitiated, either 
by the failure or loss of some faculty or instinct ; as where 
Nebuchadnezzar, being deprived of his understanding, lived 
and fed as the beasts of the field ; or where mental or cor- 
poreal disease have so affected the organs or senses as to 
make things repugnant to human nature agreeable and 
natural. 

(11.) 4. aKpao-ias—naXaKias — rpv(p^js. The former is pro- 
perly the moral temper or state acted upon by rj8v or Xu7n;- 
pov. — p, aXaKia is the disposition to avoid trouble, whereby 
Xv7TT]p6v is more able to convey its impression. — rpvcprj, the 
tendency to self-indulgence, a certain luxury-loving softness, 
whereby rjdv operates more rapidly and sensibly; but it is 
here used in connection with the two last, rather as a natural 
tendency towards ordinary pleasure and aversion to pain, 
which exists in every one. All these vary according to 
the particular constitutions of men, and thus are different 
phases of moral weakness different in different people. — 
iyKpareia is the general moral state opposite to dupac-La, 
(self-denial generally,) and also the particular temper which 
does not care much for things of sense. — Kaprepia is a 
certain manliness of character which stands up against Xu- 
7rr]p6v, rather glorying in hardships than flying from them, 
resists the softer solicitations of the rjbv. 

(12.) 4. as 7repl tcov civtcdv e £ e <o v. The more natural con- 
struction would be, cos rds avras e£ei?, but nepl k.t.X. depends 
directly on vTroXiyrrTeov : "We must not form a conception of these 
severally, as if the conception were about" $c. 



5, 6; c. ii. I.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 157 

(13.) 5. eir\ Ttov aWwv: see bk. i. ch. 4. The whole of this 
passage is valuable, as giving a distinct statement of Aris- 
totle's method of enquiry. There is not much trace here 
of his being the patron of a deductive as opposed to an in- 
ductive method. 

(14.) 6. 8oKel k.t.X. The dogmas and difficulties which are 
started on the subject, and each of which resolves itself, 
more or less easily, into a question : — 

1. That iyKpdreia is good, aKpaaia bad, which may be stated 
as a question : " Is all eyKpareia good, all aKpaa-'a bad ?" 

2. Is adherence to reason always iyKpareia, departure there- 
from always aKpaaia? 

3. The a<parr]s acts contrary to what he knows to be right, 
under the influence of passion ; the eyKparrjs, with the same 
knowledge, resists his desires, through reason. Have the 

aKparrjs and eyKparrjs knowledge ? 

4. The eyKparrjs or KaprepiKos is held by some to be iden- 
tical with the (Tai(pp<ou, and the aKparrjs with the aKoXaa-ros ; 
by others only partially so ; while others say they are always 
different. 

5. Can aKpao-la and (ppovrjo-ts exist together ? and if so, in 
what sense ? 

6. To what objects may the term dicpao-ia be applied, and 
in what senses is it applied to such matters as anger, 
gain, &c. ? 



CHAPTEE II. 

(15.) 1. He here starts some difficulties which are suggested 
or implied in these several views of dupacrla. — ir £>s vtto- 
\ap,pdva>v 6 p 6 <b s, i. e. with a right vnoXrjylns on moral 
subjects ; that is, with cppovrjais. Some say that cppovrjo-is 
is incompatible with aKpaala. Others distinguish between 
4>p6vr)<ns and ima-Tripr), (inio-Tdpevou pev ovv,) and Say that 
such a habit of mind is incompatible with the degree of 
intellectual conviction expressed by eVio-rj^ ; while So- 
crates denied the possibility of any one erring against his 
mental conviction, whether it were weak or strong ; that is, 
be denied such a sort of action as dicpao-ia at all, but said 



158 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. ii. 2-6, 

that when any one did so err, it was not contrary to their 
better knowledge, but from lack of it, (8t ayvoiav). 

(16.) 2. This, like many of Socrates' views, he rejects on the simple 
ground of its being contrary to experience. — 6' n yap ovk 

o'Urai ye, SC. belv Trparreiv : see ch. X. 3. 2, last line. 

(17.) 3. He next states the objections which attach themselves 
to the view which distinguishes between complete (en-tori^) 
and incomplete knowledge (boga). It must be borne in mind 
that he is stating not his own difficulties and arguments, 
(though he may agree with some of these,) but the opinions 
and arguments of others, which give him, as it were, the 
questions which he begins to consider in the next chapter. 
Almost all these opinions are open to objections, and this it 
is which makes an enquiry into d<paaia so complicated as 
well as so necessary, in order to form a clear conception of 
its nature. 

(18.) 4. The argument here is a destructive conditional syllo- 
gism. If it be a weak conviction, then there is avyyaprj, 
but the action of the dwarfs is p.ox6r}p6v and \Ja€kt6v, there- 
fore it is not a weak conviction. 

(19.) 5. (ppovrja-ecos k.t.X. a p a is emphatic then, marking a 
new supposition, and referring it to the former one. Sup- 
posing that aicpao-ia is the acting against <j>p6vri<ris, an objec- 
tion arises here too. 

(20.) 5. aronov. This supposition is met on the other side 
by the elenchus, that the logical deduction of such an 
hypothesis (that the (ppovifios was duparrjs) would be contrary 
to mental phenomena: we may see that the (ppovifxos can- 
not be dKparrjs : such a supposition would imply that the 
cppovipos could knowingly act wickedly, which is contrary to 
the opinions of men, (ov§' av (pfaeU ns,) as well as to the 
practical character of the <pp6vip.os, (on TrpaKTiKos 6 <pp6vip.os). 

(21.) 5. tS)v yap i<rxaTG>v r i s, for he is one who has to do with 
the particulars, not the principles of action only. If he is 
<pp6vi}ios, his single actions must be good ; which, if the above 
hypothesis be correct, they will not be. 

(22.) 6. en iv p.ev k.t.X. These are the arguments and dif- 
ficulties connected with the fourth question in the preceding 



6—8.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 159 

chapter. It must be remembered that these are not stated 
as Aristotle's own arguments, even though he may agree 
with the position advanced. The whole passage is a com- 
plicated argument, consisting of a syllogism in the second 
figure, — (yKparrjs being the minor, o-wcppw the major term, — 
the minor premiss being supported by a double conditional 
syllogism. 

(23) 6. ovre yap to liyav k.t.X. Excess does not belong to 
the aoicppcov. The desires of the o-6icpp(op must be both modi- 
fied and purified. 

(24.) 6. dXXa pfjv Set ye, sc. that eyKparrjs should have desires 
both excessive and evil, — both laxvpai and (pavXai — com- 
bined. 

(25.) 6. 6i p.ev ydp k.t.X. If the desires are xp r }°" ra h then the 
declining them is bad. — el 8' dadevels <al pfj (pavXai, 
ovdev o~ep.v6v. If they are weak and not bad, it is no 
such wonderful thing to control them ; the negation of the 
consequent takes away the prj from (pavXai, therefore the 
desires are (pavXai : the emphasis of this part of the argument 
rests more on the /x?) (pavXai than on the do-Bevels. 

(20.) 6. el 8' (pavXai <a\ do- Bevels (=/>"7 icr^t/pai). The ne- 
gation of the consequent takes away the pr) from lo-xvpal, 
without touching upon (pavXai at all, — the emphasis of this 
part of the argument rests w r holly upon do-Bevels ; there- 
fore they are <pavXai (proved before), and lo-xvpai, proved by 
negation of do-Bevels : without keeping this in mind, the 
conclusion of this hypothetical would be, the desires are 

p,fj (pavXai and prj daOevels. 

(27.) 7. The real question is the kind and degree of intellectual 
firmness which constitutes eyKpaTeia. 

(28.) 8. 6 o- o(p i o~t i k6 s Xoyos yp-evbopevos. The sophistical 
trick of reasoning called mentiens, (see Aldrich, iii. 8. 12) : 
either an illustration ; as in this fallacy of mentiens the mind 
feels itself logically bound to the conclusion which common 
sense rejects, so in aKpao-la the mind feels the falsity of the 
moral fallacy from which it is unable practically to loose 
itself; or that the fallacy itself suggests a question on the 
nature of aKpao-la, wmether he who abides by such a conclu- 
sion is eyKparrjs, and he who leaves it dwarfs ; i. e. whether 



1G0 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. ii. 8—1 1 5 

these habits obtain in matters of pure intellect : in which 

Case aKpaa-la would be good, iyKpareia bad. 

(29.) 8. dia ydp k.t.X. See Soph. Elench. i. 6, sqq. — orav im- 
t v x <o a- 1 v, when they make a hit. 

(30.) 9. etc tivos Xoyov, from a certain conceivable mode of 
stating it. — fa v v tt o\ a p /3 a v e i, SC. §eii> npaTTeiv. 

(31.) 10. 8 6 £■ e lev av, may be held to be. 

(32.) 10. p 77 i tv e tt e 1 a- t o. Most MSS. omit pr\ : " If the dwarfs 
had done it from a (bad) conviction that he ought to do it, 
he would have had a chance of altering when his con- 
viction is changed; but now with a different conviction, viz. 
that he ought not to do it, he does it." But prj eTreVeio-ro, which 
seems on the whole preferable, is supported by one or two 
MSS. : " If he had not had a right conviction" (that he ought not 
to do it,) " he might have changed when he got that convic- 
tion, (peraneiadeis) ; but now, though he has that conviction, 
he does it." In the reading without pr\, Treireio-Oai and eVe- 
Treio-To mean the false conviction of the d<6\ao-Tos, while 
7re7reio-pevos refers to the right conviction, implied in /xera- 
TreiaBeis. If p.f) is read, TrenelaOai refers to the wrong convic- 
tion of the aKohao-TOS, and ine-neto-TO and Treneiapevos to the right 
conviction of the dicpaTrjs. In either case it is awkward to 
construe the same word differently in the same passage, but 
it is less so to do this with ireTrelvOai and intTreio-To than with 
e7T£7reicrro and 7r€7reicrp,€vos : if we take these two last to mean 
the same, then we must read prj. 

(33.) 11. The last words of the chapter are worth remark : — f] yap 
Averts rrjs dnopias evpeo-is eVrti/. 



CHAPTEE III. 

(34.) 2. t<» ftip\ a fj t<3 TTois, differ in their subject, or their 
method of handling the subject. 

(35.) 3. oh ote t at, SC. belv TTpdrTeiv. 

(36.) 3. rrepl p.ev oZv k.t.X. : cf. Plat. Eep. 479, E.— n a p %v, 



contrary to which. 






'■> 



c. iii. 2-5.] ETIIICS.-BOOK VII. 1G1 

(37.) 4. Sr/XoT 8' 'HpdicXeiTos. See Prcllcr, page 21, Plato, 
Cratyl. 402, E. Heraclitus professed to have 86£a only; 
yet his d6ga was practically as strong as Plato's tVim-j^ : it 
is merely a difference in words. 

(38.) 5. There are various ways of accounting for a man's acting 
contrary to his knowledge, founded on the practical dif- 
ference between active (xp^f l€V0 s ) and inactive (ov xp^' 
fxevos t fi e n la-TTj ixr}) knowledge : — 

a. By the difference between the knowledge of the uni- 
versal principle, and the knowledge of the character of the 
particular thing which presents itself for the time to the 
will : a mistake in the latter does not prove the absence of 
the former. 

j8. By the varieties of this knowledge of the universal and 
particular which are concerned in a simple action ; the know- 
ledge of a general principle as regards such things gene- 
rally ; the knowledge of a principle as regards men, or some 
class of men generally : and to each of these belongs a par- 
ticular ; so that frequently four varieties of knowledge are 
concerned in a single act, and the absence of any one of 
these may cause error, though the agent may be in conscious 
and active possession of the other three. "What Butler, in 
Sermon X., calls self-partiality, continually operates to pre- 
vent men applying to themselves principles, which they 
believe abstractedly. 

y. By the various temperaments and states which are fa- 
vourable to the exercise of knowledge, or the contrary. Not 
only is there abstractedly a great difference between know- 
ledge when active and when dormant, but practically the 
knowledge is called into action, or suppressed, by different 
temperaments, or by those changes of temperament to which 
human nature is liable ; so sleep, anger, excitement, mental 
or bodily, suspend the active operation of the knowledge of 
which, at other times, we may be in conscious possession; — 
a veil is thrown over the intellect at such times by the gene- 
ral suspension of our faculties, as in sleep, or by the over- 
activity of one part of our nature : how this veil is removed, 
and activity restored to our knowledge, is a question for 
pathology. Such persons cannot be said to have knowledge, 



162 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. iii. 8, 9, 

and therefore to act contrary to it at the moment of action, 
though they have it at other times. 

(39.) 8. avfjLcfjvvai, to be worked into the nature. The whole 
phenomena of moral action depend on the degree in which 
knowledge of good and right is worked into the whole system, 
so as to become part of our self-consciousness, and to operate 
instinctively, or exists externally, as it were, to ourselves, 
and operates only with great effort. In aKpaala the (ppcvrjo-is 
may exist externally ; in iyKpdreia it is partially, in aaxppoarvvrj 
it is wholly, worked into our being. See below, note 42. 

(40.) 9. (pvo-accos, psychologically ; according to its nature, and 
hence here psychologically. — hv a'Lo-O-qvis rjb-q Kvpla, 
which thenceforward depends on the senses. — fj drj: the function 
of j? KadoXov 8 6£a has ceased. 

(41.) orav Se p. I a k.t.X., when these agree. This syllogistic pro- 
cess of reasoning in moral action seems to be a true account 
of what goes on, though, as in scientific reasoning, the pro. 
cess is often instantaneous and imperceptible. 

He supposes two premisses or principles in the mind, 
arising, the one from the law of the mind, the other from 
the law of the members ; the one may be represented by nau 

y\vKv alperov, the other by nav alo~xp ov cpevKTov (rj KcciXvovcra 

yeveadai). The mind assents, and the will follows which- 
ever of these is called most strongly and sensibly into being, 
by having its particular attached to it. If it is tovto ia-rc 
yXvKv, then the major premiss, irav y\v <v alperov, is 
aroused (avrrj £' ivepyei), and the conclusion of the will follows, 
{tovto e o-ti alperov); whereas, if the premiss tovto ea-n 
alo-xpov had suggested itself with equal strength, the major 
premiss, irav alaxP 0V <p*vkt6v, would have presented itself 
in full force, and the conclusion of the will would have been 
tovto i o-tl cpevKTov. Now where sensual desire or pro- 
pension is present {tuxu &' eiriOvpia ivovo-a), the sensual minor 
premiss, tovto e o-ti y\v ki>, presents itself with more readi- 
ness and force than the moral one, tovto e o-t i alaxpov. 
It is true that, except where the mind is quite depraved, the 
moral major premiss virtually forbids it (J) pev \eyei qbevyeiv 
tovto) ; but the mind is carried away by the impulsive im- 
pression of desire (^ einOvpla S' ayei), so that the warning 
voice is disregarded : thus the man is overcome not wholly 



0,10.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 1G3 

contrary to knowledge, but yields to a sensual knowledge, 
and the syllogistic process arising from it, which represents 
the end as an object of rational desire. Hence it is of 
the greatest importance to right action that the tone of the 
mind, according to w r hich we take a sensual or moral view of 
particulars, should be in a true and healthy state, so that the 
particular should strike us in its moral rather than its sen- 
sual view; hence the Apostle's direction for holy living, — 
" to have our loins girt about with truth," so that it may be 
always ready for use. 

(42.) Our actions in matters of sensual pleasure and pain de- 
pend really on the greater or less degree in which cppourjais is 
worked into our moral nature. 

In dKoXao-la the (ppovrjais is totally absent, and a sen- 
sual wisdom (alaOrjTiKr) e7ri<TTr)pr)) is Substituted, for it, — irav 
y\v kv 8io>kt6v: sometimes, in cases of utter depravity, 
ala-xpop iari yXvKv obtains. The principle which should coun- 
terbalance and restrain the passions (jvav al<rxP° v <£ e ^ *" 
rov) is lost (dpxt) diacpOeiperai), and " he imagineth mischief to 
himself as a law." 

In aKpacr La the moral principle and the moral view is so 
far worked into our nature, that though external objects strike 
us in the sensual view rather than the moral, and the sensual 
principle consequently acts more instinctively and forcibly, 
yet there is a slight reaction on the part of the latter, though 
not sufficient to prevent the wrong action. 

In eyKpdre ia the moral principle and moral view is 
more completely worked in, so that the reaction is sufficient 
to overpower the emdvpia, and the moral fallacy connected 
with it. 

In o-acppoo-vvr] the (ppourjcns is so wholly worked in, that 
the moral principle and moral view has become part of our 
very being, and takes the lead; and though there may be 
some slight reaction on the part of the senses, yet it does not 
affect or hinder right action, or even produce wrong opegts. 

(43.) 9. a p. a rovry, i. e. as soon as the (pdacs has taken place. 

(44.) 10. orav olv k.t.X. : cf. Plato, Eep. 439. — ri>xn depends 
on orav, which is carried on by Se. — eKaa-rov, the passions 
and the reason. — vtto \6yov, sc. the reasoning process, 

nrdv ykvKv r)8v, tovt\ yXvKv, tovti rjdv. — d 6 £r) s } a result of a 

reasoning process ; sc. tovA ?}5u. 



164 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. iii. 10-13, 

(45.) 10. on ivavrias k.t.X., SC. 6p6& Xoyco. Tllis doga is not 
essentially opposed to right reason, though it is so accidentally, 
in consequence of the imOvpia making it a practical guide to 
an action which 6p66s Xoyos disapproves : there is no struggle 
between this 8 6% a and 6p66s Xoyos, but between the imdvpia 
and the 6p66s Xoyns. From ovk havrias to X6ya is in a sort of 
parenthesis, so that the sentence beginning &are ml dta tovto 
belongs to the sentence immediately preceding ovk ivav 
rias k.t.X. 

(46.) 11. wo-Te ku\ §ta tovto k.t.X. This is brought forward 
as a proof that aKpao-ia is founded on some sort of reasoning 
process, on some general principle which, true in itself, is 
Kara avp^€J3r)K6s t a right guide for practice under certain cir- 
cumstances ; it is not a mere impulse. Hence animals are 
not termed tkpareis because they are not capable of these 
general principles, but act on the impulse of the senses. 

(47.) 11. cpavTao-la, the impression received from external 
things, from to, cpaivopeva. 

(48.) 12. irS>s be \{>€Tai k.t.X. It being thus shewn how the 
principles of moral wisdom are lost sight of by the active 
influence of desire, it is no business of ours to enquire how 
and when they return in power to the mind : that is a ques- 
tion for pathology. 

(49.) 13. Eire) Se f) TeXevTaia k.t.X. It is the particular 
premiss of the moral syllogism, the judgment we form of the 
object before us (8 6 £ a a I a- 8 r\ r o €), which mainly influences 
our action {kv pi a t&v tt pdgeav); and he who is under 
the influence of desire does not take the moral view of the 
particular object, but only a sensual view. The object sug- 
gests to him tovtI yXvKv, which calls forth nav yXvKv f/Sv, and 

not tovtX alcrxpov, which would Call forth nav alarxpov (pevKTov, 

and prevent the action. And it may be again said, that it i$ 
of the utmost importance to right action that the tone of the 
mind should be right, that things should strike us in a moral, 
and not a sensual, point of view ; — this is the object of right 
education. 

(50.) 13. Kal dia to k.t.X. Since a right judgment on par- 
ticulars is not necessarily implied in the knowledge of the 
general principle (dia t6 ^ Ka66Xov 8oKe7v etvat), and, being of 
particulars, is not matter of ima-Typr) (prf i-mo-rnpoviKov 6pola>s) } 



14 ; c. iv. 1, 2.] ETIIICS.-BOOK VII. 1G5 

the want of right judgment on a particular docs not imply 
the want of the general principle : if the particular were 
enta-TriiioviKov opolm, then a wrong view of the particular would 
imply the entire absence of the general principle. 

(51.) 14. oi ydp k.t.X. Socrates appears to be right (tome 6 e^r« 
2a>KpaTr}s avppaivei v),for aKpaaia does not take place when 
«nori/fi?7, properly so called, (nvplas en-to-r^iT/, the law of the 
mind,) is present in power in the mind. This is hindered and 
obscured, though it exists passively. But there is a sort of 
inia-TTjixr] present, viz. f] aiV^riKj/, the law of the members, such 
as irav ykvKv r)Sv ; and this does exist when aKpaaia takes place. 
aKpaaia is not a mere animal impulse, but, by the aid of a 
reasoning process, it operates in spite of our better know- 
ledge, which exists, though not actively, (eVori, not napeari). 
The natural reference which a reasoning creature would make 
to reason to approve his actions is supplied by the operation 
of the sensual syllogism, and thus cppovrjais is suspended as a 
principle of action. 

(52.) 14. ovb* avr-q — 77 ados is in a parenthesis, so that rrjs 
alo-drjTiKris is in the same construction as Kvplas «rt<jTj)/«is, 
depending on napovaqs. 



CHAPTER IV. 

(53.) Having thus discussed the nature of aKpaaia, he now goes 
on to the subject-matter. aKpaaia, properly speaking, does not 
apply to all the particulars of moral action, but only to such 
bodily pleasures and pains as are necessarily part of our na- 
ture, (the dvayKala fj8ea) : when honour or wealth have be- 
come, as it were, dvayKala, then the term is applied meta- 
phorically to the wrong pursuit of them, contrary to our 
better judgment. 

(54.) 1. ey Kparels k a l KapTtpiKoi See notes at the end 
of the book. 

(55.) 2. e xov ra vir e p (3 o\r) v, liable to excess. — a tt X a> $•, in its 
proper sense.— & anep avdpunos. As we add an epithet 
or characteristic to the man who thus differs from other men ; 
the common term " man" has a slight difference attached to 



160 ETHICS.--BOOK VII. [c. iv. 2-5, 

it to mark the individual : it is a slight difference ; but never- 
theless, by it he differed from other men, dXX y optis erepos 
tju. Another interpretation is, that a man named Anthropus 
won the Olympic prize, and that in order to prevent it 
being supposed, when the individual Anthropus was spoken 
of, that the class audpconos was meant, they attached to his 

name 6 to. 'OXvpTTia veviKrjKus ; SO that the kolvos Xoyos (avdpcojros) 
Iblov ^AvdpoiTTOs) p'tKpco bucpepev. 

(56.) 2. e fee iv cp, SC. tco ra 'oXvpma vevtKrjKoTi. — k ara to pe po s, 
as ciKpaTTjs itotov, dupciTrjs o\jrov k.t.X., which are all varieties of 
aKpao-ia proper. The argument here is in the second figure. 

(57.) 3. t co 77 p o a i p el a- 6 a i, modal dative. — o v Kara 7T p 6 a 6e 
a- 1 v, not with an addition. 



(58.) 4. paXcucol. This term, which expresses one phase o 
cLKpaaia proper, is not (like dKparrjs) used metaphorically, and 
is only applied to bodily pleasures : if dwarfs were properly 
applied to all the above, then it would be applicable to them 
in all its shapes and phases ; but it is not so. Another read- 
ing is aKoXao-Tos, taking the meaning to be, if aKoXao-Tos cannot 
be properly applied to Spyr] Tiprj, &c, so neither can aKpao-ia ; 

but the former is best. — ir e p\ t avTas, SC. irep\ as aKparrjs 
XeyeTai a rr X co s. — e k e t v co v refers to nepl Ta8e, opyrjv, Tiprjv, &C. 

The argument consists of an affirmative and a negative con- 
clusion in the third figure. — o vk e Keivcov ovbeva is pa- 
renthetical, so that 8ta to k.t.X. belongs to the preceding 
clause : the meaning is, we do not place aKpa-r^s dpyrjs, Tiprp 
k.t.X. in the same category with aKoXao-Tos, as we do the simple 
aKpaTrjs. — prj en i6v p.S>v. The aKoXao~Tos is rather bent on 
indulgence from the tone of his mind and taste (^cW^), than 
hurried into it by vehement desire. Mark the distinction 
here drawn between emOvpia and fjdovr]. 

(59.) 5. tco yevei, generically of the number of things fair and 
esteemed. The first sentence of the next chapter, however, 
suggests that tco yevei may mean " to the species man." 

(60.) 5. tcov yap rjdecov k.t.X. This is a difficult passage, 
especially when compared with sect. 2 ; but it is solved by 
taking to. peragv to be the dvayKala of sect. 2 ; standing, that is, 
between to. cpvaei atperd and to. cpvaei cpevKTa, being neither the 
one nor the other ; not being alpeTa, matter of choice at all, 



; 



5, 6.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. . 107 

but simply dvaymla, in which wo havo no choice. The 
division then stands thus : — 

1. cpuaei alperd — rtpi] — vikij k.t.X. ev vnepftdXf] yjstyerat cos 

<p€VKT<X. 

2. (pvaet q)evKTd — $r]pc6rrjS — a7rXcos yjseyerat. 

3. to. p,era£v: prjde (pvoei alperd pr]8e (pevKrd, food and 
raiment, &C, ev vnep^oXfj yjreyerai cos yf/eKrd. 

No one would call the last KaXd ko\ (rnovheua. 
(61.) 5. Ka.6a.Trep b te IXopev rrporepov; SCCt. 2, that is, as 

far as the cpvo-ei alperd and the rd peragv are concerned. 

(02.) O. ra roiavra: rd q^vo-ei alperd. — ov tco tt da \e iv } 
not by the simple affection. 

(63.) 5. 8 a- oi, all are blamed who — . Supply y^eyovrai. "We must 
distinguish between yjseyeatiai and ^eurd : the latter has got 
a technical sense of things of bad desert, and thus is con- 
trasted to those things which, as we see below, are simply 
cpevKrd. tylyeaOai simply means to be found fault with. An- 
other way of taking the sentence is to suppose that from 
" KaX ydp raCra" down to " poapalveiv " is in a parenthesis, to 
support the introduction of the new terms, rd rrepl rUva ko\ 
yoveh, and that the words after this parenthesis, " poxOrjpta 
p,ev ovv ovdepia Tvepl ravra" is an anacoluthon for poxOrjpol ovk 

elo-l ; and on the whole this, perhaps, is the best. — r av r a, sc. 

rd rrepX reKva <a\ yovels. 

(64.) 5. Kp ar ovvrai refers rather to the mental state of such 
persons ; diwKovai to the practical result thereof : he turns his 
attention only to one of the above divisions, the ra cpvaet 

alperd. 

(65.) 5. 2drvpos 6 <£ iXo tt or co p. Satyrus having been aided 
by his father in obtaining an object of unlawful desire, loved 
him to such a degree, that on his father's death he threw 
himself from a precipice. — nepl Tana, SC. ra (pvaei KaXd Kal 



OTTOvoaia. 



(66.) 6. dXXd <a\ yjfenrav. Mark the distinction between 
favKTov, "fyeKrov, piarjrov : the first to be avoided as excess in 
things KaXd Kal (nrovbala ; the second, objects of evil desert, 
as aKpaoia ; the third, objects of abhorrence, as Orjpiorrjs. 

(67.) 6. 5 i opoiorrjra k.t.X. Analogously, not strictly, the word 



163 ETHICS— BOOK VII. [c. v., vi. 1, 2, 

aKpciTijs is applied to these cases, as the word kcikos is to one 
who is unskilful or unlearned. — 7>ep\ de 6v\x6v k.t.A. His 
endeavour to shew that dicpacria is properly confined to fjBovfj 
aanariKr) has reference to his opposition to Plato's theory of 
morals, — that 6vp6s, and not rjbovr], is the real motive cause 
of human action. 



CHAPTEE V. 

(68.) In this chapter he shews that the gross violations of right 
and decency are not to be classed under dicpao-ia, or from 
acting contrary to knowledge, but proceed from a perverted 
nature, where there is a complete confusion, or rather ab- 
sence, of principles of right and wrong. 

(69.) 1. rci be ovk e crriv 7 SC. ovk icrriv (fivo-ei qbea, — are not 0&- 
jects of desire by nature. 

(70.) 2. rrjv av$ p oa-nov. Lamia, a lady of Pontus : Hor. Ars 
Poet. 340. — 7repl rbv TLovtov. Arist. Pol. viii. 3, p. 260, 
and bk. iv. 18, p. 106. — to tt e p\ 3> dXap tv \ey 6 p.ev o v. 
Phalaris is said to have eaten his son. 

(71.) 5. ovk f] dirXrj aKpaala. Supply 77 eyicpdreia. — tt e p\ tovs 

Bvfiovs, angry passions. See Grr. Gr. 355, obs. 1 rov rrd- 

6 ov s SC. aKparr] 3vp,ov } not aKparrj drrX&s. 

CHAPTEE VI. 

(72.) 1. tjttov alcrxpa, ^ ess ivrong, less a violation of duty. 
alcrxpdv gives the neuter notion of Kaicia, as ko\6v of aperf. 

(73.) 1. cpavraaia, the faculty which receives impressions (apev ttjs 
vXrjs) from external things and acts, following on dlo-Orjo-is, so 
that below ata-Brjaris is used for it. vppis, properly speaking, is 
not matter of atvOrjo-is, but of cpavTao-ia ; it is not any thing 
or act actually seen, but it arises from some such thing or 
act. 

(74.) 1. 6 Xo'yos rj fj a 3 io-0r) o-is. The two channels whereby 
T)t)v presents itself, the one of things absent, the other of 
things present, are here distinctly recognised. 

(75.) 2. fj §' €Tri6vfiia ov. He is here speaking of right reason, 
which puts forth its directions under the form of § e I,. as a 
matter of duty, which emOvpia does not, as we have seen in 



2—6.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 1G9 

cli. iii., allow to operate. The sensual Xoyos, alo-6r)riKrj ema-TTjprj, 
may have operated so far as to shew that this particular 
thing is i)hv, or that nav r)8v Siuktov, and sp far it operates in 
aKpaata as to sanction the 6^^117 of cmtivpia, but it does not 
say 8fT nav r)8v 8id>Keiv : in 6vp6s, a sort of right reason, 
something which pretends to be so, lends its sanction to the 

action : 8 e I toiovtco noXcpelv. 

(76.) 2. k a\ r) ^aXeTTOTT;? k.t.X. Supply tov dvfjLov eVri cpvaiKco- 
T€pa T1)S TQ)V €7rL0vp.ia>v. 

(77.) 3. 8o\o7t\6kov. The force of the quotation of course 
lies in the 86\os of the compound. 

(78.) 3. ajo-r' etnep k.t.X. The way to construe this is, "If 
aKpaa-ia proper is more a violation of justice than that of 
anger, it is also (koi) worse (ato-xtW), and it is most properly 
termed aKpaaia, and in a certain sense is vice." 

(79.) 4. This sorites is somewhat difficult, from the short way in 
which the argument is stated, and from there being a change 
from the first middle term, — the greater cause for resentment in 
€7tl6v |ita, and consequently greater injustice — to that which 
implies this, but does not state it, — the less cause for resentment 
in 6 py 77, and consequent less injustice : " and aKpao-ia 8\ eW 
Bvpiav is worse than that from anger, for it is a fitter object 
for resentment, (dSiKovrepa) ; for 6pyr), being accompanied with 
Xvnr), can have no v(3pi$, and therefore is a less fit object for 
resentment, and therefore less unjust." 

Or it may be stated in another way : — 

"Whatever has pain has no vfipis : 

6pyr) has pain ; 

opyr) has no v(3pis. 

Whatever is a more fitting object of resentment than 6pyr) 

is d8(Kcorepa rrjs 6pyr)s. 

aKpao-ia 81 imOvplav is more an object of resentment than 
dpyrj, (for 6pyr) has no vftpLs). Rhet. ii. 2. 5. 
aKpacrla b\ iniBvplav is dbiKcorepa. 

(80.) 4. <al r) a.K.p ao~ la k.t.X., SC. <(tt\ ddiKcorepa. — p. e 6' rjdovrjs: 

see Rhet. ii. 2. 5. 
(81.) 6. Kar apxas: the beginning of this part of his book. 

Cf. ch. i., aXXrjv noirjcrapevovs dpxqv. 

z 



170 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. vi. 6, 7 ; 

(82.) 6. t<S yei/ei Ka\ ra peyidei, in kind and degree; i. e. 
both in their nature, and when they exceed proper bounds. 

(83.) 6. dXXa tj Kara peracpo pav Kal ei nvi k.t.X., except 
by a figure, and that when any kind of animal, fyc. ov yap e'x« 
belongs to the sentence ending Xeyopev, being the reason why 
those terms are not applied to animals except in a figure. — 
dXXa egeo-rrjice, but nevertheless it has transgressed its nature 
by its excesses, and therefore in a figure we do apply these 
terms. 

(84.) 7. eXarrov k.t.X., sc. KaKop.—cp o j3 e p d) r e p o v, "more awful" 
sc. kclkov. That OrjpioTrjs is not (pofitpwTepov from the amount 
of evil it might inflict, is clear from the words in the end of 
the chapter, which say that the evils it can inflict are less 
than what a man with vovs can cause, (pofiepurepov, there- 
fore, must mean in itself, in the impressions it creates. 
Thus a madman at large is more awful — creates stronger 
impressions of fear for the time, though he is really less able 
to do injury than a deliberate villain. (Cf. Plato, Republic, 
519.) In the next sentence the emphasis lies on 8iecp8ap- 
rai, as opposed to oi< e^et. — OrjpioTrjs, the state of beasts, — 
whether it be in the brute creation, or in men who are " as 
brute beasts." The words ov yap ducpOaprai to (BeXrio-rov &<nrep 
iv ra dvOpwnat, mark, he considers such men merely brute 
beasts in human form. 

(85.) 7. da-iveo-repa, less harmful. See last note. — r ov p.fj 
exovros dpxvv. that which has no principle or power of 
action, no power of originating action, viz. vovs. — irapanXr}- 
o-lov ovp. This sentence is in a parenthesis, down to kokiop, 
so that pv pioirXda-ia ydp k.t.X. refer to the clause ending 
6 Se vovs dpxr), to shew that the <pavX6rr)s of the one which 
has vovs is more harmful than the other which is without it. 



CHAPTER VII. 

(86.) The habits of mind on bodily pleasure and pain, mentioned 
in this chapter, exhibited in the characters corresponding 
thereto, are — 

1. aKoXao-ros : seeks pleasure and avoids pain, (npoaipov^ 
pevos) ; this is the law of his life, rjftv presents itself to him 



c. vii. 1—3.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 171 

as his Sole dyaOov, Xvnrjpop as his Sole kcikou, — (ipxr) 8ia(f)0eip(Tai f 

conscience reprobate. 

2. dKparfjs: indulges in evil pleasure contrary to his 
conscience and sense of right. The r)8v presents itself as 

dyadov, but not as rdyaOov. 

3. fiaXaKos : shrinks from right pains. Xv-rrrjpov presents 
itself for the time as kcikov. 

4. KaprepiKos: abides right pains for conscience' sake. 
\virrjp6v presents itself as a /cokoV, but is counterbalanced by 
fear of atVxpoV, or love of m\6v, as the case may be. 

5. eyKpdrrjs: declines evil pleasures for conscience' 
sake, t) 8v presents itself as a good, but is overpowered 
itself by fear of alo-xpov or love of kq\6v. 

6. o-o>cpp<ov: evil pleasures do not present themselves 
as r/dv, nor proper pains as \vnnp6v, but the koKov presents 

as rjbv, the alaxpop as XvTrrjpov. 

(87.) 1. fiera^v Se k.t.X. Observe this expression of Aristotle's 
view of human nature. 

(88.) 2. 6 p,ev ras v7r€p@o\ds /c.r.X. : excessive pleasures, out 
of the way, extraordinary indulgences, — such as are told of 
the old Roman epicures. — rj Ka6' vrrep^oXds, sc. rjdea ; 
carrying common pleasures to excess, — such as the drunkard 
or sensualist. The fj before 8ia npoalpeo-iv is evidently out 
of place, as the aKoXao-ros always acts with npoatpeais : it is 
found, however, in almost all the MSS. Nevertheless, the 
Paraphrast and some other commentators omit it. It cer- 
tainly creates hopeless confusion. Michelet suggests d for rj, 
but it seems quite as simple an alteration to omit it : it may 
have crept in from the r) mff vnep(3o\ds. 

(89.) 3. twv p.r) npoaipovpiipcov, sc. Aristotle here draws a 
distinction between the man whom an internal bias towards 
self-indulgences {fjbovr)) leads to act against his conscience, 
and one who acts thus under the pressure of a strong de- 
sire, an urgent external temptation, (cVtdv/ua,) of which the 
former is the worse. This is the principle of the rhetorical 
way of putting a wrong act, (to. eXaxtara /xeyio-ra,) the less 
the external temptation, the greater the natural tendency to 
wrong. 

(90.) 3. 8i6 k.t.X. is introduced parenthetically, as what may be 
called " a proof by instance." 



172 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. vii. 3-8 ; 

(91.) 3. t a v 8rj Xf^^e'i/rai/, SC. dyopevos St' f)§ovrjv, and yj/evycoi/ 

ti)v Xvtttjv tt)v cltvo tt]s €m6v[xias : of these, the latter is a species 
of (laXania, the former approaches nearer (pdXXou) to the &k6- 
\ao-Tos, inasmuch as the motive cause of the evil act is his 
own evil tendencies. 

(92.) 5. rpvcjiT): a species of paXa/cla, a certain indolent, self- 
indulging temperament, which, above all things, dislikes 
trouble. — rrjv Xvnrjv: equivalent accusative to novfjo-r). — 
Ka\ fxifiov fxevos k.t.X. The man who does this affects 
the gait and indolent bearing of a sick person, but does not 
fancy that he is to be pitied for his affectation, though he is 
so as much as a sick man. 

(93.) 6. KapKivov. I have so often heard a false quantity in this 
word that I think it as well to refer the student to Arist. 
Vesp. 1508. — e v rfj 'AX o it t), a play of Carcinus. — K e pKvav. 
In this play Cercyon killed himself on finding out his 
daughter's disgrace. — S evofpdvra. A Xenophantus is men- 
tioned by Seneca as having been a minstrel at the court of 
Alexander ; and thus Aristotle became intimate with him. — 
SkvOcls: see Hat. i. 105. 

(94.) 7. it a i b i to 5 r) s. He seems to seek f)8v iv V7rep(36krj from 
irpoaipeo-is, but he is really trying to escape from \virr]p6v. — 
a veer is, a cessation from toil. 

(95.) 8. o-cpobpoTTjra, their vehemence. See ch. xiv. 6, for an 
account of this. 

In 7r pon ere ia the Kvpicos imcTTrjpi] has not time to make 
itself heard. 

In the case of p. e X a y x o X i < o l, it speaks to ears closed 
by the dogged vehemence of the desire for some self-in- 
dulgence, — such as when a man tries to drown care by 
pleasure. 

In do-Beve ia the Kvploos ima-Typr) is partially heard, but 
iTTiBvpla leads the mind to the wrong course of reasoning, 
and thus carries it off. 



c. viii. 1—1.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 173 

CIIAPTEK VIII. 

(9G.) 1. uxnrep f)7roprj<ra[xev: see ell. ii. 10. — \av6duei, it 
escapes the person's notice. The (ikoKiicttos is so without being 
aware of liis wretchedness. The aKpar^s is reminded of it by 
the stings of conscience. 

(97.) 2. avTcov be tovtcov, sc. the different sorts ofaK/xrreiy: there 
is a parenthesis down to arepoi, and we might not unrea- 
sonably suspect it to be an interpolation. — i ko-t ariKo l t 
SC. o£e!s : see last chapter. — f) tt SiPTai, SC. ol tov Xoyov e'xovTes 
p,r) eppevovres be. — opotos yap refers to ov \av6dvei. 

(98.) 3. Here, instead of stating the similarity or dissimilarity 
between them separately, he states it together, and proves 
each separately, so that the clause to pev yap napa . . . eo-Tiv 
belongs to the former clause, Srt pev ovv . . . cpavepov, and the 
clause ov prjv . . . ddiKovo-i be to dXXd nrj tacos, " but perhaps in 
some respects they are the same. 1 ' — to Atj pob 6 kov. All that 
is known of Demodocus is that he was a native of a small 
island near Miletus, who made the Milesians butts for his 
wit. — a 8 lko i ov k elo- 1, — because the npoalpeais is wanting. 

(99.) 4. i v be Tats it p d £ e <r i k.t.X. : see bk. iii. ch. 4. The 
final cause is the starting-point in moral reasoning or actions, 
as in scientific reasoning we start from the hypothesis. — exei 
in mathematics: see bk. vi. 11. 4; and ch. 2. 3. — 6 \6yos t 
reasoning, as opposed to vovs. 

(100.) 4. aXX' dp err) rj (pvo-iKr) rj tjBiktj tov opOobo^elv 
irep\ ttjv dpxh v ' We here gather that a b6£a of some 
sort is necessary to a moral action. After the emOvpla has 
been roused, and the ope&s moved, there is then a decision 
of the moral intellect (b6£a) as to the fitness or unfitness of 
the end. We are guided aright in this decision by the gene- 
ral tone of our mind, — either by the shadowy instincts of right 
and wrong ((pvo-iKrj dperr)) in the yet unformed character, or 
by the rational principles or instincts (rjdacf)) in the more 
developed mind. When this boga has pronounced the pro- 
posed ov evena to be right, fiovXrjais follows, and the ov eveica 
becomes an actual end to us, (see bk. iii. note 40). The 
aotcppiov is of such a character that right always presents itself 
to him as right, and good, and pleasant ; the dKo\ao-Tos views 



174 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c.viii.5; c.ix.; 

pleasure as. good, and consequently very often the fj&v as 
the good. He imagines it to himself as a law. — tov 6p6o- 
80 gel v depends on 8i8ao-na\iKr). 

(101.) 5. eo-ri 8 4 tls. He is setting forth the two characters 
already described, not introducing new ones. — dve8r)v 8 civ, 
" that he ought unrestrainedly to follow evil pleasures." The 
apxr], the sense of right and wrong, ov dia<fi6e[p€Tai, while in 
the duoXao-Tos it is destroyed. 



CHAPTER IX. 

(102.) The question started in ch. ii. 7 divides itself into three : — 

1. Is eyKpareia merely intellectual firmness ? 

2. Is it intellectual adherence to a right opinion? 

3. Is intellectual rectitude the essence of it, intellectual 
firmjiess the accident ? 

(103.) 1. rj 6 rip yj/evbel refers to the case supposed in ch. ii., 
such as that of Philoctetes : — is such a man to be considered 

dKparrjs ? 
(104.) 1. rj Kara crv^^e^rjKos- A man to be eyKparfjs must 

have intellectual firmness ; but this is not enough — it is Kaff 
avro possessing and acting on right moral judgment and 
principles, to which the peculiar circumstances (Kara avpfte- 
firjKos) of the case make intellectual firmness necessary. The 
essence of ly<pdreia is moral, the way in which it acci- 
dentally operates is intellectual; the intellectual is a 
means to the moral, therefore the latter is the essence, the 
former the accident, (el yap ns — to irpoTepov). 

(105.) 2. &o-7T€p ao-coros k.tX., i. e. it is an exaggeration of 
the right principle. — e n-el ev7reio-Tos: the ey/cpar^s- may 
change 8ia \6yov, though not 8ta naQos : the difference be- 
tween firmness and obstinacy. — 6 8e oi>x vtt6 \6yov, sc. 
/xera/3dXXei. — X ap.^dvova-1, receive from external things. 

(106.) 3. &o-7rep ilrr](pi(rp,aTa. The yj/rjcpiapia does not carry with 
it any power of effecting what it decrees ; as far as itself 

goes, it is inoperative & are p,d\\ov k.t.X. : because they 

are influenced, not by reason, but by pleasure and pain. 



c. x. 1-4.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 175 

(107.) 4. d\\a KaXrjv, sc. 8ui koXtjv rjSovfjv. Remark the dis- 
tinction here drawn between the sorts of r/Soi/17, kuA/;, and 

mcrjfpa. 

(10S.) 5. He here shews that eyupdreia is a mean, as well as those 
properly termed virtues. — § toiovtos: that is, as i';w ;is 
this point in his character is concerned. This is supported 
by three MSS. 6 toiovtos ol. is a. mere repetition of the 
first words of the clause : ear\ must be supplied, 6 toiovtos 

ovk ippevav earl t&> Aoyco. — 8 la ro pdWdv t i : through his 

sense of pleasure being too strong ; while the other does 
not allow himself the indulgences which reason allows, owing 
to his sense of pleasure being too weak, (St a to tjttov n). 

(109.) 6. t)ko\ov6t]K€p, is derived from it in the way of analogy* 



CHAPTER X. 

(110.) 1. He now shews that wherever aKpao-la takes place, perfect 
(ppovrjo-is is wanting. It is not that cppovrjcris is not a suf- 
ficient development of the intellect, but because it is not 
sufficiently worked into the ndOr). 

(111.) 2. toi/ 8e Seii/o'i/. As SeivoTrjs does not involve any moral 
considerations, but is merely a power of carrying out the 
necessary means to a desired end, the deivos may be dupciTxis, 
and vice versa, for the d<paTf]s may shew great deivoTr/s in ar- 
riving at his end. 

(112.) 2. Kara top \6yov. deivoTrjs and the (ppovqais dno ttjs 

SeivoTrjTos are, as far as the intellect is concerned, 
an exertion of nearly the same faculty, but the latter has a 
right end in view, while the former may have either one or 
the other ; or Kara tov \6yov may be construed, "as to their 
definition" for both might be defined to be dvi/apis tov npaTTeiv 
to, npos to tcXos, though in the case of (ppovrjo-is it must be 
6p6bv tcKos. 

(113.) 3. e n I /3 o v A o s, " ivith malice intent" — 6 ptv yap avT&v, 
sc. do-Oevrjs : does not abide by his intent. The p. e A a y x o- 
X i k 6 s is a person of morbid temperament, upon whom a 
temptation comes suddenly, and is embraced as a relief from 
the pain of existence. 

(114.) 4. tcov /3 o v A € v o- a p. e v <o v, SC. the do-Qcvus. 



w****- 




176 ETHICS —BOOK VII. 



CHAPTEE XI. 

(115.) Having discussed and explained the nature of dKpaa-la and 
iyKpdreia, he now proceeds to rjSour) and \v7rr) as the motive 
causes of human action ; while in the tenth book he rather 
considers them in their relation to, and connection with, 
the end, ei>8aip.ovia. 

(116.) The fact that Aristotle discusses the question again in 
bk. x., and goes over, in many points, the same ground as 
here, has led some to suppose that these last chapters have 
found their way from the Eudemian Ethics (in which they 
occur verbatim) into this place; but the distinction given 
in the last note will point out a difference in his way of 
looking at pleasure and pain in this book and the tenth, 
while their close connection with aKpaaia will suggest a suf- 
ficient reason why he should have introduced them here. 

(117.) 3. eviat fiev elpai, SC. ay ad a i. 

(118.) 4. He gives the arguments by whicli these three opinions 
are supported— y eve a- is, transition state — a- vyyevrjs, co- 
existent with. While the yeveais (olKo86fxr](Tis, for instance) is 
going on, the reXos thereof (oi/aa) is not in existence ; when 
the riXos (oIklo) is in existence, the yeveais (olKoSoprjais) has 
ceased : therefore, if 77801/77 is a yeveo-is, it cannot ever be co- 
existent with the dya86v, for this is a reXos- 



CHAPTEE XII. 

(119.) Aristotle in this chapter is giving the arguments on the 
other side of the question. We must not suppose that these 
are held all by the same persoris, but they probably were used 
by differing schools or individuals, so that we must not expect 
the same facts to be assumed or the same results deduced in 
the several positions : — 

1. That there is a difference between the airXcos rjdv and 
the tivX fjbv, so that what may be true of the latter is not true 
necessarily of the former, (sect. 1). 

2. That there is a difference between the ivepyeia of plea- 
sure and the jfgis of pleasure, (sect. 2). 



c. xii. 1, 2.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 177 

3. That even those pleasures which seem to be yevtcrcis 
are not so really, but rather eVcpyemt, (sect. 3). 
Sects. 4, 5, 6, and 7 are evident. 

(120.) 1. irpSiTov pev k.t.X. The argument here is, that the 
objections urged above may be true as against f}8ov^j nw, but 

not rjdovrj dnXcos. 

(121.) 1. aKoXovOfjcrovcriv. As there is an dyaObv dnXus, and 
dyaOov TIN, SO there are (pvcreis and e£eis, which are dyadai dnXoos, 

and others only dyaBai tipi; and further, there are some Kivrjaeis 
and yeviaeLS dyadai anXctis, and others Only dyaOa'i tivi, — as, for 
instance, the yivccns, or process of the act of sight, is dyaBrj 
dnXcos, the yeueais, or process of recovery from sickness, is 

dyaOr) tcvl. 
(122.) 1. evia i 8e ov&e T<5Se, SC. del or Kad' citrus. 

The divisions of rjdovf) in this respect are, — 

dyaOal dnX a s. 
dyaO a I r ivi del. 
dyaBai rivi it ore. 

(j) a i v u /j, € v a i r}h oval. 

(123.) 2. en k.t.X. Further, we must distinguish between the 
dnXcds rjdv and the Kara <rv pP* (3rj k6 s f) d v ; for as not 
only an e£is, or completed state, is dyadov, but also the eWp- 
yeicu which precede and lead to that state, so also those eWp- 
yeiai which may be viewed as yeveaeis, carrying us onward 
and producing in us some state which is agreeable to nature, 

at (Zvepyeiai, SC.) KaOicrTacrai {f]pds) els ttjp (pvcriKrjv egiu : see Hhet. 

i. 10,) are pleasures, though only accidentally so, as being the 
hepyeiai which are working towards a yet imperfect and de- 
ficient state, {yTtoXo'nvov egeas, SO below, sect. 3,) els reXeiaxriv 
dyofievGiv ttjs <pv<reois, in order to get rid of the pain, evbeia. 
They are not mB" avrds or cm-ASy rjdeiai, because they are only 
rjbelai when the e£is is vttoXoittos ; while to those who have no 
such lack or deficiency they are not pleasant. But all rjbovf) 
is not such a yeveais, since (ewei) some exist without any pre- 
ceding evbela Or imdvpia, i. e. without any such vnoXoinos egis. 
Michelet reads vttoXvttov egeas, i. e. connected with pain, that is, 
with an eV6«a ; but the other reading has the same meaning. 
Aspasius interprets these words as above, — rrjs Xoiwa^opevrjs 
(pvo-eas Kai iv evbeia ovarjs : the Paraphrast, — 17 be ivcpyeia tt}v 

ZXXe'nrovcrav e£iv dvcmXrjpov. Others interpret v7roXot7rov } the re- 
a a 



178 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. xii. 2, 3, 

mains of our former nature; i.e. those appetites and 
wants which arise from the recollection of our former na- 
ture : but the former interpretation is the best, though the 
sense given to vnoXoiiros is unusual ; but the words o v k ev- 
Seov s ova-rjs below point to this sense. Cardwell reads, 
with one MS., "on a I tvepyciai" for " eon 8' rj evepyeia," 
making this sentence the reason or explanation of the former 
one : but the reading in the text comes to much the same 
thing. The clause beginning eWi koL avev Xvnrjs seems to 
belong to the one ending with fjbelai, ela-iv, so that eon 8' ^ 
evepyeia — e|ecos is in a sort of parenthesis, and we must supply 
before good, &c. But all are not of this sort. 

(124.) 2. etc en-ei k.t.X. — e£ts. The connection of these words 
with what follows seems to be, that as the dyaBov shews itself 
in an ivepyeta or an egis, so the rjbv exists either as an ivepyeia 
or an e£i?, though in the former it is only Kara crvp,fiefir)K6s rjbv, 
as teuding towards a desired e£u. 

(125.) 2. ttjs (pva-€(os ovk e v S e o v s ov<tt)s. This expression 
gives us the sense of the one opposed to it, viz. vnokomov 

e^ecos. 

(126.) 2. <tt] /Lteioi/ k.t.X., sc. that the pleasures belonging to the 
ivipyeia of dvair\r]pco(Tis and those belonging to the state which 
is the result of that dvaiik^poiais are different, so that what 
may be true of the one is not necessarily true of the other. 

(127.) 2. dva7r\r)povpevr)s: in the process of dvcmXrjpaHris. — 

KaOeo-TTjKvias: in a state of Karao-rao-is, or satisfaction ; 
a settled, quiescent state. — o- vveo-rrjicev, clash, differ. 

(128.) 3. rjdovf] does not necessarily stand to dya66v as a yivea-is 
to the rzXos, which is the completion of it ; for some sort of 
pleasure is simply an evepyeia and a reXos in itself, without 
anything beyond it. 

(129.) 3. ovbi yivofiivav /c.r.X. Nor do such pleasures arise 
when we are in the transition state of yiveais, (yivopevw,) 
but when we are in the possession and enjoyment of them, 

(xpc0jaeVc0j>). 

(130.) 3. ku\ re\os k.t.X. The riXos of such pleasures (sight, 
for instance) is not distinct from the pleasure itself, but only 
of those which conduce to the supplement of some natural 
want, (l7roXoi7rov €$€(os, sect. 1). — 816 k.t.X. : see ch. xi. 4. 



3—7; c.xiii. 1.] ETHICS.— BOOK V1J. 179 

(131.) 3. evepyeiav ttjs Kara (pvaiv egeus, the operation or 
energy of a state consonant to nature. This is the definition of 
anXcos rjSovr) : the others, as we have seen above, are only narh 
arvp^ej3r)<6s jfielai — a t o 8 r] t tj v y eve a iv, a perceptible state of 
transition towards something. 

(132.) 3. do ac el hi k.t.X. It may be said that the very notion 
of pleasure being a yeveo-is arises from its being in the most 
proper sense, (fn/ptW) dya$6v ; for as that which is properly 

dyadov is an evepyeia, and rjbovrj being properly such an evepyeia 

tov dyadov, people confound it with a yeveo-is, fancying that 
the two are identical. The way people got at the notion of 
its being a yeveo-is was — f)8ovr) must be an evepyeia, because it 
is dya$6v, and an evepyeia must be a yeveo-is. He brings for- 
ward the source of the error (that f)8ovr) is a yeveo-is) which 
he has just been confuting, in proof of his position that 3760^17 
is in the proper sense an dyadov, (though not rdyaOov). 
(133.) 4. to at to Kal, the same as if (you were to call) healthy 
things bad, because, &c. — n p6s xpV f iaT l(T l JL ^ v } money-mak- 
ing, business. — TavTv. Viewed relatively, both rjbea and vyieiva 
are sometimes bad ; but this does not prove them abso- 
lutely bad. 

(134.) 6. ovde yap a\\r)s k.t.X. An art is that which sets out 
and regulates the productive powers of a bvvapis : that which 
sets out and regulates the operation of an evepyeia is a law, 
not an art. — k a It 01 : " and yet the objection does not seem 
to be founded in fact, for," &c. 

(135.) 7. to Sc tov o <b(p p ov a <p evy e iv, SC. ttjv rjbovrjv. — tov 

aXvirov piov, sc. aXwia in preference to t)8ovt). 



CHAPTER XIII. 

(136.) 1. t) Se rep 7r>3 ipLirohio-TiKr}, is an evil to particular 
persons, (opposed to dirXcos,) as being in some way an hindrance 
to them : al. irfj tq3, opposing nrj to dnXcos. 

(137.) 1. 0)5 yap l.irevo-nviros k.t.X. The method devised to 
meet the foregoing argument (e£ ivavrlmv) was simply this : 
as the two extremes are not only opposed to the mean as 
good, but each to the other as an evil, so the opposition be- 
tween Xirnr) and t]8ovt) may be of this latter kind, and both be 
evils. Aristotle answers — if both were evils, both would be 
alike avoided. Cf. bk. i. 12. 



180 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. xiii. 2-7; 

(138.) 2. tovto, SC. ivepyeia dvepTrobicrTOs. — ovbepia yap k.t.X. 
The argument is, " ivipyeta TeXeios is 77801/77, (as being dvepno- 
diaTOs,) evbaipoula implies evepyeia TeXeios, evbaipovia implies 
77001/77. 

(139.) 3. oi be k.t.X. : see bk. i. ch. x. The essence of the evbai- 
povia would remain, though the adjuncts perished ; the evbai- 
povia would remain, though the man would not be evbaipav : 
see bk. i. note 175. — 77 iicovres fj a < owes, whether they 
really mean it or not, 

(140.) 5. (pr]pr) S' oi K.r.X., Hes. Opp. 762. — Xaoi, SC. (prjpi&v 

o-lv, Hesiod. 

(141.) 6. oi>x V avrr), SC.7racri. 

(142.) 6. dXXd ttjv avTrjv. In reality, there is a divine instinct 
within men, which prompts them to desire and seek after 
true pleasure, though in their views and practices they re- 
cognise and seek only the lower sort, because these are 
commonly received as the only pleasures. Reasonable self- 
love is at bottom a motive cause to every one. — irapa- 
pdXXeiv is neuter.— 7rai/ra yap k.t.X. These words give 
an important feature in Aristotle's view of human nature. 

(143.) 7- fj evepyeia, SC. rrjs qbovrjs. — evb e x eT ai £l v i sc * T0P 
evbaipova. 

CHAPTEE XIY. 

(144.) 2. o v v, if then this is the case. 

(145.) 2. 77 ovras. This is another opinion, which Aristotle, on 
the whole, adopts. He frequently introduces such opinions of 
his own by rj ovtg>s. — r 6 p rj k a k 6 v, sc. the getting rid of the 
Xv7T77 ttjs emdvpias. — p * XP l fov ay a6 ai'. that is, as long as 
they are within proper limits. — r <S dioxctv: modal dative. 

(146.) 2. ovbe ttjs rjbovrjs, sc. virepfioXri eon, i.e. where the 
energy or state is such as not to admit of its being indulged 
in too much, (such as sight, or thought,) there is no possi- 
bility of the pleasure arising from it being desired too much. 
— r as dvay Kaias, SC. qbovds. — e vavr ia> s S' e w i Xvnr] s. 
In the case of rjbovf] a man is bad, not for pursuing pleasure 
at all, but its excess ; in the case of Xv-rrrj a man is bad, 
not from avoiding the excess of pain, but pain altogether. — 

oXcos, SC. 6 (pavXos. 

(147.) 2. o v ydp e cm. This is an answer to the second ques- 






c. xiv. 2—4.] ETHICS.— BOOK VII. 181 

tion proposed above, (8ia tL ovv k.t.X.) u If some plea- 
sures are bad, why are the pains opposed to them bad like- 
wise ?" Having first answered the difficulty, " how far bodily 
pleasures are good," (/} ovtus ayaOal k.t.X.), he then introduces 
his answer to the other, as if it were a deduction from it. We 
must supply the seutence to which yap refers : " So that it is 
not absurd for one who holds excess of pleasure to be an 
evil, to say that Xvirr) is an evil also, for \vir-q is not in itself 
the opposite of the bad sort of pleasure, but only acciden- 
tally, in the case of him to whom this bad sort of pleasure is 
good," ((i\X' fj tg> dtuKovri ttjv v7r€p(3o\r)v) . In itself this bad 
pleasure is an evil, and therefore cannot be opposed to Xvttt), 
which is an evil also. 

(148.) 3. to Sia t\ (patvcrai d\r)6esis the nominative case 
to (pavf/. — eVel 8' ov. The apodosis begins in sect. 4, npwrov 
pev ovv k.t.X. : when a reasonable cause can be given for the 
origin of an error, it confirms the truth. Cf. Hooker, Ecc. 
Pol. I. viii. 3. 

(149.) 4. u> s ovo-rjs I ar pe ias, SC. rye fjbovrjs — o~(po8pai. These 
remedies against violent pain are in themselves violent, hence 
the two are placed in strong contrast. — 8 1 6 ku\ bidxovrai 
dia to it a pa to evavTiov (by the side of the contrary,) 
(paiveo-Oai, sc. rjdelai. These false pleasures appear to be 
pleasures from their contrast to the pain to which they are 
opposed. — ftia. dvo tclvto. may be either, the two reasons 
above do not prove these pleasures to be good, for the fol- 
lowing reasons ; or dvo TavTa may refer to the following rea- 
sons themselves. — 6 n a I pkv k.t.X. He is giving one reason 
for the view which some men, looking only at bodily plea- 
sures, and these in excess, take of rjBovf) as an evil. 

(150.) 4. at de I ar pelai k.t.X. This is another reason for the 

same. The full sentence is, at Se larpelai (ov anovbala elvai $0- 
kovo-i) on evbeovs (elcrl) Ka\ (on) ex* lv ( r /3eXndV eari, rj (tovto) 
yiveo-Qai : " But the pleasures which are of the nature of reme- 
dies are held to be bad, because they imply a deficiency, and 
because it is better to be in possession of any thing, than 
that this thing should be in course of production," or fycut 
may be rendered "an e£is, and yevio-6aC^ and yeveo-6ai towards 
that egis. It is better to be well than to have recourse to 
remedies for getting well : an larpela implies an evil, rather 



182 ETHICS.— BOOK VII. [c. xiv. 4—8, 

than is itself a good. Such pleasures seem to be of the na- 
ture of evil, because they are merely remedies for a defect. 

(151.) 4. at Se crv fx(3a ivo v <r i TeXeiovpevoav: "And other 
pleasures accidentally arise while the defect is in course of 
being supplied," (present participle, TeXeiovpevw,) — see below, 
sect. 7, — and therefore are only accidentally good, not in 
themselves, but in consequence of the previous defect. 

(152.) 5. en biatKovrai: this is another reason why these 
pleasures appear to be the best. — orav pev ovv dftXa- 
fi els, SC. 7rapa(TK€va£a)(riv. — to d e prjb ct e pop, a passive, 
neutral state ; with neither pleasure nor pain. 

(153.) 6. o I v a> /x e v o i. Their desires are more active and in- 
satiable, as drunken men are more thirsty the more they 
drink. 

(154.) 7. a I 8' avev \vna>v. such as the pleasures of thought, 
sight, &c. ; and as these are never lv v7repftoXf}, they are 
(TTzovhaiat. — r o v viropevovTos k.t.X. Health is restored, 
not by the action of the medicine, but by the operation of 
the yet surviving principle of health. All that the antidote 
does is to check that which would prevent this principle 
working ; and therefore, though it is for the time an object of 
desire, it is only accidentally so, as hindering a greater evil. — 
a it o iel 7r p a £■ iv rrj s r o i a cr 8 e (pv o~ e a> s, which performs 
the actions suitable to such nature. In the Rhetoric this would 
be stated — d 7roteI Trpos.a (pikoToiovros, or ra KaTaaravra els ttjv 
v7rdpxovo~av (pvo~iv. 

(155.) 8. ovk del k.t.X. St. James i. 8, "A double-minded man 
is unstable in all his ways." In proportion as the parts of our 
nature are harmonized so as to work together, our pleasures 
will be consistent and enduring. — k a 66 <p 6 apTm., as being 
destructible; since we are destructible. — otclv S' la-d^rj, when 
these balance each other. — d 1 6 6 6 e 6 s k.t.X. Here is a distinct 
recognition of a God, and of the divine nature. — a XX a /cat 

a Kivr} a las. Sleep, for instance, is an ivepyeia dKiprjo-las. 

(156.) It maybe useful to subjoin a general view of aKpaa-ia 
and e y k p dr e i a : — 

aKpao-ia is twofold : a. improper pursuit of pleasure. 

j3. improper avoidance of pain. 
eyKpaTtia is twofold : a. avoidance of wrong pleasure. 
j3. endurance of right pain. 



ETHICS.— BOOK VII. L88 

In both the will is supposed to bo ill a passive state, and 
two principles — one sensual, the other moral — existing pas- 
sively in the mind. If the former were wanting, it would be 
o-ojcfipoavvT); if the latter, it would be dicoXao-la. 

d k paa-ia, a. pursuit of improper pleasure ; sensual per- 
ception of particulars, — "rovrl yXvxv ;" imdvpia, of the 
senses roused, — the sensual principle called out ; ndv 
y\vKv r]bv : sensual syllogism : <pdo- is representing it 
as an object of rational desire ; rovrl rjdv — ope£is, of the 
will consequent thereon, apparently sanctioned by rea- 
son : slight but intellectual reaction of moral principle, 

— t; pev Xe'yei (pevyeiv rovro ; intOvpla ayei, with the sanc- 
tion of the alcrdrjTiKrj eVioTJ^, — action as f)$v. 

ey apart ta, a. sensual perception of particular rovrl yXvav' 
emOvpla : effective reaction of moral perception, rovrl 
alaxpdv : moral principle called into being, ndv alo-xpov 
<$)cvkt6v, — (pdais; rovrl <pevKTov, action declined, though 

rjdv. 
an. pa a la, j3, (p a\a < I a), avoidance of pain, rovrl Xvnrjpov ; 
sensual principle, ndv Xvnrjpov (pevKrov ; (p da- 1 s, rovrl CpevK- 

tov : slight ineffective reaction of moral principle, ndv 
KaXbv SiooKTov, — action declined as painful. 

e y K p d r e 1 a, ft. (icapTepia), sensual perception, tovt\ Xv- 
nrjpov; reaction of moral perception, rovrl KaXov, moral 
principle, ixdv KaXov diaxrov. — (p a cr t s : rovrl fiiwKroi/, 
action performed, though painful. 

pr) fiovXevo-dpevot. . 
a Kpao- La 8 1 a df-vrrjra: rovrl yXvav, basty decision, — 

rovrl rjdv, rovrl 8ig>kt6v, — without giving time for the moral 

principle to make itself heard. 
dupaala 81a o~<podp6rr]Ta (peXayxoXiKol) : rovrl yXvav, rovrl 8ia>K- 

rov, violent impulse to escape pain, — obstinate emOvpla, — 

moral principle not allowed to speak. 
dicpacr la hi' daOeveiav: fiovXevadpevoi, taking counsel 

with right reason, but not having the moral principle 

in sufficient strength to be effectual ; — given above. 
aKpao-la 5i" e 6 1 o~ pov : where self-indulgence has given 

increase to the imBvpla, quickened sensual perception, 

and strengthened the sensual principle. 
J: or aapaala dnb rrjs imOvpias, and dupao-la dnb rrjs rj&ovrjs, See 

note 89. 



184 ETHICS.— BOOK VIII. [c. i. 1—4, 



BOOK VIII. 

CHAPTER I. 

(1.) Aristotle in this book discusses the social instincts of man 
apart from any notion of social or political obligation, which 
he has treated of in the fourth (ch. vi.) and the fifth 
book. "While going through the principles and the phe- 
nomena of cpiXia, he shews that r)BiKr) apery secures the most 
perfect and enduring exercise of the social instincts, as he 
has shewn in the fifth book that it secures the due per- 
formance of social obligation. 

The actual difficulties in this book are fewer than in any 
of the preceding, but it requires considerable attention and 
clearness to master and retain the details, and the relation 
in which the matters treated of stand to each other : such 
as the conditions of cpikla in general, and of true <pc\(.a in 
particular, — the points of identity and difference between 
this true sort and the spurious imitations of it ; and the 
relation between the several spheres of the social instincts, 
— domestic, social, political. 

(2.) 1. dp err) tls. Eor the proper development of one of the 
energies of the social instincts, the mean between KoXaKeia 
and drjbeia, see bk. iv. 6. 4 r rj prjdeir), SC evrjrepia. 

(3.) 2. iv Ttevia re, al. be, as an emphatic reference to what 
goes before. — /3 or) 6 el, sc. r) cfuXia, al. fior)6elas, supported by 
a majority of MSS. : it must be taken as ace. plur. in ap- 
position to KaTacpvyrjv. The plural is used in this way in 
(Econ. i. 3.— a-vv re 8' ipxo\ieva>: II. X. 224. 

(4.) 4. eoiKe be ras noXeis o-vvex^^v r) <pi\La. In the 
fifth book xpei-a is spoken of as the bond of society. Mankind 
there are viewed in their artificial, as here in their natural, 
state. The earliest bond of society is (pikla, of which xp*' l(l 
supplies the lack or the deficiency, cptkia is natural binaio- 
<rvvr), biKaioo-vvrj is artificial (pikia: but where cpiXla exists 
there is no need of its artificial substitute ; where biKaioo-vvrj 
supplies its place as the formal bond of union, there is still 
a necessity for cpiXia in a greater or less degree, — at the very 



6, 7; c. ii., iii. 2.] ETHICS.— BOOK VIII. 18fl 

least ill its shape of 6p.6voia. — e^^pav, al. f\dpdv. — to fid- 
\i<tt(i (fiiXiKov etvai doicel, the highest sort of dUaiov 
seems to be founded on (pt\la. 

(5.) G. 8ian<f)i<T(3r)T€lTai. k.t.X. These views of the nature of 
cj)iKta differ as it is supposed to be founded on k<i\6v, j? 6" v, 
or xP*) (Tl t JLOV : if either of the two former, identity of 
feelings and interests is the principle of <pi\la, (o p. o i o $• npus 
ofjLoiov) ; if the latter, diversity, (Kcpap-evs Kcpap.il). See ch. 
viii. 6. 

(G.) 6. 66 ev top ofioiov: Od. xvii. 218. — xepa/xftj: lies. Opp. 

25, Kal Kepapevs Kepapel Koreei Kal tcktovi t€Kt(ov. — dv&TCpov, 
more deeply. — cpva-iKoiTepov, on physical principles: Evpi- 
71-/877? : Frag, ddfaav dpap-droov, iv. — to dvr l £ o v v, a surface 
with corresponding indentations. — 'HpdxXfiT o$: cf. Plato, 

Symp. 187, A epiv: Eth. Eud. vii. 1, 'UpaKkeiTos iivLTip.a 

rcS noirjaavTi " cos*EpLs ex re decov e< re dvQpaiiroiv a7rohotTO." 

(7.) 7. This is the same practical principle on which he acts in 
his investigation of dperr), where he says he does not dis- 
cuss ri ecTTtv fj apery. — Kal to. e t e p a : Kai IS even. — or 1 
€7rtSex €rat - The meaning of this argument is, that those 
things which admit of change of degree do not differ in kind. 
■ — ep.TrpoaOev. Michelet approves of Zellius's reference to 
bk. ii. 8, where it is shewn that the extremes on either side 
of the mean do differ from the mean in kind, though, they 
are also different degrees of the same ird6os. 



CHAPTEE II. 
(8.) The conditions of cpiXia are : — 1. (juXtjtov. 2. <p l X 17 o- 1 s. 

3. fiovXr] or is dyadov Or e v v o 1 a. 4i. dvr i(p i\r) a 1 s. 
5. p. 1) \av 6 dv ov o~ a. 6. (rv^rjv. 

(9.) 2. d7r\a>?, in the abstract. 



CHAPTEE III. 

(10.) 2. ovx fl ° (piXovfievos icrnv, not in respect of that 
which the person beloved is in himself; al. <pi\ovp.evos eariv, not, 
as in true friendship, where his mere existence, without 

Bb 



1S6 ETHICS.— BOOK VIII. [c. iii. 6—9; c. v., 

further results, is the object of friendship, rj io-rlv, al. § eVru/, 
as above: but itrriv is here evidently the copula. — So-ncp 
ear iv, whatever he may be, (e.g. good, 77 dyados,) not for 
himself, but for what he is to them. 

(11.) 6. reXeta. cptXia is perfected by r) 6 tier) dperrj.— al avral ij 

o po 1 a 1, al. Toiavrai r) opoiai, are of some particular sort, or 
like them ; but the former reading is the better. 

(12.) 7. ravTj] fie V7rapx ei k.t.X., herein exist all the above- 
mentioned requisites in the parties themselves, — essentially, and 
not accidentally r avrrj 6 po la, SC. ra e'idr) rr]s <j>i\ias. The 

other sorts of friendship are merely resemblances and sha- 
dows of this : al. ravrrj yap opoia, in this they are similar, &c. 

(13.) 8. rovs Xeyopevovs a\as. Michelet quotes Cic. de 
Amicitia, c. 19, Verumque Mud est quod dicitur multos modios 
salis simul dandos esse ut amicitice munere expletum sit. End. 
Vll. 2 : els 7rapoipiav i\r)\vdev 6 pedipvos t<ov dXcov. 

(14.) 9. avrrj, SC. (ptXia Kar dperr)v. — Kara, rbv x p d i> o p, in regard 
of duration. — r avrd, al. ravra. 



CHAPTEE IV. 

(15.) 2. prj § e re p o v, he who is neither really good nor really bad 
(neither iirieucrjs nor <pai)Xos) can be a friend to any sort of man. 
— o I yap KaKoi k.t.X. Mark the analogy between cfaXia and 
<pikavr[a, which is more fully drawn out hereafter. 

(16.) 3. ov d ev i, SC $La{3dXkovTL i v t o v t o i s, SC. rots dyaOois. 

(17.) 5. o-vvdiTTova i, combine. 

(18.) 6. ravrr], SC. rjj rav dya8a>v (piXia : opoioi being used as 

opoiapa, in sect. 1 : or ravTrj in this respect, sc. xP e ' a or h§ ov fl' 



CHAPTEE V. 

(19.) 3. dnoS e xo pevo i, taking to one another. — ol paicdpio i. 
The word expresses here both virtue and prosperity. 

(20.) 5. rjbel. The common reading is ei'Sei, but it seems 
difficult to make any sense of this word ; and the reading in 



it, vii. 2, 3.] ETHICS.— BOOK VIII. 187 

the text (178ft) is not much better. (3<v\ij(T€i is by some taken 
to mean ru ayn&5, in which case fjBe'i WOllld do very well ; hut 
tli is seems doing violence to the word /3ovX>7cret. I would 
suggest e/>yw, which is Hot a violent alteration. 



CHAPTER VI. 

(21.) 4. fiaWov fouf <pi\la k.t.X, that friendship is most 
like friendship. I should be inclined to read cptXia. 

(22.) 6. toy fir) kci\ rfj apery v7r e p ixv Tat K.r.X., Unless //e 

(6 vTrepe^wv) be surpassed in virtue. If this be not the case, he 
does not, by being in his turn inferior, (yn-epexopcvos,) preserve an 
analogous equality. If the one who is superior in one point 
is inferior in another, there is, analogously, an equality be- 
tween them. 

(23.) 7. toiovtol, sc. virepexo^voi. Those in power are not 

wont to look On themselves as vnepexopevoi ttj apery. — at elpr)- 
piv at, the three sorts of (^tXt'at. — /3 o v X o v t a t, SC. to avrd. — 
Ka\ pi v ov <j iv, SC. kou otl tjttou pevovcriv. — k a k € I vrj, SC rrj 
tear dperrjv <piMa. 



CHAPTER VII. 

(24.) He now examines the nature and operation of the social 
instincts, where the parties are not on absolute, but only on 
a relative, footing of equality ; where there is not an exact 
interchange of feelings, but such an interchange as answers 
to the relative position of the parties. 

(25.) 2. eirieiKTjs <pi\ia, such as is seemly ; answering to eViei- 
Keia in justice, — not strictly <pi\ia, but such as suits the 
circumstances. 

(26.) 3. ear i yap iv pkv k.t.X. In (piKia each does not con- 
sider the exact rights of himself and the other ; he does 
not think how much he is bound to give, but how far his 
abilities go. In BiKaioo-vvr) the main question is that of 
rights : he does not think how much he has power to give, 



188 ETHICS.-BOOK VIII. [c. vii. 5, 6 ; c. viii., 

but liow much the other has a right to claim. If <pi\ia and 
SiKaioa-vvr) were conceived to be at the opposite points of a line, 
then as g/hAi'u degenerated into diKaioo-vvr), the ttoo-ov would be 
exchanged for the dgia ; as diKcuoo-vvr) was replaced by cpikia, 
the a%ia would be lost sight of in the noaov. 

(p t\ i a a £ l a n 6 cr ov 8 t na i oavvrj. 

In proportion as the question of agio, is forced upon us in 
the c/uAta iv vrrepoxfi, the character of <pi\ia is lost. 

(27.) 5. dcpatpovpewv: many of the points of friendship 
being destroyed by inequality. — pevei, sc. 6 <p[\os, or r) cpikia. 
— X oopta-OevTOS, SC tov (piXov : al. ^ co p t cr e i/ r e s, in which 
case we must supply phovo-i. 

(28.) 6. av 6 pan &> o v r i, to him as a man. Whatever goods 
belong to humanity : hence not such as pertain to the gods. 



CHAPTEE YIII. 

(29.) 1 . v it e p e x 6 p e v o s, in an inferior condition. — to iovto s 
elvai, al. Om. eivai. 

(30.) 4. iv ots tov to yivcTat kclt agtav. He is speaking 

of the (fiikiai iv virepoxfl- 

(31.) 5. 6 po LOTTj S (SC. eOTl) CpiXoTTJS € 7T I T p € 7T € I V '. the COUl- 

mon reading has virrjpeTelv after i-mTpkneiv, but the reading in 
the text is the better, supplying dpapTaveiv. 

(32.) 6. <pi\r)Tov S ovtcls. This accusative depends on Set in 
dgicoTeov = del agiovv : Grr. Gh\ 613, Obs. 5. 



CHAPTEE IX. 

(33.) He now discusses the nature and operation of the social 
instincts in domestic and political life. — i v dpxfl-> sc - ch. i. 4. 
Some persons have argued from this expression, here and else- 
where, (bk. viii. and ix.,) that these chapters do not properly 
belong to the Nicomachean Ethics : but there is no reason 






ix. 1—3.] ETHICS.— BOOK VIII. 189 

why eV cipxji here may not mean "the beginning of this part 
of the subject;" and there are other passages in these books 
where the words eV apxfii used somewhat differently, imply 
connection with the earlier parts of the Ethics. — cpiXLa bi: 
fie is emphatic ; Gr. Gr. 761, 2. 

(34.) 1. ku6' 00-01/ k.t.A. As biKiuov is the substitute for <pi\ia, 
it follows, that wherever there is cpi^la there might be ftu<aio- 
avvx] ; wherever there is StKaioavvr) there might have been 
(friXla ; so that either can be brought to prove the possible 
or actual existence of the other. Both depend on Koivavia, 
wherefore, in whatever social relation there is BUaiov, there 
must be a possibility of cpiXia. 

(35.) 3. avgeo-Oat k.t.X. The nature of <pi\ia and bUaiov is such 
that they vary in degree in a common ratio. Wherever the 
claims of cpiXia are strongest, the claims of BUaiov are so too. 
On the other hand, we must remember that where cpiXia 
ought most to be, there Simiov ought least to be : but still, 
looking at it practically, as (piXLa is so much set aside, the 
position in the text is perfectly true, — that wdiere cpiXia has 
most right to look for mutual good offices, there bUaiov lays 
down the claims of each most authoritatively. For the use 
and progress of bUaiov from a state of <piXia, see bk. v. ch. 8, 
note. 

(36.) 3. naaai, al. 7rao-i, Wrongly. — rov (rv fi(f) e p ovt o s x<*P lv 
8 ok el. So in the fifth book he speaks of xp et « as the bond of 
social union. The social instincts which bind man to man 
do generally assume their lower form of cpiXia 6\a xpW l H- 0V i 
which differs but little from dtKaLoo-vvrj, except that this latter 
is more definite. <fiikia proper is a higher bond of union in 
the abstract, but practically does not work when the society 
grows from a family to a state. In the early Church we 
have an instance of an attempt to frame a society on the 
purer principle of cpikla, individual rights being for a time 
forgotten in the common interest, — the dg[a merged in the 
7v6aov\ but individual rights soon made themselves heard, and 
complaints from individuals that their claims were neglected 
reintroduced b'ucaiov into the Church : and surely, if there 
ever could be a society in which (ptKla might have held her 
(abstractedly) natural place in society, it was a body of 
Christians who had received the especial grace of God. Yet 



190 ETHICS.— BOOK VIII. [c. ix. 5 ; 

human nature refused to obey, and fell back on the artificial 
system of dLKaioo-vvrj. See note.— bond. Micbelet observes 
truly, that Aristotle does not mean to give this bond of social 
union as the best and truest, but only as the practical and 
historical view of it. 

(37.) 5. 6v<rias re noiovvres at first sight seems to agree 
with the plural implied in ttoKitiky) : but Michelet's observa- 
tion is right, that ttoXitikt) is an abstract noun, and therefore 
does not admit of this construction. See instances in Gr. Gr. 
379, b. He refers noiovvTes to cpvkerai koL 8r)p.oTai, making 
from *~Eviai down to fiiov in a parenthesis, to mark that he is 
passing from the o~vp,(pepov to the -qdv, but that what he has 
advanced equally holds good. Grammatically speaking, 
noiovvres might be viewed as the nominative to 7to\lt€vov- 
rat x^P LV - — T °v tt a p ovt o s k.tX., implied in f] 7to\itik^ 
icpUracy — see Gr. Gr. 708, 1 ; but Michelet's way seems the 
best. — ov yap tov tr a p 6 v r o s k.t.X. : politics does not 
merely provide for the points of common weal as they from 
time to time arise, but for every part of life ; not only for the 
actual o-vfKpepov, but for the rjbv as far as it is o-vp-cpepov : hence 
all these associations which have rjdv in view come under 
politics, as well as those which look to avpcpepov. — nep\ 
t avr as, sc. Bvaias. — cr v v 6 8 ov s depends on TroLovvres, making 
assemblies for these, i. e. for sacrifices. 



CHAPTEE X. 

(38.) He now examines the social instincts as they are developed 
in the political or domestic life. The subject is discussed 
at length in the third and fourth books of the Politics. — 
7r o X i t e I a s. A constitution may be defined as a system or 
arrangement (rdgis : see Pol. iii. 1.) which embodies the rights 
and duties arising from the relations in which the various 
parties in the state stand, or are viewed as standing, to each 
other ; and as the principle (a£ia) on which these relations are 
estimated varies, the constitution varies likewise. It is to be 
distinguished from a government which takes care that these 
rights and duties are performed and exercised without let or 
hindrance. A good constitution is that which fitly embodies 



c. x., xi. 1—6.] ETHICS.— BOOK VIII. 101 

the really existing relations. A constitution is bad when it 
embodies relations which do not exist, or does not embody 
relations which do exist. 

(39.) 2. 6 fxf) avrd p k r] s, not independent. — t\s e'lr) (Baa i\e v s, 

al. t) fiao-iXevs. There is about equal authority for eaeh. If 
rj is read, we must supply pdXXov before it: Gr. Gr. 579, 
Obs. 3. If rj is omitted, then KXripwros (Baaikevs is the same 
notion as we find in Pol. iii. 10, p. 102. 

(40.) 3. nep\ TrXeiVrou tt o 10 v pc v o i to nXovr elv. Ill oli- 
garchy wealth is looked upon as an instrument of unconstitu- 
tional power. In tiniocracy it is a test of the relations in 
which the individuals of the state stand to each other ; either 
of the amount of interest or stake which each person has in 
the common weal, or as a presumptive test of education and 
ability. Observe Aristotle's theory of revolutions. — j3 o v- 
X e r a i, claims or pretends to be = is in theory. 

(41.) 4. napabeiypaTa, models. — it ar p l kt], patriarchal. — 
avrr), sc. rj deo-noTiKr). It is right, because it truly embodies 
the relations which really exist between a master and a 
slave : the slave, viewed in the relation of a Krrjpa, has no rights 
or duties properly so called. The patriarchal authority, as 
set forth in Asia, is wrong, because the supposed relation 
between father and son, on which it is founded, as if they 
stood in the relation of master and slave, is not the true or 
real one. — 8 idcp o p o t : not merely different in species, but 
have a different character ; are to be differently thought of ; 
as in the cases just quoted. 

(42.) 5. dvdpos K.r.X. Supply Koivuvia. 



CHAPTER XI. 

(43.) 1. <?<£' oo-oi/ Kai to biKaiov: see note 34. 

(44.) 2. r) Tr clt p inr), SC. (ptkla. — dt,a<pepei, SC. Trjs fiacriXeias. — 
an o v e p,€T at, attributes. 

(45.) 6. iv ols urjdev kolvov: where there is no common in- 
terest the slave has no interest in what his master does, — no 
mutual relations. 



192 ETHICS.— BOOK VIII. [c. xi. 6, 7 ; c. xii. 1-3, 

(46.) 6. ovbe yap htKaiov. The argument here is, " If there 
is (piXla there would be Sikcuov ; there is no Sikcuov, therefore 
no <pi\ia." The absence of bUatop is a token, not a cause, of 
the absence of cpiXla ; the lack of cpiXia, on the other hand, is 
a cause of the absence of dUaiov. — w^fXniai pev yap 
k.t.X. There is an axpeXeia between the parties, but still no 
koivov, therefore neither cpiXia nor binaiov. — p. ev yap: there 
is no dUaiov, '''■for these indeed are benefited :" it is almost 
equivalent to "for though" 

(47.) 6. fi 8ov\os. Aristotle seems never to have been able to 
get rid of the fact that every man had some claim upon his 
fellow-men, by virtue of his humanity : he was obliged to 
recall to his mind the artificial view of individuals as slaves, 
in order to justify what he says as to their position. 

(48.) 7. SoKeT yap elvai k.t.X. This is the arrXas hUaiov of the 
fifth book. 

(49.) 7. k a\ cpiXias S r). Ka\ Br) (cpiXia) npos Tvavra rbv dvvdpevov 

Koiva>vr)crai cpiXias : — unless the proper reading be na\ cpiXla dr). 
Michelet suggests that cpiXias depends on W, supplied from 
rt binaiov. 



CHAPTER XII. 

(50.) 1. irao-a cpiXla. He is here speaking of noXiTiical cptXiai, or 

cpiXiai Kar d^Lcov. — a cp o p i <x e i e cT av t i s k.t.X. One might 

perhaps eliminate or exclude from this definition the friend- 
ship of relationship and companionship, which might be 
viewed as arising from the cpvo-iKr) cpiXia mentioned in chap. 
xiv. 4, from a similarity of feelings (SpoTradels), or of character 
(6p.or)6eis), rather than from any community of interest be- 
tween the parties. Eudem. vii. 10, XeyovTai 8e cpiXiai, avy- 

yeviKr), eTaipiKr), Koiva>viKrj, r) Xeyopevrj ttoXltikt). 

(51.) 2. 6K ct va), al. eKeivoov de o v 8 e v i, sc. to none of these is 
the possessor an object of interest ; but the new reading is by 
far the better. 

(52.) 3. t<5 e£ avTa>v necpvKevaL Cf. 1 Ep. St. John 5. — rail- 
rbv a I p. a: II. £. 211. pi£av: Eur. Ion. ix. 76. — Kal fv 
dirjpr)p.evois, in the separate branches. — e I a I, sc. alpa Kal 
pi£a. 



4-7; o. xiii. 2-7.] ETHICS.— BOOK Vlll. 198 

(53.) d'. »'/Xl£ V"/ 5 tfXlKU, SC. TtpiTfl. (TVVOIKC t U) V T (II, C//V' 

connected, 

(51.) 5. ws 7r/jo? ^eouy. Observe his notion of the care of the 

Divine Being for man. 

(55.) G. r; roiavTt] (p iX i a, SO. 17 (rvyycuiKJ). — r co v o Qv e L 10 v, 
SC. tt/s (fiiXlas. — 6 (3 i s k.t.X., their daily lives have mure 
in common. — pdXXov iv rois e a-ie t/ce o-t : that is, where 
there is apery']. — v7rdpxovcri o-repyovres- (Supply etcri 
before oliceioTepoi ; 111. vrrdpxoPTes arrepyovcri. 

(56.) 7. o<ri|) 7rpdrepov k.t.X. Iii the Politics he speaks of the 
ttoXis as npurepov rfj (fivcret. : in that passage he is speaking 
naturce intcndentis, — ttoXis, olula, av8pa>iros ; the avOpumos being 
formed with a view to the family, the family with a view to 
the state: in this passage lie is speaking natures operantis, 
(avOpa-rros, olida, ttoXis,) as in order of development the indi- 
viduals form themselves into families, and families become 
states. 

(57.) 7. 17 tt w $• 8'iKaiov, sc. o-vpfiiwvai. The requirements of 
(fiikia are the same as those of binaiov, though on different 
principles : as the relations differ, so will the bUaiov ; and 
hence also the <£iAia must be different. — r avrov, sc. bUaiov, 



CHAPTER XIII. 

(58.) 2. d p v v e t a t, al. dpeifierai. 

(59.) 6. o-waXXdgao- 1 : neuter. See Lidd. and Scott ad v. 

(60.) 6. cpiXiKrjv 5e ttjv dvafioXrjv ex el -> but it admits of a 
friendly delay : c/nX lkov, Bekker ; but friendship admits of delays : 
cf. Plat. Legg. 915. But the former reading is the better, 
as the neuter adjective for the abstract noun requires the 
article to : see Gr. Gr. 436, y. 

(61.) 7. 6t 18 rjrr o r e ciXXo, for whatever other services he does to 
the other, are as to a friend: al. aXXa, sc. napex^. This is the 
old reading, but aXXo has MS. authority, and is better. 

(62.) 7. bwapevep. If he is able, he must repay the debt. — kcl\ 

£k6vtl, and with good-will. — anovra ydp k.t.X., ior we 

must not make a man a friend against his will, as we should 

be doing if we were to suppose that as friendship is not cVi 

c c 



194 ETHICS.— BOOK VIII. [c. xiii. 9—11; 

pr)Tols, therefore we need not repay it,— that it was no debt. 
From Jco/itO<r0a( down to evepyerelcrQai we have the 
expectation of the benefactor, that though it is not a matter 
of debt, yet he expects to receive something in return ; so 
that 8w a fie v a k.t.X. refers to the clause 17 5' Tjdt<fj ovk eVt prj- 
toIs, — he is not to make a return unless he is able ; and at the 
same time to the expectation of the donor, — he is to make a 
return if he is able. SiapapTovTa may either refer to the act of 
repaying, (diroboreov,) the case being changed after «?, (see Gr. 
Gr. 703,) or may better depend on dtaKvreov below, (Gr. Gr. 
613, obs. 5 ;) the clause ov yap vno obiXov being evidently a 
parenthetical explanation of ev naBovra i </>' ov ovk e'Set. In this 
interpretation acorn and aKovra refer to different persons, one 
the agent, the other the recipient of the apodosis ; and kcu 
€k6vtl has not the emphasis whieh it evidently is meant to have. 
It is better to take both for the same person, making itcovri to 
refer to the will of the recipient, as hwapeim does to the power 
of the agent, and making it depend on airoftovvai in airoboriov, 
(Gr. Gr. 613, 3,) and not on the passive verbal notion. " A 
return is to be made to him who did the benefit, if the person 
benefited is able to do it, and if he is willing to receive it ; 
for one must not make a man a friend against his will," which 
would be the case if you were to treat a man as if he had done 
you a service as a friend, while he declares he did not do it 
as your friend, that he has no such claim upon you : as where 
a person had accidentally benefited another, without the 
least notion of doing him a service, or done it from friend- 
ship to some one else. In such a case the person benefited 
ought not to have received the benefit, and all he has to do 
now is to allow the matter to be settled, (SiaXvreW,) as if it had 
been hn faroU ; in which case, as no mention of return was 
made beforehand, no return would be expected afterwards. 
This gives kcu Ikovti its emphatic force, and gives the two con- 
ditions of the dvTcm6doo-is, viz. the ability of one party and the 
willingness of the other ; and moreover describes a case which 
is perpetually happening in every-day life. A man refuses to 
accept a return for a benefit conferred, because such accept- 
ance would imply a friendship which does not exist, and was 
not implied in the original act. 

(63.) 9. 6po\oyr)<rat a. v ; k.t.X. As the words kcu eKovn are ex- 
plained by aKovra yap k.t.X., so here we have an explanation of 



c. xiv.; i. 2—4.] ETHICS.— BOOK IX. 195 

the condition bvpapipa : — "Any one would allow that he ought 
to repay it, ifhe is able ; if not, no one would expect it ;" — 

al. ofxoXoyrjaai, which is not right ; al. a> p. o X 6 y r) a- e 6' a v, 

which would favour the former of the two interpretations, by 
shewing that the eVi p/roTy refers to the dnodoo-is to which he 
would have agreed beforehand, and not, as suggested 
in the second interpretation, to there being no bargain for 
an dnoboais, and therefore no case for it. 

(64.) 11. c tv a p k e I, SC. erepos. 



CHAPTEE XIV. 

(65.) 3. eis xph\ xaTa k-t.X., by him who is on the debtor side 
with respect to money or to excellence. — dvrairobih6vra 
depends on Sei in avranodoTeop =. del avrbv dnoSovvcu. 

(6Q.) 4. ov8e\s ydp k.t.X. Oi serve here again his notions of 
the gods. — ocpeiXovra, same construction as dpTanoboTeop 
above. — v rr e p (3 dWo p t o s, sc viov. — r at be <p e v kt op, SC. 
via po^Orjpa opti. — ev tt d <r \e <> v, the father cannot hope for 
any benefit from a very bad son, and men do not usually 
benefit those for whom they cannot hope for some return. 



BOOK IX. 

CHAPTEE I. 

(1.) Akistotle in this book considers certain questions connected 
with our social instincts, their development and operation. — 
Kad art e p e tpijrot, be viii. 14. 4. 

(2.) 2. 6 epwpevos, SC. eyKakel. — £ n a y y e X X 6 p. e p o s, SC o 
epao-rfji. 

(3.) 3. f) ra>p T) 6 a> p } SC. fj r}6iKJ]. 

(4.) 4. k i 6 a p <o 8 <5, Plut. Fort. Alex. c. i. Dionysius is said to 
have answered a poet who claimed a promised reward, that 
he had repaid him by the pleasures of hope which his pro- 
mise had given him. 



ETHICS— BOOK IX. [c. i. 5-9 ; iL* 

(5.) o. ravTct, sc. a ex*h al. rawrd, sc of the same value.— e ice L- 
vov x<*P LV > sc - &>v beopevos Tvyxcivei. — tt po\ afro vt o s, SC. he 
icho was the first recipient, as irpoex 0VTa below. — UpcoTayopav : 
Plat. Prot. 328, B. 

(6.) C. piaOos 5' dvbpl (piXcp elprjpevos iipKios ecrTco, HeS. 
Opp. 36S. 

(7.) 7. Si' avr ov s, those ivho benefit their friends for their own 
sake, i. e. 8i dpeTrjv. 

(8.) 8. top 7r p oe xovtci, he who first received the benefit. — dvrt- 

Xa (3 cov, SC. 6 erepos. 

(9.) 8. e v to 7 s co viols, in shops. The buyer fixes the price he 
will give according to the benefit or pleasure he thinks the 
article will give him, and will not give more ; whereas the 
seller tries to get as much as he can. The need of the buyer 
gives the article its marketable value ; and the person who 
has been benefited in the same way ought to fix the value, 
as it was his need which determined it. 

(10.) 9. iicovcricov o~vp.(3o\alcovi see V. 2. 13. 



CHAPTEK II. 

(11.) He now considers some questions of casuistry. The logical 
description of casuistry would be, where the particular minor 
or fact being realized, a deliberation arises as to what major 
premiss or principle we should refer that known particular. 
Honest casuistry is where the doubt implied in such delibe- 
ration is real. Dishonest, or casuistry in its usual accepta- 
tion, is where the proper major is really known, but it is at- 
tempted to refer the minor to some more palatable principle, 
and thus escape from an inconvenient conclusion or dis- 
agreeable duty. — 6 polcos, SC. TTOTepov. 

(12.) 5. iavTov, than himself He ought rather to ransom his 
father, than procure his own liberty. — r rjv tt p ovirap xvv, 
al. erepov TrpovTrapxqv, al. eTalpov. — r <a § e refers to the same 
person as 6 piv, while the nominative to oierat is supplied 
from o-TTovbcuov . — o Xovt a l be, but they suppose it so. 

(13.) 8. TpocpPjs iirapKeiv. Eor gen. see Gr. Gr. 535. 



iv. 1-1.] ETHICS.- BOOK IX. 197 



CHAPTER III. 

(11.) 1. cv dp XT): cn< '• 4. These words st (Mil frequently fco have 

the sense of "before," unless we choose to adopt the notion 
of their denoting that the Ethics are made up of a number of 
separate treatises, so that the beginning of each one may be 
referred to as the dpx 1 !' 

(15.) 3. yevrjTcu dc poxOrjpos kcu 8oki} 7 al, 7) koi 8okjj. — ovre Set, 

0111. al. 



CHAPTER IV. 

(16.) He here commences an analysis of our social nature, and 
its connection with self-love. 

(17.) 1. TrpoaiceKpovKOTes, those who have met with some of- 
fence ; — they continue friends, even though they look for no 
return. 

(18.) 2. to l v t o 1, sc. emeiKels. — p e r p v, the standard whereby 
the perfection or right operation in human affairs is esti- 
mated ; so that in the case of abiXavria he is most perfectly 
(ptkavTos who is (TnovdcuoTaros. 

(19.) 3. rod yap dyadov. It is the property of the good man, that 
he aims and. works out his highest good, and for the sake of 
that which is most properly himself, — his reason : he aims at 
a rational existence ; and hence, as this is the highest good of 
man, he is most truly (frlXavTos who developes it. — ray ado. 
k a I t a (paivo peva : these coincide. The good presents 
itself as good to him. There is no double- mindedness in 
him, no difference between his abstract idea of good, and 
his practical appreciation of it. — t ov yap dyadov, sc. 



avopoonov. 



(20.) 3. tov b Lavorjn kov x « p * "• The good man lives a life 
of reason, not of sense, according to the Kvpias, not the alaSrj- 
tlkt}, €7naTf)pr] : even those parts of his sensual nature which 
enter into his life are governed by, or rather leavened by, 
reason. Cf. ch. 8. 6, sqq., whence it is clear that by Siai/o^riKoO 
here he means the practical, not only the scientific, intellect. 

(21.) 4. eKao-Tos &' iavTu /3ouXerat k.t.X. The point he 
wishes to prove is, that the good man, as most completely 



198 ETHICS.— BOOK IX. [c. iv. 5-10; 

realizing his nature, or personality (eicao-r^s), i. e. that which 
we properly call ourselves, — is most truly fond of himself, and 
most truly wishes good to himself, and hence is most truly 

(piXavros. 

The good of every creature depends on its personality 
(etao-TOTr)?), i. e. must be suitable to, and be the development, 
or energy of, that living being which each man calls himself. 
He proves this — 

1 . By the fact that when a living being, (man, for instance,) 
having a distinct personality and nature, by virtue of which 
he wishes himself a particular sort of good, partially throws 
off this personality, and assumes a fresh one, (yevopevos a\Xos,) 
as if he were to become an animal, as Circe's swine, or to 
live a mere animal life, he would not be content that his new 
nature (iicelvo to yevopevov) should be his all in all, (iravr ex eLV ) > 
retaining an instinctive consciousness of his former nature 
and personality, he has desires suitable to it : so that hence 
we see that a man's notion of his proper good, and his pos- 
session of it, depends on his proper personality. 

2. The Divine Being has some good ; but even this is by 
virtue of some nature or personality unknown to us, (a> v on 
7roT car i,) to which this good is suitable. 

So that, if in proportion as any one realizes and de- 
velopes his personality or true nature he wishes the truest 
good to himself, it follows that a good man, leading a life of 
reason, (which is the ima-Torr]? of man,) wishes most truly 
good to himself. 

(22.) 5. t<5 8rj it p 6 s iavrov — virdp x e i v. Dative of proof: 
see Gt. Gr. 609, 5. 

(23.) 5. elvai r i S o k e t, seems to be something real : n is em- 
phatic. So Plato, Phsedr. 242 E, o-ep,pvve<r6ai cos ti ovt€. 

(24.) 6. ravTT), here. — ra elprjpeva, the above-named condi- 
tions of friendship, viz. iavrois crvvdiayeiv (SovXeadai, ; crv vaXyelv 
and awrjdeo-Gai : or some take them to be those named in the 
beginning of the chapter, but not so well ; others (and among 
them the author of the Eudemian Ethics, (vii. 6,) and the 
Paraphrast) interpret it, "Friendship towards a man's self 
can exist in the degree in which a man has in himself two 
parts or principles, viz. the akoyov and \6yov ex "-" In the 
Magna Moralia, p. 18, we find both interpretations. 



v., vi. 1—4.] ETHICS.— BOOK IX. 199 

(25.) 8. e rep coi/ p e v k.t.X. eniBvfxova-iv (the sensual de- 
sire); a\\a 8e fiovXavrai (the rational desire); so that 
their senses and their reason differ. — boKovprav. This 
word here implies fio'£a, a definite act of the reason. — p i- 

aoval re Kai, al. piaovurai without re Kai : both Have about 

equal MSS. authority. The Paraphrast evidently read pt- 
o-ovvrai. — fxoxBi]piav may refer to what goes before, as in 
the text, or to what follows. 

(26.) 9. S laa-TTcovra agrees with to pev — to 8e. 

(27.) 10. ei 6e fir) olov re k.t.X. If the pleasure and pain 
cannot be coincident, at all events (dXXd ye) pain follows very 
quickly 011 the pleasure. — oh av e fiovXeT o — y eve a 6 a i, 
and he would not wish that these pleasures should {again) be his. 



CHAPTEE V. 

(28.) 1. nporepov, viii. 2. — Siaracriv, intentness, earnestness. 

(29.) 3. ovbev [idXXov, not a whit the more for that reason. — 
a XX' or a v, except when. — ovk eoiKev evvovs elvai. The 
object of evvoia is another; when the xpwipov or ^u of one- 
self comes in, it is rather spurious (piXavria. 

CHAPTEE VI. 

(30.) 1. 6 fiopo ia, harmony of feeling, sympathy. 

(31.) 2. n a <r i 8 o k fj, when by common consent it is agreed. — 
apx^iv UirraKov k.t.X. Pittacus, leader of the Mity- 
leneans, is related by Diogenes Laertius (i. 75) to have had 
this privilege granted him, and to have exercised it for ten 
years, on account of captain victories gained by him. — ov 
ydp ia-Tiv k.t.X. opovoia does not consist in identity of 
feeling, but identity of feeling for the same object, and in 
the same circumstances. 

(32.) 3. err I twv avT&v ovtcs, "being, so to say, in the same 
ship, ,"— wo-tt ep Evpinos. The tides of the Euripus, the 
naXippodoi AvXiSos tokoi, are used as emblems of inconstancy 
both in Greek and Latin writers. 

(33.) 4. f^erdffi, "watches" enquires into. 



200 ETHICS.— BOOK IX. [c. vii. 1-6, 



CHAPTEK VII. 

(34.) 1. ol o e v e py erai. This is an unusual introduction of 

an cmopia by stating it as a fact There is a conjunction 

wanting here, yiv 6 pevov is in apposition to the sentence : 
and this being so, Sfc. 

(35.) 1. 'E iv i x a p p o s. These words may be an actual quotation 
of the end of an iambic from Epicharmus, or may only re- 
present his meaning — i k jrovrj pov: either "from the bad 
part of human nature" or from a bad point of view. 

(36.) 2. cpva-KuiTepov, to be more founded on the nature of 
the thing. — (p vaiKa>rep6v r e, al. r<». — it e p i, in the case of 
— Kav pLTj&ev ao-i — yevo lvto. The conjunctive points to 
the present, the opt. to the future. (Cardwell.) 

(37.) 4. iapev (T ivepyeia. This observation is founded on 
a profound knowledge of the human mind. It is the prin- 
ciple which, stirs men up to activity and toil where no de- 
finite advantage is to be gained by it. 

(38.) 4. ivepyeia 8 r\ — I a r t it a s, exists as it were in his energy. 
Michelet takes to epyov as the nominative, and reads io-rl 
TToas ; and this interpretation is recognised by the Paraphrast. 
The argument is, that the act of benefiting another is an act 
of existence, is a realization to us of our existence, and there- 
fore pleasant ; while the act of being benefited is something 
passive, and does not realize to us our existence, as we do 
not co-operate in it, but we are simply recipients of the act 
of the agent. — b yap e o-r i bwdpei: that which has a 
virtual, in posse (dwdpei) existence, is set forth actually in 
esse {Ivepyeia) by its act or result. 

(39.) 5. x a ' L P €LV €V 4 tovto, so that he to whom this per- 
tains feels pleasure . — ovbev ica\6 v iv ro3 S p do~ avr i. 
The words koXov iv ra dpao-avn must be taken together : the 
feeling of na\ 6 v which exists in the agent. 

(40.) 6. dvdira\iv. In the benefactor the memory of the 
koXov is sweet, and he therefore dwells with pleasure on his 
act and its object. In the person benefited the remem- 
brance of the avpcpepov is less vivid ; and he rather looks for- 
ward to some new benefit, than backwards to what he has 
received. It is in this sense that gratitude has been defined 



7 ; viii. 1 — 8.] ETHICS.— BOOK IX. 201 

as a lively sense of favours to come. — n otqcrti, a productive 
act. r co iratrxci-v, a passive act: the former produces 

feelings of crripyeiv coarnep tc'kpci : c-vepyerelv glVCS a notion 
of vnepoxrj, — evepyereicrOai a notion of vnepexfcrBai ; hence also 

the benefactor loves his act for the feeling of superiority 
which it gives him. 

(41.) 7. tlov irapaXafiovTcov, than those who inherit it. — p. d X- 
\ov i era o- <, i. e. more than the children know them as the 
authors of their being, or than the fathers know the children 
to he theirs. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

(42.) 1. d <£' i avTov, losing sight of himself and his own in- 
terests. 

(43.) 2. ois 6 <pi\os 6 pi (era i, which are the characteristics 
of friendship. 

(44.) 4. 77 poo-riyopia," appellation." 

(45.) 5. o-7rovbd(oi, al. o-novdd&i, which is quite as good. The 
indicative signifies the every-day fact of a good man's zeal 
for right ; the optative denotes that he may be viewed as 
greedy of right action. 

(46.) 6. eavrov r co kv picordrco, his most essential part. — 
7T o X i s, the state (== the citizens in their corporate, not their 
individual, capacity,) is the most essential, and most to be 
considered in the commonwealth, as every other compound 
body (ttclv ak\o avcTTrjpa) is most to be considered when 
taken as a whole, and not in its several parts : so in human 
nature, the whole of the parts together is the most proper 
essence of man, and more to be considered than each or all 
of the parts separately. 

(47.) 6. tovto dyem S> v, SC. eavrov to Kvpicorarov — opeyccrOai, 
al. op eye a 6a i rj. 

(48.) 7. an 08 k xovrat, welcome. — Trdvrcov §' dpn.Wcop.iv co v. 
This brings to mind what Butler says of the tendencies of 
virtue, part i. ch. 3. The public as well as the individual 
good would be secured by true cptXavria. 

(49.) 8. it ds yap vovs- The reason, when not perverted and 

Dd 



202 ETHICS.— BOOK IX. [c. viii. 9; ix. 1-7, 

overwhelmed by the passions, as in the case of the dicoXao-Tos 
or 7re7TT]pa)fi€vos, chooses the highest good : perhaps even in 
these desperate cases the good is occasionally perceived by 
the reason, though not even in wish acted upon. 

(oO.) 9. dXrjdes 5c xrept (nrovSaiov, al. to nepi a-irovbaiov, 
what is said of the good man. — v nepanoOv^a-Kova-i, those 
who die for their country or friends. — e <£' w XrjyjsovTat. See 
Grammar, 836, 5, c. 



CHAPTER IX. 
(51.) 1. 80 ev to k.t.X.: Eur. Orest. 667. 
(52.) 2. €vtv xovvtcdv ovs, sc. deojxevav. ovs in attraction to 

7roir]o~ovo~iv. 

(53. ) 4. eneio-aKTov 17 S o v ?) s, adventitious. 

(54.) 5. Sri yiverai. If the word ivepyeia had not preceded, 
this passage might have been correctly translated, is an 
energy {yiverai), and not a state, (yirapxei) : it is an active pro- 
cess, not a passive state, and therefore requires to be, as it 
were, in perpetual motion 5 and this is attained, even though 
we are unable to energize continuously in ourselves, by the 
cognate energies of our friends, which are, as it were, our 
own feelings and actions reproduced in others. — eo-n Se 
to oIkcIov, and that which belongs to ourselves is classed among 
things pleasant.— iavT ovs, ourselves: Gr. Or. 654, 2, b. 

(55.) 5. ap,<pa), SC. rr)V i v e py e lav, and to otKeZov. 

(56.) 7. a a kt) a is, discipline. — k y v 1 s. 'EadXcov p.ev yap an 
e&6\a 8idd£eai, "Hv 8e KaKolcri o~vp.}Lio~yr)s airoXels na\ tov eovra voov. 

— $ vo-iicd)Te pov : looking more into the principles and 
reason of the matter, — psychologically. 

(57.) The argument here used seems to be simply this : — To live 
is pleasant to the good man above all others. This life con- 
sists in the energies of Perception and Intellect, and the 
pleasure arises from the consciousness, whether perceptive 
or intellectual, of such energies : in proportion, then, as this 
consciousness is increased, the pleasure of the good man is 
increased likewise ; and the good man so deeply sympathizes 






7—9.] ETHICS.— BOOK IX. 203 

with the energies of his friend's life, his acts of perception 
and consciousness, that he feels his own life, as it were, in his ; 
and therefore, if he had no friends, he would be deprived of 
no small part of his pleasure in living. 

(58.) 7. to 8e Crjv oplCovrai. Life is defined (by calling it), 
in the case of animals, the power, &c. 6 p t£c o-Bai is to 
give its definition, i.e. to state the difference or essence. 
That the acts of alo-drjais and vorjais, not the mere power 
thereof, constitute human life, is proved in what follows. 

(59.) 7. 17 SZ bvpafxis — dvdyerai. The power is referred to 
its operation, i. e. the power has no value or real existence 
except when viewed in its development ; therefore the real 
value of the human dvvapis rrjs aloO^a-eons and vorjo-eas depends 
on the acts of perception and thought. A man is not man by- 
virtue of possessing the power, but by having further the 
power and opportunity of exercising it. — t 6 8 e <v piov, and 
essence of the human far) is in the acts of aiaBrja-is and vorjats. — 
i'oiKe k.t.X. to Crjv, then, seems to consist not merely in the 
power, but in the acts, of alo-Orjcis and vorjats, — the same con- 
clusion as before, but arrived at differently. — apio-pevov 
yap, for there is something settled and defined in it, which is of 
the nature (and therefore one of the tests) of good ; while that 
which is dopio-Tos is made up of a variety of unsettled, shifting 

particulars, — k at T <5 eVietKet, SC. io-ri dyaBov. 

(60.) 8. ovfi' iv \v7rais, nor one overwhelmed with sorrow. — to. 
vndpxovTa, its circumstances and details. 

(61.) 9. el 8' avro k.t.X. The apodosis is difficult to see. 
Some make ko\ ijSu the apodosis, supplying iari ; but that 
would be only a repetition of what is said above. Michelet 
better places it at KaOdne p ovv, taking the clauses between 
as a series of parentheses ; but this is a long way off : and it 
may be placed at to $' ala0dveo-6ai on £jj, which would make 
very good sense, as this is a consequence from the el b' air 6 
k.t.X. , and 8e is used to take up the sense interrupted by a 
parenthesis, (see Gr. Gr. 767, 4) ; and the words (pvaei yap dya- 
6bv £<»i7 is a repetition of the protasis, in consequence of the 
long parenthesis. — /3 Los, life; {(orj, existence. Mark the dif- 
ference between these two, — jSi'os referring rather to external 
circumstances, far) to internal constitution and state. — v oov- 



204. ETHICS.— BOOK IX. [cix.lOjx., 

fiev or i voovpev: Met. xi. 9, p. 255, votjo-LS icrriv voTj(rea>s 
porjais : i. e. thought consists in the intellectual perception of 
thought. — to 8e oti alo~ 6 av 6 pe 6 a rj voovpev on icrpev. 
This perception, (to 8e) on aladavopeOa rj voovfiev, is really a 
perception on io-piv, and therefore every such consciousness 
is a consciousness of our being living beings, and therefore 
brings pleasure. 

(62.) 10. ms 8 i k.t.\. The rest of the argument is clear enough, 
that a man receives these impressions of his own existence 
from seeing them in his friends. 



CHAPTER X. 

(63.) 1. firjTe noXvgeivos: Hes. Op. et Dier. 713. 

(64.) 3. ovre ydp k.t.X. This is a curious dogma, when illus- 
trated by modern history ; but the real fact is, that except 
where the representative principle is admitted, which it was 
not in antiquity, it seems to be true. — r 6 8e novo v. The 
exact quantity is not one point in all, but varies, according to 
circumstances, between two given points, which mark the too 
much or the too little. 

(65 .) 5. arvfi-ir'nrTeiv, happen coincident!?/. 

(66.) 6. iv bvarl XeyovTai: Pylades and Orestes, &c. — n \r)v 
7To\iTiKG>s. except politically, i. e. as members of the same 
state, or belonging to the same party. 



CHAPTEE XI. 

(67.) 2. to Xex#ej/, SC. Kov(j>i£ovTai ol \v7rovpeuoi. 

(68.) 3. avTo — to Spav, the very sight of one's friends, %c. 

(69.) 4. avWviTe'iv, al. o~vKkviviio~6ai. — vnepTeivrj tj} dXviriq. 
virepTelvrj depends on dvdpca8r]s, implied in dvbpadels : Grr. Gr. 
390, 1, b. The meaning of this is, that if he is not excessively 
callous to painful impressions, he cannot bear the sight of his 
friends grieving for him. The Paraphrast and Thomas Aqui- 
nas give another interpretation : " Unless the friend out- 






xi., xii.; i.] ETHICS— BOOK X. 205 

weighs their grief by his own dXvrria, they do not bear to com- 
municate their grief to him ;" but this is very forced. 

(70.) 5. a\is f'yw 8v<ttv X vv- Cf. Eur. Orest. 239; Soph. (Ed. 
Tyr. 1061. 

(71.) 6. to (MT) a^iaxravras. The common reading is tovs. to 
here equals tovto, (Gt. Gr. 444. 5,) and refers to to noiuv : 
"and those who do claim it." — b6£av drjdias. "We must 
take care, when we decline the sympathy of a friend from a 
reluctance to give him pain, that we do not give him an 
impression that we are acting from a dislike to his com- 
pany. 



CHAPTEE XII. 

(72.) 1. a pa. He sums up what he has said : — Is not then, Sfc. ? 

(73.) 1. fj aio~3r]<ris on ecrrtv, the perception of existence. 

(74.) 2. tovtwv kolv (o v ov a- 1 k.t.X., share (with them) these 
things whereby they think to live. 

(75.) 3. tt7ro/xarroi/rat, they take impressions from one another. 
See Lidd. and Scott ad v. 



BOOK X. 

CHAPTEE I. 

(1.) As Aristotle had, in the end of the seventh book, treated of 
pleasure and pain as the motive causes of human 
action, as the subject-matter, in the regulation of which 
consisted the several habits of Saxfrpoo-vpti, 'Eyicparna, 
'A k p a a i a, — how far it was an admissible motive, how far to 
be suppressed and eradicated, — so here he considers pleasure 
in its immediate connection with the Good, or Happi- 
ness; how far it differs from, how far it agrees with it : 
and he shews that, while pleasure is an universal object to 



206 ETHICS.— BOOK X. [c. i. 1-4 ; 

man, the highest pleasure results from the best energies, 
and that, therefore, the highest pleasure generally attainable 
by the compound being man arises from the ivepyua ^vxrjs Kar 
dperfjv : and hence pleasure itself, as a simple tendency of our 
nature, bears witness to the happiness of man, as man, being 
developed by t]6ikt) apery . 

(2.) 1. npos ttjv tov rjOovs dpxvv. Either the starting- 
point in the formation of the moral character, or the first 
step in moral action, viz. the choice of the particular act, of 
the to irpaKTov. It is equally true, whether it be taken of the 
one or the other, dperr/p is the common reading. 

(3.) 3. fir] TTore — Xeyerai. See Grammar, 873,4; 814, a. — 
t o i av tt) v ovcrav airacr av '. asifit were all alperov. 

(4.) 4. did, because they are believed. — rovs o-wievras, those 
who comprehend them. 



CHAPTEE II. 

(5.) 1. Evdogos represents the doctrines afterwards held by 
Epicurus. He lived about B.C. 366. — The arguments in 
favour of pleasure, as stated here, are — 

1. Its being the common desire and end of human nature. 

2. From contraries. 

3. From its being a final and complete end. 

4. From its increasing all other goods in degree, when 
added to them. 

(6.) 1. i-rrieiKes: here simply good. — teal t6 paXio-ra, and 
that which is most so. — jcparco-rov, the best, or bravest, as 
our old authors use the word. 

(7.) 2. avgeo-dai avToiavra, change of degree, not of hind. 
This is necessary to the argument. If it were a change in 
kind, it might be argued that the thing added to was good, 
while that which changed it was less so ; but if the universal 
characteristic of pleasure is that it enhances every good, how- 
ever different in kind, it would seem to have the good in 
itself. 

(8.) 3. tg>v dyadav, of the number of goods. — n\dr<av: in the 
Philebus, 20, E, sqq. — dvaipel, argues destructively. — ov- 



ii. 1-5.J ETHICS.— BOOK X. 207 

fievoj npoo-TfdevTos k.t.X., by no addition is good made 
better. — drjXop de k.t.X. This is not Aristotle's own argu- 
ment, but from Plato, Phileb. 20, E. Aristotle, in bk. i. 7, 8, 
contemplates the possibility of ev8aip.ovia being increased in 
degree. See also i. 11, 12. 

(9.) 4. r» ovv earl toiovtov. ovv, as Michelet rightly ob- 
serves, has here an adversative sense, (Gr. Gr. 737, 4,) 
marking an objection to Plato's doctrine ; not, however, as 
he would have it, a direct objection to his Idea : it is rather, 
against his notion, that any good which is capable of in- 
crease in degree by the addition of other good things, cannot 
be the good. What is there such ? It can only be an abstract 
idea, not anything ol fjfiels Koivovovfiev: and this is 
a further requisite (eVi^Ten-ai) to what we are looking for, 
that, in addition to the other characteristics of good, it should 
be kttjtou Kat npanrov dv8ponT(o. — eviardfjievoi, objecting; by 
the logical form Zvaratns. — /x ^ X e y a) o- 1 p. See Grammar, 873, 
4 ; 814, b. Xeyovo-Lv, Michelet. 

( 10. ) 4. 6 yap ttckt i 80 Ket tout' elvai (pap,e v. Hetnark 
the epigrammatic brevity of this great principle of his philo- 
sophy. — ravrrjv rr)v iriorii/, SC 6 naai SokcI k.t.X — et yap: 
Michelet, § yap (bpeyero, al. opeyerai. — 1\ (pvaiicov dya- 

66v : the dictates and reproofs of conscience ; the shadowy 
sense of koXov, which is perhaps never wholly obliterated. — 
Kpelrrov r/ Ka6' a bra, above and better than their evil state. 
It may be said that the wholly bad desire rjdv as rjbv, not 
as dyaOov. The answer is, that even these people have uncon- 
sciously instincts towards dya06v, which are really their 
motive causes, though apparently rjbv alone animates them. 
See. vii. 13. 6. 

(11.) 5. ovk eoiKe. Seevii. ]3. 2. — ol yap (pao-tv, they deny. — 
ap.(pa> r<o p.r)beTep<p, both these two evils are opposed to that 
which is neither, i. e. to the /ueW. The argument here, as in 
bk. vii., is, that as each of the extremes is opposed, not only 
to the mean, but to the other extreme, it cannot be argued 
e£ ei/avriW, that if one thing is evil, that which is opposed to 
it is good, for it may be the other opposed extreme, which 
is evil. There are two sorts of opposition,— good and evil, and 
evil and evil, — and the opposition between pleasure and pain 



208 ETHICS.— BOOK X. [c. ii. 5 ; iii. 1, 2, 

may be of the better sort. Aristotle answers this by saying, 
if both were evil, both would be favKTa. 

(12.) 5. fir) 8 ere pa v be, SC. ovtodv kokcov. — p.r)b ere pov, SC. elvai 

cpevKTov, — r} SfjLoioos ; or, at all events, whether they were avoided 
or not, both must be either avoided or pursued alike. 



CHAPTER III. 

(13.) 1. A 7roidT77s is that whereby a thing can be defined, its 
nature and essence set forth, (Cat. vi., ra yap bebeyplva atras 
nolo. Xiyerai /car avrds: cf. Met. V. 2, p. 112); and the notion 
advanced in the major premiss is, that every thing which is 
a good defines and sets forth the nature and essence of that 
to which it is attached ; while, to say that a thing is plea- 
sant, or the contrary, defines nothing of its real nature, for 
it may be applied indifferently to various things differing in 
nature. The major premiss is clearly a dogmatic assumption, 
which Aristotle quickly destroys by giving instances to the 
contrary, as a being or thing would be not defined by saying 
its operations were right, or that it was happy ; and yet both 
these are confessedly goods. 

(14.) 1. The arguments against fjbovr) being an dyadov, are : — 
All aya66v IS iroiorrjs : 
fjbovr) is not a iroioTqs '. 
r)bovi) is not an dyadov. 

To the major premiss of which Aristotle brings an eWrao-ts, 
using dperrjs evepyeiai and evbaifMovia as the middle terms. 

(15.) 2. Nothing which admits of degrees is a good, for the 
dya66v is something definite and fixed, (apiapevov) ; while 
every thing which admits of degrees is indefinite and shifting, 
(dopio-Tov) . 
r)bovr) admits of degrees : 
j)bovr) is not a good. 

(16.) 2. dyadov cop tad at. The moral fact that good, viewed 
absolutely, does not really admit of degrees, is curiously em- 
bodied in the grammatical fact, that the comparative of good, 
in most, if not in all languages, is irregular. A thing, to be 
good, must be perfect. " Why callest thou Me good ? there 



2,3.] ETHICS.— BOOK X. 209 

is none good but one, that is, God." (St. Matt. xix. 17.) "When 
we speak of things being more or less good, we mean that 
they approach more or less nearly to the absolute standard. 

(17.) 2. {) be a- 6 a i, middle verb: the (being in a) state of 
pleasure; pleasure in the concrete, viewed as residing in a 
subject. 

(18.) 2. <a\ it e p\ t ij v 8 iKaioa-v v rj v k.t.X. If pleasure is 
viewed in the concrete, so that it may properly be said that 
a man is more or less pleased, it may so be said of justice and 
the other virtues, that a man is more or less just, &c. ; and 
yet this does not exclude justice, &c. from the category of 
Good. — k ara r a s dp eras, in respect of the several virtues. 

(19.) 2. el d' iv rals qb ovals, if (they judge this indefiniteness to 
exist) in pleasures in the abstract : it is true that they, too, in a 
certain fashion and in a certain sense, admit of degrees, even 
as health does. Pleasure, viewed by itself, and not in com- 
bination with any object in which it might reside and work, 
(dfiiyrjs,) may be something absolute and definite, not ad- 
mitting of degrees ; so that any degree short of this abstract 
point is not pleasure, but only an approach to it ; though, at 
the same time, when residing in a subject and combined with 
other elements, (juKrai,) it may, in regard of the state of that 
subject, be said to be a greater or less degree of pleasure : so 
that, being in its own nature a single definite point, it is in 
this way capable of degrees ; just as health, being in itself an 
absolute and perfect freedom from disease, and the perfect 
well-being of the body, yet is said to exist more or less in 
individuals, — individuals are said to be in a greater or less 
state of health. So likewise, though pleasure in the concrete 
does admit of degrees, pleasure in the abstract, the simple 
idea of pleasure, does not ; and therefore the argument, what- 
ever be its value, is answered. 

(20.) 3. w pi a- iievrj ova- a: being a fixed absolute point, not 
admitting of degrees. — a-vp.fj.eTpl a, the same common mea- 
sure; the same degree in all the subjects in which it may 
reside. — dXX' dviep.kvn k.t.X., hut falling short of its abstract 
perfection, it still exists up to a certain point, — differing in dif- 
ferent subjects. A man may not be in absolutely perfect 
health, and yet one would say he was in good health. — Sta« 
E e 



210 ETHICS.— BOOK X. [c. iii. 4— 0, 

cpepet r<p pdXXov Kal t)ttov. The measure of health 
diners in coming more or less near to the abstractedly per- 
fect health. — r 6 n e p t rjbopi]v, the case ivith pleasure. 

(21.) 4', TeXetOV T€ K.T.X. 

dyaOov is TeXetov : 

fjbovr) is not TeXetov, for it is a kivt](tis or yeveats : 

rjftovri IS not dyadov. 

TeXetov, perfect in itself. — areAely, not ending in themselves, 

— Trdo-7] yap k.t.X. Every Kivrjais has ra^os Or (3pa8vrrisi 
ribovr) has not : 

rjdovf] IS not KLvqcris. 

7rp6s aXXo: if not absolutely, at least relatively. 

(22.) 4. riadrjvai, passive: to be put into a state of pleasure, 
(peTafldXXetv els tt}v fjdovrjv ra^ecos Ka\ /SpaSecos). — rj 8 e a 6 a i 7 
middle : to he in a state of pleasure, (evepyelv kcit avrrjv). 
A person may receive impressions of pleasure more or 
less rapidly, but the pleasure itself has no notion of quick- 
ness or slowness. 

(23.) 5. y eve a ts, a transition state. — boKel ydp k.t.X. This is 
one of the formal, abstract arguments of the schools, or 
rather porticos, of Athens, which Plato delighted to use, and 
which carried great weight in the philosophy of the day, 
though to us it may seem to be scarcely worthy of the notice 
of such a mind as Aristotle's. The argument, however, such 
as it is, stands thus : — Any yeveats, which we may take, does 
not arise from any chance subject-matter, (ovk sk tov tvxovtos 
to tvxov y eve a- 8 at), but that from whence it rises is the 
same as that into which it is resolved when it ceases, (e£ ov 

ylveTat els tovto dtaXveadat,) SO that if r)bovq IS a yeveats, 
there would be r) 8 v, (e£ ov ylveTat,) rjbovr), (yeveats,) r) d v 

again, [els 6 StaXveTat) ; whereas the real order is — i) 8 v, 

rjbovr), Xv 77 rj p ov, Xvirr), (ou yeveats r) rjdovr) tovtov rf Xvtvt} 
cpdopd). 

(24.) 6. evhetav tov Kara (pvo~tv, the lack or want of that 
which nature requires, and pleasure the supplying thereof: 
so that qdovrj, if thus viewed, is a yeveats. — o v do net : the 
mind, and not the body, is the seat of pleasure ; bodily 
pleasures are mental sensations arising from the body. — 
dXXh ytvopevrjs k.t.X. The dvairXrjpcdais is the yeveats of 



10— 12; c. iv. 1,2.] ETHICS.— BOOK X. 211 

which »|<Wi/ is the coincident result. — r) hk h6£u k.t.x. From 
the accidental connection of rjbovfi and avair\^pu(ris in bodily 
pleasures, they argue their identity ; whereas there arc many 
pleasures, not bodily, which are in no ways connected with 

dvanXt] parens. 

(25.) 10. fj Tto eiSei, or, admitting that tho above-mentioned 

really are i)ftovai, must Ave divide rjboval into right and wrong, 
and denying good of the latter, assert it of the former ? 

(26.) 11. rj 8ia(p6povs e'lbei, SC. ras ijbovas. 

(27.) 12. ovStls k.t.X. There is a manifest difference be- 
tween the pleasure of the child and of the man — o ifie x a l '" 
f> 6 1 v, the pleasure arising from bad sources is evidently not 
atperov, but the contrary. — p. r) 8 k n o t e p kXX on v \v7rrj6rjvai, 
though he were never likely to smart for it. See Bishop 
Butler, Tendencies of Virtue. 

(28.) 12. 7rep\ noXXa K.r.X. In some things pleasure is the 
final cause, while in others it is not ; as the pleasure of see- 
ing, &c. : hence, too, pleasures differ from each other. 



CHAPTER IV. 

(29.) 1. dn dpxvs dv a\a(3 ov a- 1: having considered the com- 
mon opinions on the subject, and their difficulties and solu- 
tions, retracing our steps, and beginning the subject afresh. He 
shews — 

1. What it is not : — it is not a klv^ctis. 

2. What it is. 

(30.) 1. reXeia eivai. Take any point in any prolonged 
energy of sight, the act of sight so taken is perfect in itself, 
though no other act of sight had preceded it, and none were 
to follow. — o X o v t i, indivisible. 

(31.) 2. iv xp" 1 "? y a P 7r«o" a Kivrjo-ts. A Ktvrjais is a pro- 
gression from one state to another, — from that which is kv 
hvvapti to that which is in eWeXex^?, (see Phys. iii. 1 ;) and 
therefore involves not merely a point of time, but a space of 
time : when that space of time is ended the Kivrjiris ceases, 
the rkXos towards which it was a kivtjo-ls being arrived at; 
wherefore kv XP° V( ? 7iw fl nlvr/ais. 



212 ETHICS.— BOOK X. [c. iv. 2, 

(32.) 2. r) iv airavri tco XP° VC0 *l * v tovtco. This is the 
major premiss of a disjunctive syllogism, one alternative of 
which has to be supplied. If a Ktvrjo-is is reXeia, it is so either 
iv cnravn xp° vc p v * v tovtco, or not at all. The first step is to give 
the characteristics of Kivr)o~eis iv pipeo-i, viz. that they are ire pat 
tco ei'Sei and areXeTs. This latter disposes of the claim of the 
Kivrjaeis iv pepecn to be reAeitu, and he then goes on to enlarge 
upon the point of their specific difference, with a view to 
prove that the whole kIv^o-is thus made of specifically different 
portions is not re\ela. Tou must view kivtjo-is either in its 
totality, extending from the hvvapis to the ivTe\ix el - a > — an( l 
then it is iv cmavn tco xpoVo) in its whole duration, — or in any of 
the various parts of the whole, and then it will be iv tovtco in 
that particular space of its duration. Michelet reads rj iv airavTi 
br) tco XP° V(0 tovtco, confining the view of k'iv^o-ls to its whole 
duration ; but this destroys the argument given above. 

(33.) 2. Ka\ eT€pai tco etdei k.t.X. As the several Kivrja-eis differ 
from one another, and from the whole which they together 
constitute, it is clear that they are several independent Kivrjo-eis 
rather than one whole : though they result in one end, yet 
they are not continuations of one another, but are hepai tco 
ci'Sa ; and therefore the whole Klvrjo-ts cannot be viewed as 
reXeia, for each of the independent parts has passed away 
before the whole is complete. That this is what he has in 
view in shewing the several Kivr)(reis to be irepat tco eiS«, is 
clear from the end of section 3. 

(34=) 2. pafiScbo-ecos, fluting : Lidd. and Scott. — < p rj it 7 S o s, base- 
ment. — TpiyXvqbov, a three- grooved tablet, placed at equal 
distances along the frieze. Id. 

(35.) 2. Ka\ ovk i'o-TLv k.t.X. If a KLvrjcns be taken at any 
point of its duration, it is imperfect, inasmuch as it has re- 
lation to what has preceded and what is to follow, and with- 
out these it has no real existence : if perfection can be pre- 
dicated at all of a KLvrjo-is (dXX' etirep TeXeiav 8et Xeyetv), it nmst 
be viewed in its whole duration, from the moment when it 
begins to the moment when it ceases {iv tco clttclvti, sc. xpovcp). 
This is another way of stating the disjunctive premiss above, 
(note 32,) one of the alternatives (the iv tovtco xp° vco Kivrjo-ets) 
having been eliminated. — k a\ Tavrt] s: particular Kivrjo-eis are 
also specifically different. 



3,4] ETHICS—BOOK X. 218 

(36.) 3. ov fiovov ydp k.t.X. The act is not merely a motion 
across a point, bat across a point with the accident of locality 
attached to it, which is sufficient to make one such act differ 

from the Other, (ci/ erepoi, SC. two) avrrj (Keivrjs). — Si' a k p i- 

^et'as: Phys. iii. 1. 

(37.) 3. iv anavri xP° V( ?i * n ^ s whole duration. A Kiurjais is 
not really perfect and complete in its whole duration, for the 
very same moment that it is completed it ceases to exist as a 
Kivrjo-is : when viewed as a whole it is merely a succession, or 
series of imperfect lav^o-eis, specifically differing from each 

other, (a\X* at noXXal kol dtacpepovaat rco e'iba,) inasmuch as 

each starts from a specific point, and tends to a specific and 
special end, (e'ln-ep to nodev 7rot et(Woioi/). We must supply 
the conclusion of the disjunctive syllogism : " therefore a 

Kivrjais is not TeXeia. 

(38.) 4. rrjs fjbovrjs S' iv 6 r a o v v reXeiov to cldos. Each, 
sort of pleasure, and each several one of a succession of 
pleasurable emotions, (i. e. of a state of pleasure,) is perfect 
and complete in itself ; each several emotion is not a step in 
an imperfect process, as in the case of Ktvrjo-ts, but in itself, 
and by itself, realizes a definite notion : so that if there was 
nothing either before or after, yet its notion and definition 
(ddos) would be complete. — twv 6\cov Ka\ reXeicov, be- 
longs to the indivisible and perfect. 

(39.) 4. to yap iv r<a vvv oXov r(. A klvyjo-is does not 
exist merely in present time; it has a before and an after, 
without which it has no meaning; whereas an emotion of 
pleasure implies no notion of time, except just so much as 
is implied in present existence : and that which can exist 
perfectly in the minutest portion of time, to the notion and 
perfection of which time is not necessary, is of the nature of 
things whole and indivisible. 

(40.) 4. tS>v pepio-Toiv: such things as are made up of parts 
imperfect in themselves, none of which has separately an 
existence independent of the whole of which it is a part. It 
is true that a state of pleasure may be divided into its suc- 
cessive pleasing emotions, but each of these is in itself a 
whole, and capable of existing independently of the whole 
state of pleasure, just as the portions of a divided crystal are 
in themselves perfect crystals. 



214 ETHICS.— BOOK X. [c. iv. 4, 5, 

(-11) 4. ovbe yap opdae&s kt.X. opaais is oXov tl ; for if a 
being were only to enjoy his sight for a single moment of time, 
the act of sight would for that moment be as perfect an act of 
vision as if it were continued for an hundred years : it cannot 
be divided into energies so minute, but that each is in itself 
perfect and complete. 

(42.) 5. alcrOrjo-eois k.t.X. Having now shewn what rjbovrj is 
not, he now proceeds to say what it is. To every act of the 
senses, or of the active or contemplative intellect, there is an 

T)8ovrj attached, (kcitcl ndaav yap aXa-Brjcriv Icttlv fjdovr) — opoicos be 

Ka\ hiavoiav kch Oecoplav,) arising from and upon the realiza- 
tion and attainment of the object of sense or intellect ; 
i. e. pleasure follows on the sensual reception of the ob- 
ject of sight, or on the intellectual conception of whatever 
object in the world of thought the intellect is for the time 
employed. The higher and more perfect the being, and the 
object on which it is employed, the higher and more per- 
fect will the energy be, and the higher and better the plea- 
sure ; and therefore the highest pleasure will result co- 
incidently on the realization and completion of the highest 
energy of the highest being. See Butler, Sermon on " Love 
of our Neighbour." 

(43.) 5. al<rdr]<reG>s Se 7rdat]s k.t.X. Every sense is directed 
towards some object as its end, in which it rests ; and every 
act of sense is an energy towards such an object. The most 
perfect energy is that of the most perfect sense, or of the 
sense in the most perfect state, working towards the best 
object which falls under its powers. 

(44.) 5. avrrjv Se k.t.X. The psychological question whether 
the sense itself works and energizes towards its object, or the 
being in whom the sense resides, is foreign to the present 
question. 

(45.) 5. avTJ] b' av e'lrj k.t.X. He here anticipates a conclusion 
which properly can only be drawn after the next clause, (kuto. 
naaav aladrjalv eWu> 77 rjBovfj,) and lays it down that that 
energy which is most perfect would also bring with it the 
highest pleasure, as every act of sense or intellect has its 
pleasure ; and that pleasure will be the highest which results 
from the highest and most perfect energy, as before defined ; 
i. e. the energy which works towards its highest and best 
object. 



G, 7.] 



ETHICS.— BOOK X. 



215 



(46.) 6. TfXeioI fie ivipyciav k.t.X. Pleasure crowns and 
perfects the energy, not as a producing or instrumental 
cause, but as a result ; as health is the perfection of, or per- 
fects, the body, but not in the same way in which the in- 
strumental causes, such as the physician or medicine, perfect 
it. The a'ia 6t)tov is an ingredient in the completion of 
the energy, as being the object on which it works ; the 
madrjais perfects it as being its instrument ; the fjbovfj per- 
fects it as being its result, — just as beauty is the perfection 
of the prime of youth, without being necessary to its ex- 
istence, or in any way producing it. 



(47.) 7. , 



O I V T CO V 



e o v t co v k.t.X. If the aiadrjais and aladr)- 



tou are good of their sort (roioi/rcoz/), f)8ovf] will always follow, as 
being the result of the realized correspondence between the 
aio-Orjo-is and the a'ladr]Tov : if the energy is incomplete, so that 
the a'ia8T)<ris fails to realize the object, 17801/77 will not follow ; 
but when they are adapted one to the other, and the a'tad^ais 
works towards the alo-QrjTov on the one hand, and the ala0t]T6v 
satisfies the a'laOria-is on the other, then pleasure is the result. 
— alaOavofxevov is here " that which is to receive the impression, = 

aiadrjcris. ^*-»*« fc 



(48.) 7. vn a pxovr 6 s ye rov n o if) cr ovr o s K.a\ rot) 7rei- 
ao /xtvov. The generic sense of noielv and itaax^v when thus 
opposed, is of things or persons standing in the relation of 
agent and patient, subject and object, active and passive : 
their specific or particular signification varies according to 
the subject-matter of the context. Thus in the fifth book 
the former signifies the producer, the latter the consumer, (see 
bk. v. note 6L ;) and in this passage, as the context relates to 
the mental energies or acts, these words would relate — the 
one, to some active energy of the mind, the other, some passive 
impression. Hence the sense seems to be, " It naturally is a 
condition of pleasure arising from the correspondence be- 
tween the aladrjais and the alo-drjTov, that there should be 
some being who has a capability of the active energies of 

aladrjais, (rov noifjcrovTOs = /xeXKovTOs 7roieTi/,) and a capacity for 

receiving the passive impressions of sense, (toO neiaonevov = 
/neXXoi/ro? 7ra0etv)." The aladrjTov might clearly exist without 
producing any pleasure, if the active aloOrjais were wanting, 
and the a'laOqa-is would produce no pleasure if the ma0r)r6v 



21G ETHICS.— BOOK X. [c. iv. 8-10 ; 

were lacking ; but even where they both exist, that in which 
they exist must be in such a state, both actively and pas- 
sively, as to allow of their being called into being. Thus the 
ala6rjais exists in sleep, and the aladrjTop likewise ; but as the 
capacity of active energies of aia-Orja-is, and the passive im- 
pressions receivable from aladrjrov are suspended, no pleasure 
is produced. 

(49.) 8. oi>x <*> s f^'s k.t.X.j not as an ingredient, but as a result 
and crown. This is the practical difference between Eudoxus 
and Aristotle. The former would say happiness is a result 
of the highest pleasure ; pleasure is an essential ingredient of 
happiness : Aristotle, that pleasure was the result of happi- 
ness ; happiness could exist without it. 

(50.) 8. 6 poL ov yap opt cop. Being similar, and there being 
the same correspondence and adaptation (irpos aXXrjXa top 
avTop Tponop exopTcov) between the active energies, (the Kplvop or 
6eopovp,) tov noirjTiKov and the qualities of the object thereof, 
(the potjtop or alo-6r)Tov), tov Tra6r]TiKov, the same result, viz., 
rjdovrj, foDows, as in the case of the simple aia-6rj<ris, (ravTo 
TT€<pvKe yepeo-Oai) : to Kphop is here the active energy, which has 
potjtop for its subject-matter ; and aladrjTov is here the subject- 
matter of decopia, which is a highly intellectual ata-Bria-is, — the 
perception of things, their qualities, laws, &c. It is possible 
that 7roir]TiKov may mean the alo-6rjT6p which produces (ttoUl) 
the impression, and nadrjTLKov the faculty which receives it, 
(ndcrxei) ; but on the whole it seems better to adopt the sense 
given above. — S ia tclv t 6, for the same reason, sc. because we 
are weary of it. — S i a t a v r a, al. for these reasons, sc. which 
have just been mentioned. — it a pan* kXtjtcu, is excited. 

(51.) 9. ?7 ac d/z vet. Michelet follows the old interpretation, by 
taking this as an answer to the preceding question, it 5> s 
ovp k.t.X., is it that he is weary of it ? 

(52.) 10. TtXetot is the TeXos of— the perfection — crown ; it is a 
necessary result. — r ov i p e p y e I v, in which life consists ; 
and therefore of life itself. 



c.v.l— 10.] ETHICS.— BOOK X. 217 



CHAPTER V. 

(53.) 1. o 8 e v, sc. from its connection with cvtpy€iai : as the hep- 
yeiat arc different, so must the pleasures which result from 
and crown them be different. The contradictory opinions 
about pleasure being or not being a good, arise from there 
being different sorts of pleasure, and one party looking 
at one sort, the other at another sort. And again, if there 
are different sorts of pleasure, true pleasure may arise from 
the pure intellect, and the moral nature, and even from the 
mere senses ; each being a true pleasure in its kind and 
degree. 

(54j.) 2. iirib t&oatriv, gain ground and are improved. This is 
one of the final causes of pleasure. 

(55.) 5. e£aKpi/3oI, perfects. 

(56.) 6. Kal yap a I in i6v p. [ a i, the desires whicli arise from 
definite feelings and passions, and whence spring definite 
emotions of desire, (opegis ; ) while f)8ovf) is the more general, 
indefinite love of enjoyment, — the general tone of mind, 
which, up to a certain point, regulates and directs the eVt- 
Ovpiac. — f) 8 ov a i, the emotions of pleasure which are the re- 
sult of the evepyeiai, of sense or reason. We must distinguish 
between -qftovr) as a motive cause preceding, and as a result 
following 011, the action. — r] yap Kara k.t.X., SC. iariv oliceia. 

(57.) 6. a l pep yap 8 1 a> p 10* p.e v a i k.t.X. The ope£is may pre- 
cede the ivepyeia by a long time. It differs from it in its 
nature as much as the act in posse differs from the act in esse, 
while the pleasure arising from any energy is so closely con- 
nected with it as to be almost identical. — o-vveyyvs, co- 
incident. 

(58.) 8. f) yap Kara k.t.X., SC. iar\v diKeia. 

(59.) 10. eivai to <paiv6/.ievov, SC. to (Paivopepov ra> OTrouSaia) civai 
Kvpiccs f]8v. — el 8 e tovto k aX a> s X eye rat. If pleasures 

then differ in excellence according to the he'pyeiai whence they 
arise, and the good man is the true standard, then the 
f)8ovTj of aperf] is the highest fjbovf) of man. — 6 dyad 6 s fj 
to iovto s, i. e. in respect of his aperr), as far as he has aperf 
he is the standard of excellence. 
rf 



218 ETHICS.— BOOK X. [c. v. 11; vi., 

(GO.) 11. d\\a tovtois, except to individuals.. — eiV ovv p. I a 
k.t.X, the energy or energies of the man who has arrived at 
the highest happiness, the greatest perfection of which he 
is capable, have the highest and most perfect pleasures 
attached to them. 



CHAPTER VI. 

(61.) He now proceeds to sum up his book by stating that to- 
wards which he has been throughout working, — the nature of 
human happiness ; — and first, happiness being an energy and 
rap kcl8' avTa alperwv, what energies apparently of this class 
are nevertheless not evbaipovia. 

(62.) 2. ovk itrrlv egis: bk. i. 7. — dvayicaiai, necessary as 
means. — a vrdpKrjs, self-contained. It needs not pleasure 
nor anything else to complete or perfect it. It would be 
what it is if nothing were to be joined with it. Of course, 
if other good things are added to it, it is increased in degree, 
just as youth is rendered more desirable by the beauty which 
accompanies it ; but it is youth still, even though there be 
no beauty superadded. So pleasure is not essential to it, 
though necessarily joined to it as a coincident result. It is 
in its essence always alpeTareTrjv, compared with everything 
else ; but if it has other goods, as accidents and results, it is 

alperarepa avrr] eavrrjs. See bk. i. ch. vii. note 112. 

(63.) 3. evBaipoviCopevcov, of those who are thought happy. 

(64.) 7. fj$r), ipso facto. 

(65.) 8. ei p.ri Kal piov, external life; social life :— they have 
far), but not (Bios. The slave has no existence of his own : his 
daily life, and all in which it consists, is his master's. 



CHAPTEE VII. 

(6Q.) In this chapter he lays down the conclusion of his whole 
treatise, that evdaipovla is the energy of the highest excellence 
of man ; that in itself the ivepyeia and apery Kara vovv is the 



vii. 1—9.] ETHICS.-BOOK X. 219 

highest energy, looking upon man merely in respect of his 
intellect as an intellectual being ; but looking upon man as 
a compound being, his highest good, being what he is — 
a moral being, — is a life according to moral virtue. 

(G7.) 1. Kara ri)v oik e Lav a p e t r\ v, according to its proper per- 
fection. 

(68.) 2. kci\ yap 6 uovs (kputkttos) TCOV iv rjpiV, Ka\ T CO v yv CO- 
OT co v (upio-ra) nep\ a 6 vovs. Of subjects of knowledge, the 
subjects of vovs are the best. 

(G9.) 3. evXoyov be rols eiSotri k.t.X. It is reasonable that 
life should be more agreeable to those who are in possession 
of knowledge than to those who are only seeking after it. It 
is assumed that all men are either searching after knowledge 
or in possession of it. 

(70.) 6. nap' avrb to it oX it ev e <r 6 ai, besides and beyond the 
mere energies of political life. 

(71.) 7. t) r e X e l a fir) evdaipovla. In itself, and looked upon 
as the highest energy which the nature of man admits of, 
the energy of the pure intellect is evdai^ovia, — of which it in 
every respect realizes the idea, and fulfils the condition ; but 
as man is a compound being, such an energy would not be 
the energy of man, but as partaker of a nature above hu- 
manity. It is a perfection which every one ought to aim at and 
realize as far as possible, but it is the perfection of dddpaTos 
rather than the 6ptjt6s. 

(72.) 8. KaTa. ttjp ciWrjv a. p e r rj v, moral virtue ; evepyeia (rod 
6eiov §ia<fiepei) evepyeias ttjs k.t.X. — Kara, tovs irapaivovv- 
Tas, according to moralists. Either Theognis, or Solon, or 
Epicharmus. Cf. Rhet. ii. 21. 

(73.) 9. 86%eie k.t.X. The essence of the life of the rational 
creature, man, is reason, wherefore it is but reasonable that 
he should try to develope and realize this wherein his life 
essentially consists. 

(74.) 9. t6 Xex$ei/ irpoTepop, sc. about dpeTT} and qcW^. 



220 ETHICS.— BOOK X. [c. viii. 

CHAPTEE VIII. 

(75.) 1. SevTt'paj. Secondarily, and viewed as the proper energy 
of the compound being, man, evdaipovia consists in j)0i<«) dperr). 

(76.) 3. e'iirep a I pev t r) s (ppovr)o~e(OS dp^al. r)6iKr) aperr), 

supposing it to be formed, tov o-kottov 6p6bv iroiei, (see bk. vi. 
12), and thus supplies the dpxai of action to cppovrjo-is as the 
deliberative faculty in moral action. See bk. vi. note 133. — 
to de 6p66v, and the direction of moral actions is the function 
of (ppovrjcns. 

(77.) 3. to Is ir a 6 e a- 1 Trepl to avv 6 ctov, with the passions 
in the compound being. — a I § e r ov o-vv 6 ctov dpsTaX dv- 
BpaiTiKai k.t.X. He thus reconciles the Platonic theory, 
which is founded on the abstract excellence of Oecopia, with 
his own, which is founded on the actual practical nature and 
position of man. — r) 8£ tov vov Ke^wpto-fxej/^, sc. from 
the passions. 

(78.) 4. cgovo-ias, liberty, opportunity. 

(79.) 7. dvdpa>7reveo-dai,, to play his part as a man. — tovs 
6eovs. This is not the language of a man who disbelieved 
in a Divine Being. — a I S e aoiCppoves, SC. npd&is. el Se o-a>- 
(ppoves, al. 

80.) 8. ov k a.T a crvp.$e$r]K.6s, not in its accidental results. 

81.). 9. derjo-ei k.t.X. A being such as man requires external 
goods for perfect happiness, for even OeatpLa looks for some of 
these as conditions and pre-requisites. — o v p r) v k.t.X. Here 
is the same distinction drawn between p.a<dpLov and evdaipovia 

as in bk. i ov yap iv Tfj vtt e p /3 o\fj. He here passes 

away almost insensibly from the abstract happiness of 6ea>pia 
to the political happiness of npdgcs. — r 6 avTapKes, the 
sort and degree of external goods necessary to deoopia. — r) 
iv pd£is, the action of moral virtue which requires external 
things as its subject-matter. Hence the real meaning of the 
passage, " Neither 6eapLa nor r)diicr) dperr) require an excessive 
amount of external goods." 

(82.) 12. Ttia-T iv p e v ov v k.t.X. Observe the practical cha- 
racter of Aristotle's mind. 

(83.) 13. el ydp tis i n t, p e X e t a k.t.X. Here again is a dis- 
tinct recognition of Divine Providence. 



c.ix. 1-17.] ETHICS.— BOOK X. 221 



CHAPTER IX. 

(84.) 1. uvk eo-Ttv iv rols npaKTols. Here be is speaking 
of the result of the whole of the preceding treatise, as to 
decoprjcrai feat yv&vai. He has been giving, not merely practical 
directions for virtue, but laying down and proving a theory 
of virtue and happiness ; not an abstract theory with no 
further result, (ov Oeopias eW*a, bk. ii. 2,) but a practical 
theory, with a view to right action, and to the system of 
politics which has human good for its end. His theory of 
virtue so far agrees with Plato's, that he holds intellectual 
energies to be in themselves the highest excellence of a 
being possessing intellect ; but he has proved that the epyov, 
and hence the excellence of man as a compound being, is 
realized by rjdtKf) dperrj. Though his Ethics necessarily have 
a practical bearing, yet their object is mainly yvaxns t^s 
operas /cat rod dyaQov ; but the re'Xos of this yvcoats is npdgis. 
See bk. i., note 46. 

(85.) 3. Qeoyviu. Theognis, 532. — n otrjo-ai av, might or would 

make. Gr. Gr. 429, 1. — Kar o ku^i/xov 4 k ttjs dperrjs, 
possessed, occupied by; al. KaraKODxtpos. II. /3. 669, ecpiXrjdev £k 
Alos. 

(86.) 5. KaTei\r]p.p.eva, possessed by ; much the same as k<itci- 
Kcoxi-pos above. 

(87.) 6. pr) 7T or ov k I <r x^U '• GtT* Gr. 814. — it pobieipydcrdai, 
to be cultivated beforehand. 

(88.) 7 '. ' a-weirjy take it in. 

(89.) 8. arepyov to ko.'Kov k.t.A. This IS cpvaiKr) dperrj. 

(90.) 9. e7T it rj 8 ei e iv avrd, SC. rpocprjv Kal empeXetav dpdrjv. 

(91.) 9. Xdyo? (ov k.tX. Observe this definition of law. — and 
rivo s eppov-qo- €(os, proceeding from a particular sort of 
cppovrjo-is ; that which takes cognizance of human good in 
general : bk. vi. 5. 5, 8. 1 . 

(92.) 13. per oXiyav, with a few others. See i. 13. 3. — Kv- 
k\g>7tlk5>s: Od. ix. 114. 

(93.) 17. ovriva yap ovv\ quemvis ; any one. — npoTeOevTa, com- 
mitted to one's care. Some refer it to vdpov. 



222 ETHICS.— BOOK X. [c. ix. 18-23. 

(94.) 18. nap a r 5> v 7to\itikg>v, i. e. "Is it a matter of 5i- 
daxij ? " — Swdpeav. properly, organic sciences or art ; 
here, opposed to e7no-Tr)pai, arts : see bk. i. note 22. — o v no- 
X i r lkovs TvtiToiriKoTes'. see Plat. Protag. 166, sqq. 

(95.) 19. ov ijltjv ixmpov ye k.t.X. This formula, ov pfjv ye, 
refers to the question stated above, — " Is it matter of dtdaxrj ?" 
(r) irapa twv noXiTiKcov ;) and when this has been discussed by 
stating and examining the opposite question, {rj ovx Spoiov k.t.X. 
— (piXraTois,) he resumes the subject by ov prjv ye : " But truly, 
at all events, (ye, however this may be,) experience seems to 
contribute not a little, otherwise (ov yap av k.t.X.) men would 
not have become politicians from political practice." 

(96.) 20. rr}v avTTjv rfj 'Ptjto pLKfj : see Rhet. i. 2 toarirep 

o v d e k.t.X. &cnrep = boKovvTes : Grr. Grr. 703. 

(97.) 21. I a 6 elev, SC. eKao-roi. — e k&gt ov s. eKao~TOV, Michelet ; 
SC. OepanevpaTa. 

(98.) 22. 7rapaXi7r6vT(Dv. This is interpreted to mean that no 
one had treated of it with sufficient accuracy. — a vtovs, our- 
selves. 

(99.) 23. 7rpS>Tov pkv k.t.X. Michelet observes that wpaTov 
pkv refers to the Politics i. 11 ; efra, to iii. — vi. ; QeaprjOev- 
tgjv, to vii., viii. 

(100.) 23. ap^dpevoi: having made this dpxn or introduction. 
The true view of the Ethics is, that it is the introduction or 
grammar of the Politics. 



INDEX TO MATTEES CONTAINED IN 
THE NOTES. 



A. 

Abstract and practical sciences, differ- 
ence between the acquisition of, vi. 87. 

ayaOos, force of, ii. 58. 

Ayvota tuv Ka8 y eKaara, iii. 19. 

r) ko.66\ov, iii. 19, 23. 

4v t?7 Trpoaip4crei, ibid. 

ayvocou, actions of, iii. 18. 

ayxivoia, meaning of, vi. 98. 

adencHTToi, meaning of, ii. 107. 

aSiKia f) iv fxepei, how far an virepfSoXi} 
and e\\ei\pts, v. 74. 

alSus, function of, iv. 123. 

alodyaLS, apxa'h arrived at by, i. 136. 

importance of in Aristotle's sys- 
tem, ii. 111. 

in moral action, iii. 40. 



aiadrjoris votjtikt], vi. 93. 

al(r6i]TiKT] e7rto"nr/yU7j, vii. 51 — 75. 

alaxpfo, meaning of, ii. 36 ; iii. 6 ; vii. 
72. 

aKoAaaia, meaning and nature of, iii. 147, 
168; vii. 42, 86, 100. 

oK^Aao-Tos, Aristotle's dislike to, iii. 167. 

anouaios, looser use of, v. 109. 

aKpaata, general view of, vii. 156 : mean- 
ing of, vii. 3 : founded on quasi rea- 
soning, vii. 75. 

i phaenomena of, explained, vii. 

38, 41. 

nature of, vii. 11 — 86. 

subject-matter of, vii. 53. 

why shewn to be Trepl 7]5ovds, vii. 



67. 
d/cpaTTjs may be 5eiv6s, vii. 111. 
aicpSrris, how virtue is, ii. 71. 
aAas tovs Asyofx.evovs, viii. 13. 



Alcibiades, illustration of fi(yaX6^vxos, 
iv. 33, 3 k 

aArjOeia rov vov, how it secures right 
action, vi. 10. 

avdyxr), meaning of, vi. 29 ; iii. 55 ; di- 
visions of, iii. 54. 

avaipei, meaning of, x. 8. 

Analogy, modes of refuting argument 
from, ii. 43. 

ava.iT\T)p<»<Tis, pleasure resulting from, 
vii. 123, 126. 

auSpeia and awippocrvvyi, why particular- 
ized together, ii. 22 ; iii. 100. 

virtue of the dvfxoeiSes, iii. 100. 

progress of an action of, iii. 109. 

conditions of, iii. 108. 

f} ttoXltikt), meaning of, iii. 122. 

spurious sorts of, iii. 121. 

why treated of before oufypoavvi), 

iii. 100. 

avdpelos, sphere of, iii. 106. 

Anger, mean of, why avuvvfxos, iv. 85. 

how far a plea of involuntariness, 

v. 104. 

auTiKstTcu, meaning of, vi. 90. 

d.VTiireirov66s, how far a true principle of 
exchange, v. 55. 

a£la, principle of in hiKaioavvr), viii. 26. 

airdeeia ital vpefiia, how far a true de- 
scription of virtue, ii. 34. 

air\6>s, sense of, i. 42. 

Siicaiov, v. 77. 

air6dei^is, meaning and nature of, vi. 33. 

a7ro8e|eTCK, meaning of, iv. 95. 

a.Troo-Tr)iJ.a.(n, meaning of, i. 179. 

apery, excellence, not necessarily moral 
virtue, i. 128. 



224 



INDEX. 



apery, how a fKaSrrjs, ii. 66. 

■ how an aKp6rr}s, ii. 71. 

how ircpl ifiovas /cat Xviras,i\. 27. 

a balance of ySowf} and Autttj, ii. 81. 

function of in choice of good end, 

vii. 100. 

— — reXem, how far indestructible, i. 
175. 

why the perfection of aladyriKr) is 

so called, vi. 132. 

effect and test of, ii. 57. 

Aristotle's moral system, key-stone of, 
iii. 35 : his data, i. 58, 140. 

his philosophy inductive, vii. 13. 

does not dogmatize, iii. 10. 

his mode of searching after hap- 
piness, i. 13, 104. 

practical wisdom of ii. 105. 

rejects views which are contrary 

to experience, vii. 16. 

his ways of searching after truth, 



i. 138. 



way of treating responsibility, 



iii. 97. 



■ and Eudoxus, different views of, 

on pleasure and happiness, x. 49. 

Art and chance, connection between, vi. 
46. 

apxv, meaning of, i. 59; iii. 67. 

apxai, ways of arriving at, i. 136. 

apxh tov rjdovs, x. 2. 

Asceticism unknown to Aristotle, i. 63. 

acrQiveia, cause of aKpaaia, vii. 95. 

ao-retoi, meaning of, iv. 50. 

aavnnerpos, meaning of, iii. 51. 

acrwria, nature of, iv. 22. 

&<tcctos, derivation of, iv. 14. 

arexvia, nature of, vi. 47. 

aiira di axnSov, v. 52. 



B. 

Barbarians, why degraded, vii. 9. 

fieXTiaTT) TToXireia, where existing, v. 92. 

Benefactor, why his feelings are strong- 
est, ix. 40. 

Benefits conferred on others are pleasant, 
ix. 38, 39. 

P'tos, external life, i. 190, 193. 



/3tos and far), difference between, ix. 61. 

reAetos, meaning of, i. 175. 

Bodily appetites, final causes of, iii. 165. 
Bodily pleasures, how realized, x. 24 ; 

cause of, vii. 123. 
(SovAerai, meaning of, iii. 22. 
fiovXevais, nature of, iii. 40. 
fiovAyais, nature of, iii. 40. 
Butler's practical argument on necessity, 

how far used by Aristotle, iii. 86. 
Buyer fixes the value, ix. 9. 



Casuistry, nature of, ix. 11. 

Catallactic justice : Siacuov and 1.<roir, 

v. 36. 

interchange in, v. 58. 

Causation in Physics, Aristotle's views 

on, iii. 54. 
Chance and art, connection between, vi. 

46. 
Change of heart recognised by Aristotle, 

v. 11. 
Channels whereby i)dv reaches us, vi. 

21 ; vii. 74. 
Circumstances of parties, how far con- 
sidered in diorthotic justice, v. 47. 
Concupiscible and irascible emotions, 

i. 219 ; ii. 22. 
Conscience, objective, iii. 21. 
Constitution, definition of, viii. 38. 
Contrary opinions, what to be deduced 

from, i. 146. 
Contrivance (re'x^), vi. 36. 



D. 

Death, events after — how far they affect 

happiness, i. 174. 
in what sense termed Trepas, iii. 

104. 
deiAia, nature of, iii. 117. 
$eiv 6s may be aKparys, vii. 111. 
SzivoTrjs, nature and function of, vi. 133, 

sqq. 
and <pp6v7]ais ) differences between, 

vi. 137. 
Deliberation, what, iii. 69. 



IXDI'A. 



225 



Descendants, how far their fortunes in- 
fluence happiness, i. 198. 

htairoTiKbv SiKaiov, v. 86. 

Sevrepos itAovs, meaning of, ii. 104. 

Si' &yvoiav, actions, iii. If). 

SiaiperSs, meaning of, ii. 61 . 

S'ikciiov, how fxiaov, v. 42 : divisions of, 
v. 77 : origin of, v. 79; confined to 
man, v. 122. 

ZiKaioavvr), notion of, why arrived at from 
aSiKia, v. 3. 

and i]0ik^) aperrj, identity and dif- 
ference of, v. 22. 

proof of 7j0i/o) apery being the 

tpyov, v. 1. 18. 

and cpiXia, what is considered in 

each, viii. 26. 

substitute for <pi\ia, viii. 36, 4. 

■ how far a proof of <piKia, viii. 34, 



46. 
ZiKcuoavvt], T) iv /uepet, twofold nature of, 

v. 15. 
■ relation of, to o\ri Sue. and t]8ik^ 

apery, ib. 
not wepl ySovds koX 

Aviras, v. 72. 
how different from other vir- 



tues, v. 72. 
how iv juepet aperrjs, v. 23. 



Diorthotic justice, how applied, v. 50. 
Distributive justice, SUaiov and fiicrov, 

v. 36. 
8/>£a, in moral action, iii. 40. 

nature of, vi. 27. 

Dreams, Aristotle's notions on, i. 216. 
Swd/xei, meaning of, iv. 105. 
Swd/xeis, how far habits become, vi. 116. 
Svvafus, meanings of, i. 22, 205. 



E. 



iytcpdreia, nature of, vii. 11, 86; vii. 

156. 
1 how far intellectual firmness, 

vii. 104. 
£Qkth6s, source of a/>x°»> i« 136. 
exaar orris, ix. 21. 
itcireaeiv avrovs, meaning of, iii. 26. 



iv apxf), meaning of, viii. :;:>. 

iv )8ty TeAefy, i. 131, 175. 

iv fxipei aperris SiKatoavv-q, meaning of, 

v. 23. 
iv rfj Suvd/u.ei, meaning of, iv. 1(),>. 
Enquiry, Aristotle's method of, vii. 13, 

33. 
e|js, meaning of, ii. 55 ; vi. 40. 
i£ viroOiacujs, meaning of, v. 70. 
itwTepiKol Koyoi, what, i. 213. 
iTrayooyi), source of apxal, i. 136. 
iiraiverdv and Ka\6v, difference between, 

ii. 102. 
cTTaivos, how the standard of virtue, i. 

223. 
faret, used independently, iv. 20. 
imSiSoaaiv, meaning of, x. 5 t. 
iirlSoais, meaning of, ii. 100. 
iirie'iKeia, nature of, iii. 102; v. 123. 
irnQvp-ia, iii. 40. 

influence of in aKpaaia, vii. 41. 

and rjSovf), how different, iii. 40, 

154; vii. 58—89, 91; x. 56. 
irricrrarai, meaning of, vi. 34. 
imaT-qix-q, nature of, ii. 63 ; vi. 28, 30. 

/cara av/j.fie&r)K6s, vi. 35. 

iirio-ry/xuv, vi. 30. 

Equality, how far necessary in daily 

life, v. 61. 
icr/xev ivepyela, meaning of, ix. 37. 
saxarov, meaning of, vi. 118; kcl\ iv- 

Sexo/xevov, meaning of, vi. 120. 
kripa irpSracris, what, vi. 121. 
Ethics, in what sense a practical treatise, 

i. 46 ; ii. 13. 

a scientific treatise, ii. 13; x. 81 : 

introduction to Politics, x. 100. 

Etymology, arguments from, ii. 2. 
evSai/xovia, meaning of, i. 51 ; energy of 

highest excellence, x. 66. 
evScu/jLOVKTiJLds and fxaKapio-fids, i. 169. 
Eudoxus, x. 5 ; i. 206. 
and Aristotle, different views of, 

on pleasure and happiness, x. 49. 
ed Zrjv, vi. 49. 
evOvs, meaning of, vi. 58. 
6uotox»o» vi. 97. 
i<pdirrerai, meaning of, iii. 142. 
%xeiv Xoyov, meaning of, i. 221. 



S 



22G 



INDEX. 



Exchange, in catallactic justice, v. 36. 
External goods, how far necessary to 

happiness, i. 175; x. 81. 
Extremes and mean, how opposed, iv. 

83. 
how one, more opposed to the 

mean than the other, ii. 96 ; iv. 1. 



H. 



7)84a, divisions of, explained, vii. 60„ 

7^5eo-0at, meaning of, x. 17, 22. 

77577, meaning of, x. 64. 

7]Soval, divisions of, iii. 149 ; vii. 122. 

7]Sovr), twofold sense of, ii. 27 ; na- 
ture of, vii. 131; x. 42 ; arguments 
against its being ayaQov, x. 14; not a 
yeueais, vii. 123 ; x. 23 ; why thought 
to be such, vii. 132. 

and avairXripuais, not identical, x. 

24. 

and Xvirrj, how they enter into all 

the virtues, ii. 65 ; iii. 99 : iv. 1 ; how 
they act in formation of character, ii. 
27 : arising from ko.\6v and cuVxpof, ii. 
27; iii. 11, 15: how considered in 
Books vii. and x., vii. 115 ; x. 1. 

and imdv/.ua, difference between, 

iii. 40, 154; vii. 58, 89, 91; x. 56. 

of apery) highest, x. 59. 

TjBv and Ka\6u, views of, different in dif- 
ferent moral states, vii. 4. 

7)56, difference between airAas and tivI, 
vii. 119; and o-v^&efirjKos, vii. 123. 

rjOiKT) aperr), how 7rept ySovas koI Avnasi 
iii. 99. 

how said to secure a right 



end, vi. 131. 



right 



Trpoatpecris, vi. 133. 
and Sinaioavvri, identity and 



difference of, v. 22. 
7) ovtuis, meaning of, vii. 145. 
r)udr)vai and 7}8e<r0e», difference between, 

x. 22. 



F. 

Fear, when right, iii. 101. 

Final cause, why called apx^), vii. 99. 

Final causes of action, ii. 35. 

Forms of opposition, compressed, to be 

worked out, i. 185. 
Fortitude and temperance, of what the 

regulation, iv. 1. 
Friends, actions of, why pleasant, ix. 54, 

57. 



r. 

yevecris, nature of, x. 23. 

yvw/xr), nature and functions of, vi. 114. 

and crvyyvufxri, difference between,, 

vi. 114. 

yv£><ns, how far the object of Ethics, i. 
46; ii. 13; x. 84. 

God recognised by Aristotle, vii. 155; 
viii. 54; ix. 21; x. 79, 83. 

Good, an absolute point, x. 16: no re- 
gular comparative of, ibid. 

highest, chosen by reason, ix. 49. 

how far recognised by bad men, 

ix. 49 ; x. 10. 

the, admits of degrees, x. 19. 

depends on personality, ix. 21. 

man, his life one of reason, ix. 19. 

Government, function of, viii. 38. 



H. 



Habit, how far expressive of the word 

e£is, vi. 40. 
Habits cannot have opposite results, 

v. 3. 
of mind on pleasures and pains 7 

vii. 86. 

how discernible from actions, v. 3. 

Happiness, essence and adjuncts of, i. 

175, 194. 

how to be attained, i. 160. 

whether attainable during life, i, 

174. 
why shewn to be tI^iiov, and not 

iivaii'eTov, i. 204, 



INDEX. 



227 



Happiness, highest, of man, x. (J(i. 

■ complete in itself, x. 62 : how in- 
creased by additions, ibid. 

Human nature, Aristotle's view of, ii. SI ; 
vi. 158. 



Ignorance, when an excuse, iii. 19. 
II liberality, nature of, iv. 19. 
Incontinence, inadequate translation of 

aKpaaia, vii. 3. 
Individual, how prior to state, viii. 56. 
Induction, recognised by Aristotle, vi. 81. 
Innate principles, i. 136. 
Instincts of human nature, iv. 1. 
Intellect and passions, both necessary to 

moral action, vi. 17, sqq. 
channel of impressions on iradtj, 

vi. 21 : not a motive cause, vi. 20 : 

how it £px e * T *? s TroiTjTiKfJy, ib. 
Intellectual development in virtue, vii. 1. 
energy, in what sense the 

highest, x. 66, 71. 
1 firmness, how far the same 



as iyKpareia, vii. 104. 
process, how concerned in 



action, vi. 115. 
Irascible and concupiscible emotions, 

i. 219; ii. 22. 
Vcroy, how fizaov, v. 36. 



KaOeffTTjKvias, meaning of, vii. 127. 
Kaiva. tov tto\4/xov, iii. 127. 
tcaXov, meaning of, i. 192 ; iii. 3. 

final cause of ai>dpela, iii. 114; 

of virtue, iii. 113. 

KaX6v and inaiviT6i/, ii. 102. 

alrrxptv, shadowy visions of, 

vi. 138, 142. 

Kaprepia, vii. 86. 
Kara, meaning of, ii. 14. 
Kara Sid^rpov avfcv^is, v. 58. 
Kara rbv SevTtpov ttXovv, ii. 104. 

\6yov, vii. 112. 

KaTonwxW *) meaning of, x. 85. 



K(i>a rod TroKt'nov, iii. 127. 

KepSos, meaning of in diorlhotic justice, 
v. 17. 1!». 

K€(pa\^}u txoutra, vi. (JS. 

nivr)(Tis not reAeia, x. 31: parts of, not 
rekaai, x. 32. 

Knowledge, actions contrary to, ex- 
plained, vii. 38. 

of general and particular, vi. 

74, sqq. 

Kvpios, meaning of, i. 175, 184; ii. 14. 

Kvp(ws, meaning of, i. 122. 

iTTi(TTT]fxrt, vii. 51. 

KvptwTcpov, meaning of, i. 126. 



X. 



Xavvos, nature of, iv. 51. 



A. 

Aa/j.(idveiv (pp6vt](riv, vi. 111. 
Law, definition of, x. 91. 
Keyecrdai, meaning of, i. 126. 
A.e/7r€T«i, ii. 55. 
Aeafiia a.KoSo/x(a, v. 129. 
Liberality, nature of, iv. 19. 
Living, pleasure in, ix. 57. 



IxaOrjTov, whether happiness is, i. 161. 
lioLKapiov, meaning of, i. 191, 194. 
/AaKapHT/xos and ev5aifxovt(Tp.6s, i. 169. 
/j.a\aKia, vii. 11, 80. 
Man, a compound being, iii. 35 ; x. 77. 
fMavreveadai, meaning of, i. 136; vi. 149. 
Mean and extremes, how opposed, iv. 83. 
/xeyaAoirpeTrris, character of, iv. 34, 41. 
fj.eya\6\pvxos, character of, iv. 75. 
Medical illustrations, Aristotle's fondness 

for, ii. 17. 
fx.€\ayxoXtKoi, why atcpareTs, vii. 95, 1 1 3_ 
Mental process, vi. 27. 
Mentiens, fallacy of, vii. 28. 
/xe/jiCTo, nature of, x. 40. 



22S 



INDEX. 



fx€aoT7]s how apery is, ii. 66 : not capable 
of degrees, ii. 78. 

yueTa opSov \6yov, meaning of, vi. 150. 

fiiKTal 7rpa|eis, iii. 6. 

Ixkti]t6v, meaning of, iii. 161 ; vii. 66. 

Money, use of, v. 64". 

Moral action, course of, iii. 40 : how far 
instructive, iii. 40. 

Moral actions, mental habits concerned 
in, vi. 115. 

and states, how they de- 
pend on (pp6vf)<Tis being worked into 
our nature, vii. 39, 42. 

energies, in what sense the best, 



x. 66, 71, 75. 

character, how formed, vi. 91, 



and page 152. 

• evil, sorts of, vii. 3. 

tone and view of great import- 



ance in Ethics, vii. 41. 

and physical beauty, connection 

between, iii. 101 ; v. 57. 
and political virtue, how not 



identical, v. 33. 
Moral wisdom, see cppovrjcris. 
Morals, shifting, ii. 16. 
Mutual wants, bond of commerce, v. 67. 



N. 



Nature, self-moving, vi. 45. 

■ of man, how viewed by Aristotle, 

page 153. 

Necessity, pleas of, answered by Aris- 
totle, iii. 78. 

vo/j.iKbv BiKatou, v. 77. 

v6jjlos, origin of, v. 81 ; voice of Siaaiov, 
v. 79. 

voovfxzv oti voovfAGV, ix. 61. 

vovs, meaning of, vi. 63 : functions of, 
page 151 : in science and morals, vi. 
120 : why termed atadya-Ls, vi. 63, 
93 : why substituted for <pp6vr]<Tis, vi. 
89, sqq., 115: why not rau npbs rb 
t4\os, vi. 63 : apx'h Kc « TeAos, in 
morals, vi. 120, 124: and ope|ts, how 
they imply each other, vi. 10. 

Number of citizens in a state, ix. 64. 



o, n. 

Obligations, how and when to be re- 
turned, viii. 62. 

opyrj, distinguished from 6v/j.6s, ii. 9. 

opeKTiKov, meaning of, i. 220. 

ope^is, nature and sorts of, iii. 40. 

— and fiov\7}<ris, why interchanged, 

ibid. 

how different from ivepyeia, x. 57. 

ws avdpuiros, meaning of, iii. 109. 



n. 



irapayys\'io.v, meaning of, ii. 18. 

irapaireTaa-fia, iv. 48. 

TrapacreicravTi, meaning of, iv. 57. 

Particular virtues, Aristotle's object in 
treating of, iii. 98. 

Particulars, view of important, vii. 49. 

■ knowledge of, not implied 

in iiriaTrifxr], vii. 50. 

Parties concerned, when considered in 
catallactic justice, v. 59. 

Passion and reason, struggle between, 
iii. 174. 

Passions, a part of man's nature, iii. 35. 

Passive impressions and active habits, 
ii. 23. 

Trdaxov and iroiovv, meaning of, v. 61 ; 
x. 48. 

Patriarchal authority in Asia, why wrong, 
viii. 41. 

TrarpLnbu SiKaiof, V. 86. 

Physical and moral beauty, connection 
between, iii. 101. 

■ nature, why superior to huma- 
nity, vi. 68. 

Plato, how Aristotle reconciles his no- 
tions with, x. 77, 84. 

notion of our moral perfection, ii. 

38. 

Pleasure, nature of, x. 42, sqq. ; result of 
highest eVepyeta, ibid. ; sorts of, x. 53 ; 
arguments in favour of, x. 5 ; how it 
completes the ivepyeia, x. 46 ; differ- 
ent views on, how caused, vii. 149 ; x. 



INDEX. 



229 



49; how it admits of degrees, x. 53; 

abstract and concrete, x. 19; reAela, 

as a whole, and in its parts, x. 32 ; 

how treated in Books vii. and x., vii. 1 ; 

x. 1 
Pleasure, remedy against pain, viii. 150, 

154. 
■ and pain, Eudoxus' argument 

from contraries, x. 111. 
when both evils, vii. 



147. 

Pleasures, false, why held to be plea- 
sures, vii. 149: why held to be bad, 
vii. 149, 150. 

7rA.7j,U|ueAes, meaning of, i. 165. 

7rA?V oaa /ix7j, meaning of, iv. 67. 

Troidrrjs, meaning of, x. 13. 

ir6\is how irpSrepov cpvaei, viii. 56. 

ttoXitikt) requires <pp6i/ri<ns, vi. 76 ; divi- 
sions of, vi. 81. 

Tro\iTLKbu SiKatou, why alone binding on 
man, v. 79. 

tt6<tov, how principle of <pi\ia, viii. 26. 

Powers of moral action, how far natural 
gifts, vi. 123. 

value of, consists in develop- 
ment, ix. 59. 

irpay/xareia, meaning of, ii. 13. 

npiafxucf] ns rvxn, effect of on happiness, 
i. 175. 

irpoaipecris, nature of, iii. 36, 39, 40, 41, 
76; vi. 16, 17; motive cause of ac- 
tion, vi. 16. 

and /SouAeucm, why inter- 
changed, iii. 79. 

irpoirereia, cause of anpaaia, vii. 95. 
Proportion in catallactic justice, v. 40. 
Propriety of speech, nature of, iv. 97. 
irpbs aAAois %r\v, iv. 68. 
Trpov-napxtWy meaning of, i. 199. 
Prudence, see (pp6vr)<ris. 
Punishment, object of, ii. 30. 



<paura<rla, meaning of, iii. 91 ; vii. 47 — 

73 ; sorts of, vi. 21. 
<pev«r6v, distinguished from tyenrSv and 

IxiariTov, vii. 66. 



<pOe(perai, meaning of, ii. 8. 
<pi\la, conditions of, viii. 8 ; how far a 
proof of SiKaioavvq, viii. 31, U>. 

and SiKatocruvT), relations between, 

viii. 4, 26 : bond of society, viii. 4. 

cause of different views on, viii. 5. 

(piXoTijxia, nature of, iv. 82. 

<p6fios and Qappos, means and extremes 
of, ii. 82. 

<pp6i>7}(ns, function of, vi. 115: subject- 
matter of, vi. 53 : divisions of, vi. 48, 
76 ; connection with vovs — why called 
vovs, vi. 89, sqq. 

two sorts of, vi. 136 : airb vov, 

page 151 : airb tt)s 8etv6rr)Tos, ibid. : 
requires apery, vi. 141 : connection 
with 7roAiTt/o7, vi. 76, 84 : viewed in 
its first stage, vi. 104 : rov reAovs, 
vi. 48 : rod e<rx<*o~rov, vi. 93 ; why 
equivalent to evfiovAia, vi. 115: why 
spoken of as of the means, vi. 158: 
always implies aper-f], vi. 153: all the 
virtues, vi. 156 : not merely intellec- 
tual, vi. 62, perfect, wanting in a.Kpa- 
<ria, vii. 110: how preserved by 
auxppocrvvt], vi. 57 ; how far worked 
into our natures in different stages of 
character, vii. 42; why no apery of, 
vi. 60 : how applied to animals, vi. 70 : 
questions as to use of, vi. 128 ; objec- 
tions that it is not a sufficient intellec- 
tual development, vii. 1 : and SeivSrys, 
differences between, vi. 147. 

(pp6utfxos, why called fiovAevritcds, vi. 51. 
(pvcriKy aper-f], nature of, vi. 142 ; how 

formed into Kvpia, vi. 142. 
different in different individuals, 

vi. 155. 
(pvvixbv iroAirtudv, nature and divisions 

of, v. 77, 89. 
<pvaiitoos, meaning of, vii. 40. 
<pvais, senses of, ii. 60 ; iii. 54 ; vi. 29, 



T. 



i\/enr6v, meaning of, iii. 162; distin- 
guished from fxto-qTuv and <peuKr6v, 
vii. 66. 



230 



INDEX. 



R. 

Rational sense, result of first stage of 

moral character, vi. 91. 
Reason and passion, struggle between, 

iii. 174. 
Reasoning process on acts of moral choice, 

vi. 140. 
Right reason, how far violated in aKpaaia, 

vii. 41, 45, 51. 



Sailors, why not avSpzloi, iii. 106. 
Science and moral wisdom, how useful, 

vi. 128. 
and moral habits, not equally of 

opposites, v. 3. 
Self, absence of, an ingredient in virtue, 

iv. 11. 
how far a man may injure himself, 

v. 110, 132. 
Self-love, ix. 16, sqq. 
Self-partiality, cause of aKpaaia, vii. 38. 
Semina virtutum, ii. 4. 
Sense, variable nature of objects of, 

recognised by Aristotle, ii. 110. 
Seventh Book, whether interpolated, vii. 

116. 
Slave, has no fiios, x. 65; position of, 

viii. 41. 
Slavery, Aristotle's views on, viii. 47. 
Sociable instincts, virtues of, iv. 92. 
Social relations necessary to oUaiou, v. 

79. 
Society, progress of, v. 81. 
Solon's opinion examined, i. 173, 176. 
Soul, states of, ii. 49. 
ao<pia, nature of, vi. 67. 
aocp6s, who is so, vi. 66. 
Spartan costume, iv. 110. 
Stages of moral evil, vii. 3. 
Standard of virtue, i. 223. 
State, of more importance than citizens, 

ix. 46. 
motive powers of, v. 34 ; on what it 

is said to depend, v. 56. 
Struggle between passion and reason, iii. 

174. 



av£ev£is Kara 5id/J.€Tpov, v. 58. 

Suicide, how unjust, v. 131 : why not 
avSptlos, iii. 120. 

awovdfei, meaning of, v. 41. 

awsais, meaning and function of, vi. 105. 

(rvvexvs, meaning of, ii. 61. 

awqyopriaai, meaning of, i. 207. 

avvUvai, meaning of, vi. 105. 

Syllogism, not the only channel of truth, 
vi. 32. 

atpodpSr-ns, how cause of aKpaaia, vii. 95. 

auxppoavvn, nature of, iii. 144 : process 
of action of, iii. 146. 

and avSpeia, why particular- 
ized together, ii. 22 ; iii. 145 : how 
different from other virtues, iii. 145. 

adupptav, character of, iv. 49 ; vii. 42, 86. 



T. 



to Tro\iTiKa—ol Tro\?rai, iii. 130. 

TeAetoTaTTj aperr), middle term of the 
treatise, i. 129. 

reAos, why called Zaxa-Tov, vi. 118. 

Temperance, of what the regulation, iv. I. 

Te'x^, nature of, vi. 36, 42 : process cf, 
vi. 43 : what excluded from, vi. 36. 

Texn7, ancient and modern notions about 
different, vi. 36. 

tI iari, meaning of, ii. 70. 

t'i/mov, characteristic of happiness, mean- 
ing of, i. 204. 

rb e&at, meaning of, v. 22. 

rb ri -f\v efoai, meaning of, ii. 70. 

ro?s iv apxfi, meaning of, i. 167. 

True — in what sense things are said to 
be true, vi. 25. 

Tpvcpi), nature of, vii. 11, 92. 

tvxV; meaning ot, iii. 55 ; \i. 29. 

TvxovTcav, or dinar ij men, i. 217. 

t<£ \6ya>, nominally, i. 214. 



0. 



077ptoT7js, whence arising, vii. 10 : how 

(poPepcoTaTov, vii. 84. 
Qvjxos, nature of, iii. 1 32 : distinguished 

from dpyrj, ii. 9. 



i\ di:\. 



281 



T. 



vwoKonros e£<s, meaning of, vii. 128. 



V. 

Virtue, enquiry into nature of, proposed 
by Aristotle, ii. 48. 

standard of, i. 223 : practical direc- 
tions for, ii. 93. 



Virtues, in Ilk. iv., of what the regula- 
tion, iv. 1. 



w. 

Wants, mutual, bond of commerce, v. o'7. 

Wealth, how viewed in different consti- 
tutions, viii. 10. 

Weights and measures, how different in 
different places, v. i)(J. 

Will, weakness of, for good, v. 120. 



PRINTED BY MESSRS. PARKER, CORN-MARKET, OXFORD. 



ERRATA. 

Page 25, for note 138 read 133. 

— 37, note 49, for rpid read rpia. 

— 55, note 45, for fSov\T)crls read fiovArjak. 

— 56, note 55, for aopiaros read a6piaros, 

— 68, for note 112 read 121. 

— 100, for note 55 read 53. 



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